EU Statement – UN General Assembly 1st Committee: Other Weapons of Mass Destruction

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EU Statement - UN General Assembly 1st Committee: Other Weapons of Mass Destruction

22.10.2024 Press and information team of the Delegation to the UN in New York

22 October 2024, New York - European Union Statement at the First Committee of the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly on other Weapons of Mass Destruction

Madam Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The Candidate Countries North Macedonia^*,Montenegro^*, Albania^*, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina^*and Georgia, as well as Monaco and San Marino align themselves with this statement.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery remains a grave threat to international peace and security. Their proliferation can trigger dangerous arms races. Moreover, the risk that non-state actors, including terrorists could access WMD and their means of delivery remains a concern. In line with the EU's Strategy against the proliferation of WMD, one of the central goals of the EU's Common and Foreign Policy is to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation programmes of concern worldwide. Compliance with and enforcement of international obligations applicable to these weapons therefore remains a fundamental pillar of global effortsto defend and uphold the international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation architecture and to prevent an erosion of this landscape.

While marking the 10^th anniversary of the historic destruction of the Syrian declared chemical agent stockpile, we continue todenounce the Syrian Arab Republic's ongoing violation of its obligations as a State Party to the CWC and strongly condemn the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Air Force.To regain its rights and privileges under the Convention, Syria needs to resolve, in full cooperation with the OPCW, the pending issues with its declaration, declare the full extent of its chemical weapons programme, and fully comply with the Convention. Ending impunity and ensuring accountability are crucial to restore the integrity of the established norms. The EU supports collective efforts to ensure accountability for perpetrators of chemical attacks, including through the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons. We encourage Syria to completely destroy its stockpile in compliance with the Convention. We reiterate our call upon those States not yet party to the CWC to join the Convention without further delay.

The re-emergence of the use of chemical weapons poses a significant threat to international peace and security. Such an act by anyone - be it a State or a non‐State actor - anywhere, at any time and under any circumstances is a violation of international law and can amount to some of the most serious crimes ‐ war crimes and crimes against humanity. In recent years, the world has witnessed the horrific use of chemical weapons in Iraq, Syria, in the United Kingdom, in Russia, and in Malaysia. The European Union remains strongly concerned about a growing number of reports regarding the alleged use of riot control agents by Russia as a method of warfare at the frontlines in Ukraine. Such use is prohibited under Article I of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We are also strongly concerned about the alleged use of choking agent chloropicrin. This is not the first time that the world is alerted about the reported use of chemical weapons by Russia.We call on Russia to strictly comply with its obligations under the Convention.

The EU continues to support the OPCW politically, diplomatically and financially. We remain steadfast in defending the Organisation against deliberate and baseless attacks on its integrity and credibility. We also draw attention to the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the European Union and OPCW on 21 February 2024 in The Hague. This will enhance and strengthen collaboration in areas of common interest in accordance with the OPCW programme and the mandate of the Technical Secretariat.

We reaffirm our unequivocal support for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) as the cornerstone of international efforts to prevent biological agents and toxins from ever being developed, produced, stockpiled, or otherwise acquired and be used as weapons. We welcome the recent accessions of Tuvalu and Micronesia, which contributed to strengthening this instrument as well as the universal normagainst these types of weapons. We call on the remainingten States not party to the Convention to accede to the Convention as soon as possible. The EU is encouraged by the productive work undertaken by the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention to date, in particular in the development of respective mechanisms for international cooperation and assistance, as well as to reviewand assess scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. We also welcome the substantive discussions on all items on the agenda of the Working Group, andencourage the Working Group to continue to explore the topic of compliance and verification in greater depth, taking into account the developments in science and technology relevant to the Convention. However, the Working Group stands at critical juncture andshould completeits work as soon as possible, preferably in 2025 as urged by the 9^th Review Conference in order to not lose momentum andallow capacity-building projects to be implemented without delay.

The EU condemns Russia's disinformation campaigns, which undermine international peace and security as well aspeaceful cooperation and assistance between States Parties to the CWC and BTWC. It is unacceptable that Russia, as part of its attempts to excuse its unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine continues to make unsubstantiated and false claims against Ukraine, the United States, and others, attacking fully legitimate and peaceful capacity building programmes in the biosecurity domain. Moreover, it is unacceptable that Russia prevents the participation of observers, including civil society partners and regional and intergovernmental organisations, in the work of the BTWC to promoteits political objective andsilence diverse and critical voices. We reiterate the value of participation of observers to our work.

The EU recognises that the only existing international mechanism for investigating thealleged use of chemical and biological weapons is the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism and recalls its strong and long-standing support. We will continue to provide funding for the operationalisation of this independentmechanism.

We would like to highlight the regional EU Centres of Excellence on the mitigation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risks, which offer capacity-building assistance and support for large-scale cross-border exercises to 64 countries, with a budget of 140million EUR for 2021-2027. The EU continues to support the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative.

Madam Chair,

The EU reaffirms its full support for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East. We consider the 1995 NPT Resolution valid until its goals and objectives are achieved and strongly support the outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference on the Middle East.

UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) continues to be a central pillar of the international non-proliferation architecture and the EU supports the implementation of Resolution 1540 through its Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/574 and hopes to see its functioning further strengthened.

The EU supports efforts by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure nuclear safety and securityworldwide, including by financing the IAEA's staff presence in Ukrainian nuclear facilities in the face of Russia's illegal war of aggression. This comes in addition to other bilateral EU assistance to Ukraine in this field. This is a strong testament to the EU's commitment to the work of the IAEA to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies, which are also important in reaching Sustainable Development Goals.

After two decades of existence, the HCoC has become an important transparency and confidence-building measure and is all the more important to international security. The HCoC is the only multilateral instrument aiming at both preventing theproliferation of ballistic missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction and increasing confidence and transparency about ballistic missiles launchesand space launches of the Subscribing States. Subscribing States should continue to preserve the integrity and ensure proper implementation of the Code and act according to its non-proliferation objectives, in particular in light of the rapid increase of space launches and related programmes. The EU reaffirms its strong support for the HCoC by actively promoting its universalisation, full implementation and efficient functioning. We call on all UN Member States that have not yet done so, to subscribe to the Code.

We recall that effective and transparent export controls are important for facilitating the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information, inter alia for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as set out in Article IV of the NPT. Multilateral export control regimes, as well as national export control systems, are essential for the prevention of the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, and promote transparency, trust, and greater responsibility in transfers of dual-use goods and technologies, also in the context of conventional armaments. The EU therefore fully supports the Nuclear Suppliers Group,the Zangger Committee, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement. The EU recalls that the MTCR plays a crucial role in tackling the proliferation of delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and other unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technologies). All EU Member States should be allowed to join these regimes. The EU will also continue to support national control systems, including through EU-sponsored capacity building, which currently covers more than 40 partner States. Multilateral and national export control mechanisms and measures have recently faced unjustified criticisms, including disinformation and accusations of abuses. These accusationsare prompted by actors seeking to exploit for their own military build-up international trade and scientific cooperation, while intentionally blurring the line between civil and military technologies, and between the needs of peaceful development and their own global military ambitions. The EU is fully committed to defending and further developing export controls as universal, effective and responsive non-proliferation tools.

I thank you, Madam Chair.

*North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.