The United States Now Wants European Strategic Autonomy

Commentary by Max Bergmann

Published November 8, 2024

The election of Donald Trump for a second term will likely initiate a transformation in transatlantic relations. The administration's agenda will mark a massive shift in U.S. post-Cold War policy toward Europe. Instead of seeking to preserve and maintain the United States' preeminent role in Europe, a Trump administration is likely to pull back and largely leave Europe to European nations.

But the Trump administration's objective should not simply be to pull back from Europe but also to do so in a way that makes Europe stronger. This goal is achievable and does not require an expensive or exhaustive diplomatic effort. However, it does entail avoiding the "divide and rule" tactics that the United States has adopted toward Europe since the end of the Cold War, as well as supporting a common European effort toward defense. That might go against much of the incoming Trump administration's DNA, but an abrupt pullback that leaves Europe in disarray is not in anyone's interests and will inevitably prompt Europe to hedge in the U.S.-China rivalry. In short, the Trump administration should want a stronger Europe, not a weaker one, and that will require some engagement on its part.

Paradigm Shift

Since the end of World War II, the United States has been Europe's security guarantor. Initially, the United States took on this role reluctantly as it sought to bring U.S. forces back to the United States and reduce its defense budget. Yet the kindling of the Cold War and the fears of Soviet military capabilities and intentions toward Western Europe prompted the United States to relent and form NATO in 1949. Yet, the United States and European signatories were not completely on the same page about NATO's purpose. All agreed NATO sought to deter Russia, but the notion that NATO was formed to keep "the Americans in" was a European, not a U.S., objective. The United States, in other words, didn't just want to stay "in" Europe, it also sought to transform Europe and strongly backed European integration efforts, including on defense.

After the end of the Cold War, the United States had to reassess NATO and future U.S. involvement in European security, and ultimately, the United States decided that it wanted to stay "in" Europe. Ever since that point, the United States has deliberately sought to maintain the privilege of its position in Europe. After all, the United States calls the shots in NATO and likely has more influence in Europe than in any other region of the world. However, the U.S. presence in Europe has reduced the incentive and pressure on Europe to invest sufficiently in its own defense capabilities. While the United States has constantly cajoled European nations to spend more, the United States has also spent the last 25 years strongly opposing EU-sponsored defense initiatives. Even when European nations do spend more on defense, as they are now currently doing, they are unable to collectively handle their own security because collective European security is a NATO (i.e., United States) responsibility. Some U.S. leaders and members of the Washington national security establishment have increasingly grown frustrated with Europe's perceived lack of contribution and, over two decades, have come to think little of Europe.

Even so, when a debate in Europe emerged over "European strategic autonomy" with the election of Donald Trump and French president Emmanuel Macron, the U.S. national security establishment reacted in strong opposition. The United States saw "strategic autonomy" as leading to a transatlantic divorce. A senior U.S. defense official quipped years ago, "I told my wife this morning that I wanted more strategic autonomy and tonight I am staying in a hotel." When the European Union proposed modest defense initiatives, Trump's Department of State and Department of Defense strongly opposed them. Despite Trump's aversion to NATO, his administration sought to ensure the United States' primacy in Europe. That continued in the Biden administration. Yet there has been a subtle and quiet shift, with the United States no longer vocally opposing European Union-led initiatives but not actively supporting them either.

Enter Trump (Again)

This brings the discussion to the election of Trump for a second term. While Trump, during his first term, tapped traditionally foreign policy hands that embraced NATO and support for the transatlantic alliance, his second term is likely to pursue a very different course. President Trump has long-standing and strongly held views of the alliance; over the past four years, more comprehensive policy discussions have emerged on how exactly to reduce the U.S. security commitment to Europe, allowing Trump's vision of the United States' role in NATO to materialize. Furthermore, the Pentagon's focus is on the "pacing challenge" of China. While many European nations are deeply concerned about the threat Russia poses to NATO, for many analysts, Russia's years of struggle in Ukraine illustrate there is not as much to be concerned about.

Trump national security officials are thus much more likely to follow through on a deliberate U.S. pullback from NATO. But what does that mean in practice? A Trump administration might withdraw U.S. forces and capabilities from Europe or refuse to commit key assets to NATO planning. It might not appoint a NATO ambassador or a new supreme allied commander. Trump might not show up at next year's summit in The Hague.

