02/27/2026 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 02/27/2026 13:21
Photo: SAUL LOEB/AFP/Getty Images
Commentary by Jake Jennings
Published February 27, 2026
Initially, the 2026 review of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement was initially framed as a routine, if politically sensitive, "check-in" trade exercise. In practice, it is becoming something far more consequential: a stress test of whether North America can function as a coherent technology and economic-security platform in an era of intensified strategic competition globally.
Unlike earlier trade negotiations that focused on tariff schedules or sectoral market access, the coming USMCA process is unfolding against a backdrop of accelerating rivalry with China, heightened concern over supply-chain resilience, and a growing willingness by governments to use trade tools to shape trade outcomes. The result is a review process that increasingly resembles a negotiation over security architecture rather than a traditional trade update. Recent U.S. agreements with El Salvador and Guatemala, alongside the opening of USMCA reform talks on rules of origin, critical minerals, and external trade alignment, underscore that U.S. trade policy in the Western Hemisphere is now being operationalized as economic security policy, with market access used to enforce supply-chain discipline and geopolitical alignment rather than tariff reciprocity alone.
Several forces have converged to make the 2026 review distinct from past USMCA moments. The White House has focused on "onshoring" by leveraging market access to "investment commitments," particularly in technology sectors such as semiconductors, advanced computing, and AI-enabled infrastructure. These "strategic" sectors are now viewed primarily through a national security lens rather than a simple trade issue. In other words, U.S. trade policy has shifted decisively toward selective, conditional engagement that ties market access to alignment on technology, energy, and security priorities.
Taken together, these dynamics reposition USMCA review as a vehicle to operationalize North American security integration. Developments across Central America already point toward a tiered Western Hemisphere model, with a core group of "trusted" partners moving into deeper U.S.-aligned production and technology ecosystems and others facing pressure to choose between closer ties with China and privileged access to the U.S. market.
Recent U.S. trade actions offer a window into how this approach is evolving. Ongoing Section 232 activity related to semiconductors and advanced technologies illustrates a broader shift away from across-the-board protectionism toward targeted leverage. Rather than relying solely on tariffs as blunt instruments, the emerging model uses the prospect of trade restrictions to drive investment, supply-chain relocation, and policy alignment among close partners.
Increasingly, U.S. officials view prolonged compliance processes and formal dispute settlement as ill-suited to the pace of economic-security challenges. In this context, enforcement is becoming less about legal proceduralism and more about behavioral outcomes-whether trade rules are actually changing investment decisions, supply-chain composition, and technology exposure in practice.
The significance of this approach lies less in the specific measures under consideration than in the signal it sends. In particular, the United States is leveraging trade policy through tariffs as a mechanism to shape where sensitive technologies are designed, produced, and deployed, and by whom. For USMCA partners, this means that preferential access to the U.S. market will be increasingly conditioned on demonstrable alignment with U.S. technology, industrial, and security objectives.
Recent cases reinforce this shift from static trade rules to behavioral enforcement. Tariff relief for India has been explicitly tied to energy sourcing decisions, while Japan and South Korea have faced tariff escalation threats to compel delivery on investment and technology commitments. Moreover, the recent U.S.-Taiwan semiconductor arrangement takes this a step further: tariff relief is not only tied to up to $500 billion in United States semiconductor ecosystem investment, it also comes with requirements to follow United States export controls and keep Chinese-linked technology out of subsea cables and next-generation 5G and 6G networks.
Formally, USMCA remains a trilateral agreement. Functionally, however, the review process is likely to be driven by increasingly differentiated bilateral tracks.
Canada enters the review with deep institutional alignment with the United States on export controls, investment screening, and technology governance. While disputes over market access and industrial policy persist, these disagreements generally unfold within a shared framework of regulatory trust and security cooperation. As a result, U.S.-Canada trade frictions are more likely to be managed through negotiated adjustments and targeted enforcement rather than fundamental recalibration.
