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11/04/2025 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 11/04/2025 16:21

Ten Years of C5+1: U.S.–Central Asia Minerals Cooperation

Ten Years of C5+1: U.S.-Central Asia Minerals Cooperation

Photo: iuneWind/Adobe Stock

Commentary by Gracelin Baskaran and Kamal Aubakirov

Published November 4, 2025

Washington will host a C5+1 summit on November 6, marking the tenth anniversary of the regional diplomatic platform that brings together the United States and the five Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Since its establishment in 2015, the C5+1 has served as the primary forum for advancing cooperation on economic, energy and minerals, and security issues. This year's summit carries particular weight: It comes at a moment when China and Russia are rapidly deepening their foothold in Central Asia's minerals and infrastructure, positioning themselves at the center of the region's emerging supply chains.

In recent years, critical minerals have become a defining feature of the U.S.-Central Asia relationship. In February 2024, the United States launched the C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue to strengthen cooperation in geological exploration, attract mining and processing investments, and connect Central Asia's mineral wealth to U.S. markets. That same year, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan joined the U.S.-led Minerals Security Partnership Forum, signaling their commitment to building more resilient supply chains less dependent on China. To date, efforts have focused on dialogue over action.

The region holds vast reserves of minerals critical to U.S. economic and national security, including uranium, chromite, copper, titanium, gold, and antimony, as well as emerging deposits of rare earth elements and other strategic metals. Mining remains a key pillar of the region's two largest economies, contributing roughly 17 percent of GDP in Kazakhstan and 8 percent in Uzbekistan, reflecting Central Asia's deep mining heritage and existing social licenses that enable industrial expansion. Recent commercial deals, such as Uzbekistan's $8.5 billion aircraft procurement deal with Boeing and Kazakhstan's $4.2 billion locomotive contract with Wabtec, further reveal a growing U.S.-Central Asia economic momentum.

Yet, despite these developments, tangible progress in minerals cooperation remains limited. Chinese and Russian capital dominate the region's mining, processing, and logistics networks, while structural barriers, ranging from underdeveloped westward transport routes to recurring energy shortages, continue to deter Western investment. The upcoming C5+1 summit offers Washington a narrow but strategic window to translate diplomacy into concrete investment and position the United States, not its rivals, as a credible new partner in Central Asia's evolving minerals landscape.

Central Asia's Mineral Reserves and Production

Central Asia holds substantial reserves of minerals designated by the United States as critical. Kazakhstan, the region's largest economy, is the world's leading uranium supplier, producing 23,270 metric tons or 39 percent of global output in 2024. The country also leads the region in exploration spending, reaching a decade-high of $127 million in 2025, nearly half of which targets copper projects. Uzbekistan has likewise emerged as a promising mining center. In 2024, it announced the discovery of new deposits, containing tungsten, lithium, and germanium, along with 14 rare earth element sites, signaling strong potential for future development. Tajikistan, meanwhile, ranks second globally in antimony production, accounting for 15 percent of the world's supply, further highlighting the region's strategic importance in global minerals supply chains.

Despite this potential, Central Asia's mineral exports remain heavily oriented toward China and Russia, limiting opportunities for diversification and Western engagement. Kazakhstan, which leads regional production, sends 27 percent of its mineral exports to China and 16 percent to Russia, while the United States accounts for only 5 percent. Uzbekistan shows a similar pattern, with China, Russia, and Turkey as its main export destinations. Central Asia's China- and Russia-focused export patterns reveal a heavy reliance on eastward corridors and a lack of infrastructure linking the region to Western markets.

Central Asia's Role in U.S. Nuclear Security

Kazakhstan is the world's largest uranium powerhouse. In 2022, it produced more than 21,000 tons, or roughly 45 percent of the world's supply. By comparison, Canada, the world's second-largest producer, produced 7,000 tons. That same year, Uzbekistan ranked fifth, contributing around 7 percent of global supply. Together, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan account for just over half of the world's uranium production, making the global market highly sensitive to developments in Central Asia. This vulnerability was underscored in January 2022, when political unrest in Kazakhstan triggered an 8 percent spike in uranium prices in a single day, revealing the strategic fragility of supply chains tied to the region.

Central Asia's influence on the uranium market is expected to grow further. The question is whether the United States will partner effectively with these markets. China has moved aggressively to deepen its foothold in the region. It has been purchasing natural uranium from Kazakhstan since the early 2000s and maintains multiple long-term contracts across suppliers. Through its close partnership with Kazatomprom, Kazakhstan's state nuclear company, China now offtakes nearly 30 percent of Kazakhstan's uranium exports-cementing a significant degree of influence over one of the world's most strategic uranium sources.

