U.S.-India and EU-India Trade Agreements: Who Won

Commentary by William Alan Reinsch

Published February 9, 2026

Credit for this week's column idea goes to John Magnus of TradeWins LLC, a long-time trade consultant with an impressive ability to think outside the box. He reminded me that the virtual back-to-back announcements of the European Union-India and the United States-India trade agreements present an unusual opportunity to compare the two and draw conclusions about how well each party did and what that says about their respective strategies.

Of course, the now usual caveats apply. The full facts on both agreements are not yet available. The U.S.-India agreement will change depending on Trump's feelings about India from week to week, as we have seen happen with other agreements like those with the United Kingdom, European Union, and South Korea. Finally, there is the all-important implementation question. How much of what has been agreed to will be done; how much will be ignored; and how much will be slow-rolled?

That means it will be fair to complain that everything after this paragraph is speculative and need not be taken seriously. But I'm going to forge ahead anyway.

The EU-India agreement, signed on January 27, is being called the "mother of all deals." It covers about 25 percent of global gross domestic product and includes substantial tariff reductions-on 96.6 percent of EU exports to India and 99.5 percent of India's exports to the European Union. The catch is that not all those reductions will occur immediately. India estimates that 90.7 percent of its exports will benefit from immediate duty elimination, including key items such as textiles, apparel, marine, leather, footwear, chemicals, plastics/rubber, sports goods, toys, gems, and jewelry. India also estimates that only 49.6 percent of its tariff lines will be immediately reduced to zero, with most of the rest subject to 5-, 7-, or 10-year phase-outs, and not always to zero. Auto tariffs, for example, will be reduced from 110 percent to 10 percent over five years, but will also be subject to a 250,000 vehicle annual quota. The European Commission estimates that these reductions will save $4.7 billion annually in tariffs.

The agreement also provides for enhanced access to each other's services markets, and it includes binding commitments on labor rights, climate change, and environmental protection. It maintains EU food safety and sanitary standards and does not reduce tariffs on beef, poultry, rice, and sugar. The services commitments will give EU companies access to India's financial and maritime services markets, among others, and India will get access to 144 services subsectors, including information technology and professional services, as well as improved access for its professionals to the European Union. The European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, as well as other regulatory standards, will continue to apply.

A U.S.-India joint statement on an interim framework agreement was issued on February 6, although signing will not occur until at least next month. That means we should expect further changes. Since this is an interim framework agreement, there are fewer details than in the EU-India case. The main U.S. concession was to reduce the current 50 percent tariff to 18 percent. In addition, the United States promised to remove a number of tariffs once the agreement is completed-including on generic pharmaceuticals, gems and diamonds, and aircraft parts, plus adding a preferential tariff rate quota on auto parts. The statement also holds out the possibility of a further deal on pharmaceuticals and their ingredients.

On the Indian side, the statement indicates that India will "eliminate or reduce tariffs on all U.S. industrial goods and a wide range of U.S. food and agricultural products, including dried distillers' grains (DDGs), red sorghum for animal feed, tree nuts, fresh and processed fruit, soybean oil, wine and spirits, and additional products." This is significant, although the "or reduce" phrase suggests that in the end the reductions may be less than the United States expects.

There is also a commitment to address non-tariff barriers (NTBs), including in areas that have long been points of contention-medical devices, information and communication technology goods, and a review to determine whether U.S. or international standards will be accepted to allow products to enter India in some (not yet identified) sectors. India also commits to reviewing its NTBs on U.S. food and agriculture products. Note that the language, including a commitment to "address" these issues, gives India a degree of flexibility on what it might ultimately do.

The statement confirms India's commitment to buy $500 billion of U.S. goods over five years, although since India's purchases last year were only about $40 billion, that promise may not be realistic. Missing from the statement is any promise to stop Russian oil purchases.

So, who got the better of whom? Assuming it is implemented faithfully-a big assumption-the EU-India deal appears to be a classic win-win trade agreement. Both sides substantially improved their market access, including in some sensitive areas (which is why we should expect vigorous protests in both parties). On tariffs, India appears to have done better. Its new access will be broad, and its concessions are more limited in scope and time than those of the European Union. On services, the European Union may have a slight advantage, although the expanded ability for Indian professionals to move to Europe is significant.

The U.S.-India agreement, if implemented faithfully, would produce more for the United States than the EU-India deal produced for the European Union. While Indian tariffs may end up at zero more broadly, U.S. tariffs remain at a general rate of 18 percent, with some important exemptions that eliminate specific tariff lines. That leaves India largely in line with its regional competitors, which have tariffs only a percentage or two higher, not enough to make a big difference. Indian commitments on NTBs, which are not accompanied by parallel U.S. promises, could give the United States significant inroads into the Indian market.

That suggests the U.S. bullying approach may have produced better results, at least on paper, if the only criterion is how much each side got. From a broader perspective, the EU-India agreement is more likely to stand the test of time and be fully implemented since it is more balanced. The U.S.-India agreement, at least at this point, contains some elastic words that will allow India to do less than Trump says it promised, although that will prompt more threats and bullying. A full evaluation will be the job of future historians, but right now, a fair conclusion is that the EU and U.S. strategies both succeeded, but the United States ended up with a better short-term deal.

William A. Reinsch is senior adviser and Scholl Chair emeritus with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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