Mexico presents a more complex challenge. Mexico has become the United States' largest trading partner by value, underscoring the centrality of the bilateral relationship. At the same time, developments related to judicial reform, tax administration, and energy policy have raised concerns in Washington about legal predictability, regulatory independence, and investor protections. These concerns do not negate Mexico's strategic importance, but they do shape how U.S. policymakers assess risk and leverage.
In this framework, Mexico is not simply a USMCA partner but a central enforcement hinge. U.S. concerns increasingly focus on whether Chinese capital, components, and technology are being routed through Mexico in ways that undermine the agreement's economic-security objectives. Mexican policy decisions on tariffs, investment, energy, and technology governance are therefore read in Washington as signals of whether Mexico is helping to seal the North American perimeter-or leaving exploitable gaps.
This divergence suggests the USMCA review will operate less as a single trilateral negotiation and more as a framework within which the United States pursues distinct bilateral enforcement and alignment strategies. In practice, USMCA is increasingly functioning as the anchor of a tiered regional system, with differentiated access based on compliance, technology governance, and geopolitical behavior rather than uniform application of shared rules.
Several technology-linked issue areas are likely to dominate the review process.
At the same time, technology governance is becoming inseparable from infrastructure realities. The Department of Commerce's move to embed export-control officials closer to AI hubs, alongside growing constraints around power availability, permitting, and self-financed generation, signals that access to advanced technology markets will increasingly depend on firms' ability to align infrastructure investment with federal and state priorities. USMCA is therefore not just shaping rules for technology flows but influencing where industrial and digital capacity is permitted to scale.
The most consequential outcomes of the USMCA review are unlikely to take the form of sweeping treaty amendments. Instead, they are more likely to emerge through a series of targeted instruments, including side letters, annexes, and enforcement memoranda that clarify expectations and create leverage without reopening the core agreement.
These mechanisms may be used to reinforce verification and enforcement around rules of origin, formalize cooperation on export controls and investment screening, and establish principles for digital and technology governance backed by bilateral enforcement pathways. In effect, the review may produce a layered architecture: shared trilateral commitments paired with more intensive bilateral implementation.
Privately, many in Washington expect the review process to extend beyond the July 1 timeline without producing a clean renewal or a definitive package of outcomes. This should not be read as a signal that USMCA itself is at risk. Rather, the agreement is likely to remain legally intact while enforcement, interpretation, and implementation become more assertive over time.
For many firms, the central question is no longer whether USMCA will endure, but whether their sector and operating model will be viewed by Washington as advancing-or undermining-the agreement's economic-security objectives.
In the near term, firms should map exposure to rules-of-origin verification and enforcement risk, particularly for products with complex or opaque input chains; assess data, cloud, and digital service operations for sensitivity to evolving digital trade and localization pressures; and review affiliate, reseller, and distribution relationships for export-control and re-export risk.
Looking through 2026, companies should watch for signals that preferential market access is being tied to investment commitments or technology-security alignment, increased use of bilateral enforcement tools within the USMCA framework, and the emergence of sector-specific side agreements that set de facto standards for participation in North American supply chains.
The 2026 USMCA review is unlikely to produce a single headline-grabbing outcome. Its significance lies instead in how it redefines the role of trade policy in shaping North America's technology and security posture. USMCA is increasingly serving as the enforcement spine of a broader hemispheric economic-security strategy, integrating market access, technology governance, critical minerals, energy, and compliance into a single operating framework.
If successful, the review will help transform USMCA from a market-access agreement into a platform for coordinated technological resilience. If it fails, it risks accelerating fragmentation and uncertainty at precisely the moment when integration is most needed. Either way, the review will be a defining test not only of the agreement itself, but of North America's ability to act as a coherent economic and strategic actor in a rapidly evolving global landscape.
Jake Jennings is an adjunct fellow (non-resident) with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2026 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
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