The cost of inaction: Why passivity is no longer an option for the European Union

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The upcoming European summit (18-19 December) will be a stress test. That is often the case in Europe, where we tend to lurch from crisis to crisis. But this time it is undeniable that the stakes are high. In recent months, Europe has grappled with the Trump tornado. The response has become a combination of denial, cajoling, temporary concessions, and hoping that the tide will turn in time. With Trump's new security strategy , we have entered a new phase: the attack is now aimed squarely at the ideology and unity of the European Union itself.

The question is whether this latest shock will finally prompt Europe to take action. Because disapproving words alone won't get us anywhere.

European diplomacy is now following a pattern of 'track change diplomacy'. Russians and Americans draw up plans, to which Ukrainians and other Europeans then react, usually with anger and panic. Crisis talks and frantic attempts to adjust or water down these US-Russian plans typically follow. These reactions are necessary in themselves, and sometimes they even work to prevent worse outcomes. But they are all defensive.

Europe is good at formulating principles and positions, but less so at developing policies or strategies. This attitude costs us credibility and influence. Opponents understand this and apply pressure precisely where it hurts: targeting our inertia and indecisiveness.

Anyone who wants to break this dynamic must demonstrate that Europe can act. This can be achieved by delivering in three crucial areas: diplomatic, military, and financial.

Diplomatically, this means that Europe must seize the initiative: less waiting for new plans from Washington or provocations from Moscow, but rather, together with Ukraine, defining the framework for negotiations to end the war, as is finally happening in Berlin.

We cannot change Putin's ideas, but we can change his calculations about war.

The fact that Putin will almost certainly reject any plan that does not entail Ukraine's surrender is not a reason for Europe not to devise a plan of its own. Quite the opposite. This clarifies the real obstacle, both for Trump and for Europeans who doubt the value of continued support. In this way, diplomacy is not a quest for a quick and precarious peace, but a means of forcing political clarity.

The same applies militarily. It is quite shocking that European arms shipments to Ukraine have declined since the summer. And the US has done nothing for months: what comes from there is paid for by Europe.

This can and must change - and air defence is crucial. Every night, Russia terrorises the Ukrainian population, leaving large parts of the country suffering from electricity and gas shortages. Both American and French-Italian air defence systems have proven their effectiveness. The problem, therefore, is not so much a lack of capacity, but rather political reluctance to provide it.

Europe could also take steps regarding security guarantees. One such step would be to train Ukrainian troops on Ukrainian territory, protected by accompanying European air defences. Not as an escalation, but as a sign that we are serious about treating this conflict as existential.

The aggressor pays

Then there is the issue of finances. Last week, EU Member States finally decided to freeze Russian assets in the EU until Moscow makes reparations. A very good thing: the aggressor pays, and Europe - not Trump or Putin - decides what happens to the assets.

However, Ukraine's financing is not yet assured. Several countries oppose the use of Russian assets as collateral. Others no longer want to participate at all, arguing that support for Ukraine should be arranged on a national basis.

However, scraping together national contributions would be strategically weak. The best approach would be to use the Russian assets, and to support their use collectively at the EU level. This would not only finance Ukraine, but also send a signal to the Kremlin: Europe will continue to support Ukraine for years to come. We cannot change Putin's ideas, but we can change his calculations about how long he is willing and able to continue his industrial, imperial war.

This week, Europe must choose: will it continue to merely play along with the moves of others, or will it use its considerable resources and power to forge its own course? The answer will determine whether the EU remains a geopolitical object, or chooses to become a subject that shapes its own future.

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• Ukraine
• EU Foreign Policy
• Security and Defence