01/02/2026 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 01/02/2026 10:25
J.P. MORGAN EXCHANGE-TRADED FUNDS
JPMorgan High Yield Municipal ETF
JPMorgan Inflation Managed Bond ETF
JPMorgan Limited Duration Bond ETF
JPMorgan Realty Income ETF
JPMorgan Sustainable Municipal Income ETF
JPMorgan Flexible Debt ETF
JPMorgan Mortgage-Backed Securities ETF
JPMorgan Active Bond ETF
JPMorgan Core Plus Bond ETF
JPMorgan Income ETF
JPMorgan International Bond Opportunities ETF
JPMorgan Municipal ETF
JPMorgan Short Duration Core Plus ETF
JPMorgan Ultra-Short Income ETF
JPMorgan Ultra-Short Municipal Income ETF
JPMorgan Active High Yield ETF
JPMorgan BetaBuilders U.S. Aggregate Bond ETF
JPMorgan BetaBuilders U.S. Treasury Bond 1-3 Year ETF
JPMorgan BetaBuilders U.S. Treasury Bond 3-10 Year ETF
JPMorgan BetaBuilders U.S. Treasury Bond 20+ Year ETF
JPMorgan BetaBuilders USD High Yield Corporate Bond ETF
JPMorgan BetaBuilders USD Investment Grade Corporate Bond ETF
JPMorgan USD Emerging Markets Sovereign Bond ETF
JPMorgan 100% U.S. Treasury Securities Money Market ETF
JPMorgan BetaBuilders MSCI US REIT ETF
JPMorgan Equity Focus ETF
JPMorgan Fundamental Data Science Large Value ETF
JPMorgan Small & Mid Cap Enhanced Equity ETF
JPMorgan Active Growth ETF
JPMorgan Active Value ETF
JPMorgan Equity Premium Income ETF
JPMorgan Fundamental Data Science Large Core ETF
JPMorgan Fundamental Data Science Mid Core ETF
JPMorgan Fundamental Data Science Small Core ETF
JPMorgan Nasdaq Equity Premium Income ETF
JPMorgan U.S. Research Enhanced Large Cap ETF
JPMorgan U.S. Tech Leaders ETF
JPMorgan Active Small Cap Value ETF
JPMorgan International Research Enhanced Equity ETF
JPMorgan International Hedged Equity Laddered Overlay ETF
JPMorgan Active China ETF
JPMorgan Active Developing Markets Equity ETF
JPMorgan ActiveBuilders Emerging Markets Equity ETF
JPMorgan Dividend Leaders ETF
JPMorgan Global Select Equity ETF
JPMorgan Healthcare Leaders ETF
JPMorgan Hedged Equity Laddered Overlay ETF
JPMorgan International Growth ETF
JPMorgan International Value ETF
JPMorgan Equity and Options Total Return ETF
JPMorgan Flexible Income ETF
JPMorgan Nasdaq Hedged Equity Laddered Overlay ETF
JPMorgan BetaBuilders Canada ETF
JPMorgan BetaBuilders Developed Asia Pacific ex-Japan ETF
JPMorgan BetaBuilders Emerging Markets Equity ETF
JPMorgan BetaBuilders Europe ETF
JPMorgan BetaBuilders International Equity ETF
JPMorgan BetaBuilders Japan ETF
JPMorgan BetaBuilders U.S. Equity ETF
JPMorgan BetaBuilders U.S. Mid Cap Equity ETF
JPMorgan BetaBuilders U.S. Small Cap Equity ETF
JPMorgan Diversified Return Emerging Markets Equity ETF
SUP-ETFSAIII-126
JPMorgan Diversified Return International Equity ETF
JPMorgan Diversified Return U.S. Equity ETF
JPMorgan Diversified Return U.S. Mid Cap Equity ETF
JPMorgan Diversified Return U.S. Small Cap Equity ETF
JPMorgan U.S. Momentum Factor ETF
JPMorgan U.S. Quality Factor ETF
JPMorgan U.S. Value Factor ETF
(each, a series of J.P. Morgan Exchange-Traded Fund Trust)
Supplement dated January 2, 2026
to the Current Statements of Additional Information, as supplemented
The Statement of Additional Information Part II (SAI Part II) for the above J.P. Morgan Exchange-Traded Funds is replaced in its entirety with the attached SAI Part II.
