Syria: Al-Sharaa’s Offensive Against the SDF Reshape the Balance of Power

• Med this Week Middle East and North Africa
  by Lucia Dall'Asta
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The MED This Week newsletter provides informed insights on the most significant developments in the MENA region, bringing together unique opinions and reliable foresight on future scenarios. Today, we shed light on how Syria's advance in the northeast is dismantling the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and reshaping the country's political and strategic landscape.

The kurdish-led SDF are edging toward capitulation. After a rapid advance by the Syrian Army, which has reshaped the country's battlefield map - bringing large swathes of the northeast back under Damascus' control - on Sunday, January 18, the Syrian government and the SDF signed an agreement calling for the individual integration of SDF members into the Syrian army. This is a move that the new Syrian president frames as the next step in fulfilling the promise of national unification he made to Syrians 14 months ago. Yet the deal remains fragile: ongoing clashes and mounting mutual accusations in recent hours threaten to derail it before it can take hold. Formed in 2015 with US backing to fight ISIS, bringing together the Kurdish People's Protection Unit (YPG) and Arab tribal groups, the SDF now find themselves abandoned not only because of their growing unpopularity among Arab communities in the areas under their control, but also due the loss of US support. Indeed, beyond the battlefield, Al Sharaa's military push also marks a significant turning point for US policy in Syria. Over the past months, the new Syrian leadership has quietly built fruitful ties with Washington. On Sunday, Tom Barrack, the US special envoy to Syria, has openly endorsed Al Sharaa and his unification project, urging the SDF to cooperate, effectively making Al Sharaa America's main partner on the ground. In turn, the military gains carry heavy economic and strategic implications. By retaking control of key energy and infrastructure assets in eastern Syria - including al-Omar, the country's largest oil field - Damascus has regained resources that could prove critical to any future economic recovery. At the same time, the shift has reignited concerns over the fate of ISIS detention camps, previously run by the SDF and now under government control, prompting US involvement in transferring some detainees to Iraq. Hence, the situation remains highly fragmented, leaving many questions unanswered. How will this new balance of power affect Kurdish autonomy projects in eastern Syria, after Al Sharaa pledges to recognise Kurdish language and culture as part of the country's national heritage? And, more broadly, what will ultimately become of the SDF? How smoothly will their fighters be absorbed into the national army?

Experts from the ISPI network discuss how Syria's advance in the northeast is dismantling the SDF and reshaping the country's political and strategic landscape.

The SDF's weakened hand at the negotiating table

"The SDF now find themselves in a markedly weaker negotiating position than they did just one month ago. The loss of Arab-majority provinces of Raqqa and Deir Ezzor, following tribal mobilisation and the defection of most Arab fighters, has brought about their breakdown as an umbrella coalition - prompting several analysts to describe the YPG/YPJ as the only remaining cohesive core. Politically, the SDF are now grappling with the consequences of their limited popularity and alienation from local communities especially in Arab-majority areas; their overreliance on the US and external legitimacy tied to the ISIS file; and the influence exerted by PKK cadres over decision-making. A new agreement with the government was announced last Tuesday, envisioning four days of consultations within the SDF leadership and further specifics on the integration process to be hammered out. Yet, whether this last round of negotiations will bear fruit remains uncertain. In particular, it remains to be seen how military and administrative integration may concretely unfold. According to the latest agreement, local security forces in Kurdish-majority areas would be drawn from locals, and a number of SDF figures would be appointed to state institutions - raising questions about whether hybrid arrangements could take shape."

Silvia Carenzi, Associate Research Fellow, ISPI

The erosion of the SDF's leverage

"The SDF's unravelling came through the erosion of their main sources of leverage. They were compelled to relinquish control over Arab-majority oil-producing areas in northeast Syria, depriving them of both a critical revenue stream and a key strategic asset. Arab tribes that had previously aligned with the SDF - providing them with a measure of local legitimacy within Arab communities - shifted their allegiance to the Syrian government. The US, the SDF's principal external supporter, has indicated preference for Damascus as its chosen partner in Syria, and has also begun moving ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq, ending the SDF's role as Syria's custodians of security against ISIS. The SDF's miscalculations and actions led them to acquiesce to conditions much less favourable than what they would have obtained under their previous March agreement with the Syrian government."

