What Is Israel Trying to Accomplish in Lebanon

Commentary by Daniel Byman

Published March 19, 2026

Although the U.S. and Israeli war with Iran and the Iranian response dominate headlines, the concurrent war between Israel and Lebanon is producing almost as many casualties-over 1,000 Lebanese have died so far-and has led to the evacuation of parts of northern Israel, the deaths of several Israelis, and the displacement of over 1 million Lebanese in just two weeks.

This war is a continuation of past attacks, with March representing a sharp escalation in their scope and scale. The latest round of conflict can be dated to when Hezbollah attacked Israel after Hamas's October 7, 2023, strike. After months of limited back-and-forth, an all-out war broke out in 2024, which Israel won decisively. Although the two agreed to a ceasefire in November 2024, Israel carried out hundreds of attacks on Hezbollah positions and personnel since then. Things got much worse after Hezbollah struck Israel with rockets and drones shortly after Operation Epic Fury (Israel calls its operation "Rising Lion") began. Since that attack, Israel has hit Lebanon hard, striking hundreds of sites including command centers, weapons storage areas, and military leaders and personnel, particularly from its elite Radwan forces. Israeli ground forces have also advanced several miles into Lebanon.

Israel's primary goal is simple: weaken Hezbollah. Israel has long embraced a "mowing the grass" approach to terrorist groups, where it tries to keep them weak but, believing a political solution is impossible, prepares to strike them again and again to prevent them from recovering their strength. With the world focused on Iran, Israel has seized the moment to deal Hezbollah a series of tough blows.

Israel is particularly focused on the area near its northern border. Israeli officials worry that Hezbollah, like Hamas on October 7, will do cross-border raids into Israel from southern Lebanon. They also seek to reduce the threat from Hezbollah's rocket and missile arsenal, much of which is short-range, such as Katyushas, Fajr-1s, and Fajr-3s. Hezbollah has tens of thousands of these short-range systems, but they can fire less than 30 miles into Israel. Israel has called for Lebanese to evacuate southern Lebanon and other Hezbollah strongholds. This includes not only towns along the border, but also neighborhoods in major cities like Beirut. Israeli ground forces have tried to destroy Hezbollah military infrastructure like tunnels and launch positions near the border and may be establishing a de facto buffer zone there.

By hitting Hezbollah hard, Israel also seeks to bolster deterrence, a long-time Israeli concern with Hezbollah. Israeli deterrence failed on October 7, and Israel wants extra insurance that it will succeed in the future-confidence gained by keeping all its adversaries weak.

Although Hezbollah is striking back, the organization is far weaker than it was several years ago. The group has launched several thousand rockets, missiles, and drones into Israel-some days saw more than 100 projectiles being fired, according to a report by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. These have inflicted relatively few casualties on Israel, and the group has not struck deep into Israel.

So far, the balance sheet is one-sided. Although Israel is sensitive to its casualties and to the disruption of daily life in the north, it claims to have killed over 500 Hezbollah fighters, including key commanders, and destroyed parts of Hezbollah's rocket, missile, and drone arsenals.

The conflict offers an opportunity for Hezbollah's rivals in Lebanon to increase their power vis-à-vis the group, which once was untouchable in Lebanon. Hezbollah is far weaker than it was before the 2024 war, when it was a key pillar of Iran's regional position. Hezbollah's leader Naim Qassem has admitted that the organization suffered 18,000 casualties (including 5,000 deaths) in the 2024 war, and Israel destroyed much of its rocket arsenal then. The latest killings and destruction will further reduce the group's military strength. In response to U.S. pressure, the Lebanese government has put some restrictions on Hezbollah's financial institutions. Making all this worse, the fall of the Assad regime meant the loss of one of Hezbollah's closest allies. In addition, repeated strikes by Israel and the United States against the Iranian regime-combined with Iran's economic problems-will make it far harder for Tehran to continue to send hundreds of millions to Hezbollah every year, even if the clerical regime survives the latest war.

Lebanese rivals are also challenging Hezbollah more. Before the latest crisis, the Lebanese Armed Forces deployed to southern Lebanon and disarmed and replaced Hezbollah forces there. Lebanese leaders also called for negotiating with Israel, a hitherto taboo subject. Hezbollah, for its part, was not eager for this fight (Iran was probably calling in the many favors Hezbollah owes the clerical regime), and it likely to be even less eager for conflict in the future. Israel, however, shows little interest in bolstering the Lebanese state through negotiations or otherwise bolstering Hezbollah's rivals.

Israel's campaign in Lebanon reflects a familiar but intensified strategic objective: not the elimination of Hezbollah, but its sustained degradation. The broader regional context-particularly the simultaneous confrontation with Iran-has created both urgency and opportunity, allowing Israel to strike a weakened adversary whose political and financial backing is under strain. Yet the strategy carries enduring risks: Even a diminished Hezbollah retains the capacity to disrupt northern Israel and escalate unpredictably, while many ordinary Lebanese will suffer. Ultimately, Israel appears to accept that the conflict with Hezbollah will persist as a recurring feature of the region's security landscape.

Daniel Byman is the director of the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He is also a professor at Georgetown University.

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