INVESTORS SHOULD RETAIN THIS SUPPLEMENT WITH THE
STATEMENTS OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR FUTURE REFERENCE
|
INVESTMENT STRATEGIES AND POLICIES
|
1
|
|
Asset-Backed Securities
|
1
|
|
Auction Rate Securities
|
3
|
|
Bank Obligations
|
3
|
|
Commercial Paper
|
4
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|
Convertible Securities
|
4
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|
Custodial Receipts
|
5
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|
Debt Instruments
|
5
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|
Impact of Market Conditions on the Risks Associated with Debt Securities
|
9
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|
Demand Features
|
9
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|
Equity Securities, Warrants and Rights
|
10
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|
Foreign Investments (including Foreign Currencies)
|
10
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|
Inverse Floaters and Interest Rate Caps
|
20
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|
Investment Company Securities and Exchange-Traded Funds
|
20
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|
Loans
|
21
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|
Miscellaneous Investment Strategies and Risks
|
26
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|
Mortgage-Related Securities
|
32
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|
Municipal Securities
|
41
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|
Options and Futures Transactions
|
45
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|
Real Estate Investment Trusts ("REITs")
|
49
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|
Regulatory Changes and Other Market Events Relating to the Overall Economy
|
50
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Derivatives
|
51
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|
Repurchase Agreements
|
52
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|
Reverse Repurchase Agreements
|
53
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|
Securities Lending
|
53
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|
Short Selling
|
55
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|
Short-Term Funding Agreements
|
55
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|
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies
|
55
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|
Structured Investments
|
56
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|
Swaps and Related Swap Products
|
59
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|
Synthetic Variable Rate Instruments
|
61
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|
Treasury Receipts
|
61
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|
Trust Preferred Securities
|
62
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|
U.S. Government Obligations
|
62
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|
When-Issued Securities, Delayed Delivery Securities and Forward Commitments
|
63
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|
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING FUND INVESTMENT PRACTICES
|
63
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|
ESG Integration
|
63
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|
Investments in the Asia Pacific Region
|
64
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|
Investments in the European Market
|
64
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|
Investments in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
|
65
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|
Investments in the Greater China Region
|
66
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|
Investments in India
|
75
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|
Investments in Japan
|
76
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Investments in the Middle East and Africa
|
77
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|
Investments in Latin America
|
79
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|
Investments in Russia
|
80
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RISK MANAGEMENT
|
81
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LIQUIDITY RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
|
82
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|
RISK RELATED TO MANAGEMENT OF CERTAIN SIMILAR FUNDS
|
82
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DIVERSIFICATION
|
82
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|
DISTRIBUTIONS AND TAX MATTERS
|
83
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|
Qualification as a Regulated Investment Company
|
83
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|
Excise Tax on Regulated Investment Companies
|
85
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|
Fund Distributions
|
85
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|
Sale or Redemption of Shares
|
87
|
|
Fund Investments
|
87
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|
Investment in Other Funds
|
91
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|
Backup Withholding
|
92
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|
Foreign Shareholders
|
92
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|
Foreign Taxes
|
93
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|
Exempt-Interest Dividends
|
94
|
|
Creation Units
|
94
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|
State and Local Tax Matters
|
95
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|
Tax Shelter Reporting Regulations
|
95
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|
General Considerations
|
95
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|
TRUSTEES
|
95
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|
Qualifications of Trustees
|
101
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|
Board Leadership Structure
|
104
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|
Standing Committees
|
105
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|
Communications to the Board
|
107
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|
Trustee Compensation
|
107
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|
OFFICERS
|
107
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|
INVESTMENT ADVISER AND SUB-ADVISER
|
109
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|
J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc.
