07/14/2025 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 07/14/2025 17:12
Summary
Since the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021, the ruling junta has suppressed the human rights of the population, intensified abuses in the country's decades-long armed conflicts, and exacerbated the economic and humanitarian crises. Many people have fled the oppression, fighting and inadequate aid to go to neighboring countries, joining the millions of Myanmar migrants, refugees and asylum seekers already living abroad. Over 4 million are now in Thailand, nearly half of whom are undocumented, facing the constant threat of harassment, arrest, and deportation.
This report examines the situation for Myanmar nationals in Thailand since the coup. Many are refugees under international law, even though they have not been recognized as such and there are limited ways in which they can regularize their status in Thailand. These undocumented Myanmar nationals are compelled to seek out security and a livelihood and avoid being returned to repression, conflict and humanitarian crises in Myanmar.
Thailand does not recognize refugees, and the limited measures it has in place for "protected persons" are effectively closed to most Myanmar nationals. As a result, many Myanmar nationals, including children, have no legal access to basic health care, education or work. The reality for many is self-imposed house arrest to avoid the constant risk of extortion, not only from random encounters with Thai police, but also from the semi-formal systems Thai security personnel use to extract money from undocumented migrants.
On February 1, 2021, Myanmar's military staged a coup and arrested the country's elected civilian leaders, including de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint. Mass protests quickly proliferated in cities and towns nationwide. The military junta, called the State Administration Council, and led by Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, soon turned on the anti-coup demonstrators, carrying out mass arrests and using deadly force. The security forces targeted individuals perceived as threats to the junta: activists, students, journalists, humanitarian workers, lawyers, and religious leaders. Those taken into custody were subjected to torture, rape, enforced disappearance, and prolonged imprisonment without a fair trial.
The armed groups in ethnic minority areas that have been fighting successive Myanmar governments since independence in 1948 were joined by members of the civil disobedience movement fleeing urban areas. In the ensuing years, hundreds of anti-junta People's Defense Forces have formed, notably in areas previously tied to the military, often cooperating with the ethnic armed groups. The military has responded with intensified operations, including widespread aerial and artillery attacks against towns and villages, harming civilians and damaging civilian infrastructure. An abusive conscription law was put into effect in 2024,
The junta has severely hindered the delivery of humanitarian aid to communities most at risk. Humanitarian needs have reached alarming levels, with an estimated 19.9 million people - more than a third of the population - in need of assistance, including more than 3.5 million internally displaced. A devastating 7.7-magnitude earthquake on March 28, 2025, near Mandalay resulted in more than 3,500 deaths and widespread destruction. The United Nations estimated that the number of people needing humanitarian services surged from 1 million to 5.2 million in the affected areas.
All of these factors have led to an upsurge in people fleeting Myanmar.
Thailand has long been a destination country for migrant workers across Southeast Asia. Most come from Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, with the overwhelming majority coming from Myanmar.
Approximately 82,000 mostly ethnic Karen refugees from Myanmar have been living in closed refugee camps along the Thai-Myanmar border for decades. Freedom of movement is restricted, and the population survives on little to no income and humanitarian aid services, a situation that has worsened since the 2025 cuts to US funding.
Hundreds of thousand more Myanmar nationals have fled oppression and armed conflict to cross the long and porous border into Thailand. The Thai government has allowed new arrivals to stay in informal temporary stay areas near the border, but has at times pushed them back. None of the arrivals since the coup have been permitted to enter existing refugee camps and Thai officials place strict restrictions on their movement and access to humanitarian aid and basic services.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) conservatively estimates that over 4 million Myanmar migrants live in Thailand and that up to 1.7 million are undocumented. The IOM notes that in 2023 alone, 1.3 million Myanmar migrants crossed into Thailand. While many Myanmar nationals cross into the country seeking a livelihood, particularly since Myanmar's economic collapse and its humanitarian crisis, many are fleeing persecution, conflict, and the junta's recent enforcement of its conscription law. Migrant workers and refugees are not mutually exclusive categories, even though Thai policy seems to regard them as such.
Thailand is not a party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Refugee Convention) or its 1967 Protocol. The country has no refugee law or formalized asylum procedures that are applicable to all nationalities. Instead, in 2023, the government introduced a new National Screening Mechanism (NSM) under which some individuals who are unable or unwilling to return to their countries of origin due to fears of persecution can seek protection. Those deemed eligible are granted legal recognition under Thai law as "Protected Persons." While presented as a step towards greater international protection, the National Screening Mechanism and its implementing regulations largely exclude certain nationalities from access, including migrant workers from Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos. In addition, those who present themselves before the screening mechanism are still vulnerable to arrest and detention under Thailand's immigration laws, which deem undocumented foreigners "illegal," discouraging many from applying.
The focus of this report are the abuses Myanmar nationals face in Thailand. Exposed to arrest and detention and the constant risk of deportation, Myanmar nationals self-restrict their movements, living in hiding and out of sight. Human Rights Watch found that Thai police frequently stop and interrogate Myanmar nationals, extorting them with the threat of arrest and detention if they fail to pay bribes, considerable sums for those with little income. Human Rights Watch found this practice to be prevalent in the border town of Mae Sot in Tak province, where a lucrative business of threats and bribes has resulted in the authorities referring to Myanmar nationals as "walking ATMs."
Interviewees told Human Rights Watch that these practices left them scared and intimidated; having fled human rights abuses, armed conflict and a humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, they felt marginalized and exploited in Thailand.
Thai security personnel have engaged in racketeering through a semi-formalized system of extortion that involves "selling" unofficial "police cards" to Myanmar nationals looking for a pathway to documentation or even just seeking to avoid arrest. The only real option for those not willing or able to purchase such cards is self-imposed house arrest.
In Mae Sot, interviewees said that they paid a monthly "subscription fee" of approximately 300 Thai baht (THB) (US$9) and provide a photograph of themselves with a "broker" who gives them a telephone number. This telephone number is a direct line to the broker who can be contacted if the Thai police take the person into custody. The broker will then assure the police that the person is paying a monthly subscription and should be released.
This loose and unofficial form of "protection" may involve seemingly small sums of money, but for many interviewed it is a large amount. They cannot afford this monthly "service" and only do so when they can find work or need to travel. An 8½-months-pregnant woman living in a forested area near Mae Sot said that she struggled to pay the transportation costs to the clinic for her first pre-natal scan (an examination that should be performed in the first 24 weeks of pregnancy). She feared arrest because she is undocumented and could not afford a police card.
The families hiding in remote, rural areas outside Mae Sot with whom Human Rights Watch met were cut off from electricity and clean running water. Upwards of 20,000 Myanmar nationals are estimated to be living in these rural areas with limited access to basic services.
Even those paying a subscription fee are not fully protected against deportation. Mass deportations of Myanmar nationals, including children, continue across the country, without regard to the risk they might face. One woman said that despite paying for herself and her 12-year-old niece, the Thai immigration authorities arrested them both, held them in a detention facility for nine days, and then deported them to Myanmar.
Most of the Myanmar nationals who spoke to Human Rights Watch were in the process of applying for or renewing a migrant worker's card, commonly known as the "pink card." This is the main document available to Myanmar nationals in Thailand that provides a legal status. The process requires an employer to sponsor the migrant worker. Every interviewee, whether renewing their documentation through a regularization window (a specific period during which the Thai government allows undocumented or migrants to regularize their legal status) or applying for the first time, relied on a paid broker to handle the process, and paid often exorbitant fees to purchase the necessary documentation and manage the convoluted process. In all cases examined by Human Rights Watch, the listed employer on the pink card was not their actual employer, but a fabricated one.
While a migrant worker's card provides some protection from arrest, detention, and deportation, it is not a legitimate, protective pathway for people who are likely de facto refugees. The use of brokers to provide fake employers exposes people to arrest should they face investigation by the Thai authorities. In addition, the inflated sums - up to WHAT?? -- to purchase documentation are prohibitive for many, who may make only THB250 (US$7) per day as laborers -- when they can find work. Being protected as a refugee under international law should not have to depend on making such payments.
