10/24/2025 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 10/24/2025 15:29
Photo: JUNG YEON-JE/AFP/Getty Images
Commentary by Erin L. Murphy and Philip Luck
Published October 24, 2025
Critical minerals play an increasingly important role not only in technology used on a daily basis but also in important military, medical, and emerging technology applications. Reliable access to these resources is key to maintaining a technological and competitive edge. As China controls and processes the majority of the world's critical minerals, the United States and like-minded countries should work together to ensure a secure supply chain and cultivate trusted partners across both midstream and downstream sectors. The upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Gyeongju, South Korea, provides the United States and its regional allies an important opportunity to build resilient supply chains by expanding regional mining, refining, processing, and manufacturing capacity.
The region is central to all of these industries: An estimated 70 percent of global mining output is produced and consumed within APEC economies, and APEC's own energy ministers recognize "minerals, materials . . . and technologies [as] critical inputs for achieving secure energy systems." Yet the region's technology sectors and security rely heavily on just a few suppliers. For example, the United States is 100 percent import dependent for at least 15 mineral commodities, and China produces roughly 60 percent of the world's rare-earth elements.
The United States is actively focused on rebuilding its industrial base to maintain a leading edge in military and critical emerging technology. However, these technologies, including batteries, semiconductors, medical devices, fighter jets, and missiles, among others, all rely on critical minerals (including rare earths) most of which are produced or processed by China. On October 9, China expanded its export controls on rare earths, requiring Chinese nationals to obtain authorization from authorities to participate in or support overseas projects that engage in exploration, extraction, processing, or magnet manufacturing. Foreign companies and individuals must also obtain an export permit for dual-use items from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce before they export materials out of China. This is not the first time China has implemented export controls or threatened to limit access to its national resources, nor will it be the last time China resorts to economic coercion.
Given this backdrop, the United States and its partners and allies can build on the foundation already laid through its membership in APEC and the momentum around bilateral agreements and policy initiatives to stabilize and secure critical minerals supply chains.
The United States has recently struck initial deals with Australia and Indonesia on critical minerals. As noted in an October 20 fact sheet issued by the White House, the United States and Australia are looking to invest $3 billion in critical minerals projects in the next six months and pursue efforts to curb China's mining acquisitions. Additionally, the U.S. Export-Import Bank is issuing seven letters of interest targeting investments in critical minerals and supply chain security projects, and the Pentagon intends to support the construction of a gallium refinery in Western Australia. Indonesia agreed to remove some of its export restrictions on critical minerals and to work with the United States to improve supply chain resiliency. The details of these agreements are still lacking and are likely subject to change, but these actions at least demonstrate the Trump administration's concerns about critical minerals supply chains, particularly as they relate to the administration's goals on technology leadership.
Adding to the momentum is South Korea's dual role as APEC host and chair of the Mineral Security Partnership (MSP), a multilateral initiative aimed at building resiliency into global critical minerals supply chains. Beyond South Korea's important role as a leader in multilateral fora like the MSP, it is also well positioned to take concrete steps in collaboration with APEC partners through its existing overseas investment institutions. South Korea's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport and the business development platform Korea Overseas Infrastructure and Urban Development Corporation (KIND) already invest in large overseas infrastructure projects (e.g., ports and power plants) and could extend these activities to critical minerals infrastructure. For example, KIND runs "infrastructure cooperation centers" in key markets (e.g., in ASEAN and Africa) to connect South Korean firms with local projects, illustrating how Seoul can channel investment to priority areas. These ongoing efforts can be further enhanced using APEC's connectivity initiatives to streamline permitting and build facilities (e.g., mineral processing plants, refineries, and recycling centers). South Korea's KIND already supports projects abroad, and coordination through APEC could ensure critical minerals projects are treated as high-priority infrastructure, benefiting from fast-tracked approvals and shared best practices.
South Korea's leadership in these efforts is not only well aligned with U.S. interests but is also critical to the country's economic security. Access to critical minerals is vitally important to South Korea, as it is the second-largest producer of semiconductors, responsible for 60.5 percent of the memory semiconductor sector globally. South Korea is also a global battery manufacturing powerhouse, producing lithium-ion batteries for electric vehicles, IT devices, and energy storage systems. Its main competitor is China, adding to South Korea's economic security concerns. The country knows its economy relies on sustained access to critical minerals and rare earths, necessitating strong partnerships to build supply chain resiliency.
South Korea is not alone in advocating for such partnerships. The U.S. Senate is considering a bill introduced by Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) that seeks to enhance collaboration with partners and allies on resilient supply chains, promote tech cooperation with trusted partners, and reduce dependence on Russia and China for critical minerals. The Critical Minerals Partnership Act, introduced earlier this year, would also empower the Department of State, through the newly confirmed undersecretary of state for economic growth, energy, and the environment, to actively participate in the MSP, using it as a way to "to identify and support investment and advocate for commercial critical mineral mining, processing, and refining projects" and to pursue joint projects, among other steps. These efforts could be further enhanced and magnified through the proposal for APEC science and tech working groups to focus on research and development on recycling and material substitution. For example, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea are jointly developing rare-earth-free magnet technology (as done by Japan's Daido Steel and Honda). Pooling innovation funding would reduce costs and ensure open licensing across APEC economies.
Pooling funding and undertaking joint development projects is also an avenue for APEC members and is included in the United States recent agreement with Australia and in Senator Shaheen's bill. For example, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) has provided financial support to critical minerals mining in Brazil and Mozambique and has been engaged in the Lobito Corridor project, providing technical assistance and political risk insurance for mining projects across Central Africa. The DFC also works closely with its counterparts in Japan and Australia and has signed a memorandum of understanding with partners in South Korea. These partners can work in third countries where resource wealth is available or provide funding to support infrastructure buildouts for processing or refining facilities. The South Korean government has taken steps to support resource development projects overseas, committing more than $37 billion in August 2025 as part of the Supply Chain Stabilization Fund to secure supply chains and critical minerals. Japan has likewise paved the way for public-private partnerships in the sector. The Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security has partnered with Sojitz since 2011 on investments in Australia's Lynas Rare Earths mining firm to secure important natural resources for the country. APEC partners can build on these examples, working within these networks to develop mining resources in countries with rare earths and critical minerals, such as Indonesia and Vietnam, as well as other resource-rich countries, and scale up processing and refining facilities.
China's control of critical minerals, including much processing and refining, makes the United States, South Korea, and other members of APEC economically insecure. Every country cannot scale up processing and refining, nor do they all possess access to the minerals themselves. It behooves the United States and its partners and allies to collaborate on these issues, building trusted supply chains and supporting each other's contributions to tech manufacturing. MSP is one area for potential collaboration, but longstanding alliances and partnerships on economic issues provide the foundation for engagement on such critical challenges.
Erin Murphy is deputy director of the Chair on India and Emerging Asia Economics and senior fellow of Emerging Asia Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.Philip A. Luck is director of the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.
Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
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