|
109
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|
JPMorgan Asset Management (Asia Pacific) Limited
|
109
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|
JPMIM Management Agreements
|
110
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|
POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
|
111
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|
PORTFOLIO MANAGERS
|
116
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|
CODES OF ETHICS
|
117
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|
PORTFOLIO TRANSACTIONS
|
118
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|
Investment Decisions and Portfolio Transactions
|
118
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|
Brokerage and Research Services
|
118
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|
Portfolio Trading by Authorized Participants
|
121
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|
ADMINISTRATOR
|
122
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|
DISTRIBUTOR
|
122
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|
CUSTODIAN
|
123
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|
CUSTODY AND FUND ACCOUNTING FEES AND EXPENSES
|
123
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|
TRANSFER AGENT
|
125
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|
SECURITIES LENDING AGENT
|
125
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|
EXPENSES
|
125
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|
COMPENSATION TO INTERMEDIARIES
|
126
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|
TRUST COUNSEL
|
126
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|
INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM
|
127
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|
DIVIDENDS AND DISTRIBUTIONS
|
127
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|
NET ASSET VALUE
|
127
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|
DELAWARE TRUST
|
128
|
|
DESCRIPTION OF SHARES
|
129
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|
PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS DISCLOSURE
|
130
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|
Portfolio Holdings Disclosure for Funds that Disclose Portfolio Holdings on a Daily Basis
|
130
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|
Portfolio Holdings Disclosure for Semi-Transparent Funds
|
130
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|
PROXY VOTING PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES
|
132
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|
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
|
139
|
|
APPENDIX A - PURCHASES AND REDEMPTIONS
|
A-1
|
|
APPENDIX B - EGAN-JONES PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES
|
B-1
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APPENDIX C - DESCRIPTION OF RATINGS
|
C-1
|
|
Name (Year of Birth; Term of Office,
and Length of Time Served)(1)
|
Principal Occupation(s)
During Past 5 Years
(or longer)
|
Number of Funds
in Fund Complex
Overseen by
Trustee(2)
|
Other Trusteeships/
Directorships Held
During the Past 5 Years
(or longer)(3)
|
|
Independent Trustees
|
|
Name (Year of Birth; Term of Office,
and Length of Time Served)(1)
|
Principal Occupation(s)
During Past 5 Years
(or longer)
|
Number of Funds
in Fund Complex
Overseen by
Trustee(2)
|
Other Trusteeships/
Directorships Held
During the Past 5 Years
(or longer)(3)
|
|
Stephen P. Fisher
(1959); Trustee, since 2018.
|
Retired; Chairman and
Chief Executive
Officer, NYLIFE
Distributors LLC
(registered broker-
dealer) (serving in
various roles 2008-
2013); Chairman,
NYLIM Service
Company LLC
(transfer agent) (2008-
2017); New York Life
Investment
Management LLC
(registered investment
adviser) (serving in
various roles 2005-
2017); Chairman,
IndexIQ Advisors LLC
(registered investment
adviser for ETFs)
(2014-2017); President,
MainStay VP Funds
Trust (2007-2017),
MainStay DefinedTerm
Municipal
Opportunities Fund
(2011-2017) and Main-
Stay Funds Trust
(2007-2017) (registered
investment companies).
|
174
|
None.
|
|
Gary L. French
(1951); Trustee, since 2014.
|
Real Estate Investor
(2011-2020);
Investment
management industry
Consultant and Expert
Witness (2011-present);
Senior Consultant for
The Regulatory
Fundamentals Group
LLC (2011-2017).
|
174
|
Independent Trustee, The
China Fund, Inc. (2013-
2019); Exchange Traded
Concepts Trust II (2012-
2014); Exchange Traded
Concepts Trust I (2011-
2014).
|
|
Name (Year of Birth; Term of Office,
and Length of Time Served)(1)
|
Principal Occupation(s)
During Past 5 Years
(or longer)
|
Number of Funds
in Fund Complex
Overseen by
Trustee(2)
|
Other Trusteeships/
Directorships Held
During the Past 5 Years
(or longer)(3)
|
|
Kathleen M. Gallagher
(1958); Trustee, since 2018.
