From Fraud to the Frontlines: Scam Centers Caught in the Cambodia-Thailand Conflict

Critical Questions by Julia Dickson and Japhet Quitzon

Published January 15, 2026

In July 2025, a long-standing border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand escalated into direct armed confrontation. The fighting lasted five days and ended in a fragile ceasefire brokered by Malaysia and the United States. But that truce was short-lived. On December 7, the fighting resumed, with both governments accusing the other of provoking renewed clashes. A second ceasefire, signed on December 27, is already on shaky ground.

What distinguishes this latest phase of the conflict is the choice of targets. Thailand bombed several Cambodian casino and hotel complexes that it claims functioned as scam centers-repurposed casinos and hotels, often in remote border regions, where trafficked laborers are forced to defraud victims around the world, generating billions of dollars annually for transnational organized crime groups. Thai officials alleged these sites were also being used by the Cambodian military. While the military use of these sites remains contested, their targeting highlights the intersection of two seemingly distinct regional problems: a border dispute and the proliferation of scam centers.

Q1: What roles do Cambodia and Thailand play in scam center operations?

A1: Cambodia has emerged as a central hub of this illicit economy. The country hosts more than 50 scam centers, and the revenue from these operations exceeds $12.5 billion annually, roughly half the country's formal GDP. According to the 2025 U.S. Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, senior Cambodian government officials and business elites are reportedly involved in and benefit from scam operations, helping explain their continued proliferation despite growing international scrutiny. For instance, Chen Zhi-a Chinese-Cambodian national who the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned for "[operating] a transnational criminal empire through online investment scams"-served as an adviser to both current Prime Minister Hun Manet and former-Prime Minister Hun Sen, as well as other senior Cambodian government figures.

Thailand plays a different role, serving as a major transit hub for human trafficking victims recruited to scam centers. Recruiters lure victims from around the world with fraudulent job postings, fly them to Thailand, then smuggle them across international borders to scam compounds often in Cambodia or Myanmar. According to the 2025 U.S. TIP Report, corrupt Thai immigration and law enforcement officials facilitate this trafficking by accepting bribes at borders and international airports, transporting victims across borders, and bypassing visa and other documentation controls.

At the same time, scam centers are costly to Thailand, both financially and reputationally. In 2024, Thai citizens were defrauded out of an estimated $17.2 billion, equivalent to 3.4 percent of the country's GDP. Beyond the economic impact, the perception that Thailand tolerates or is complicit in scam activity threatens to damage the country's international reputation. This reputational harm has already weakened the country's tourism sector. Chinese tourist arrivals to Thailand, one of the largest tourism markets, for example, fell 30 percent between January and September 2025. Heightened concerns about human trafficking and scams drove the decline, intensifying after a Chinese actor was trafficked through Thailand to a scam center in Myanmar in January 2025.

In response to these growing financial and reputational costs, Bangkok has faced mounting pressure, both domestically and internationally, to take action against scam centers. With one of the most effective and well-funded armed forces in the region, it is conceptually well-positioned to respond. Direct military action, however, may not be the most effective or sustainable path forward, and the government has historically employed non-kinetic measures such as cutting off power, water, and internet to scam centers along its border with Myanmar and seizing assets tied to transnational organized crime groups.

Q2: Which scam centers did Thailand target, and what factors motivated Thailand's decision to carry out these operations?

A2: The Thai military targeted at least six casino and hotel complexes that are known to be associated with scam activity. Among them was the O'Smach Resort, which Thai forces shelled, killing a security guard and wounding at least five others, including Chinese and Myanmar nationals. Notably, in September 2024, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned the O'Smach Resort and its owner, Ly Yong Phat, for "their role in serious human rights abuse related to the treatment of trafficked workers subjected to forced labor in online scam centers." Thai forces also reported strikes on the Royal Hill Resort, which the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime recognized as a scam center in May 2025, and a hotel and casino compound in Cambodia's Pursat Province, which the U.S. government linked to virtual currency scams in September 2025.

The Thai military noted that it targeted these compounds because it believed the Cambodian military was using them for drone launches, troop deployments, and weapons depots, making them military targets. For its part, the Cambodian Information Ministry responded to the attacks, claiming the complexes housed only hotels and casinos, which were not used for either scam or military purposes. However, independent confirmation of either story is lacking.

Some analysts note military use of scam centers is plausible, as scam compounds often represent the most substantial infrastructure along otherwise less developed border areas. Further, the same political connections that shield scam center operations from prosecution may also compel scam compound owners to comply with Cambodian state demands, including military use of their facilities. However, public reporting has not independently verified use by Cambodia's armed forces.

