CSIS - Center for Strategic and International Studies Inc.

07/15/2025 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 07/15/2025 14:42

Trump Sends Weapons to Ukraine: By the Numbers

Trump Sends Weapons to Ukraine: By the Numbers

Photo: Andrew Harnik/Getty Images

Critical Questions by Mark F. Cancian and Chris H. Park

Published July 15, 2025

Remote Visualization

Under the Trump administration, military aid to Ukraine has been on and off, then partially on, then on again, and then increased further. As of Tuesday, July 15, this pattern characterized the administration's approach to Ukraine policy.

The resumption of aid on July 7 was good news for Ukraine, and yesterday's announcement of a U.S.-NATO agreement for additional weapons is even better. These changes take place amid intensified drone and missile strikes on Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure, while the Russian summer ground offensive advanced, albeit slowly and at high human and material costs.

Yet, much is unknown about the new policy, and the details will affect the speed of weapons delivery, the effectiveness of the deliveries, and the policy's political acceptability. Further, the concerns that prompted the second aid pause-dwindling U.S. stockpiles and competing military needs-remain.

These Critical Questions lay out the status of the program and its future in six graphs and a table.

Q1: What was the state of military aid to Ukraine when the Trump administration took office?

A1: Before leaving office, the Biden administration had made announcements covering all the available funding for military aid. That aid came in three ways: Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA, $34 billion), which draws down weapons from existing U.S. inventories; Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI, $33 billion) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS, $1 billion), whereby the United States provides funds to Ukraine, and Ukraine contracts with U.S. defense industry for production of weapons. Figure 1 shows the history of these announcements.

Image

Mark F. Cancian

Senior Adviser, Defense and Security Department
Image

Chris H. Park

Research Associate, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy

Programs & Projects

  • Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
  • Defense and Security
Remote Visualization

[Link]

Q2: If the Biden administration had used all the money, what was the Trump administration shutting off?

A2: Although the Biden administration committed all the money that Congress had appropriated for military equipment, around $29 billion of that equipment had not been delivered. This occurred because of the delay between announcing an aid package and its delivery to Ukraine; that delay varies according to the delivery mechanism.

PDA weapons arrive quickly, generally within six months of the announcement. As Figure 2 shows, virtually all drawdowns authorized by the Biden administration have been delivered. But the Department of Defense (DOD) does not publicize deliveries, so these are estimates.

Remote Visualization

[Link]

FMS and USAI take several years to deliver weapons because the weapons must be manufactured. CSIS estimates four months to put the weapons on contract, two years for delivery of the first item, and another 18 months until delivery of the last item-42 months in all.

Several major weapon systems were contracted in 2022 and 2023 and are now being delivered. Figure 3 estimates deliveries of newly manufactured major weapons systems based on the Biden administration's periodic updates on new contracts and CSIS calculations of delivery timelines.The deliveries of these newly manufactured weapons will continue until 2028.

Remote Visualization

[Link]

Figure 4 gives a sense of the status of military aid funding overall. Some of the appropriated funds have not yet been obligated. That means that there is no signed contract. Some has been obligated but not yet dispersed. That means that there is a signed contract, but the work has not yet been done. "Dispersed" means that the work has been done, the contractor has been paid, and the equipment has likely been delivered. The bottom line: A lot of military aid is still in the pipeline.

Remote Visualization

[Link]

Q3: What has been the history of aid flow under the Trump administration?

A3: The table below lays out the Trump administration's actions since taking office in January.

Remote Visualization

Q4: What aid did the DOD pause on July 1, and why?

A4: Although the specific items paused were not released publicly, they apparently included a Patriot, other air defense systems, and ammunition. For most items, the pause was likely a reordering of deliveries from the factories, with the United States going to the head of the line and Ukraine being pushed back. Ukraine would get its equipment eventually, but the delay might be years.

The White House Deputy Press Secretary Anna Kelly stated that the administration made the cutoff decision "following a review of our nation's military support and assistance to other countries across the globe." Reportedly, Elbridge Colby, the undersecretary of defense for policy, drove the pause. Colby has long argued that the Russia-Ukraine War is a distraction from the primary competition with China and that aid to Ukraine diverts limited resources desperately needed to counter the Chinese military threat. In this, other "Pacific prioritizers" have joined Colby.

Importantly, the administration no longer argues that aid is being abused and that Ukraine is corrupt. The extensive auditing has apparently put those concerns to rest. Instead, the administration makes a strategic argument.

Q5: What is the Trump administration doing under the new policy?

A5: The administration is doing three things.

First, it is giving Russia a 50-day deadline to reach a peace deal with Ukraine or risk "very serious tariffs" on Russia and "secondary tariffs" on countries doing business with Russia.

Second, the administration appears to continue delivering military equipment promised to Ukraine under the Biden administration. That's important news because that stream of equipment is larger than anything that might count out of this U.S.-NATO deal.

Third, Trump and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced a new delivery mechanism for sending weapons to Ukraine. Here is what the president said at a July 14 press event: "We are going to make top of the line weapons and that will be sent to NATO. NATO may choose to have certain of them sent to other countries where we could get a little additional speed where the country will release something. It will be mostly in the form of a replacement." Rutte added, "this is only the first wave and there will be more. What we will do is work through the NATO system to make sure we know what Ukraine needs so we can make packages."

The deal with NATO appears to be a new drawdown mechanism where

  • NATO member states will immediately start sending weapons from their stockpiles to Ukraine.
  • The United States will backfill them with new weapons, paid for by NATO countries and produced in the future.
  • These drawdowns will come in periodic packages and be shaped by Ukraine's evolving needs, European weapons availability, and U.S. inventory requirements.

