Hoover Institution

07/14/2026 | Press release | Archived content

The Moon As A Test Case For Coercion Theory: US Interests In A New Space Race

  • Science & Technology
  • Innovation
  • US Defense
  • Understanding the Effects of Technology on Economics and Governance

China aims to land taikonauts on the Moon before 2030-before the US returns to the lunar surface-and set the operating rules that will govern future lunar activity. Traditional deterrence won't work in a domain where the US is unable to project military force, and space treaties lack enforcement. This essay presents four conflict scenarios to show what's at stake, and proposes a near-term US strategy of accelerated missions, allied coordination, clear red lines, and concrete military doctrine.

Key Takeaways

  • The Moon is becoming the next strategic battleground between the US and China. China has conducted an ambitious series of robotic lunar missions, has a stated goal of landing taikonauts (Chinese astronauts) before 2030, and has partnered with Russia to establish the International Lunar Research Station at the Moon's south pole before 2035.
  • The US needs to make getting astronauts back to the Moon a top national priority. Whichever country establishes a sustained lunar presence first will have outsized power to set the operating rules, claim the most strategically valuable sites, and potentially block competitors from accessing critical areas.
  • Traditional methods of deterring adversaries won't work on the Moon, where the US lacks ability to project military force. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty-the foundation for international space law-has no enforcement mechanisms. And the Artemis Accords' provision of "safety zones" around nations' lunar bases remains undefined.
  • America should work with allies now to establish clear operating rules. The 67 countries who've signed the Artemis Accords need to agree on concrete definitions and standards before China establishes its own competing framework.
  • The US must draw clear red lines and be prepared to enforce them. This means publicly stating what behaviors will not be tolerated (like interfering with our satellites or equipment) and backing those warnings up with real, credible consequences.
  • The Department of Defense (War) and Space Force need to move beyond theory and continue to develop concrete doctrine and force design to prepare for the risk of actual conflict in the cislunar environment.

The Moon as a Test Case for Coercion Theory: US Interests in a New Space Race by Hoover Institution

Cite this report:

Dan Berkenstock and Walter J. Manuel, "The Moon as a Test Case for Coercion Theory: US Interests in a New Space Race," Leadership for Responsible Space Policy, Hoover Institution, July 2026.

About the Authors

Dan Berkenstock is a distinguished research fellow at the Hoover Institution, where he studies the intersection of space entrepreneurship, venture-backed defense tech companies, and defense acquisition reform. Previously, Berkenstock was the founding CEO of the venture-backed company Skybox Imaging. He holds a PhD in aeronautics and astronautics from Stanford University.

Walter J. Manuel is a PhD candidate in Stanford's Aeronautics and Astronautics Department and a member of the Stanford Space Rendezvous Laboratory. His research focuses on enabling autonomous distributed space systems and improving space domain awareness in cislunar environments.

Hoover Institution published this content on July 14, 2026, and is solely responsible for the information contained herein. Distributed via Public Technologies (PUBT), unedited and unaltered, on July 24, 2026 at 12:25 UTC. If you believe the information included in the content is inaccurate or outdated and requires editing or removal, please contact us at [email protected]