Thai military statements have also framed the strikes as a "war against the Scam Army." Such framing may be a way for the Thai government to show that it is acting against scam centers, reassuring both domestic and international audiences that the government is taking decisive action. At the same time, this narrative helps deflect criticism of official complicity or inaction against scam networks while advancing domestic political objectives, legitimizing its actions abroad.

Domestically, the campaign against scam centers serves clear political objectives. The Bhumjaithai Party, led by Prime Minister Anutin Chanvirakul, may try to capitalize on rising nationalist sentiment to boost its popularity ahead of the upcoming February snap elections. The conservative, military establishment in Thailand, with Anutin's Bhumjaithai Party as its key organizer, views the scam centers and border conflict as a means to help anchor Anutin's image as a strong leader, thereby securing political gains and limiting the influence of reformist parties like the People's Party.

Internationally, targeting scam centers allows Bangkok to assert moral leverage over Cambodia by portraying the country as an untrustworthy neighbor while framing Thai operations as a defense of national sovereignty. During the recent border skirmishes, Thai media and online discourse have villainized Cambodia as "Scambodia," linking scam activity to the ruling Hun family. This narrative recasts Thailand's kinetic strikes as a moral and security struggle, not just a territorial dispute, helping justify Thailand's actions to an international audience and amplify pressure on Phnom Penh.

Q3: What concerns arise from Thailand's strategy of targeting scam centers?

A3: Targeting scam centers raises serious humanitarian concerns due to the presence of trafficked victims within these facilities. An estimated 150,00 people have been trafficked and are being held in scam compounds across Cambodia. Eyewitness accounts from the bombing in O'Smach, for example, report that "foreign workers were not allowed to leave" during the strikes and were even forced to continue working as explosions landed close enough to shake their building. Following the strikes, foreign trafficking victims joined crowds moving through the town of O'Smach toward Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital. Videos circulating on social media reportedly show hundreds of people fleeing scam centers near O'Smach and walking along roads carrying their belongings.

Q4: What are the prospects for long-term peace and efforts to combat scam centers, given the intersection of border disputes and transnational organized crime?

A4: The two countries agreed to a shaky ceasefire on December 27, ending almost three weeks of border clashes. Two days later, the two countries' foreign ministers met and committed to taking stronger measures to combat transnational crimes, including scams. Despite these agreements, however, the prospects for long-term peace and robust action against scam centers remain uncertain. The tenuous peace has already been tested by accusations from both sides alleging ceasefire violations.

Further, given the strong nationalistic sentiment on both sides, it is unlikely that either government can disengage from the conflict entirely without losing face. In Thailand, the Anutin administration adopted an aggressive military posture during the December clashes, a stance believed to be an effort to harness nationalist public sentiment and boost domestic support ahead of the upcoming February elections.

In Cambodia, meanwhile, the Hun family may not have sufficient incentive to decouple from family connections that benefit from these scam centers. This calculus, however, may be changing under growing international pressure. On January 6, Cambodia arrested Chen Zi, a Chinese-Cambodian billionaire who allegedly built and operated at least 10 scam centers in Cambodia, and extradited him to China. Cambodia also suspended the operations of Prince Bank, a subsidiary of Chen's Prince Group, and extradited two other Chinese nationals. As Chen had close ties to the Hun family, his extradition may signal recognition within the ruling elite that it must distance itself from scam centers amid international scrutiny and escalating tensions with Thailand.

Experts warn, however, that Cambodia's scam industry is highly resilient and such enforcement actions could push scam operators to relocate elsewhere. The transnational organized crime groups behind scam centers are sophisticated and capable of rapidly relocating or setting up new scam centers elsewhere. For example, scam networks previously moved their compounds from Myanmar to Cambodia to evade law enforcement crackdowns, and scam centers have since appeared in countries such as Timor-Leste and Peru. As a result, destroying physical buildings and targeting a very limited number of criminals is unlikely to have a meaningful or lasting impact on the broader scam problem.

Finally, the disputed border regions themselves present additional challenges. Government presence is weakest in these areas, creating environments ripe for transnational criminal activity. The turmoil unleashed by the clashes risks deepening discord in places already experiencing weak pull from their governments. In such environments, enforcement of any initiatives would require significant buy-in from both sides and earnest government efforts. But the cross-border collaboration required for success is likely not yet possible given the fraught bilateral Thailand-Cambodia relationship. Addressing scam centers and border integrity is therefore intertwined, necessitating frank and sustained bilateral dialogue to solve this two-part problem.

Julia Dickson is an associate fellow for the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Japhet Quitzon is an associate fellow for the Southeast Asia Program at CSIS.

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