Human Rights Watch urges the Thai government to enact legislation that establishes criteria and procedures for recognizing refugee status and providing asylum that meets international legal standards. Refugee status should be open to all nationalities according to the same criteria, consistent with the international refugee definition, including complementary forms of protection for people fleeing conflict.
In the interim, Thailand should introduce a temporary protection framework for Myanmar nationals (see the appendix), recognizing the immediate needs of thousands of people who have fled persecution or the country's conflicts. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has repeatedly said that there should be no forced returns to Myanmar: "People fleeing Myanmar must be allowed access to territory to seek asylum and be protected against refoulement."
Against this backdrop, Thailand should implement a system to allow Myanmar nationals the opportunity to apply for legal residency in the country, permitting them the right to work, and giving them access to healthcare and education services. Thailand's parliamentary Committee on National Security, Border Affairs, National Strategy and National Reform, as well as many civil society organizations, have made similar proposals to ease the exploitation and suffering of hundreds of thousands of undocumented Myanmar nationals.
Recommendations
To the Royal Thai Government
To the Myanmar Junta
To Donor and Resettlement Governments
Methodology
This report is primarily based on 30 interviews with Myanmar nationals - 11 women, 18 men, and a boy - and 11 members of national and international nongovernmental organizations, representatives of United Nations agencies, and lawyers.
All the Myanmar nationals interviewed by Human Rights Watch went to Thailand following the February 2021 coup in Myanmar. All interviews were in-person in Thailand in February 2025, apart from one telephone interview in April 2025. All interviews were conducted with interpreters who translated from Burmese, Rohingya or Karen to English.
All interviews were conducted in private settings - either alone or with the interviewee's immediate family members present - with assurances of confidentiality. The researcher informed all interviewees about the purpose and voluntary nature of the interviews, and the ways in which Human Rights Watch would use the information. All were told they could decline to answer questions or could end the interview at any time.
Human Rights Watch provided no payment, service, or other personal benefit to the interviewees. Transport costs for interviewees who had to travel to a safe location for the interview were covered to a maximum limit of THB300 (US$9). Where appropriate, Human Rights Watch provided interviewees with contact information for organizations offering humanitarian, legal, social or counseling services.
Human Rights Watch wrote to the Thai authorities on June 10, 2025.
To protect confidentiality, pseudonyms are used for all interviewees.
Background
On February 1, 2021, the Myanmar military arrested the civilian leaders of the national and state governments and announced a one-year "state of emergency."Myanmar's commander in chief, Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, established the State Administration Council (SAC) junta, appointing himself as chair.
Opposition to the coup erupted immediately in Yangon and many other cities and towns throughout the country. The security forces responded to peaceful opposition as they had done frequently in the past, firing on protesters, brutally breaking up demonstrations, and conducting mass arrests. They targeted individuals perceived as threats: activists, students, journalists, humanitarian workers, lawyers, and religious leaders. Those taken into custody were subjected to torture, rape, and enforced disappearance. To the extent detainees faced the courts, there was not even a modicum of due process. The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) reported in 2025 that since the coup, junta forces have arbitrarily arrested at least 30,000 people.
Human Rights Watch and others concluded that the junta's crackdown was a widespread and systematic attack on the population, amounting to crimes against humanity. The UN-backed Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) reported that it had substantial evidence that:
[A] variety of crimes against humanity have been committed in relation to the suppression of post-coup dissent, including torture; rape and other forms of sexual violence; persecution based on intersecting grounds, including gender, sexual orientation, perceived political affiliation, religion and ethnicity; enforced disappearance; imprisonment; murder; and other inhumane acts.
Soon after Myanmar gained independence from Britain in 1948, several armed conflicts broke out between ethnic armed groups and the country's newly independent central government. Armed opposition movements, some pre-dating independence, soon formed in all of the country's seven ethnic states. The objectives of the ethnic armed groups varied, ranging from secession to achieving autonomy and rights in a federal, democratic Myanmar. Several of these conflicts persist to the present.
The military and, to a lesser extent, the ethnic armed groups have long been responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law, including deliberate or indiscriminate attacks on civilians, unlawful killings, torture, sexual violence, the use of child soldiers, and unlawful recruitment and forced labor in combat zones. Military personnel implicated in war crimes have enjoyed nearly total impunity from prosecution.
In the years since the coup, the opposition has transformed from civil disobedience to widespread armed conflict. Hundreds of anti-junta People's Defense Forces have formed, notably in areas previously tied to the military, often cooperating with ethnic armed groups. Clashes between the military and non-state armed groups have taken place in all 14 states and regions.
Myanmar's junta has increasingly used "scorched earth" tactics in opposition areas, committing numerous war crimes. As the junta has lost territory since late 2023, its unlawful attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure have increased, including indiscriminate airstrikes, killings, rape and other sexual violence, torture, and arson.
Fighting between the Myanmar military and anti-junta and ethnic armed groups continues across most of the country's states and regions.The junta has not eased its blockages of desperately needed humanitarian aid used as a method of collective punishment against civilian populations. These blockages sustain the military's longstanding "four cuts" strategy, designed to maintain control of an area by isolating and terrorizing civilians. To that end, the military has increasingly used banned antipersonnel landmines in civilian areas across the country. Myanmar now has the highest number of landmine and explosive ordnance casualties of any country in the world. A newly enforced conscription law to address shortfalls in the armed forces has resulted in frequent abuse.
People throughout the country continue to be beset by natural disasters, inadequate health care, food insecurity, inflation, loss of livelihoods, and disruptions of critical public services. These calamities have caused humanitarian needs to reach alarming levels, with an estimated 19.9 million people - more than a third of the population - in need of assistance.[11]
Many majority Burmans and ethnic community members have temporarily or permanently left Myanmar for Thailand and other countries because of political oppression, armed conflict and conscription, and natural disaster or to seek economic opportunities.
The coup and its aftermath resulted in new departures abroad. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that since February 2021 approximately 184,600 Myanmar refugees have sought refuge in neighboring countries. The Thai government said that another 52,000 who crossed into Thailand since the coup have returned to Myanmar, but this figure only includes those who entered into temporary stay shelters and were therefore officially counted by the Thai authorities.
These numbers do not capture the full extent of the influx. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that as of 2024, there were more than 4 million Myanmar migrant workers in the country, approximately 1.7 million of whom were undocumented.
The IOM noted:
In 2023 alone…at least 1.3 million Myanmar nationals crossed the border. In the first half of 2024, IOM reports 649,000 crossings with a notable 35 per cent increase in longer-term arrivals compared to last year. Following the conscription law announcement [in February 2024], entries to Thailand from Myanmar peaked in March and April, with more than 330,000 people recorded by IOM, compared to 96,000 entries in the same period the previous year.
IOM further said that in the first four months of 2024, there was a notable increase in Myanmar nationals citing conflict and persecution as their reason for entering Thailand. In May 2024, UNHCR stated that:
persons who had to flee Myanmar due to the currently prevailing situation of widespread human rights violations in the context of the conflict between the military, EAGs [ethnic armed groups] and PDFs [people's defense forces], are likely to be in need of international refugee protection under Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention), or under the broader refugee criteria under UNHCR's mandate, or in regional instruments.
Thailand's Protection Framework
Thailand is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol. It recognizes those in need of protection according to a fragmented and layered system of regulations, delineated by nationality and geographic presence on the territory. The lack of a legal framework leaves refugees and asylum seekers in a precarious state, making their stay in Thailand uncertain and their status unclear. Thailand does not recognize the term "refugee" and instead narrowly refers to "displaced" people or "People Fleeing Fighting." There is no reference for those fleeing persecution.
