Sudan and Beyond: How El-Fasher’s Fall Could Worsen Regional Fragmentation

• Med this Week Africa
  by Caterina Roggero and Lucia Dall'Asta
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The MED This Week newsletter provides informed insights on the most significant developments in the MENA region, bringing together unique opinions and reliable foresight on future scenarios. Today, we shed light on Sudan's escalating civil war, as the fall of El Fasher deepens the country's fragmentation and risks fuelling regional instability.

After two years and a half of civil war, the fall of El-Fasher - the capital of Sudan's North Darfur region, besieged for eighteen months - marks a turning point in the Rapid Support Forces' (RSF) advance across Sudan. With the group now in full control of Darfur, the risk of a de facto partition of the country has grown sharply. The war pits the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, against the paramilitary RSF commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti. The conquest of El-Fasher has fuelled violence in the Darfur region with reports from the ground describing door-to-door killings, sexual violence, and the deliberate starvation of besieged communities, forcing thousands to flee. Sudan is the world's gravest humanitarian emergency: nearly 30 million people need aid, over 12 million are displaced, and at least 150,000 have been killed, with aid convoys blocked, hospitals destroyed, and hunger used as a weapon of war. This war, both in humanitarian and security terms, weighs heavily on many regional actors - from neighbouring countries struggling with the influx of refugees to others directly involved. Among them is the UAE, long accused of covertly supporting the RSF through arms shipments, funding mercenaries, and providing logistical aid. The Quad initiative's statement, presented on 12 September 2025 by the US, Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia has outlined a peace plan, yet both sides remain far from accepting a ceasefire and developments on the ground raise fears that the fighting is outpacing peace efforts. As neighbouring states reel under the weight of refugee flows, instability threatens to engulf neighbouring countries and fears of a partition of Sudan intensify as the RSF gain a stronger hold over the west of the country. What would this mean for the rivalry between the two fighting sides? How could a worsening of Sudan's crisis weigh on neighbouring countries? Can credible mediation still emerge, led by a revitalised civilian coalition? What role will the international community play - and how much leverage do regional powers such as the UAE and Egypt truly hold?

Experts from the ISPI network discuss Sudan's escalating civil war, as the fall of El Fasher deepens the country's fragmentation and risks fuelling regional instability.

Sudan's war fuels the world's largest displacement crisis, engulfing its neighbours

"Sudan is facing the world's most severe humanitarian and displacement crisis. According to the United Nations, 30 million people require humanitarian assistance - over half of the country's population. More than 20 million are food insecure, with famine declared or imminent in several areas. At least 12 million people have been displaced, including 4 million who have fled to neighbouring countries. Chad, Egypt, and South Sudan bear the greatest pressure (South Sudan alone has also seen over 800,000 returnees) alongside Libya, Ethiopia, and the Central African Republic. This mass displacement strains countries already struggling with pre-existing challenges. Limited resources, weak infrastructure, economic hardship, and health challenges add on the vulnerability of refugees and local population, as recorded in border areas of Chad and South Sudan. As such, the humanitarian pressure created by this crisis adds to the far-reaching economic and political spillovers in neighbouring countries, while remaining underreported and underfunded."

Lucia Ragazzi, Research Fellow, Africa Programme, ISPI

Hemedti's advance and the shadow of Sudan's partition

"El-Fasher was the last major SAF stronghold in an otherwise RSF-dominated Darfur. It marks both a strategic and symbolic victory for Hemedti, consolidating territorial continuity across the areas over which the parallel Tasis government - established in August - claims its authority. The recent intensification of RSF shelling around Kadugli and Dilling in South Kordofan suggests that extending territorial continuity further may now be a central objective. This increases the likelihood of a Libya-like partition, a scenario carrying severe risks for regional stability and for the Sudanese people already facing mass displacement and famine. However, despite the SAF's tactical withdrawal from El-Fasher, neither Al-Burhan nor Hemedti seem to be fully satisfied with a de facto division of the country. Both head fragmented coalitions of armed and political actors with diverging agendas and interests, and both remain convinced that they can obtain an outright military victory."