|
Retired; Chief
Investment Officer -
Benefit Plans, Ford
Motor Company
(serving in various
roles 1985-2016).
|
174
|
Non-Executive Director,
Legal & General
Investment Management
(Holdings) (2018-
present); Non-Executive
Director, Legal &
General Investment
Management America
(U.S. Holdings)
(financial services and
insurance) (2017-
present); Advisory Board
Member, State Street
Global Advisors Total
Portfolio Solutions
(2017-present); Member,
Client Advisory Council,
Financial Engines, LLC
(registered investment
adviser) (2011-2016);
Director, Ford Pension
Funds Investment
Management Ltd. (2007-
2016).
|
|
Robert J. Grassi
(1957); Trustee, since 2014.
|
Sole Proprietor,
Academy Hills
Advisors LLC (2012-
2024); Pension
Director, Corning
Incorporated (2002-
2012).
|
174
|
None.
|
|
Frankie D. Hughes
(1952); Trustee, since 2008.
|
President, Ashland
Hughes Properties
(property management)
(2014-present);
President and Chief
Investment Officer,
Hughes Capital
Management, Inc.
(fixed income asset
management) (1993-
2014).
|
174
|
None.
|
|
Name (Year of Birth; Term of Office,
and Length of Time Served)(1)
|
Principal Occupation(s)
During Past 5 Years
(or longer)
|
Number of Funds
in Fund Complex
Overseen by
Trustee(2)
|
Other Trusteeships/
Directorships Held
During the Past 5 Years
(or longer)(3)
|
|
Raymond Kanner
(1953); Trustee, since 2017.
|
Retired; Managing
Director and Chief
Investment Officer,
IBM Retirement Funds
(2007-2016).
|
174
|
Advisory Board
Member, Penso
Advisors, LLC (2020-
2024); Advisory Board
Member, Los Angeles
Capital (2018-present);
Advisory Board
Member, State Street
Global Advisors Total
Portfolio Solutions
(2017-present); Acting
Executive Director,
Committee on
Investment of Employee
Benefit Assets (CIEBA)
(2016-2017); Advisory
Board Member,
Betterment for Business
(robo advisor) (2016-
2017); Advisory Board
Member, BlueStar
Indexes (index creator)
(2013-2017); Director,
Emerging Markets
Growth Fund (registered
investment company)
(1997-2016); Member,
Russell Index Client
Advisory Board (2001-
2015).
|
|
Thomas P. Lemke
(1954); Trustee, since 2014.
|
Retired since 2013.
|
174
|
Independent Trustee of
Advisors' Inner Circle III
fund platform, consisting
of the following: (i) the
Advisors' Inner Circle
Fund III, (ii) the Gallery
Trust, (iii) the Schroder
Series Trust, (iv) the
Delaware Wilshire
Private Markets Fund
(since 2020), (v) Chiron
Capital Allocation Fund
Ltd., (vi) formerly the
Winton Diversified
Opportunities Fund
(2014-2018), and (vii)
Symmetry Panoramic
Trust (since 2018).
|
|
Name (Year of Birth; Term of Office,
and Length of Time Served)(1)
|
Principal Occupation(s)
During Past 5 Years
(or longer)
|
Number of Funds
in Fund Complex
Overseen by
Trustee(2)
|
Other Trusteeships/
Directorships Held
During the Past 5 Years
(or longer)(3)
|
|
Mary E. Martinez
(1960); Vice Chair, since 2021;
Trustee, since 2013.
|
Real Estate Investor/
Adviser (2010-
present); Managing
Director, Bank of
America (asset
management) (2007-
2008); Chief Operating
Officer, U.S. Trust
Asset Management,
U.S. Trust Company
(asset management)
(2003-2007);
President, Excelsior
Funds (registered
investment companies)
(2004-2005).
|
174
|
None.
|
|
Marilyn McCoy
(1948); Trustee, since 1999.
|
Retired; Vice President
of Administration and
Planning, Northwestern
University (1985-
2023).
|
174
|
None.
|
|
Shaun Real
(1965); Trustee, since 2026.