Undocumented migrants are subject to Thailand's Immigration Act 1979, which sets out that anyone who enters Thailand without authorization "shall be punished by an imprisonment not exceeding two years and a fine not exceeding 20,000 Baht [about US$600] (section 62)," and that any foreigner who "stays in the Kingdom without permission or with permission expired or revoked shall be punished with imprisonment not exceeding two years or a fine not exceeding 20,000 Baht or both (section 81)."
Temporary Shelters
The only recognized space for long-term asylum in Thailand for Myanmar refugees is in the nine officially recognized camps along the country's 2,107-kilometer (1,310-mile) border with Myanmar, which are inaccessible to new arrivals. There is no officially recognized camp for ethnic Shan refugees, who have lived in Thailand for decades. Those longstanding camps currently accommodate a population of approximately 90,000 refugees, some of whom have lived there since the mid-1980s. While these camps offer their residents some element of protection, the Thai government imposes harsh restrictions on refugees' freedom of movement, prohibiting residents from leaving the camps, earning income, or obtaining a good quality education.
Since the February 2021 coup, Thailand has tolerated additional temporary safety areas along the border with Myanmar. Although the Thai government has allowed new arrivals to stay in these informal temporary shelters near the border, it has also intermittently pushed them back. None of the new arrivals are permitted to enter existing refugee camps and Thai officials place strict restrictions on their movement and access to humanitarian aid and services. In February 2025, the Thai Ministry of Interior publicized a plan to establish new refugee camps with space for about 100,000 people along the border to temporarily house Myanmar refugees fleeing the post-coup violence. In April 2025, UNHCR noted Thailand's revised operating procedures managing influxes, and Thailand permitted UNHCR access to an influx of Myanmar nationals.
National Screening Mechanism
In 2019, Thailand established a National Screening Mechanism (NSM) to grant "protected person" status to foreign nationals unable or unwilling to return to their home countries due to a well-founded fear of persecution. In September 2023, a government committee started screening NSM applicants, but excluded migrant workers from Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos. Human rights and labor organizations have criticized this restriction. At the time of writing, no Myanmar national has applied to be a "protected person" under the NSM.
Nonrefoulement Under Domestic Law
On October 25, 2022, the Thai government published the Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance Act B.E. 2565 (2022) in the Royal Gazette, when it came into force. This law codifies the customary international law obligation of nonrefoulement, which prohibits countries from returning anyone to a place where they would face a real risk of persecution, torture, or other serious ill-treatment, a threat to life, or other comparable serious human rights violations. Despite the entry into force of this law, Thailand has continued to breach this obligation, from pushbacks of Myanmar nationals at the border to deporting ethnic Uyghurs to China, where they could face arbitrary detention, torture, and long-term imprisonment. In September 2024, the Bangkok Criminal Court disregarded Thailand's nonrefoulement obligation and ruled that the government could send exiled Montagnard human rights activist Y Quynh Bdap back to Vietnam.
Migrant Workers in Thailand
Thailand has long been a destination country for migrant workers across the region. Most migrant laborers come from Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, with the overwhelming majority coming from Myanmar. According to IOM, of the 5.2 million non-Thai nationals estimated to be living and working in Thailand as of July 2024, at least 1.8 million are migrants in irregular situations. IOM says that "high costs, long waiting times, and bureaucratic red-tape discourage many from entering to work in Thailand through legal routes."
According to another IOM assessment, "1.3 million Myanmar nationals crossed the border from January through December 2024" and 25 percent of those that entered since March 2023 cited the conflict and discrimination as a reason for crossing into Thailand.
It is clear from this description that Myanmar migrants crossing into Thailand are part of "mixed migration" flows. Mixed migration captures the fact that people crossing borders will be doing so for a variety of reasons, including those that would qualify for refugee status, or other form of complementary protection, as well as for economic opportunities or as the victims of human trafficking. A single individual may fall into more than one of these categories.
IOM has noted that "since March 2023, IOM monitoring activities indicate that 60 per cent of long-term Myanmar nationals had no documentation, exposing them to higher risks of violence, exploitation and abuse."
There are two main ways in which migrant workers from Myanmar can obtain documentation to regularize their status: 1) through the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) bilateral arrangement between Myanmar and Thailand on labor cooperation; or 2) through a regularization window, during which the Thai government issues a Cabinet Resolution to establish an amnesty period for in-country migrants to regularize their status.
MoU migrant workers generally start the process of documentation and enrollment on a labor migration pathway from outside Thailand and complete their orientation once in Thailand, although it has become increasingly difficult for Myanmar nationals to leave the country through formal pathways due to new restrictions imposed by the junta and since the new conscription law. Those who wish to regularize their status during an amnesty window are, by definition, already inside Thailand. Only 12 percent of Myanmar migrants are MoU workers, while 88 percent regularized their status in country during the amnesty windows.
Obtaining regularization through the amnesty window is a step-by-step process that includes: first, verifying one's identity with the Myanmar authorities (which is extremely risky for those who have just fled the country), resulting in a certificate of identity, especially important if an individual does not have a Myanmar passport; second, receiving a so-called "pink card," attesting to the migrant's legal status and their right to work; and third, being issued a work permit. While the official fee to regularize migrant workers is THB2,530 (US$77), interviewees said they consistently paid much higher fees to brokers to settle their status.
Undocumented in Thailand
The International Organization for Migration conservatively estimates that 1.7 million of the 4.1 million Myanmar nationals living in Thailand are undocumented. Most of this undocumented population have scant access to pathways for protection and remain vulnerable to harassment, arrest, detention, exploitation, and deportation by the Thai authorities. Despite this unwelcome treatment, the deteriorating human rights situation in Myanmar has pushed hundreds of thousands to cross the border and seek safety and economic opportunity in Thailand. While the migration flows are indeed mixed, and those people fleeing conditions in Myanmar want and need to work, this does not make them exclusively economic migrants. The underlying reality driving much of this migration flow is the need for protection-Human Rights Watch spoke to Myanmar migrants who had been arbitrarily detained, tortured, and extorted in Myanmar. Yet, Thai authorities broadly characterize it as economic. Thai immigration law both excludes Myanmar nationals from refugee recognition and renders most Myanmar nationals liable to arrest, detention, and deportation.
Fear of Return to Myanmar
Myanmar nationals in Thailand who have fled serious threats because of persecution or conditions of conflict, and who fear return on that basis, are de facto refugees, even if they have not sought asylum, been registered, or been officially recognized by Thai or UNHCR officials as refugees. The absence of a legal framework for refugee-status recognition-or lack of access to procedures-does not mean that they are not, in fact, refugees with legitimate claims to assistance and protection from the UN and the Thai government.
All those interviewed by Human Rights Watch said they could not and would not return to Myanmar. While their reasons varied, all cited reasons relating to the oppression and conflict in Myanmar from individual fears of persecution to a generalized fear of conflict-related violence.
Khin Kyi, a 33-year-old journalist from Yangon, said that when the coup happened, she participated in many of the anti-coup protests organized across the city:
I took part and reported on a lot of anti-coup protests. That's why I had to leave, when the arrests started, my friends were being arrested. I had the helmet that you use for journalists in my house - I heard that the police were doing midnight raids in the houses- I was worried they would come and search my house. My ID card said I was a journalist... I was scared. I fled for the jungle [on the Myanmar side of the border with Thailand].
Khin Kyi hid and worked from an area controlled by an ethnic armed group before she eventually sought refuge in Thailand.
Junta authorities have arrested hundreds of journalists since the coup.
Kyaw Thu, a 33-year-old man from Rakhine State, spent two years in detention in Myanmar's Ayeyarwady Region following his involvement in anti-junta protests in the years after the coup. He explained that the junta authorities had issued an arrest warrant against him, so he fled to Mandalay in Myanmar, but returned to Myaungmya where he had been living to see his wife and son, where he was taken into custody. He said:
When I was in prison in Myanmar, during the interrogation, the prison guards tortured me and hit me with a gun. I had high blood pressure because of this and the left side of my body became paralyzed. I had a stroke [as a result of the torture].