The theory of the Trump case is that a blunt, in-your-face pullback will shock Europe to get its act together. This may work. But this plan may also fail spectacularly, further fragmenting European security and creating a security vacuum that the Trump administration will be blamed for creating. While Europe may not seem to matter to modern-day national security professionals, European security has been the animating concern of U.S. foreign policy since its founding. From this perspective, the last two decades have been an aberration, and a situation where Europe is insecure will necessitate deep U.S. involvement.

From the Trump administration's perspective, there are two major downsides associated with a rift in transatlantic relations.

First, the transatlantic security relationship is a key factor in cooperation regarding China. The Biden administration recognized the importance of the EU market (which has 450 million people and an economy the size of China's) and formed the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council. The United States also twisted the arm of European nations toward adopting significant technology restrictions, which were particularly difficult for the Netherlands and the strategically important company ASML, which produces photolithography machines critical to the global semiconductor supply chain. Critical in getting Europe to go along with certain export restrictions was the fact that the United States was its security guarantee. Thus, an abrupt pullback of U.S. security commitments will lead to a major rift and make European nations much less likely to follow the United States on China policy.

Second, U.S. commercial interests will suffer. An abrupt pullback will likely lead to a major decline in U.S. arms sales to Europe, as European nations will seek to buy European arms. Additionally, the European Union is forging ahead with its "European Green Deal" and other regulatory initiatives, such as those targeting U.S. tech and social media companies that impact U.S. companies. While the United States has corresponding economic leverage vis-à-vis Europe, Trump's key advantage has previously been that the United States provides Europe's security guarantee. Remove that, and Europe will likely feel less encumbered in hitting back at U.S. industry.

Provide a Roadmap for Europe to Step Up

The Trump administration should not pull back without a corresponding strategy that aims to reorganize European security. This will not take much effort on the part of the administration, but it will take a degree of U.S. leadership to point Europe in the right direction. Restructuring European defense around Europe and not the United States is not easy and will take time.

First, the Trump administration should call on European nations to create a European pillar of NATO. European leaders have been rhetorically talking about the need to do this but have not gotten specific. Putting pressure on European leaders to follow through and develop a clear plan to form such a pillar will be vital.

Second, the Trump administration should encourage collective European spending. It is not enough for European states to spend more on defense. If European states all spent 3 percent of their GDP on defense, as Trump has called for, it is still doubtful European nations would be able to defend Europe. The problem is that European militaries are not set up to fight together without the United States. In the European Union, 27 disparate militaries are lacking the key capabilities needed to fight a war. European countries do not prioritize European defense but national defense. Europe thus needs to create a common pot of funding to address capability gaps currently filled by the United States, such as in missile defense systems and air domain enablers. It is imperative that the European Union increase the funding for its defense initiatives and focus on integrating European militaries into a fighting force that can defend Europe.

Third, the Trump administration should not only support the European Union to take on more defense initiatives but also take the European Union's efforts seriously. There are divergent perceptions amongst conservative national security analysts between outward hostility to the European Union, exemplified by Trump's former national security advisor John Bolton, and ambivalence. The Trump administration needs to realize that the European Union is a relevant geopolitical actor. It is much stronger and more durable than Washington has realized and is not going away. If anything, the bloc will become stronger and more important. The Trump administration should see the European Union doing more on defense as part of Europe getting its act together. For instance, the new incoming EU defense commissioner, Andrius Kubilius, has proposed ambitious ideas such as the European Union creating common armaments pools or helping to incentivize European states to buy the same equipment, making it easier to fight together. The Trump administration should encourage these efforts.

Without the Trump administration's call for unified European action, there is a risk that European nations may fail to organize and unite, which could exacerbate divisions within Europe. Individual European countries, especially those in Eastern Europe most concerned about their security, are likely to approach the president to "cut deals" in order to maintain U.S. engagement. Meanwhile, there may be a push from U.S. officials to oppose common European efforts, just as occurred in the first Trump administration and in past U.S. administrations. A Trump administration should reject those calls and avoid seeking bilateral deals with countries that undermine a collective European approach. Instead, a Trump administration, if intent on pulling back from NATO, should pursue this in a managed and deliberate manner, pressing Europe but also allowing time for it to strengthen its own capabilities.

A managed transition would help maintain European support and ensure stable transatlantic relations, which is an essential factor in geoeconomic competition with China. By taking this approach, Washington could enable Europe to become not only stronger but also a more capable and effective partner of the United States.

Max Bergmann is director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and Stuart Center in Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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