The Himalayas Are Heating Up. Can China and India Cool Their Climate Rivalry

• Commentary Asia
  by Jagannath Panda
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COP30 in Belém arrived at a moment when global climate diplomacy has become increasingly fractured. With the United States retreating into unilateralism and the European Union preoccupied with domestic economic pressures, the world's attention shifted to the two Asian giants, China and India. Both countries used the COP30 platform to call for equity, climate finance, and technological justice.

Yet, their public convergence masked a deeper reality: the Himalayan ecosystem that both binds and divides them is now warming at nearly twice the global average. The "Third Pole", the source of Asia's major rivers and the environmental backbone of almost two billion people, is collapsing under the weight of glacier retreat, erratic monsoons, flash floods, droughts, and unprecedented temperature spikes. In this context, the question grew unavoidable: can China and India, despite their geopolitical unfriendliness, find common ground on this critical ecological frontier? And can the result of COP30 or the UNFCCC process push them toward climate peace, or will old suspicions continue to overshadow any possibility of real environmental cooperation?

COP30 and the New Climate Geometry

In Belém, both China and India projected themselves as champions of the Global South. COP30 President André Corrêa do Lago praised India and China for their leadership in the clean-energy transition and their growing influence over global energy governance. China presented itself as a clean manufacturing powerhouse, highlighting its dominance in solar components, EV batteries, and renewable industrial supply chains. India showcased its expanding renewable footprint, now the fourth largest globally and on track to become second only to China by 2030. This twin rise positioned the two countries as indispensable to the success of the Paris Agreement. Their joint criticism of the developed world, particularly its failure to deliver the USD 300 billion per year promised at COP29, was a reminder of the structural inequalities that continue to paralyze the UNFCCC.

India emphasized climate justice and equity at COP30. New Delhi arrived with a clear outline: expanding climate finance, improving technology transfer, and insisting on a just energy transition. India reminded the world that the developed countries had backtracked significantly on financial commitments, offering only USD 300 billion of the USD 1.3 trillion demanded in previous negotiations. This shortfall, according to India, threatens not only mitigation but also adaptation, especially for countries facing acute climate vulnerabilities. India also highlighted its own progress: rapid expansion of non-fossil fuel capacity, scaling of solar parks, and increased clean-energy deployment. Yet, it did not shy away from acknowledging its dependence on coal. India remains the world's second-largest coal consumer, after China. Both countries, in fact, recorded rising coal demand in recent years, an uncomfortable truth that complicates their global green leadership aspirations.

China, too, used COP30 to present itself as a climate leader. It accused the West of imposing trade barriers, particularly the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, while also pointing to the chronic failure of developed countries to mobilize climate finance. It called on developed nations to take the forefront in cutting emissions, meet their financing commitments, and expand technical and capacity-building assistance for developing countries.

However, this diplomatic alignment slipped swiftly into deeper contradictions. For all the rhetorical solidarity, India and China remain divided by one of the world's most fragile ecological faultlines, the Tibet-Himalaya region. While they stand shoulder to shoulder in multilateral climate forums, their bilateral climate insecurity is increasingly shaped by water scarcity, data opacity, environmental degradation, and the political volatility of the Line of Actual Control.

Tibet, Water, and the Deepening Trust Deficit

Tibet, in particular, remains at the heart of discord. The plateau is home to more than 120 identified minerals, including vast deposits of copper, lithium, and rare earth elements. China's intensive extraction, combined with sprawling industrial projects, dams, and hydropower installations, has caused soil erosion, contamination of water sources, and irreversible ecological damage. India and the Himalayan community increasingly view these activities not only as environmentally catastrophic but also as strategically destabilizing, especially when combined with the militarized infrastructure buildup in the region.

Nothing symbolizes this tension more sharply than the Yarlung Zangbo or Brahmaputra River. China's construction of the world's largest hydropower project on this river has triggered alarm in New Delhi. The Indian concern is not abstract: a significant share of India's northeast depends on this river for agriculture, drinking water, and ecological stability. The larger Himalayan ecosystem is also concerned about these opaque Chinese construction activities. In early 2025, Bangladesh, which is even more vulnerable because of its low-lying terrain, officially requested more information from China. Beijing, on its part, has promised not to weaponize water flows, yet the past decade has been marked by repeated refusal or selective sharing of hydrological data, especially during moments of political tension. These disruptions have undermined India's ability to forecast floods, prepare early-warning systems, and manage river-dependent communities. Since China has already shown its readiness to wield water as a tool of influence in the Mekong basin, where its upstream dams have created serious challenges for downstream countries, some observers are now worried that South Asia could face a similar situation. Climate cooperation cannot be built on such an unstable foundation: without transparent and permanent data-sharing mechanisms, India sees China's upstream presence as a potential strategic lever, one that could be manipulated during future crises.