Kyaw Thu was released in January 2025 and said that when he exited the detention facility, police were waiting at the prison gates.
The [police] arrested me again and took me to the police station. I asked them why they arrested me - and they said the "generals" were waiting to see me. I met with the generals and they interrogated me and released me two nights later. I realized I did not have security. I have written political books before - the SAC [junta] sees me as a threat.
Upon release from the police station, Kyaw Thu immediately fled to Thailand.
More than 2,000 people have died while in junta custody, although the actual number is likely higher. The use of torture, sexual violence, and other ill-treatment is rampant in prisons, interrogation centers, military bases, and other detention sites, with reports of rape, beatings, prolonged stress positions, electrocution and burning, and deprivation of food, water, and sleep.
Mya Mya, a 65-year-old woman from Rakhine State, fled to Yangon in December 2024 when the fighting in her village intensified. Hostilities between the military and the ethnic Arakan Army in Rakhine State have surged since November 2023, with both sides committing mass killings, arson, and unlawful recruitment of civilians.
Mya Mya arrived in Mae Sot in December 2024:
I don't have a home anymore in my Rakhine State, it is destroyed. My daughter is still there and she told me my home is destroyed from the bombing. I was a farmer in Rakhine. We have land but since I am getting old, I cannot do that [farm work] anymore. We used to rent out the land to get income. But last year there was nobody to rent the land because of the conflict.
Mya Mya is now living in a safe house in Mae Sot in Thailand but does not leave the building as she has no documentation and is fearful of being stopped by the Thai authorities.
Military Conscription
Military conscription of those age 18 and older is generally permitted under international law. To be legally justified, forced recruitment for military service needs to fulfill certain criteria: be prescribed by law; implemented in a manner that is not arbitrary or discriminatory; and permit conscientious objection that can be challenged in a court of law. Child conscription is prohibited under international law. Human Rights Watch is especially concerned that conscription in Myanmar not be left to the unfettered discretion of local authorities or press gangs, but should be carried out according to nationally prescribed and enforced standards.
On February 10, 2024, the Myanmar military junta issued an order that brought the 2010 People's Military Service Law into force, so that men ages 18 to 35, women ages 18 to 27, and "expert" men and women up to the ages of 45 and 35, respectively, can now be drafted into the armed forces. The duration of conscription is usually two years but can be extended up to five years during a state of emergency, as in the current context. The law allows the use of military conscripts for work that is not of a purely military nature, which is incompatible with Myanmar's obligations under International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 29 on Forced Labour.
In a November 2024 report, the ILO, citing the Confederation of Trade Unions-Myanmar, noted that conscription has driven many people to flee the country: "Numerous individuals have escaped to Mae Sot, Thailand, to avoid being drafted into military service, where they now face new hardships, including lack of documentation, making it difficult to secure employment."
Myanmar's military has a long history of employing abusive recruitment tactics. Over the past year, junta authorities have used abductions and detention of family members to carry out conscription, including children. Conscripts have been used as human shields and porters on the front lines. The UN has verified the military's recruitment and use of over 1,900 children from July 2020 to December 2023, noting that "cases are likely significantly underreported."
Several interviewees told Human Rights Watch that they had fled Myanmar to escape conscription into military service.
Zaw Win, a 21-year-old man from Ayeyarwady Region fled being conscripted in Myanmar because the military was abusive.
I left Myanmar in December 2024 because of the conscription law. In the past the SAC would do the lucky draw [a lottery system to pick conscripts], but now they [the military] drag people out of the house. This is what my family who are still back home tell me now. I miss my family and I want to go back but then I hear this and my family tell me not to come back…I don't want to be in the army - I don't want to kill civilians. I heard rumors that there are a lot of casualties on the front line, and I don't want to be part of this. I'm not a political person. I'm in the betel nut business.
Zaw Win keeps a low profile in Mae Sot in Thailand. He does not leave his safe house as he does not have any documentation that would protect him against arrest and detention by the Thai authorities.
UNHCR has recognized that those fleeing conscription from militaries that commit violations of international law can claim refugee status.UNHCR's 2014 Guidelines on International Protection state that, "[i]ndividuals may … object to participating in military activities because … they may refuse to engage in activities which constitute violations of international humanitarian, criminal or human rights law."
The Myanmar military has a long history of committing war crimes and other atrocity crimes. In November 2024, the International Criminal Court requested an arrest warrant for Myanmar's junta chief, Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, for his role in alleged crimes against humanity committed against the Rohingya population in Rakhine State in 2017. The ICC prosecutor said that the alleged crimes were committed by the armed forces of Myanmar and supported by the national police, among others. UN entities, governments, and human rights organizations have also reported grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law by the Myanmar military.
The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar reported in July 2024 that there is:
substantial evidence that a variety of war crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed…. This pattern has been escalating and spreading across the country and the Mechanism has been collecting credible reports of brutal atrocities being committed at an alarming rate.
The European Court of Justice has also found that "in the context of armed conflict, particularly civil war, and where there is no legal possibility of avoiding military obligations, it is highly likely that the authorities will interpret the refusal to perform military service as an act of political opposition, irrespective of any more complex personal motives of the person concerned."
Human Rights Watch found that military deserters and defectors from Myanmar may be exposed to acts that are of such severe nature that they could amount to persecution. Thai authorities nonetheless continue to routinely arrest people from Myanmar who have evaded conscription or deserted for reasons of conscience and returned them to Myanmar.
Pathways to Documentation
Most of the Myanmar nationals interviewed by Human Rights Watch arrived in Thailand without any form of documentation. Several obtained an entry visa for a period of seven days when crossing the border regularly in Tak province in northern Thailand, but this documentation expired quickly. All said they were desperate to try and access any kind of legal status to regularize their stay in the country.
With no specific pathway for Myanmar nationals fleeing Myanmar, people used whatever available routes to Thai documentation they could pay for, including education visas, the statelessness card (a special identity card issued to stateless persons, particularly those living in border areas or hilltribe communities), and most commonly the migrant worker's card (the "pink card") when a regularization amnesty was announced.
All interviewees who had been or were in the process of applying for documentation, used an intermediary-a broker-to navigate the process. Most could not explain the steps of the lengthy process; they simply knew how much they had to pay at intervals. Some could name the various steps but could not detail what each of the fees they handed over were for.
Aye Kyi, a 24-year-old woman from Karenni State, took part in the civil disobedience movement after the coup. She said she wanted to become a fighter in one of the anti-junta People's Defense Forces, but her parents prevented her. She crossed the border to Thailand irregularly in 2022 and was undocumented. Aye Kyi explained that for the first year in Thailand, she knew no one and did not understand how to regularize her status but gradually learned how to go about doing it:
For the first year I had no documentation. I didn't trust anyone and no one I knew had information about how to get documentation. My boss in the burger restaurant where I worked told me to be careful if I saw the police. I was always looking out for the police, and the dangerous places where I could get stopped. I didn't have papers, I didn't have a passport, nor a driving license, it would have been a big problem if I had gotten arrested. I needed to support my family. The Myanmar police would put me in jail if I returned as I am wanted for my CDM [civil disobedience movement] activities. In the end I tried to get a pink card - one of my cousins introduced me to a broker and told me I could trust this person.… Everyone I know uses a broker because we cannot do it [regularize our status] directly.
Harassment, Arrest, and Detention of Myanmar Nationals
Many interviewees said that Thai police officers harassed them. Some said they were arrested and detained. One interviewee was deported. Human Rights Watch's investigations found a predominance of incidents occurring in Mae Sot, a city of more than 50,000 people in Tak province in northern Thailand, located on the border with Myanmar. Interviewees there described an atmosphere of extreme police surveillance and concomitant fear. As one UN official said, "The police are just looking for victims in Mae Sot.... [T]hey will try and find someone who is undocumented to extort them."
