Why the Saudi-UAE Rivarly Is a Strategic Dilemma for Russia

• Commentary Middle East and North Africa · Russia, Caucasus and Central Asia
  by Boris Sharov
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The end of 2025 and the beginning of 2026 have been characterized by an escalation of tensions between two Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members - Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Despite their long history of cooperation, both states have accumulated multiple disagreements related to the political and economic position in the region. The rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE has already provoked discussions in the US and European expert communities on the development of the approach toward the Saudi-UAE rivalry. However, the West is not the only side that faces a strategic dilemma in this situation. Another great power that has interests in the Persian Gulf appears to be between the two fires - Russia.

The Saudi-UAE alignment

The Saudi-UAE alignment was an example of Stephen Walt's balance of threat theory: both states have cooperated to resist Iranian interventions in the Middle East. During the Arab Spring, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi prevented the revolution in Bahrain, supported the anti-Assad groups in Syria and collaborated in the operation Decisive Storm against the Houthis, Iranian allies in Yemen. Finally, both states have convinced Donald Trump to withdraw from the JCPOA during his first term. Balancing the threat of Iran and its regional allies, as well as the Qatar crisis in the Gulf, has forced Saudi Arabia and the UAE to collaborate in previous years, but the normalization with Qatar in 2021 and the gradual weakening of Iran's Axis of Resistance after the start of the Gaza War in 2023 have shifted the priorities in both countries.

Abu Dhabi and Riyadh have different opinions on the security partnership with Israel: the first is actively developing ties with Israel, while the latter opposes any normalization without solving the Palestinian question. Another serious matter for the Arabian Peninsula's security is the conflict in Yemen: the Kingdom is relying on the country's unity under the central government, while the Emirates are supporting the separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC), which controlled Southern Yemen before the Yemeni government's counteroffensive in January 2026. Another clash between Riyadh's and Abu Dhabi's allies is in Sudan: the first is supporting the government in Khartoum, while the latter is supporting the insurgent Rapid Support Forces (RSF) that fight against the government. Finally, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi's rivalry touches on the economy as well: Saudi Project HQ, aiming to become the major hub for multinational companies, is challenging the current hub status of the UAE.

Russia's balancing act in the Gulf

Despite Russia's past support of the toppled Assad regime in Syria and its alignment with Iran, Moscow has developed closer ties with Riyadh during the previous decade. Iran and Saudi Arabia have been the major rivals for regional preponderance in the Middle East for decades, so Russia has elaborated a complex diplomatic strategy to establish positive relations with the Kingdom without ceding its alignment with the Islamic Republic.

An achievement of this diplomtic strategy was King Salman's visit to Moscow in October 2016 and the OPEC members and non-OPEC oil producers (the OPEC+) deal of November 2016 to cut the oil production. This led to an increase in oil prices to the significant benefit of Moscow and Riyadh. Despite a temporary setback in March 2020 in the form of the "oil price war", both countries preserved their cooperation even after the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine in 2022. Riyadh declined the calls of the US, the UK and the EU leaders to drop the oil prices to undermine Russia's economy and its ability to continue the war in Ukraine. Furthermore, Moscow and Riyadh continued developing commercial ties in sectors such as arms, agriculture, oil trade, tourism and others.

Russia's relationship with the UAE is another example of the Kremlin's diplomatic efforts in the preservation of alignment with Tehran, while developing close ties with Iran's opponents in the Middle East. It was the UAE that, among the Gulf monarchies, first decided to normalize relationships with Damascus, reopening its embassy in 2018. After the start of the war in Ukraine, the UAE became one of the major hubs for Russia's expats, getting a slang name of Dubaisk (imitating the name of Russian cities with -sk) that signifies that Dubai became a "Russian city" due to the large Russian community. Moreover, the UAE became the most prominent trade partner of Russia in the Arab world, exceeding $12 billion in 2025, and remains the main hub for companies that assist Russia in bypassing Western sanctions. Like Riyadh, Abu Dhabi has also declined the US and its allies' calls to drop the oil prices in 2022.

Moscow's diplomacy has worked hard to establish good relationships with both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Despite the current state of the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE not reaching the same enmity as the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry, it has the potential of turning into a zero-sum game that could force Moscow to choose the way of behavior that will inevitably support one side against another. The zero-sum game nature has become already visible in the security and economic aspects of the rivalry. In terms of security, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are supporting conflicting parties in Yemen and Sudan. The economic side of the rivalry touches on the competition for being a hub for multinational corporations and existing disagreements in the OPEC+.

The OPEC+ case has attracted significant attention due to the possibility of the Riyadh-Abu Dhabi rivalry undermining the agreements among the petroleum-exporting countries. Previously, in 2021, Saudi Arabia and the UAE had episodes of discord when the latter tried to pursue a more independent oil policy from the former, which is considered a traditional leader of OPEC. Moreover, in 2023, there were rumors about the UAE's plans to quit OPEC, which were swiftly denied on the official level. For Russia, the informal leader of non-OPEC producers in the OPEC+ forum, the possibility of undermining the OPEC+ unity is a significant threat to its economy that faces the enormous costs of the aggression against Ukraine.

A new testing ground for Russian diplomacy

During the last decade, Russia has demonstrated its ability to successfully maneuver in regional rivalries, such as Iran-Israel and Iran-Saudi Arabia in Syria and Yemen. The Saudi-UAE rivalry is becoming a new testing ground for Russian diplomacy in the Middle East. The challenge is twofold: first, Moscow must find an approach toward their conflicting interests in Sudan and Yemen. Russia's maneuvers between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Syria and Yemen could become a model for this approach. The economic aspect of this rivalry is more challenging. Although Russia earlier succeeded in mediating the Iran-Saudi Arabia conflict in OPEC in 2016, the Saudi-UAE rivalry could aggravate existing tensions, since Iran also strived to boost its oil production.

The Saudi-UAE rivalry is a challenge to the diplomats in Moscow, Beijing, Washington and Brussels that should develop a specific approach that would preserve positive relationships with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. The side that will succeed in elaborating a more sophisticated strategy will have the opportunity to strengthen its influence in the Persian Gulf, ahead of its counterparts in other global capitals.