|
Partner, Financial
Services, Ernst &
Young (EY), Boston
(2010-2025); New
England Financial
Services Industry
Leader, EY (2018-
2024); Wealth and
Asset Management
Assurance Practice
Leader, EY (2010-
2018); Assurance
Practice, EY (1987-
2010).
|
174
|
Board Member, New
England Council (2021-
present); Director
Emeritus, Expect
Miracles Foundation
(2015-2021); Board
Member, Milton-Hoosic
Club (2017-2020);
Board Member, Canton
Youth Hockey (2017-
2020).
|
|
Name (Year of Birth; Term of Office,
and Length of Time Served)(1)
|
Principal Occupation(s)
During Past 5 Years
(or longer)
|
Number of Funds
in Fund Complex
Overseen by
Trustee(2)
|
Other Trusteeships/
Directorships Held
During the Past 5 Years
(or longer)(3)
|
|
Emily A. Youssouf
(1951); Trustee, since 2014.
|
Adjunct Professor
(2011-present) and
Clinical Professor
(2009-2011), NYU
Schack Institute of Real
Estate; Board Member
and Member of the
Audit Committee
(2013-present), Chair
of Finance Committee
(2019-present),
Member of Related
Parties Committee
(2013-2018) and
Member of the
Enterprise Risk
Committee (2015-
2018), PennyMac
Financial Services,
Inc.; Board Member
(2005-2018), Chair of
Capital Committee
(2006-2016), Chair of
Audit Committee
(2005-2018), Member
of Finance Committee
(2005-2018) and Chair
of IT Committee
(2016-2018), NYC
Health and Hospitals
Corporation.
|
174
|
Trustee, NYC School
Construction Authority
(2009-present); Board
Member, NYS Job
Development Authority
(2008-present); Trustee
and Chair of the Audit
Committee of the Transit
Center Foundation
(2015-2019).
|
|
Interested Trustees
|
|||
|
Robert F. Deutsch(4)
(1957); Trustee, since 2014.
|
Retired; Head of ETF
Business for JPMorgan
Asset Management
(2013-2017); Head of
Global Liquidity
Business for JPMorgan
Asset Management
(2003-2013).
|
174
|
Treasurer and Director of
the JUST Capital
Foundation (2017-
present); Advisory Board
Chair, Lerner Business
School at the University
of Delaware (2018-
present).
|
|
Nina O. Shenker(4)
(1957); Trustee, since 2022.
|
Vice Chair (2017-
2021), General Counsel
and Managing Director
(2008-2016), Associate
General Counsel and
Managing Director
(2004-2008), J.P.
Morgan Asset & Wealth
Management.
|
174
|
Director and Member of
Executive, Legal and
Human Resources
Committees; American
Jewish Joint Distribution
Committee
(2018-present).
|
|
Name of Committee
|
Members
|
Committee Chair
|
|
Audit and Valuation Committee
|
Ms. Gallagher
Mr. French
Mr. Kanner
Mr. Real
|
Ms. Gallagher
|
|
Compliance Committee
|
Mr. Lemke
Mr. Fisher
Mr. Grassi
Ms. Hughes
|
Mr. Lemke
|
|
Governance Committee
|
Ms. Martinez
Mr. Fisher
Mr. French
Ms. McCoy
|
Ms. Martinez
|
|
ETF Committee
|
Mr. Deutsch
Ms. Gallagher
Ms. Hughes
Mr. Kanner
Ms. Shenker
Ms. Youssouf
|
Mr. Deutsch
|
|
Equity Committee
|
Mr. Kanner
Mr. Deutsch
Mr. French
Ms. McCoy
|
Mr. Kanner
|
|
Fixed Income Committee
|
Mr. Grassi
Ms. Hughes
Ms. Shenker
Ms. Youssouf
|
Mr. Grassi
|
|
Money Market and Alternative
Products Committee
|
Mr. Fisher
Ms. Gallagher
Mr. Lemke
Mr. Real
|
Mr. Fisher
|
|
Name (Year of Birth),
Positions Held with the Trust (Since)
|
Principal Occupations During Past 5 Years
|
|
Matthew J. Kamburowski
(1980), President and Principal
Executive Officer (2025)*
|
Managing Director, Chief Administrative Officer for J.P. Morgan
pooled vehicles and Global Head of Business Transformation. Mr.