Sara De Simone, Assistant Professor, University of Trento; Associate Research Fellow, ISPI

A roadmap to peace without civilians cannot end the civil war

"General Burhan's roadmap, presented to the UN in March, calls for a Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue to be held inside the country. Yet civilian leaders linked to the 2019 transition remain subject to arrest warrants on politically motivated charges, have had their bank accounts frozen, and have been denied new passports. The 12 September Quad statement, which called for a humanitarian truce and emphasised that Sudan's future should not be controlled by the warring parties or the Muslim Brotherhood, was welcomed by anti-war, pro-democracy civilians, who should now be consulted by mediators on the design of the peace process. While armed actors are key to halting hostilities, lasting peace can only be achieved if it is driven by civilian actors who want genuine democratic transformation."

Dame Rosalind Marsden, Associate Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House

The UAE's quest for influence through Sudan's gold

"The UAE's engagement in Sudan reflects a calculated blend of economic leverage and geopolitical ambition. Central to its interests is control over Sudan's gold sector, which sustains the UAE's position as a global bullion hub and offers informal channels of influence. Abu Dhabi's reported backing of the RSF is widely interpreted as a bid to secure these supply chains and consolidate its footprint in Sudan's resource economy. Strategically, Sudan anchors the UAE's posture in the Red Sea corridor, where investments in port infrastructure serve both commercial and military objectives. This presence enables the UAE to project power, counter rivals such as Turkey and Iran, and shape a regional security order conducive to its interests - often at the expense of multilateral, African-led diplomacy."

Hubert Kinkoh, Mo Ibrahim Foundation Academy Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House

As the civil war unravels, Egypt's fears intensify

"Egypt has long been concerned about the ongoing conflict in Sudan and has supported the SAF and General Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan, as they represent the unified Sudanese state. The fall of El-Fasher to the RSF presents Egypt with a difficult dilemma, as it places Mohammed Dagalo's militia in control of all of Darfur and the Kordofan regions of Sudan. In February 2025, Dagalo announced the establishment of a parallel government that pledges to continue fighting until the collapse of the Khartoum-based administration. This points to a continuation of the struggle for control of the whole of Sudan, or at the very least, the possible secession of western and south-western Sudan from the mother country - a development that only increases Egypt's apprehensions about its strategic vulnerability. Indeed, an unstable Sudan poses a threat to Egypt's territorial integrity through unwarranted interference. Moreover, Sudan's civil war has created a major humanitarian crisis, resulting in the displacement of millions of Sudanese across international borders, including into Egypt - a country already grappling with endemic economic difficulties and social strains."

Imad K. Harb, Director of Research and Analysis, Arab Center Washington DC

Sudan's war could redraw the Horn of Africa

"The RSF' capture of El Fasher on 26 October entrenches a de facto partition of Sudan and portends further fragmentation and conflict in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region more broadly. Possible overlapping scenarios for these regions include: (1) considerable civil conflict and war for the remainder of the decade, including a potential war between Ethiopia and Eritrea; (2) further consolidation of breakaway would-be states such as Somaliland and even greater calls for self-determination in areas such as Tigray and southern Yemen; and (3) even fewer options for civilians fleeing conflict, given that they are now sometimes caught between multiple conflict zones, and face greater brutality from both state and non-state forces."

Alexander John Thurston, Associate Professor, University of Cincinnati

From El-Fasher to N'Djamena the war's expanding shadow

"The war in Sudan is undermining Chad, which faces an influx of over one million refugees into its already fragile eastern provinces. Humanitarian capacities, overstretched and further weakened by the suspension of US aid, are struggling to meet the growing needs. Rising prices, increased criminality marked by the spread of gangs and self-defence militias and escalating interethnic tensions are heightening the risk of communal clashes - particularly in Ouaddaï, between Arab and non-Arab populations. Further north, the provinces of Wadi Fira and Ennedi-East are also receiving refugees, especially since the attack on the Zam Zam camp last April. This influx is expected to grow even more now that El-Fasher has fallen to the RSF. Meanwhile, in N'Djamena, the UAE's support for the RSF from Chadian territory is dividing the ruling elite and reigniting internal rivalries around President Mahamat Déby Itno, while exposing Chad to the risk of long-term reprisals by the Sudanese army, which could, for example, seek to destabilise the regime by supporting an armed opposition."

Charles Bouëssel, Analyst, Central Africa, International Crisis Group