Mae Sot has long been an important hub for trade, migrant labor, and refugee movements as the Thailand-Myanmar Friendship Bridge connects it to Myanmar's Myawaddy town. The population of Myanmar nationals in Mae Sot has increased dramatically in the years since the coup.
As noted above, to be irregularly present in Thailand is an arrestable offense and Thai law does not allow for the protection and recognition of Myanmar refugees if they are outside the long-term camps and presumed to be migrant workers. This situation has given way to a landscape of corruption, exploitation, and extortion, in which Myanmar migrants and refugees are forced to buy whatever protection they can wrangle.
Tens, possibly, hundreds of thousands of Myanmar nationals continually pay bribes to avoid arrest, detention, and possibly deportation without obtaining meaningful protection in a lawful, systematic and sustainable way. Many Myanmar nationals are likely de facto refugees, fleeing persecution, conflict, abusive conscription and a dire humanitarian situation. These layers of exploitation and abuse add to their already vulnerable status.
Khin Maung, a 30-year-old journalist from Yangon who fled to Mae Sot in July 2023, told Human Rights Watch about his experiences with Thai police. He said that he had already fled once to Mae Sot in May 2023 but returned to Myanmar to continue documenting the conflict. He was arrested at a junta checkpoint in Hpa-An in Karen State where the officials said they would send his information to the police station in his hometown in Yangon so that he could be "watched." Fearing arrest by the SAC authorities, Khin Maung decided to flee again. He lived in Mae Sot for eight months, the first three of which he had no documents, and was stopped by the police six times and forced to pay money to be released. He said:
The main threat [in Mae Sot] is the police. I was scared of them. …I got stopped [by the police] six times: three times I paid the police money and they let me go. The first time, they asked for THB3,000 (US$88), the second time, it was THB9,000 (US$265), the third time it was THB18,000 (US$530).
Khin Maung eventually "bought" a migrant "pink" card and is now living in Chiang Mai where he feels more secure.
In Thailand, it is illegal to knowingly transport someone who does not have documentation as it could be construed as a human trafficking offense. Even if there is no intent to exploit, knowingly transporting an undocumented person can be considered aiding illegal immigration under the Immigration Act. Several interviewees, including Khin Maung, said they had been stopped by the police and threatened with a human trafficking offense.
Myint Swe, a 34-year-old journalist from Myitkyina in Kachin State, was actively involved in civil disobedience movement activities in the year after the coup. He heard that the group of people he was working with were specifically wanted by the junta authorities, so he decided to flee with his wife to Thailand in June 2022:
I was arrested in Mae Sot three times. …I was so shocked. In Myanmar I took part in a lot [of protests] but wasn't arrested, but in Mae Sot I was arrested. The police said they could charge me for human trafficking. … In December 2022, I was with my friend who is a lawyer and who is illegal [has no documentation]. … I drove home with him and I was caught. It was 11:30 p.m. when the police stopped us; they brought us to the police station in Mae Sot. I said please don't do any illegal things to us. They [the Thai police] said through their interpreter that they could charge me with human trafficking. I stayed in detention for four hours. They forced my illegal friend to go and get money. We had to give THB15,000 [US$448] to the police, and THB2,000 [US$60] to the translator who was Burmese.
The police again arrested Myint Swe, this time with his wife, and took them to the Mae Sot police station. They told him his motorbike was not registered and that he would have to pay them because of this. "I said you don't have the mandate to do this, you're not the traffic police. They said they could do anything they wanted." Myint Swe paid THB500 (US$15) and was released. In a final instance, Myint Swe said that police followed him on a street in Mae Sot while he was driving alone:
They [the Thai police] were hiding at the corner of the road. When I passed the corner, they followed me. I showed them my passport but they took me to the police station. They forced me to sign a letter in Thai. I don't know what it said. They still forced me to sign it. I tried to translate it with my phone and they told me to stop and they checked the photo gallery in my phone and deleted the photograph I had taken. I got a big trauma after these three times with the police.
Following these instances, Myint Swe moved to Chiang Mai in August 2023 where he managed to purchase an education visa. He explained that his Myanmar passport will expire soon, and he would have to return to Myanmar to get a new version, which he cannot do. In September 2024, the junta announced that Myanmar nationals living in Thailand with short-term education visas, who had previously been allowed to renew their passports at the Myanmar embassy in Bangkok or consulate in Chiang Mai, would now be required to return to Myanmar to do so. Myint Swe said he may be forced to consider buying a migrant workers' card, as the only solution (in the absence of a valid passport) to obtaining documentation and protection to remain in Thailand. As years pass since the coup, growing numbers of Myanmar nationals in Thailand and other foreign countries are facing the challenge of expired passports.
Many other interviewees had similar experiences with the Thai police, especially in Mae Sot. A civil society representative said that the police in Mae Sot often station themselves along key routes and intersections that are frequented by Myanmar nationals, such as on the highway route to Mae Tao clinic, a medical center that serves undocumented Myanmar refugees and migrants in the area: "The police checks are every day, like on the highway to Mae Tao clinic. Every evening, I see them there."
Soon after the coup, Htet Naing, a 29-year-old man from Insein Township near Yangon, participated in protests that led to him fleeing to Lay Kay Kaw in Karen State. At the end of 2021, he fled to Mae Sot because of fighting in Lay Kay Kaw. Because he entered irregularly and was undocumented, he limited his movements in Mae Sot until 2024 when he managed to purchase a "pink" card during a regularization window. In May 2024, as he was in the middle of the pink card process, he was stopped by the police:
I had received the document that confirmed my name on the Myanmar name list [the first step in the pink card process]. I was working at a tea shop and I was delivering tea at the Mae Tao clinic. As I was leaving, the traffic police stopped me - I didn't have a driving license [because I was undocumented] and he asked me for THB500 (US$15). The police nearly took my name off the list document. … I would have been so vulnerable if he took it from me. I was also stopped in July 2024.… It was the normal Thai police this time - they took me and my colleague to the police station and we had to pay THB1,000 to be released. At the time we had to negotiate a lot - I couldn't call my broker because my phone was broken, and the police at the police station kept saying, "Why didn't you call the broker when we arrested you?" They were angry. They threatened to deport us back to Myanmar.
Htet Naing eventually received a migrant worker's card. "Even though we are here, I don't feel like we are safe, we are Burmese and we will always be subordinate."
Police Card in Mae Sot
Interviewees told Human Rights Watch that the usual way to avoid arrest and detention in Mae Sot is to purchase what they described as a "police card," a "subscription" usually costing around THB300 (US$9) per month. The subscription does not involve an actual card, but rather the number of a broker who subscribers can call if they are arrested. The broker will then confirm with the police that the arrested person has already paid a subscription and should be released. The police card system does not correspond to any formalized process or official protection pathway but exists, rather, in custom and practice. It is a form of corruption that is a lucrative means of raising "off-the-book" funds for the brokers and police. A humanitarian organization official in Tak province said that a variation of Mae Sot's police card process existed in rural areas of western and northern Thailand, whereby Myanmar nationals purchase a subscription from the village leader who then liaises with the local police. While city people directly pay the broker THB300 per month under the table, this official said, village people usually pay a village leader THB400 for six months.
Most of the interviewees who spent time in Mae Sot obtained a police card so they could move around the city with less fear of arrest and detention. Young men who had evaded military conscription and were staying in safe houses said that community members had organized the police card for them and with this subscription they felt they could leave their house and work as day laborers, although they still restricted their movements. Khin Maung, a 28-year-old man from Ayeyarwady Division, said, "Since we don't have documentation and only the police card, I don't go outside unless it's very important."
In other situations, interviewees said they organized the police card by themselves but would only pay the monthly subscription when they needed to move. Win Kyi, a 39-year-old former university lecturer in Yangon, participated in the civil disobedience and resistance movements in the year after the coup. She fled to Mae Sot in the summer of 2021. "I couldn't pay the THB300 subscription every month," she said. "It was only when I was traveling around that I paid."