Uranium is a bedrock of U.S. energy security, accounting for 19 percent of U.S. electricity, and the United States remains the world's largest nuclear power producer. However, that leadership is under pressure. Years of stagnation and plant retirements have slowed U.S. growth, while China is rapidly expanding its fleet-on pace to surpass U.S. nuclear capacity by 2030, with 150 new reactors expected between 2020 and 2035. Ensuring a stable uranium supply has therefore become one of the most critical factors in preserving U.S. nuclear leadership. The United States remains reliant on Russia, an adversary, for much of its uranium; in 2022, 30 percent of imports came from Russia. Over the next five years, global demand is expected to surge by nearly 30 percent. Achieving these goals, while de-risking nuclear power supply, will require not only a massive increase in uranium supply but also secure, diversified, and resilient supply chains.

Why Do Central Asia's Minerals Struggle to Reach Western Markets?

Despite Central Asia's abundance of mineral resources, the region's ability to fully capitalize on new partnerships with the West, particularly with the United States, remains constrained by inadequate transport infrastructure. Most export routes still run north to south, a legacy of Soviet-era railway construction that prioritized moving raw materials toward Russia to support its industrial base. As a result, Central Asia remains heavily dependent on Russian rail and maritime infrastructure for shipping minerals to Europe and the U.S. In Kazakhstan, the region's primary transit hub, an estimated 57 percent of railway tracks are in disrepair, further limiting export capacity.

Before Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Central Asian countries relied on the Northern Corridor, which passes through Russia to the Black and Baltic Seas, to transport energy resources and minerals to global markets. After the imposition of Western sanctions on Russia, regional governments shifted focus toward developing the Middle Corridor, a multimodal trade route connecting China to Europe via Central Asia and the South Caucasus. The corridor's transit time of 16-20 days is comparable to the 14-18 days via the northern route.

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Gracelin Baskaran

Director, Critical Minerals Security Program

Kamal Aubakirov

Intern, Critical Minerals Security Program

Programs & Projects

  • Critical Minerals Security Program
  • Defense and Security
Remote Visualization

Yet, despite its promise, the Middle Corridor remains a complex network of road, rail, and sea links across Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, facing major financial and logistical hurdles. It is estimated that roughly $21.4 billion in investment will be needed to make the corridor commercially viable. Transporting cargo through the route currently costs between $3,500-4,500 per 40-foot equivalent unit, compared with $2,800-3,200 via the northern route, limiting the competitiveness of mineral exports in particular.

Moreover, recent railway, road, and port upgrades along the Middle Corridor are largely financed by Chinese and Russian capital, raising strategic concerns over the route's long-term governance and accessibility for Western partners. While the European Union pledged $10.8 billion for Middle Corridor transport infrastructure at its first EU-Central Asia summit this spring, those investments remain in the early stages, with disbursements lagging far behind Chinese capital flows. Central Asia has meanwhile become one of the Belt and Road Initiative's largest beneficiaries, receiving $24.3 billion in infrastructure, energy, and mining investments in just the first half of 2025. It is worth recalling that Kazakhstan was where China first announced the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, and more than a decade later, Beijing's role in financing the region's mineral logistics remains dominant.

Remote Visualization

At the same time, Central Asia's power constraints, rooted in its Soviet legacy, pose a major barrier to expanding mineral production and processing. Under the Soviet system, power generation and distribution were centrally managed across the republics, with little regard for modern borders or national energy needs. After independence, all five states were left scrambling to balance generation, energy imports, and domestic demand.

Mining is highly energy-intensive, yet much of Central Asia still depends on aging power plants and outdated transmission lines, limiting its ability to scale up mineral output. The region faces high transmission and distribution losses, as well as frequent seasonal blackouts that can disrupt mining operations. In Kazakhstan, transmission losses reach about 15 percent, while in Uzbekistan, distribution losses are estimated at around 13 percent. Rolling blackouts are also common across all five states during both harsh winters and extreme summer heat, with temperatures in Turkmenistan often exceeding 50° C.

Power demand continues to grow rapidly, driven by industrial expansion, but capacity additions have lagged far behind. Central Asia's population has also risen from roughly 50 million in 1991 to about 84 million today, further straining grids. Upgrading national and regional networks, and integrating renewable energy sources to provide reliable electricity for mining, would require at least $20 billion in investment in Central Asia by 2030.

Recommendations for Strengthening U.S.-Central Asia Minerals Cooperation

Historically, the mining industry has long been a cornerstone of Central Asia's economy. During the Soviet era, the region supplied Moscow with a wide range of minerals, including copper, coal, lead, uranium, tantalum, zinc, and rare earth elements, that supported the Soviet Union's industrial base. Most geological exploration was conducted before the 1990s under the centralized Soviet system for mineral prospecting, and after independence, Central Asian states relied heavily on those legacy surveys to sustain output and attract investors.

In recent years, however, the region's mining industry has been reinvigorated as governments pursue national strategies to integrate into global critical minerals supply chains. Uzbekistan has launched a $2.6 billion initiative to advance 76 critical minerals projects over the next three years, while Kazakhstan introduced a five-year development plan focused on attracting foreign investment, expanding processing capacity, and strengthening mining governance.