Lina Khatib, Principal Analyst, ExTrac; Associate Fellow, Chatham House

The security challenge posed by ISIS detention camps

"The immediate risk stemming from the transfer of responsibility for ISIS detention camps to the Syrian government is less a mass breakout enabling ISIS to reconquer territory than a gradual erosion of security that allows affiliates to filter back into communities across Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and the al-Hasakah countryside. The Shaddadi incident - involving the escape of suspected IS fighters from an SDF-run detention facility in Shaddadi in southern Hasakah - revealed that custody transfers are occurring under combat conditions rather than coordinated handovers, creating exactly the chaos ISIS operatives can exploit. The deeper concern is structural: the combination of contested custody, collapsed SDF-Damascus coordination, and years of deferred international repatriation has left a volatile population in limbo at the worst possible moment. Damascus now has an opportunity to demonstrate its capacity by securing these facilities, but this requires resources, discipline, and ideally continued anti - ISIS coalition support. If mismanaged, the result will not be a caliphate reborn but something harder to contain: a dispersed insurgency exploiting gaps within Syria's overstretched security apparatus."

Nanar Hawach, Senior Analyst, International Crisis Group

The SDF's strategic setback after Assad's fall

"When Assad's regime collapsed in December 2024, the SDF's status as a non-state actor holding 25% of Syrian territory became unsustainable. The speed with which US diplomats, as well as the military and intelligence apparatus rushed to engage with Damascus made it clear early-on that the prospect of working with a sovereign government was the priority. From a purely counter - terrorism perspective, it is impossible to accomplish permanent strategic effects without a cohesive campaign that spans a whole area of operation. Though the SDF did sign the March 10 framework agreement, it did so under US pressure and ever since then, the SDF's calculation has clearly been to delay and stall integration. The US clearly wants to avoid a permanent spiral of escalation or the kind of violence we saw on the coast and in Suwayda in 2025, but ultimately, it seeks a united Syria in which the government holds a monopoly over the use of force. The current ceasefire remains extremely fragile and the removal of third country national ISIS prisoners to Iraq indicates the US military is not optimistic about a peaceful solution."

Charles Lister, Senior Fellow and Director, Syria Initiative, Middle East Institute

After the SDF setback, Israel weighs security, politics and negotiations with Syria

"After the successful Syrian offensive against the Kurdish-led SDF, Israel now finds itself facing a strategic dilemma. Although a truce is formally in place to determine the fate of Kobane, al-Hasakah and Qamishli, the YPG continue to urge Israel to intervene on their behalf, either directly or by exerting pressure on the Trump administration. At the same time, pro-Israeli Druze factions - represented by Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri - are on alert and openly speak of a 'genocide' against the Kurds. Israel, which has pledged to protect them as part of its project to redefine the shared border with Syria, must decide whether to heed these appeals or press ahead with negotiations with Damascus, as President Trump hopes. In any case, Israeli media have intensified their focus on President Ahmed al-Sharaa, highlighting his jihadist past and questioning his reliability. Even so, a security agreement remains possible, as Israel also weighs the Turkish role, US backing, and domestic political constraints, including the prospect of elections later this year."

Francesco Petronella, ISPI

The timing of Damascus' offensive and the SDF's dilemma

"After talks between the SDF and the Syrian army failed in early January over the future of north-east Syria, heavy fighting quickly erupted in Aleppo, then later in western Aleppo, Tabqa, Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. Damascus has also taken al-Hol camp and the Yarubiya border gate, while the Kurdish town of Kobani was surrounded as it was in 2014 by ISIS. It is clear that this offensive was planned long before, but the question is why Damascus did not confront the SDF earlier. First of all, it was afraid of the US for fear that the US would not remove terrorist designations and sanctions. However, as a result of lobbying by Turkey and the Gulf states, the US has lifted sanctions, and the US envoy has made clear that the SDF's anti-ISIS function is no longer central, leaving it in a precarious position.Now that the US is transferring 7,000 ISIS prisoners from Syria to Iraq, it will be more difficult for the SDF to keep some form of autonomy."

Wladimir van Wilgenburg, Freelance Journalist