In some situations, one family member - usually the one working - will obtain the card and the other family members will entirely restrict their movements and stay at home in a form of self-imposed house arrest. Soe Myint, a 41-year-old woman from Karen State, said that she and her two school-age children did not go outside in Thailand after fleeing there with her husband, who paid a subscription to be able to work. She said:
I left in March 2024- we heard the military had enacted the conscription law. I was afraid of that - my husband was in their age range. The only family I have is my husband and kids. ... We also have to think about our kids' future, we couldn't send them to school [in Myanmar]. It is difficult to find a way to educate them in Myanmar.
In other cases, Myanmar nationals who could not afford police cards for the whole family moved to more remote areas because they believed police were less likely to detain children trying to go to school. Than Than Nwe and her family moved to a rural area outside Mae Sot near a migrant learning center:
I stay at home all the time. Only my husband goes to the construction site [to work]. We came here because we wanted our kids to have an education. We have no jobs here, no documentation, so we are afraid of being arrested. When my husband has to go out for work, he [purchases] the police card. As for me, I don't have anything. If I go out, the police will arrest me, as I have no documentation.
The police card appears to afford a corrupt and unpredictable system of ad hoc protection for newcomers from Myanmar and those who cannot afford a more expensive and secure form of documentation. It does not correspond to any official mechanism or law in Thailand. It permits the Thai police to use their power and position to extort money from vulnerable refugees and migrants from Myanmar.
Myanmar Nationals in Rural Thailand For some Myanmar nationals who fled to Thailand, even the relatively cheap police card subscription is out of reach. Human Rights Watch met with families hiding in hard-to-reach rural areas outside Mae Sot. Tin Shwe and Htun Aung, a husband and wife from Karen State, live in a makeshift bamboo hut on barren land in a rural area unconnected to running water and electricity. Tin Shwe was 8½ months pregnant at the time and said she had only just visited the Mae Tao clinic, which accepts Myanmar nationals without documentation, for her first scan (which should be performed before 24 weeks of pregnancy) because she had been too fearful of being arrested by the Thai police en route, as she could not afford to pay a bribe. "Just last month I went to the clinic to get a scan appointment," she said. "That was my first appointment because I can't afford the transport. I have no documentation; if I go, there's a risk of being arrested." In May 2024, the nongovernmental group, The Border Consortium, released a report looking at tens of thousands of refugees living in remote areas along the Thai-Myanmar border. It estimated that roughly 20,000 Myanmar nationals were living in these rural conditions along the border with little to no access to documentation: The overwhelming majority of households interviewed stated they have no passport or paperwork allowing them to stay in Thailand. Under Thai law they are considered illegal immigrants, not refugees. …This compels families to live on the fringes of society. Families' undocumented status confines them to the shadows, hindering their access to basic services, employment, and legal protection. This invisibility amplifies vulnerability, as they navigate their existence in perpetual fear of authorities. |
Rohingya Muslims in Thailand For many years Rohingya Muslims have been forced to flee their homes in western Myanmar's Rakhine State because of crimes against humanity, including persecution and apartheid, and acts of genocide. The lives of Rohingya refugees in Thailand, notably Mae Sot, are especially precarious because of their stateless situation. Since November 2023, a new wave of Rohingya have had to flee both the ethnic Arakan Army and the Myanmar military. Most have gone to nearby Bangladesh. However, some take land routes across Thailand to try to reach Malaysia and other countries where they hope their rights will be respected. Human Rights Watch spoke to two Rohingya families and an unaccompanied boy who had taken the long and arduous route from Rakhine State to Mae Sot. The journey was managed by smugglers and traffickers who accompanied them most of the way, extorting money at various points, beating, and abusing them. The Rohingya finally made it to Mae Sot, where they found relative security amid the Muslim Myanmar community already living there. Hamida and Karim, a young couple with a baby who was born on their travels, were living in a small, rented space in a makeshift warehouse with limited access to services. Having been extorted in Myawaddy in Myanmar for several months, the couple said they had no money left upon arrival in Mae Sot. They also had no documentation in Thailand, and because, like the vast majority of Rohingya in Myanmar, were stateless, had no identification or means to access identification there. A March 2024 report from the Mixed Migration Centre found that 97 percent of the Rohingya respondents they interviewed in Thailand were undocumented, compared to 55 percent of other ethnicities from Myanmar. The couple said they had suffered from scabies from the unsanitary conditions they were living in. Their months-old baby still had visible signs of what appeared to be scabies. Karim said: We have no documents and no papers now. We can't work and we're afraid that people will arrest us here [in Mae Sot]. We heard that we could have applied for a document in December [through the migrant worker amnesty window] - maybe paying between THB8,000 to THB10,000 [US$235 to 300] but we were told it would now be THB20,000 [US$600] each and we cannot pay this. … We have absolutely nothing, no form of ID - nothing! |
"Buying" the Migrant Worker's Card
The "pink card," officially known as the Non-Thai Identification Card, facilitates legal residence and employment within Thailand and serves as an identification document for foreign nationals, including migrant workers from the neighboring countries of Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. The regularization windows intermittently announced by the Thai government are open to both undocumented and documented migrant workers. In September 2024, the Thai Cabinet approved another regularization window, which was extended in February 2025.
Most interviewees said that they were in the process of renewing their pink cards or obtaining one for the first time. Because the process purports to facilitate employment, it requires the sponsorship of an employer. All interviewees used a broker to manage the process, and in all instances used a "fake" employer, that is, no one worked for the actual employer listed on the pink card paperwork. A UN official summed up the situation:
If you [a Myanmar national] want protection, you apply for the pink card. You pay maybe THB10,000 [US$300]. This is the only way to get protection from deportation. But it's basically paying bribes. They are forced to buy the pink card so they will not be arrested.
A representative from an international organization acknowledged the imperfect system, replete with exploitation, but suggested it was the best form of protection that currently could be expected:
People get extorted for getting the card, but the extortion that happens is still better than not having anything at all. Getting the card is the best-case scenario right now. And "borrowing" an employer is the best case.
The official government fees to obtain a pink card are roughly THB6,000 (US$167), but interviewees paid a wide range of fees, up to THB30,000 (US$884) to brokers to obtain an extension or to start the process from scratch. When Aye Kyi met with Human Rights Watch, she was in the process of extending her work permit:
Thailand is quite free and I like to live here, but the extension process is so expensive. Whenever I save [some money] it's time to pay the extension fee again.… I asked the broker about an update on my extension… but the broker hasn't responded. … I will not get it [the extension] if I do it myself, I need my broker.
Aye Kyi's documentation expired the day after she spoke to Human Rights Watch, and she was on the cusp of becoming undocumented once again. The Myanmar Certificate of Identity offices - an essential step in the process - in Chiang Mai were shuttered. "I have no idea what is happening," she said. "I have to be careful from tomorrow because the police will arrest me if they stop me." She also expressed concern that the political situation between Myanmar and Thailand could have an impact on her legal status and personal security. In July 2024, several of the Certificate of Identity offices in Thailand were closed allegedly in response to a request from Myanmar's junta.
The Myanmar Response Network highlighted many of the problems associated with obtaining a pink card in a May 2024 report:
Without clear worker registration guidelines and with short registration periods, some groups cannot complete registration in time. This is unreasonable, given the actual [low] numbers [of applicants]. These groups become illegal and risk arrest due to their lack of legal status. … There is no complaint mechanism for cases of overcharging or exploitation by brokers and recruiters, including excessive wage deductions.
Civil society organizations have criticized the process for including the step of verification with the Myanmar authorities: obtaining the certificate of identity for those who do not have a valid Myanmar passport. Some groups have recommended dispensing with the need to verify with the Myanmar authorities, a requirement which is dangerous for those wanted for resistance-related activities or evading conscription.