Although the deal could include orders for new equipment that would go directly to Ukraine, that process will take up to 42 months, as described earlier. The United States may allow weapons for Europe to go to the front of the production line, so equipment intended for Ukraine is delivered relatively quickly.

Although President Trump talked about NATO purchasing the weapons, the packages will likely be coordinated through NATO, but the purchases will be done bilaterally. Funneling the program through NATO's bureaucracy would slow it down at a time when Secretary General Rutte repeatedly emphasized speed.

There were reports last week that the United States might draw down its own equipment, with Europe purchasing the replacements. That might be consistent with the general principle of Europe paying for Ukraine's military aid, and the United States has amassed some munitions and equipment that came off the assembly lines in the last few months. However, it would be unpopular with officials like Colby, who would point out that further drawdowns weaken the United States.

The sizes of the first (and upcoming) drawdown packages also remain unclear. President Trump talked about "billions of dollars," but gave no timeline. Some equipment appears ready to move quickly, but it will take weeks for each package to be agreed on by all three parties and then assembled.

Also unknown is where the European funds will come from. There has been speculation about using frozen Russian funds. Europe has used $1.5 billion in interest from these assets to provide military support to Ukraine. There have been proposals to tap into the assets' principal, but this is not policy. Funds could also come from the defense loan mechanism recently established by the European Union.

The deal with NATO meets one of the White House's concerns, that support for Ukraine has been too costly to U.S. taxpayers. Pacific-oriented strategists may be satisfied with the stipulation that the U.S. needs will be considered. However, the DOD's reluctance to lift the pause is evident in its terse announcement, saying that it was done "at President Trump's direction" and that the DOD would continue its evaluation "of military shipments across the globe."

Under the deal with NATO, the politics and financial realities of U.S. military aid have changed. NATO countries would dip into their stockpiles and later replace them with newly produced equipment by the U.S. defense industrial base. The materiel realities, however, have not changed. The deal does not meaningfully alter how fast weapons can be drawn down, manufactured, or reach Ukraine. New drawdowns under the NATO deal will quickly reach Ukraine over the next few months, while the $29 billion worth of weapons in the pipeline authorized by the Biden administration will be delivered over the next three years.

Q6: What will be the effect of Trump's aid announcement?

A6: The major effect is intended to be political, forcing Russia to participate in ceasefire negotiations. The Trump administration has not adopted the Biden administration's policy of helping Ukraine win the war.

Militarily, the administration's latest announcement gives a moderate but useful "bump" to weapons delivery for the next six months, as Figure 5 shows.

Remote Visualization

[Link]

Figure 6 provides a clearer view of the "bump." It shows that deliveries from just drawdowns will likely continue until the end of the year and beyond, instead of ending this month. (Note: Figure 5 includes drawdown, PDA, and new procurement, USAI and FMS.) Based on past drawdown announcements and the cost of some of the systems discussed, CSIS estimates announcements of equipment packages of several $100 million every few weeks.

Remote Visualization

[Link]

Included in the bump, according to Trump, is "everything; it's Patriots, it's all of them-it's a full complement." Rutte listed air defense systems, missiles, and ammunition.

There has been a lot of focus on high-end capabilities, especially the Patriot. The Patriot is indeed an important capability designed to defend against Russian ballistic and cruise missiles, but only about 5 percent of attacking aerial munitions are in those categories. Most of the attacks come from low-technology suicide drones. For these, Ukraine needs a wide variety of air defense systems, which will likely be in the aid packages.

Although Ukraine's greatest need is air defense, the packages will also include weapons, munitions, and supplies across the board since armies in combat consume these at a high rate. Indeed, these will likely comprise the bulk of the deliveries.

Q7: What will happen next with military aid to Ukraine?

A7: The situation is unstable. This deal puts pressure on Russia while addressing the president's priority for increased allied contributions to Ukraine's defense, but three unresolved issues will continue to vex the administration.

First, no serious negotiations are going on to end the war. This aid and tariff announcement is part of President Trump's effort to press both sides to come to the table, but thus far, Russia has refused to participate in serious negotiations. They believe they are winning the war.

Second, the administration is still undecided about what to do in Ukraine, with key officials holding vastly different views on U.S. defense policy. The decisions to pause Ukraine aid were the latest example of an unsettled foreign policy in an administration that tries to balance a desire to stay out of foreign conflicts, confront China in the Western Pacific, and continue some level of superpower activities in the rest of the world.

Finally, President Trump claims that "Biden emptied out our whole country, giving them weapons, and we have to make sure we have enough for ourselves." Although that is an exaggeration, the United States does face the problem of "empty bins," as our CSIS colleague Seth Jones has discussed, but not just because of Ukraine. Crises around the world-to include the ongoing War in the Middle East and instability across the Taiwan Strait-have stretched U.S. resources. For example, the U.S. Navy fired as many missiles in 15 months as it had in the previous 30 years while defending itself and Israel against Houthi missiles and drones.

With time, the accelerated procurements that the Biden administration put in place and that the Trump administration is continuing will refill the "empty bins," but events will likely bring about another crisis before that happens.

Mark F. Cancian (colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, ret.) is a senior adviser with the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Chris H. Park is a research associate for the Arleigh A. Burke Chair at CSIS.

Critical Questions is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2025 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

Tags

Europe, Russia and Eurasia, Defense and Security, Geopolitics and International Security, Ukraine War, Missile Defense, and Strategic Capital
CSIS - Center for Strategic and International Studies Inc. published this content on July 15, 2025, and is solely responsible for the information contained herein. Distributed via Public Technologies (PUBT), unedited and unaltered, on July 15, 2025 at 20:42 UTC. If you believe the information included in the content is inaccurate or outdated and requires editing or removal, please contact us at support@pubt.io