Criminal Kingpin “El Mencho” Is Dead, What Comes Next

Critical Questions by Henry Ziemer and Ryan C. Berg

Published February 26, 2026

On Sunday, February 22, Mexico's Ministry of Defense reported that it had killed drug kingpin Nemesio "El Mencho" Oseguera Cervantes in an operation originally aimed at capturing him. During the operation, six other cartel members were killed, and weapons, including "rocket launchers capable of downing aircraft and destroying armored vehicles" (authors' translation) were reportedly seized. Mexico will need to keep up pressure against organized crime, however, to further dismantle the powerful criminal enterprise El Mencho oversaw, which remains intact following his death.

Q1: The Mexican government carried out a significant operation against the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG). What happened, and how did the CJNG respond?

A1: The head of the feared CJNG, El Mencho, was the Mexican cartel leader with the highest reward on his head-the Department of State had offered $15 million for assistance in his arrest. Although not much is known about the operation carried out against El Mencho beyond the tracking performed to locate the drug lord at a remote hideout, Mexico's Claudia Sheinbaum administration has insisted that Mexican forces carried out the operation, with intelligence assistance from the United States. U.S. announcements confirm the same.

This represents an early and significant victory for the Joint Interagency Task Force-Counter Cartel (JIATF-CC), which was established a little over one month ago by the U.S. Department of Defense. An interagency effort, JIATF-CC aims to map cartel networks that operate seamlessly across the southern border and collect actionable intelligence. Both the Mexican and the U.S. governments hinted at this intelligence-sharing and broader cooperation framework in their announcements after El Mencho's death.

Predictably, the CJNG responded to the death of their leader with violence and a show of force against the Mexican state. Normally, after the killing of a cartel leader, the Mexican state expects acts of revenge and shows of force in areas of cartel control, in this case centered around the group's power center in the states of Jalisco, Guanajuato, and Michoacán. By contrast, on Sunday, at least 20 states reported cartel activity and outbursts of violence coordinated by the CJNG. This included harrowing scenes of an attempted takeover of the Puerto Vallarta Airport, stranded tourists in beachside hotels, and more than 250 "narco blockades" along roads and important transport arteries in Mexico, where burning vehicles or physical barriers prevented passage. To date, the fallout has resulted in the deaths of dozens of the CJNG operatives, as well as at least 25 members of the Mexican Armed Forces. The scope of the CJNG's reprisals was notable and serves as a fresh reminder of the power cartels wield in Mexico vis-à-vis the Mexican state. By Tuesday, violence had become concentrated once again in some of its main areas of territorial operation, such as the aforementioned central states of Mexico.

Q2: What are the likely scenarios for Mexico and the CJNG moving forward?

A2: Mexico has sent forces to Mexican states where the CJNG has its power base. Occasionally in the past, killing a cartel kingpin has been highly destabilizing in the short-to-medium term. Much depends on whether the CJNG can consolidate around a single leader, or whether the group fractures and enters a civil war.

In the first scenario, the situation may revert to its status quo ante before the death of El Mencho, with the CJNG maintaining control over key territories in Mexico and remaining a predictable source of violence. This scenario would require someone within the CJNG to quickly consolidate support and prevent any factions from opposing their rule. As of now, there are unconfirmed reports that Juan Carlos Valencia González, El Mencho's stepson, who runs the Elite Group within the CJNG, has assumed control. If confirmed, Valencia González's leadership would present a host of challenges for JIATF-CC, as he was born in the United States; there are limits on intelligence collection and kinetic operations against U.S. citizens.

In the second scenario, violence could spiral out of control and present another front in Sheinbaum's public security efforts. Since 2024, the state of Sinaloa, home to Mexico's other large and famous cartel, has been the site of an ongoing civil war between the "Chapitos" faction, run by the remaining sons of Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, and the "Mayitos" faction, run by the son of Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada García. Violence in that state has accelerated beyond the Mexican state's ability to control. Homicides in Sinaloa rose by 400 percent as the two groups descended into internecine warfare. The last thing the Sheinbaum government wants is a further hit to Mexico's public image, especially given that Jalisco state's Guadalajara is planning to host FIFA World Cup matches later this year.

A third scenario would be both preferred by the United States and best for Mexico as well. President Claudia Sheinbaum, emboldened by the success of the mission against El Mencho, may be encouraged to leverage the forces surged to multiple Mexican states and exploit the disruption to CJNG's leadership. She may opt to continue pressing for the Mexican state to improve territorial control. This would require her and her secretary of security and citizen protection, Omar García Harfuch, to continue leaning into cooperation with the United States and the intelligence collection undertaken by JIATF-CC. While risky, electing to continue pressing ahead in a moment of vulnerability for the CJNG could see Mexico make important gains in the fight against cartels.

Q3: What does Mexico need to translate tactical success into lasting security?