While the pink card usefully ensures migrant workers have a pathway to regularization and access to documentation, its use as the only protection mechanism available to Myanmar nationals is dangerous and exploitative. People desperate to stay in Thailand, to live and work without fear of arrest, detention, or deportation are forced to enter a system of exploitation as their only pathway to legal status and to health care and education.
Deportations
Deportations of Myanmar nationals from Thailand and pushbacks at the border have regularly taken place since the 2021 coup.In late October 2023, for instance, the Thai authorities forcibly returned approximately 9,000 Myanmar nationals to Myanmar without providing any legal procedure.
The Thai government is obligated to respect the international law principle of nonrefoulement, which prohibits countries from returning anyone to a place where they would face a real risk of persecution, torture, or other serious ill-treatment. Refoulement is prohibited by the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, to which Thailand is a party, as well as customary international law. The prohibition is incorporated in Thailand's 2023 Act on Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearances.
Thai authorities often conduct immigration raids and deport Myanmar nationals, particularly those without legal work permits. In August 2024, Thailand's Labor Ministry announced that it had detained and deported more than 144,000 Myanmar citizens in a three-month period "in a crackdown aimed at weeding out 'job seekers.'"
In February 2025, Thai officials in Ranong in southern Thailand on the Andaman Sea coast deported approximately 200 Myanmar nationals to Myanmar authorities in Kawthaung, across the border. All of the men deported were reportedly immediately conscripted into the Myanmar military. In March 2025, Thai authorities again handed over another 250 Myanmar nationals to SAC officials in Kawthaung, according to a statement from the Ranong Immigration Office.The Irrawaddy, an independent media outlet in Thailand, has connected the monthly deportations by Thai immigration officials in Ranong with the conscription policies of the Myanmar junta and alleged there is collusion between the two authorities:
[T]he junta is using Ranong Immigration Center as a recruitment hub, forcibly conscripting hundreds of its detainees amid recruitment struggles at home. The investigation revealed that Thai authorities in Ranong are indirectly aiding conscription efforts under the cover of an immigration crackdown, handing over 1,556 mostly male Myanmar nationals to regime authorities in Kawthaung between June and December 2024.
Interviewees consistently expressed fear of deportation, which underscored their fear of moving through cities without documentation and their desire to purchase whatever protection modality was available.
Ye Ni , a 47-year-old woman, said she fled Yangon when junta authorities arrested her boss in October 2022. She said that she was working for an organization that provided rations to civil disobedience movement teachers when her coworkers warned her that she was at risk of arrest herself. Ye Ni immediately fled, together with her 12-year-old niece whom she was caring for, to Mae Sot. Her relatives already in Mae Sot helped Ye Ni and her niece to purchase a police card subscription. She paid an additional THB1,000 (US$29) per month to the police to allow her to run a noodle shop. Despite this, Thai police in Mae Sot arrested her in May 2023 and forced her to pay THB2,000 (US$58) to be released. "They [the Thai police] said if I didn't pay, they would detain me and put me in jail," she said.
In November 2023, Thai immigration authorities arrested her and detained her together with her niece in an immigration detention center in Mae Sot:
We were opening a restaurant [in the neighborhood] at the time. I think maybe the neighbors reported this [to the authorities].… On that day, three people in immigration department uniforms and two people in civilian clothes came. They said they were from Bangkok. They checked if I had proper documents and I didn't have proper documentation [for the shop]. They said what I was doing [with the shop] was illegal. Me and my niece were at home and they arrested both of us.
She said that at the immigration center the authorities found out that they had no documentation: "So they said we would be detained and then we would be deported back to Myanmar. When I got the police card, the broker told me this would not protect us from the immigration authorities."
Ye Ni was detained with her niece for nine days wearing just the clothes she was arrested in. "We didn't have extra clothes," she said. "My niece was crying for three days straight."
After nine days, the Thai immigration authorities deported them both back to Myanmar. Ye Ni said that the other detainees had warned her that the Myanmar authorities would check her phone on the other side of the checkpoint, so she hid her phone among the blankets a relative had brought for her in the immigration detention center.
Once back in Myanmar, she said she was met with a range of authorities from various ethnic armed groups and the SAC, who told her she would be taken back to Yangon by bus. Ye Ni said that it was too dangerous to contemplate passing through the main SAC checkpoint on the way back to Yangon so she paid 130,000 Myanmar kyat (approximately US$62) to the bus driver who agreed that when the bus stopped for a meal before the checkpoint, she and her niece would not re-board the bus. Ye Ni made arrangements with a relative in Mae Sot who facilitated a car to pick them both up and drive them back to Mae Sot. She said she was still trying to obtain documentation in Mae Sot:
Right now, we don't have anything. I couldn't afford to pay for the pink card at first. I don't have that kind of money. But … the Thai police are conducting more raids. My uncle [who lives here in Mae Sot] said I need more documents, so he gave me money to apply for the pink card. We just completed the first step a few months ago.
Access to Essential Services
Myanmar nationals-especially undocumented migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers-face significant challenges in accessing essential services in Thailand. These challenges stem from their legal status, lack of official recognition, and limited rights under Thai law.
Health Care
Documentation plays a key role in accessing healthcare services in Thailand, but it is beyond the scope of this report to present a comprehensive analysis of the state of health care for Myanmar nationals in the country. Article 55 of the Thailand Constitution provides that, "The State shall ensure that the people receive efficient public health services universally, ensure that the public has the basic knowledge in relation to health promotion and disease prevention."[91] While few interviewees sought urgent health care while in Thailand, they nevertheless expressed fear about traveling to clinics or hospitals because of the risk of arrest and detention and preferred to seek treatment for any health-related issues by purchasing medicine at Thai pharmacies, or seeking out Myanmar healthcare professionals within the community in Thailand. The nongovernmental organization Fortify Rights has reported that Myanmar refugees seeking health care face arrest and extortion by Thai authorities in Mae Sot:
Refugees in Thailand identified fear of arrest, lack of legal documentation, lack of access to public health insurance schemes, and language barriers as among the reasons preventing them from accessing needed healthcare, especially in public hospitals and healthcare facilities. Faced with these barriers, refugees in Mae Sot often rely on free clinics run by non-governmental organizations.
Aung Ko, a 40-year-old journalist from Yangon, spent the first year after the coup documenting the situation in the country. In early 2022, he learned that the SAC authorities had started an investigation into his profile and so he fled the country. He spent a year in Mae Sot with a police card, but otherwise was undocumented. He limited his movements for fear of arrest by the Thai police in Mae Sot:
One day I was chased by two police officers on a motorbike; they drove slowly next to me but didn't stop me. After that incident I didn't go out because I was scared. Because I had no legal document, I was scared, I was hearing about arrests of people every day and I heard that people were being sent back to Myanmar and I didn't want that.
Aung Ko eventually moved to Chiang Mai in 2023 and applied for a migrant worker's pink card through a broker. Shortly after his arrival, he got into a motorbike accident:
I crashed my motorbike and I broke my shoulder. I had no documents at the time. I went to two private hospitals in downtown Chiang Mai and they denied me treatment because I had no documentation. I had to wait 10 days and I was just taking pain killers, it was terrible. I didn't know what hospital to go to and it took me 10 days to find one to accept me.
He said he called the broker who was helping him with his pink card, who helped him:
I had to pay THB5,000 [US$146] up front to him. I don't know how much he gave the hospital from that sum. The broker acted like a guarantor of payment. He provided a guarantee to the hospital that the injury did not come from a criminal act. He was basically saying "I vouch for this person."
He said the hospital told him it would cost THB100,000 (US$2,942) to do the operation, and he had to guarantee he had the money:
I got a grant from an NGO [nongovernmental organization], so I could do the operation. Then I went home, and the injury started leaking… I went back to the hospital and there was an infection. I had to do three more operations but this time I couldn't get funding for them.