Inevitably, China's claims of clean-energy leadership are shadowed by its actions in Tibet. Despite Xi Jinping's narrative of "ecological civilization", China continues to expand mining operations, extract rare earths at unsustainable rates, and build mega-dams that destabilize fragile landscapes. These actions undercut the credibility of China's climate diplomacy and intensify India's as well as the larger Himalayan community's skepticism. Moreover, Beijing's export restrictions on critical minerals, many sourced from Tibetan mines, have disrupted India's EV ambitions, challenging New Delhi's efforts to scale electric mobility under its Atmanirbhar Bharat agenda.

Despite this, China and India remain structurally bound. The scale of their emissions makes cooperation unavoidable: China accounts for roughly 26% of global greenhouse gases, while India contributes about 7%. Both face climate-driven crises that transcend borders-flash floods in Himachal Pradesh, glacial lake outbursts in Sikkim, heatwaves across northern India, droughts in southwestern China, and erratic monsoon cycles destabilizing agriculture on both sides of the Himalayas. The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates indicate that four billion people will endure at least a month of severe water scarcity each year, and almost half of them are in India and China. The accelerating collapse of Himalayan glaciers demands coordinated scientific research, cross-border data-sharing, and co-investment in early warning systems. These are areas where cooperation is not optional but existential.

Can the Third Pole Become Common Ground?

There are several domains where India-China collaboration could, in principle, reshape South Asian climate security. Joint Himalayan cryosphere research would enable more accurate forecasting and create shared baselines for understanding glacial melt. Transparent hydrological cooperation, long resisted by Beijing, would reduce India's vulnerability to floods and water shocks. Shared investments in renewable manufacturing, particularly in battery storage, grid technologies, and green hydrogen, could accelerate clean-energy transitions in both countries. Even adaptation and disaster management constitute natural areas for working together, given that both countries face similar climate-induced vulnerabilities, including landslides, floods, and heat stress. Furthermore, within BRICS+, they could co-develop a parallel climate finance model less dependent on Western capital

There is some historical basis for optimism. Formally, China and India base their climate cooperation on the 2009 agreement that established both a bilateral climate partnership and a working group to coordinate positions on negotiations and policy. The 2015 Joint Statement reaffirmed this framework and highlighted its mutual benefits. Subsequent statements, such as the 2022 BRICS declaration opposing the politicization of climate issues and the 2024 BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) statement calling for stronger collective leadership, further reflect the two countries' alignment on resisting unilateral climate measures and advancing coordinated action.

Yet none of this will take root unless political mistrust is addressed. The unresolved LAC tensions, the memory of the Galwan clash, India's deep suspicion of China's activities in Tibet, and China's unease with India's growing strategic partnerships with the U.S. (no matter how much President Trump has severed India-U.S. ties) and Japan all complicate cooperation. Climate diplomacy cannot be insulated from geopolitics. At the same time, the ecological urgency of the Himalayas may force both countries to rethink the limits of their rivalry. If the Third Pole collapses, the consequences will be catastrophic for both nations (and even global climate trends), far more damaging than any tactical advantage gained from obstruction, data hoarding, or strategic posturing.

COP30 in Belem highlighted the contradictions, but also the possibilities. The climate crisis is pushing China and India into a shared ecological destiny, even if their politics resist the logic of cooperation. Moving forward, climate collaboration could become a stabilizing anchor in bilateral relations, especially as BRICS+ emerges as a new platform for climate governance. If China demonstrates genuine transparency in water data, refrains from environmentally reckless mega-projects in Tibet, and moderates its mineral extraction practices, India would find it easier to consider deeper joint work. Similarly, if India signals that climate cooperation can be pursued despite strategic competition, Beijing may be more willing to build institutional mechanisms for environmental engagement.

The Himalayan faultline will remain a zone of strategic contention. Yet the urgency of climate change may still transform it into a frontier of cooperation, if both nations choose to see ecological interdependence not as a vulnerability but as a shared responsibility. In the post-COP30 world, climate cooperation has the potential to become the central pivot of China-India engagement, shaping not only bilateral ties but also the broader trajectory of BRICS+, the Global South, and the UNFCCC process.