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03/06/2026 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 03/06/2026 17:33
No One, Not Even Beijing, Is Getting Through the Strait of Hormuz
No One, Not Even Beijing, Is Getting Through the Strait of Hormuz
Photo: Gallo Images/Orbital Horizon/Copernicus Sentinel Data 2025
Commentary by Harrison Prétat, Monica Sato, Aidan Powers-Riggs, and Matthew P. Funaiole
Published March 6, 2026
Since the United States and Israel launched an attack on Iran a week ago, maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has come to a virtual standstill. The resulting trade disruptions will be felt globally, but China's outsized reliance on energy imports from the region and its position as one of Iran's few remaining international partners makes its response to the crisis especially consequential.
Despite Beijing's calls to keep the strait open to international trade, ship-tracking data shows that Chinese tanker and container ships have all but ceased transits since the conflict began, leaving dozens of Chinese ships trapped in the Persian Gulf. This data underscores China's limited ability to shape the course of the conflict, even to protect its own strategic and commercial interests.
Traffic Stops
Quickly after the initial round of air strikes, which killed Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other senior political and military officials, the country's remaining leadership announced that its retaliation would include strikes on regional energy infrastructure and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. On March 2, a senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) adviser declared that any vessel attempting to pass through the strait would be attacked. Within 24 hours, at least five commercial ships operating in nearby waters were targeted with drones or missiles.
Traffic estimates based on ship-tracking data indicate that Iran has so far been largely successful in shutting down traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Automatic identification system (AIS) data from Starboard Maritime Intelligence shows that the strait was averaging more than 153 vessel transits per day in the weeks leading up to the conflict, with container ships and oil tankers together making up roughly 88 percent of traffic. But since March 1, only 78 vessels have been detected passing through the strait, for a daily average of 13.
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Vice President, iDeas Lab, Andreas C. Dracopoulos Chair in Innovation and Senior Fellow, China Power Project
Remote Visualization
Transits have quickly dropped off as the conflict has escalated. On February 28, the day of the initial strikes on Tehran, 105 ships transited the strait-approximately 68 percent of its typical volume compared to prior weeks. By March 2, total traffic fell to a mere 13 transits (8 percent of normal volume), with only a single oil tanker observed transiting.
No Exception for China
The Strait of Hormuz's closure has wide-reaching consequences for energy markets and for states reliant on exports from the region, but one customer of particular interest is China, which imports as much as 40 percent of its oil and 30 percent of its liquid natural gas (LNG) through the strait. Beijing has publicly urged all parties in the war to keep the strait open to avoid disrupting international trade.
Early unverified accounts had suggested that Chinese-flagged or -owned vessels might enjoy privileged access through the strait, owing to Beijing and Tehran's increasing diplomatic alignment. Such an agreement would have precedent: In 2024, the Houthis, an Iran-backed rebel group, reportedly agreed to avoid targeting Chinese merchant vessels during its campaign against commercial shipping in the Red Sea. However, data thus far suggests that Chinese vessels have not yet received similar assurances in this conflict.
Remote Visualization
Between February 23 and 28, AIS data shows that more than 49 Chinese- and Hong Kong-flagged vessels transited the Strait of Hormuz. But since March 1, just two Chinese-flagged ships have been observed transiting the strait.
Remote Visualization
Bulk cargo carrier Jin Hai Wo managed to pass through midday on March 1, while another container ship, Run Chen 2, appears to have made a midnight run through the strait with its AIS transponder turned off. Its signal went dark at 9:30 pm local time on March 1 near the western mouth of the strait before reappearing in the Gulf of Oman at 4:20 am the next morning.
Remote Visualization
The closure has also left Chinese ships stuck on both sides of the strait. Outside, cargo carriers like the Xin Hai Kou that were heading toward the strait are now idling in the Gulf of Oman.
Remote Visualization
Inside, 55 Chinese-flagged ships remain trapped in the Persian Gulf.
Remote Visualization
Curiously, while almost all China-flagged vessels have chosen not to attempt transit, a Marshall Islands-flagged cargo ship named Iron Maiden invoked Chinese identity in an apparent effort to get through the strait unscathed. In an incident reported by Bloomberg, the ship changed its AIS destination to read "CHINA OWNER" just before it passed through the strait in the early morning of March 5.
Friends Like These
These developments showcase a divergence in strategic priorities between China and Iran, with Beijing's calls to keep traffic flowing through the strait running directly counter to Tehran's declared aims of shutting down energy exports from the region. It should come as no surprise that, given the existential threat they face, Iran's leaders are putting the regime's survival above Beijing's desires for global energy stability.
Still, it is possible that Iranian officials could consider quietly granting Chinese ships a green light to continue operating through the strait, particularly if the conflict drags on for weeks or months. Such assurances could even be used as a bargaining chip to encourage China to take more concrete action to support the Iranian regime. Reporting by Reuters on March 5 suggests that talks between Iranian and Chinese officials on an arrangement to allow tankers safe passage through the strait are actively underway.
Yet, even if with such assurances in hand, Chinese operators would be bold to risk transiting an active warzone, especially given the Iranian military's targeting of energy hubs in the strait, such as the United Arab Emirates' port of Fujairah and Oman's Duqm port. Skyrocketing insurance premiums for shippers also heavily discourage taking such risks, with most insurers canceling war risk coverage altogether.
Ultimately, while Beijing and Tehran may be strategically aligned on certain issues, it would seem difficult for that concord to translate into better access to the Persian Gulf for Chinese ships as long as strikes continue in the region surrounding the Strait of Hormuz. If the intensity of operations falls in the coming days or weeks, however, it could create a more hospitable environment for such an arrangement.
Looking Ahead
The Strait of Hormuz's closure has global implications. As a critical chokepoint for the world's oil and LNG, a sustained halt on maritime traffic through the strait would strain global supply chains and put pressure on energy prices. Major Asian economies such as China, India, Japan, and South Korea could be especially affected, as over 80 percent of oil and LNG transiting the strait is bound for Asia.
While China is by far the largest single destination for these energy flows, it may be better positioned than its neighbors to weather short-term price shocks. China has stockpiled significant amounts of crude oil over the past year, and it has room to substitute Middle Eastern oil with alternative energy sources such as LNG and coal to insulate its economy.
Still, China is far from immune from mounting costs of critical trade disruptions rippling through the global economy. On March 5, Beijing directed its oil refiners to halt fuel exports, in a sign of growing unease. If the conflict drags on for weeks or months (as President Trump has indicated it could) and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz remains blocked, China may begin putting more active pressure on all actors involved to bring hostilities to a close.
Harrison Prétat is deputy director and fellow with the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Monica Michiko Sato is a research associate for the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) at CSIS. Aidan Powers-Riggs is an associate fellow for China Studies with the iDeas Lab at CSIS. Matthew P. Funaiole is vice president of the iDeas Lab, Andreas C. Dracopoulos Chair in Innovation, and senior fellow in the China Power Project at CSIS.
Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
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