The South Caucasus: Scenarios of a Rapidly Changing Region

• by Aldo Ferrari
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The South Caucasus is currently experiencing a period of great political dynamism, redefining its structure in a significant break from its recent past. Until a few years ago, Georgia was clearly pro-Western; Armenia had a solid strategic relationship with Russia, while maintaining strong ties with the US, the EU, and Iran; Azerbaijan collaborated positively with both Turkey and Russia, seeking to maximize its energy resources. In recent years, these orientations have largely faded, and the dynamics of the region are rapidly evolving.

This dossier therefore aims to outline some of the region's key political dynamics. The construction of a new and less conflictual relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan is probably the most significant development of this changing situation. The so-called Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), launched on August 8, 2025, by U.S. President Donald Trump with Armenia's premier Pashinyan and Azerbaijan's president Aliyev, constitutes a quite remarkable product of the ongoing and complex reconciliation process between the two countries. This corridor/route - connecting mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia - promises new regional connectivity but excludes Iran and, above all, Russia, which has had a decisive role in the region in the past. Apart from the numerous questions regarding this project's implementation, the post-Second Karabakh War landscape clearly reflects a significant weakening of the Russian position in the region, primarily due to the end of its long-standing collaboration with Armenia. At the same time, Turkey's role in the South Caucasus has grown considerably, mainly thanks to its privileged relation with Azerbaijan, a regional partner and ally. The strong ties with Baku, however, do not prevent Ankara from recognizing Russia's interests in the South Caucasus. As Daria Isachenko wrote, this policy enables Turkey to achieve more, by doing less.

According to Shujaat Ahmadzada, the Armenia-Azerbaijan normalization is expected to have positive effects across the region, including the development of new Armenia-Turkey relations, the economic benefits of which for local communities could be remarkable. In this perspective, the new Pax in the Caucasusshould be embedded in wider regional structures, as bilateral normalization alone cannot suffice; more institutionalized Baku-Yerevan-Ankara ties could form the baseline of a new regional order-making framework that would also include Georgia, but not Russia, whose relations with Azerbaijan have seriously deteriorated in the last while.

However, as Benyamin Poghosyan observes, it is far from certain that Armenia's near future will finally see the opening of the border with Turkey and the signing of a peace agreement with Azerbaijan, or will it meet the fate of previous, unsuccessful attempts to establish lasting peace and security in the South Caucasus. Indeed, Armenia's political situation appears highly polarized. Pashinyan's leadership - after securing parliamentary approval in February 2025 for a highly complex move toward EU accession - is now facing growing difficulties and is also engaged in a disconcerting conflict with the Armenian Apostolic Church. Given the huge historical role of this institution in national identity, the government's actions provoked a serious backlash, both in Armenia and in the Diaspora, contributing to the further polarization of society. In any case, the year 2026, which will see crucial parliamentary elections, could be a crucial one for Armenia, significantly influencing the foreign and domestic policy trajectory of the country in the coming period.

Cesare Barberis's article takes into consideration the political deadlock between the EU and Georgia. Since taking office in 2012, Georgian Dream Party has overseen a progressive normalisation of relations with Moscow after the 2006 embargo and the 2008 South Ossetia war. Tensions with EU broke out when Georgia declined to align with sanctions against Russia after the invasion of Ukraine. Georgian Dream government justified its position by arguing that sanctions against Moscow could expose the country to hard economic pressure and security risks along the occupation lines in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. From Brussels' perspective, however, the refusal indicated a troubling shift in geopolitical posture of Tbilisi. While Georgia remains strategically relevant for the Union's Eastern Neighbourhood, Brussels has struggled to exert consistent influence on a government that has progressively recalibrated its alignment. Nevertheless, divergent approaches among EU institutions and member states have limited the Union's capacity to respond to democratic regression in Tbilisi.

Russia and Iran view a Western-backed corridor through the region with suspicion and will likely look for ways to slow it down or weaken its impact. Anyway, according to Agha Bayramov, framing TRIPP as a regional peace and connectivity project could reduce this kind of resistance and foster trust. In this perspective, the TRIPP could become the center for wider trans-Caspian connectivity, stimulating future projects linking Central Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus. This framework would strengthen technical and economic ties among Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, while deepening cooperation with the EU. Armenia and Azerbaijan need visible, long-term political support from both the EU and the US, and diplomatic cover as the two countries work through practical steps to normalization.

Russia appears only marginally in the articles of this dossier, reflecting the widespread and largely accurate perception that its influence in the South Caucasus has significantly declined in recent years. However, it cannot be ruled out that Moscow could regain a more active role in the region - above all in Armenia, where its attempts to influence the 2026 elections to its advantage are widely feared by Pashinyan. Indeed, a victorious conclusion to the Ukrainian conflict would give Russia new leverage to revitalize its relationship with Iran, manage competition from Turkey, stem Baku's ambitions, and limit Western penetration, especially that of the United States, given the European Union's limited political effectiveness.