Western interest has also grown sharply. In 2024, the U.S. Department of State signed memoranda of understanding with both Kazakhstan's National Geological Survey and the government of Uzbekistan. In spring 2025, the European Union committed $2.9 billion under its Global Gateway initiative to support exploration and critical minerals development across all five Central Asian states. Around the same time, France, Germany, and South Korea concluded additional agreements with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to conduct geological exploration and invest in early-stage mining projects.

Although the United States has found it difficult to deepen ties with a region that is both geographically distant and strategically situated between its two primary rivals-China and Russia-Central Asia will play a key role in the future of minerals security. Here are some recommendations to strengthen U.S.-Central Asia minerals cooperation.

  1. Strengthen U.S.-Central Asia vertical integration for uranium supply chains: Kazakhstan has affirmed that it has no plans to pursue uranium enrichment in the foreseeable future-making it a valuable strategic partner for the United States, which currently produces little uranium but is rapidly expanding enrichment capabilities in New Mexico, Ohio, Tennessee, and Kentucky. Establishing strategic uranium production in Kazakhstan, paired with offtake agreements for enrichment in the United States, could significantly reduce reliance on Russian supply chains while bolstering the uranium availability needed to achieve the United States' ambitious nuclear energy goals.
  2. Engage Gulf partners to coinvest in Central Asia's mining and infrastructure: For more than three decades, the United States has struggled to engage in large-scale infrastructure and mining projects in Central Asia beyond the oil and gas sector, a challenge driven by geographic distance and the region's proximity to China and Russia. However, the recent strengthening of ties between Central Asian states and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries presents a strategic opportunity for U.S. engagement. Gulf partners such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar have become active investors in Central Asia's transportation and energy infrastructure. Recent agreements between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan with the United Arab Emirates (UAE)'s Masdar and Saudi Arabia's ACWA Power to develop renewable energy projects underscore this trend. Central Asian governments are eager to see a greater U.S. role in the minerals space, and joint investments with Gulf partners, whether in mining projects or supporting transport and power infrastructure, could de-risk capital flows and expand Western participation. Investing in Middle Corridor infrastructure to enable mineral shipments from Central Asia to Saudi Arabia or the UAE for refining would also shorten supply chains compared to oceanic routes, strengthening both regional connectivity and U.S. strategic access.
  3. Partner with Japan and South Korea to modernize geological mapping and support exploration: Outdated Soviet-era surveys and decades of underinvestment have left much of Central Asia's mineral wealth unexplored. In Kazakhstan, exploration spending in 1990 equaled the total spent between 2003 and 2023, while only 40 percent of Uzbekistan and 6 percent of Tajikistan have been geologically surveyed. Japan and South Korea, two of the region's most consistent partners, are well-positioned to help modernize this foundation. The Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security and the Korea Institute of Geoscience and Mineral Resources have signed agreements with Kazakhstan to advance mineral exploration, with KIGAM recently identifying sizable lithium reserves at the Bakennoye deposit and Japan's ITOCHU Corporation joining an Uzbek-French-Japanese uranium venture in Navoi. Deepening cooperation with these trusted U.S. allies to update geological mapping and support early-stage exploration would unlock new reserves, improve data transparency, and strengthen collective engagement in Central Asia's critical minerals sector.
  4. Develop a skilled mining workforce through Western academic collaboration: While mining has long anchored Central Asia's economy, much of its geological expertise has eroded since the Soviet era. The region has historically relied on Russian training, but diversifying education and technical collaboration is essential to improving competitiveness. Eight of the top ten mining programs in the world are based in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Examples such as the Colorado School of Mines planning to open an international campus in Zhezkazgan, Kazakhstan, a major copper hub, in 2026, or the S. Embassy-funded exchange program with Uzbekistan's Navoi State Mining Institute to strengthen academic and technical cooperation, offer strong starting points for deeper U.S. engagement. Expanding such initiatives with other Western universities and training institutions would help develop a new generation of skilled mining professionals, elevate environmental, social, and governance standards, and align the region's mining governance with Western practices, reducing operational risk and enabling deeper U.S. engagement in the region's critical minerals industry.

Central Asia sits at the crossroads of global competition for critical minerals. The region's abundant resources, strategic geography, and growing openness to Western partnership present an important opportunity for supply diversification. Turning diplomatic momentum into tangible outcomes will require sustained investment, coordination with allies, and the mobilization of trusted partners across the Gulf, Japan, and South Korea.

Gracelin Baskaran is director of the Critical Minerals Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Kamal Aubakirov is an intern for the Critical Minerals Security Program at CSIS.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2025 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

Tags

Asia, Central Asia, China, Russia and Eurasia, Critical Minerals, and Energy and Geopolitics

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