Fighting for Information: A Theory of Tactics for the Next Army

Commentary by Benjamin Jensen

Published June 11, 2025

Next Army is a collaborative series by CSIS Futures Lab and the Modern War Institute launched in honor of the U.S. Army's 250th birthday and the Army Transformation Initiative (ATI). The commentaries explore how emerging technologies, organizational reforms, and major shifts in the strategic environment will shape the force of 2040 and beyond.

In the future, the U.S. Army will dominate the air littorals through manned-unmanned teaming, algorithmic targeting, and distributed reconnaissance networks designed to win the fight for information and regain tempo in a contested battlespace.

The U.S. Army Transformation Initiative (ATI) should be anchored in a simple yet powerful idea: Whoever wins the fight for information wins the fight overall. Future combat won't be about massing formations to penetrate defense lines-it will be about dislocating adversaries through sensor dominance, deception, and speed of decision. As the Army considers major cuts to air cavalry squadrons and legacy aviation elements, it must resist the urge to restructure without first reimagining how air-ground, manned-unmanned teams win the future fight for information. Along these lines, the Army should pair upgraded attack helicopters like AH-64s with enhanced capabilities like AESA radar, runway-independent armed drones like the Gray Eagle STOL, and AI-enabled systems like TITAN (Tactical Intelligence Targeting Access Node) to achieve decision advantage in the most contested part of the battlespace: the air littorals. To counter unmanned aerial systems (UAS), this modern day skirmisher force will need novel solutions, such as cannon-based air defenses, built for speed, flexibility, and fungibility.

The Fight for Information: A Theory of Tactics

The "fight for information" is not just doctrinal jargon-it's a theory of tactics that prioritizes finding, fixing, and dislocating the enemy before it can act. Traditionally conducted by cavalry squadrons, this fight is now increasingly conducted in the air littorals-the contested zone of sky below 10,000 feet where rotary-wing aircraft, drones, loitering munitions, and electronic warfare systems operate under persistent threat.

In this zone, victory goes to the side that can

• see first without being seen;
• strike before being targeted; and
• disrupt the enemy's ability to do the same.
  

Modern armed reconnaissance involves not just observing terrain but forcing the enemy to react-to unmask through movement, emissions, or critical capabilities (e.g., command and control nodes, air defense and counter drone systems, fires)-so they can be located, targeted, and disoriented in support of follow-on operations. In short, winning the fight for information is a precondition for advancing in ground combat and denying the enemy the ability to launch attacks across deep disruption zones.

The key to this is information, both denying the enemy the ability to "see" your intent and rapidly assessing opportunities to gain an advantage. Increasingly, the key to information is AI/ML. Winning the fight for information will transcend traditional armed reconnaissance to encompass C5ISR-T (command, control, communications, computers, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting) and rapidly closing kill webs along the front line across multiple domains. The side best able to analyze-at machine speed-massive volumes of information and pair it with human judgment will gain distinct advantages in time and freedom of action. They will strike three times for every enemy blow and better match weapons to targets.

Where the Army Is and What Needs to Change

Today's air cavalry squadrons and tactical reconnaissance assets are under pressure from budget cuts and shifting modernization priorities. But the tools that will allow the Army to win the information fight already exist. They just need to be better integrated with existing technology to create hunter-killer teams that wage a fight for information in front of Army formations.

First, the Army should explore how to empower its air cavalry squadrons. Existing budget plans call for cutting the number of squadrons in combat aviation brigades. Instead of cutting Apache battalions from active-duty forces, the Army should explore how to enhance and better integrate them as a replacement for the Gray Eagle. For example, as part of the ATI, the Army could explore adding AESA radar upgrades to AH-64 attack helicopters. This enhancement would enable standoff detection, target tracking, and rapid cueing to long-range fires. The combination also supports intelligence collection (e.g., synthetic aperture radar) and electronic warfare, providing a key stopgap given planned cuts to other airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) programs like HADES. This addition, along with modernizing as opposed to cutting Gray Eagles, will create a division capability for winning the fight for information in expeditionary environments.

Second, the Army will need to accelerate its fielding of TITAN and unmanned strike optimized for the air littorals. TITAN will enable division formations to leverage AI/ML, fusing national, theater, and tactical sensor feeds to compress the kill chain and prioritize high-value targets in real time. When combined with a large inventory of loitering munitions, these platforms create the modern day equivalent of skirmishers needed to fix the enemy and set conditions for winning the fight for information.

Third, the Army will need mobile formations capable of exploiting the fight for information while denying the most likely attack vector: enemy drones. This implies a need for novel solutions to air defense that turn traditional direct- and indirect-fire weapons into data-linked air defenses. Imagine 30 mm guns on unmanned ground systems destroying drones and providing suppressive fires to support maneuvers in the air littorals.

Integrating AI and Manned-Unmanned Teams into Reconnaissance Formations

To create the Army of 2040, the ATI should focus on rethinking armed reconnaissance using manned-unmanned teams using the concept of a fight for information. The Army should resist the temptation to restructure before it reimagines how it fights, the hallmark of transforming in contact.

The future battlefield won't reward mass for its own sake. Rather, it will reward the force that can see first, act first, and strike precisely-all concepts the Army has been grappling with since General Gordon Sullivan set out to imagine an information-age fighting force in the early 1990s. Winning the fight for information is no longer a supporting operation; it is the decisive fight in multidomain operations.

To succeed, the Army must invest in the air littorals-the contested band of sky where drones, attack helicopters, loitering munitions, and countermeasures converge. It must empower air cavalry squadrons, pairing upgraded AH-64s with AESA radar and runway-independent armed UAS like the Gray Eagle STOL variant. It must accelerate the fielding of TITAN nodes that use AI to fuse sensor feeds and compress decision cycles. And it must treat loitering munitions and mobile counter-UAS systems as essential components of future maneuver-turning legacy 30 mm cannon-based systems into dual-purpose weapons for strike and defense.

This is not just modernization. It is a return to a core idea of war: the fight for information-now waged with machines, algorithms, and autonomous teams. These new skirmisher formations, operating ahead of the main body, will sense, deceive, strike, and suppress-clearing the way for decisive operations while denying the enemy its own options.

The side that wins the fight for information sets the tempo. The side that controls the air littorals shapes the battlefield. The Army's next transformation must be built around these truths.

Benjamin Jensen is director of the Futures Lab and a senior fellow for the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Programs & Projects