A3: Despite its impressive tactical performance on February 22, Mexico cannot afford to relax the pressure on organized crime. The elimination of a single leader, no matter how notorious, is not sufficient to unwind a group as wealthy, well-armed, and brutal as the CJNG. A bloody contest for control over the cartel, or even a splintering of the organization into rival factions, could all exacerbate problems of insecurity in Mexico.

Furthermore, the CJNG has seemingly held a fair amount of its capabilities in reserve. For instance, the CJNG has been at the cutting edge of weaponized drone use in Mexico, but has seemingly avoided deploying these systems en masse against security forces. This could reflect the surprise and ad hoc nature of the group's initial retaliation, but it may also signal that the cartel is conserving its forces to wage a more protracted fight against the state. Countering this demands a sustained effort by Mexican security forces to not merely take out cartel leadership, but to take and hold territory formerly ruled by armed groups.

Another key challenge for Mexico will be rooting out corruption and impunity within the political system. Especially at the local level, cartels like the CJNG routinely seek to co-opt or intimidate government officials into doing their bidding. This includes high-ranking members of President Claudia Sheinbaum's own Morena Party, like Adán Augusto López, who resigned from his role as President of the Senate this year, dogged by scandals alleging his links to organized crime, including the CJNG. Furthermore, impunity remains a perennial issue in Mexico, where up to 99 percent of violent crimes go unsolved. The country's recent judicial reforms, which brought a spate of, in some cases, underqualified and unvetted judges to the bench, could worsen this problem at a time when a stronger criminal justice system is sorely needed. Nevertheless, recent arrests of local government officials, including the mayor of Tequila, Jalisco (a Morena party member), for extortion and collaboration with the CJNG, could be a sign that the Sheinbaum administration is beginning to take graft and impunity seriously.

Q4: Has the killing of El Mencho meaningfully reduced the likelihood of kinetic action from the United States?

A4: The probability of unilateral U.S. military intervention in Mexico has likely decreased with the death of El Mencho. The CJNG leader was a priority for the United States, which last year designated the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. While President Donald Trump's eagerness to take credit for the killing of the cartel leader during his Tuesday State of the Union Address may rankle some within Mexico, it is far more important that the president did not take the opportunity to levy any threats of direct military action against the cartels.

Preliminary reports of the operation also signal strong U.S.-Mexico intelligence cooperation leading up to, and even during, the raid on El Mencho's safehouse. In addition to JIATF-CC, the CIA and FBI both provided critical intelligence on the precise location of this facility, while one recent article claimed that a U.S. Predator drone circled overhead as Mexican special forces dueled with cartel hitmen on the ground. This would be consistent with reports last year that the United States has flown unarmed MQ-9 Reaper drones into Mexican airspace at the request of the Sheinbaum administration, collecting intelligence on organized crime, which led to subsequent arrests of cartel leaders. In August of 2025, one such drone flight was detected on public flight tracking sites penetrating deep into southeastern Mexico, around the states of Michoacán and Jalisco, where the CJNG has a significant presence. It is possible that some of these flights helped build an operational picture of El Mencho's facility and its defenses ahead of the assault.

The February 22 raid could also provide a template for future U.S.-Mexico security cooperation wherein the United States provides enabling intelligence while Mexico provides the boots on the ground. The United States has significant intelligence collection capabilities but is often reticent to share this with non-vetted partners. Under former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, U.S.-Mexico intelligence sharing fell to historic lows, compromising Washington's trust in the ability of its partners to act decisively on the information being shared. The fact that seemingly Mexican special forces were able to achieve total surprise against the CJNG is therefore encouraging in this regard. Beyond intelligence sharing, the United States can also play an important role in capacity building for the Mexican police and military. Indeed, the week before the raid on El Mencho's compound, U.S. Navy SEAL Team 2 arrived in Mexico to begin a two-month training exercise with their Mexican counterparts. U.S. expertise in special operations will be critical to allowing the Mexican armed forces to keep up an aggressive tempo against cartel leadership.

While it seems like U.S. kinetic action in Mexico is in abeyance, developments in the coming weeks and months might cause the current equilibrium to erode. A CJNG civil war centered around Jalisco and Michoacán states would exacerbate the problem of violence along Mexico's east coast. With the Sinaloa civil war still raging, Mexico would find renewed intra-cartel violence difficult to control. If the White House begins to feel again that Mexico is unwilling or unable to keep a lid on criminal violence, it could return to its former position that only direct military intervention can break the power of the cartels. Other developments, like the targeting of U.S. tourists or violence during the upcoming World Cup, could exacerbate this sentiment within the Trump administration. Although U.S.-Mexico security cooperation appears much stronger now than it did a year ago, the present stability is predicated on continued progress in the fight against organized crime.

Henry Ziemer is an associate fellow with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Ryan C. Berg is director of the Americas Program and head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative at CSIS.

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