Assessing the Air Campaign After Three Weeks: Iran War By the Numbers

After Day 10, the pace settled down to 300-500 targets per day as the campaign needed to maintain a sustainable tempo. Aircraft required maintenance, and crews needed rest. Further, the rate of adding targets likely declined as the original list was exhausted. Developing new targets takes time as they need to be identified, validated to ensure the identification was correct, and developed into an attack package.

Department of Defense (DOD) officials reported that the United States and Israel together have struck over 15,000 targets by Day 14. Based on CENTCOM releases represented in Figure 1, Israeli strikes appear to account for more than half of those strikes.

Air Defense Campaign: Iranian Launches

The DOD has provided only a few updates so far on Iranian uncrewed aircraft system (UAS) and missile launches. The released data show a pronounced decline in launches after the first few days. This drop occurred as the U.S. and Israeli strike campaign actively attacked Iran's missile and drone inventories, manufacturing capacity, and launchers; the Israel Defense Forces reported 70 percent of Iran's ballistic missile launchers were disabled by Day 16. Breakdown in command and control after strikes against leadership targets may have contributed, particularly to the initial drop. Iran also may be taking a more deliberate approach to expending its diminishing inventories of munitions and putting at risk its launchers.

Four Gulf coalition partners-Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)-have released more frequent updates on Iranian launches. Most have been providing daily updates; Saudi Arabia has reported interceptions as they have occurred. In terms of metrics, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have shared the number of intercepted Iranian drones and missiles. The UAE reported detections and interceptions until March 9, then reported only detections. Kuwait has reported on both since March 6. It is unclear whether the reported interceptions reflect those carried out solely by respective militaries or if they include U.S. interceptions. Given the high levels, the latter may be more likely.

Figure 2 aggregates the four Gulf countries' reports to illustrate the general trend of Iranian launches. The data below (930 drones and 269 missiles at Day 4) represent about half of the total reported launches (more than 2,000 drones and 500 ballistic missiles at Day 4). As a point of comparison, Russian missile and drone launches have routinely reached 700 a day. Iran achieved that level for maybe the first two or three days of the war.

Figures 3 through 6 show the reporting by each of the four Gulf partners. Despite statements about wanting to avoid conflict with its Gulf Arab neighbors, Iran continues to fire missiles and drones at them. The Bahraini (Figure 3) and UAE (Figure 4) missile and drone interceptions show the initial large Iranian salvos that, as the DOD reported, have declined significantly-albeit not completely.

The Kuwaitis (Figure 5) reported a resurgence of Iranian launches on Day 15. For the Saudis (Figure 6), Iranian attacks were initially at a low level but increased after Day 7. Not surprisingly, Saudi Arabia has threatened Iran that it will strike back if attacks continue. The UAE, which has faced the greatest share of Iranian attacks so far, reportedly considers doing the same.

The direction and focus of Iran's strike campaign remain unclear. Although the data is incomplete, updates from Saudi Arabia-which have included the general location where interceptions took place-provide partial insights into Iranian targeting practice. In the past three weeks, nearly 70 percent of Saudi-reported intercepted drones and missiles were on course for the oil-rich Eastern Province or specific oil facilities. Targets included the Shaybah Oil Field near the de facto Saudi-UAE border and the Samref refinery on the Red Sea coast.

The Saudi reports suggest that Iranian strikes may be increasingly focusing on Gulf states' economic foundations and civilian infrastructure-not solely on U.S. regional military presence. Figure 7 breaks down the Saudi-reported targets of Iranian drone and missile launches.

Air Defense Campaign: Interceptions

Drones and missiles that have made past defenses have caused widely-reported damages and disruptions. Based on reports from two Gulf states, the overall interception rate appears high. Table 2 shows these reported numbers from the UAE and Kuwait, where most Iranian projectiles are being shot down. Although not independently verified by the United States, these rates are consistent with Ukrainian interception rates when Ukraine has an adequate inventory of air defense systems.

Both the United States and the Gulf states use Patriot missiles to intercept Iranian ballistic and cruise missiles. They are generally not used against Iranian UASs. Instead, the Gulf states use helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and ground-based short-range defenses. The United States also has systems like the Coyote, Roadrunner, and the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) specifically designed to intercept drones.

The Gulf states' inventories of interceptors are reportedly running low. The recently announced arms sales will replenish inventories postwar. However, if the Gulf states need resupply before then, the munitions will need to come out of existing U.S. stocks. That would trigger a major policy debate.