Aung Ko managed to negotiate a payment plan with the hospital whereby he paid half of the THB80,000 (US$2,338) he owed to correct the infection and then THB5,000 (US$146) per month. He said that none of his Myanmar friends could visit him at the hospital because they were also undocumented and feared arrest on the way there.
He said he spent 50 days alone in the hospital where he said he faced unequal treatment by the hospital staff because of his Myanmar nationality. "The nurses knew I didn't have money," he said. "They didn't treat me well. I had no one to visit me. I didn't get given food. Gradually they got to know me but still they didn't explain much to me. I was not treated equally as others." He said:
It doesn't matter how many documents I have, I will never feel secure. Even if I don't do anything wrong, I feel I will be targeted. Everywhere I go, I feel their xenophobia. Once they [Thai people] know I'm Burmese, I am treated differently.
Thailand is a state party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Under article 12, the Thai government is obligated to "recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health." Article 2 guarantees this right without discrimination, including based on national or social origin.
The right to health includes not just the availability of healthcare services, but also the ability to physically and financially access them. Undocumented migrants, refugees, persons with disabilities, and those in rural areas must not face barriers to obtain health care due to discrimination or legal restrictions.
In areas like Mae Sot, many Myanmar nationals rely on health clinics such as Mae Tao Clinic, which offers free health care to undocumented people. Their service is essential and relied on by thousands in the area. Several interviewees who lived in Mae Tao said they had visited the clinic when they were sick. The clinic, however, mainly offers primary care services and does not have the capacity to conduct major procedures. Clinics such as Mae Tao are a critical lifeline for Myanmar nationals in the Tak region, but more is needed to ensure accessing health care does not become an opportunity to extort undocumented migrants and refugees.
Education
Most of the Myanmar nationals with whom Human Rights Watch spoke did not have families with school-age children, preventing a detailed analysis of access to education issues. However, those parents and guardians with school-age children described how fear of arrest prevented them from enrolling or sending their children to school. In one case this led a family to move to a rural area that has an education center for migrants, and lesser threat from police than urban areas.
Thailand has has had an "Education for All" policy since 1999, bolstered by a 2005 Cabinet resolution on education for unregistered persons, that guarantees 15 years of free basic education to all children in the country regardless of nationality or legal status. This policy, complemented by Thailand's withdrawal in August 2024 of its reservation to article 22 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which protects refugee and asylum-seeking children, aims to ensure that every child, including undocumented migrants, refugees, asylum seekers,and stateless individuals, have access to education.
Despite the inclusive legal framework, several obstacles hinder undocumented Myanmar nationals from accessing education. While the "Education for All" policy removes legal barriers, in practice some schools still request official documents during enrollment, deterring undocumented families from registering their children. To address these challenges, many undocumented Myanmar children attend Migrant Learning Centers (MLCs), which are community-based schools offering culturally sensitive education in the Burmese language.
However, MLCs are not officially accredited, lack government funding, and often face resource constraints. A few undocumented families told Human Rights Watch that they feared that enrolling their children in a formal Thai school could expose their lack of legal status, leading to potential arrest or deportation, so they relied on the MLCs instead. In recent years, the number of MLCs has increased in some areas to accommodate new arrivals, but others have been closed and staff face immigration-related prosecutions by the Thai authorities, who have raided and shut down MLCs for teaching in the Burmese language, teaching without permission, and because staff have no work permits.
Temporary Protection of Myanmar Nationals in Thailand
The lack of a legal framework in Thailand that recognizes and provides documentation for refugees and asylum seekers, and that treats Myanmar nationals who are not registered refugees inside the long-term border camps as illegal, means both de facto refugees and asylum seekers are subject to arrest, detention, and at times forced return. It makes them forever vulnerable to harassment, threats, and extortion on the street, in the workplace, and in their homes.
While it is not known how many of the five million Myanmar nationals living in Thailand outside of camps are de facto refugees, the Thai authorities should not presume that they are migrants with no refugee claims or need for protection.
The Thai government should consider an alternative to its current refugee policy that would allow Myanmar nationals to remain in Thailand to live and to work. Such a policy would reduce opportunities for corruption and exploitation and remove the chilling atmosphere of intimidation and harassment under which Myanmar people face. It would enable refugees to contribute to Thailand's economy in a sustainable manner and do so with dignity. Myanmar nationals constitute a significant portion of Thailand's migrant labor force and are essential in sectors such as agriculture, construction, manufacturing, and services. As the International Organization for Migration has highlighted, migrant workers help mitigate risks associated with an aging population and fill critical labor gaps.
Adopting a Temporary Protection Policy
The idea of a temporary protection policy for Myanmar nationals has long been under consideration. Various senior Thai government officials, including members of the House of Representatives Commission on National Security, Thai Border Affairs, National Strategy, and Country Reform, civil society organizations and UN agencies have all recommended a temporary framework for Myanmar nationals fleeing Myanmar since the 2021 coup. Rangsiman Rome, chair of the Thai House Committee on National Security and deputy leader of the People's Party, has emphasized the need for urgent reform:
The civil war in Myanmar is devastating, forcing many to flee into Thailand. Unfortunately, Thailand wasn't prepared, and refugees now live in the shadows without legal status. We can't return them due to international and domestic laws, so we've been working with [nongovernmental organizations] to provide humanitarian aid, but a long-term solution is necessary. … In the short term, Thailand must register the … Myanmar people here, providing them with legal status, work and education.
"Temporary protection" is internationally recognized as an expedient in response to mass influxes that overwhelm individual asylum systems. A temporary protection regime does not provide refugee or other status per se, but rather provides a mechanism for guaranteeing access to territory, protection, and assistance until such status can be determined. Temporary protection is intended to protect nationals and habitual residents of countries experiencing extraordinary conditions from being returned to those countries if they are not able to return in safety. Unlike asylum, which puts a person on a pathway to permanent protection, temporary protection does not require a person to establish a well-founded fear of being persecuted. Instead, it designates members of a nationality group for protection because they cannot return in safety due to generalized, temporary conditions in their home country. For instance, in Türkiye, a temporary protection regime was brought in to deal with the influx of Syrian refugees fleeing the civil war in the country. The European Union triggered its Temporary Protection Directive in response to the Ukrainian refugee crisis following Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022.
Because Thailand does not have an asylum procedure, no immigration agency mandated with these powers exists that can be overwhelmed by a mass influx. The National Screening Mechanism is in practice not open to Myanmar nationals because of regulations that exclude nationals of bordering countries and migrant workers.
Thailand should accede to the Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, establish its own asylum system, and provide protection either on the basis of individualized examination of claims or on a prima facie basis to refugees based on both the Refugee Convention definition and those fleeing war and generalized violence. In the interim, however, it should introduce an ad hoc temporary protection regime that would allow Myanmar nationals to register their presence in Thailand without fear of arrest or detention, acquire legal status, time-bound residency allowing freedom of movement, and the ability to access essential services such as health care and the right to work.
Acknowledgments
This report was researched and written by Nadia Hardman, researcher in the Refugee and Migrant Rights Division at Human Rights Watch.
This report was reviewed and edited by Bill Frelick, Refugee and Migrant Rights director. The report was also reviewed and edited by Bryony Lau, deputy director of the Asia division director, Sunai Phasuk, senior researcher on Thailand and Shayna Bauchner, Asia researcher. It was also reviewed, Heather Barr, associate director in the Women's Rights division, Bill Van Esweld, associate director in the Children's Rights division and Julia Bleckner, senior researcher in the Global Health Initiative of the Economic Justice and Rights division. Freddie Salas, senior associate in the Refugee and Migrant Rights Division, provided editing, and production assistance.
James Ross, Legal and Policy director, and Tom Porteous, acting program director, provided legal and program reviews. Production assistance was provided by Travis Carr, publications manager.
We are grateful to the Myanmar nationals in Thailand who were willing to share their experiences, including tragic personal accounts.