Kamburowski has been with JPMorgan Chase & Co. since 2001.
|
|
Timothy J. Clemens (1975),
Treasurer and Principal
Financial Officer (2020)
|
Managing Director, J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. Mr.
Clemens has been with J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc.
since 2013.
|
|
Gregory S. Samuels (1980),
Secretary (2022) (formerly
Assistant Secretary 2014-2022)
|
Managing Director and Assistant General Counsel, JPMorgan
Chase. Mr. Samuels has been with JPMorgan Chase since 2010.
|
|
Stephen M. Ungerman (1953),
Chief Compliance Officer
(2014)
|
Managing Director, JPMorgan Chase & Co. Mr. Ungerman has been
with JPMorgan Chase & Co. since 2000.
|
|
Kiesha Astwood-Smith (1973),
Assistant Secretary (2021)
|
Vice President and Assistant General Counsel, JPMorgan Chase
since June 2021; Senior Director and Counsel, Equitable Financial
Life Insurance Company (formerly, AXA Equitable Life Insurance
Company) from September 2015 through June 2021.
|
|
Matthew Beck (1988),
Assistant Secretary (2021)*
|
Vice President and Assistant General Counsel, JPMorgan Chase
since May 2021; Senior Legal Counsel, Ultimus Fund Solutions
from May 2018 through May 2021; General Counsel, The
Nottingham Company from April 2014 through May 2018.
|
|
Elizabeth A. Davin (1964),
Assistant Secretary (2022)*
(formerly Secretary 2018-2022)
|
Executive Director and Assistant General Counsel, JPMorgan
Chase. Ms. Davin has been with JPMorgan Chase (formerly Bank
One Corporation) since 2004.
|
|
Carmine Lekstutis (1980),
Assistant Secretary (2014)
|
Executive Director and Assistant General Counsel, JPMorgan
Chase. Mr. Lekstutis has been with JPMorgan Chase since 2011.
|
|
Erika K. Messbarger (1987),
Assistant Secretary (2025)*
|
Assistant Vice President and Senior Counsel, JPMorgan Chase; Ms.
Messbarger has been with JPMorgan Chase since October 2011.
|
|
Henry F. Pickell (1980),
Assistant Secretary (2025)*
|
Vice President and Assistant General Counsel, JPMorgan Chase;
Mr. Pickell has been with JPMorgan Chase since July 2018.
|
|
Max Vogel (1990),
Assistant Secretary (2021)
|
Vice President and Assistant General Counsel, JPMorgan Chase
since June 2021; Associate, Proskauer Rose LLP (law firm) from
March 2017 to June 2021.
|
|
Zachary E. Vonnegut-Gabovitch
(1986), Assistant Secretary
(2017)
|
Executive Director and Assistant General Counsel, JPMorgan
Chase. Mr. Vonnegut-Gabovitch has been with JPMorgan Chase
since September 2016.
|
|
Frederick J. Cavaliere (1978),
Assistant Treasurer (2015)**
|
Executive Director, J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. Mr.
Cavaliere has been with JPMorgan since May 2006.
|
|
Michael M. D'Ambrosio (1969),
Assistant Treasurer (2014)
|
Managing Director, J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. Mr.
D'Ambrosio has been with J.P. Morgan Investment Management
Inc. since 2012.
|
|
Aleksandr Fleytekh (1972),
Assistant Treasurer (2023)
|
Executive Director, J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. Mr.
Fleytekh has been with J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc.
since February 2012.
|
|
Shannon Gaines (1977),
Assistant Treasurer (2019)*
|
Executive Director, J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. Mr.
Gaines has been with J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc.
since January 2014.
|
|
Jeffrey D. House (1972),
Assistant Treasurer (2023)*
|
Vice President, J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. Mr. House
has been with J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. since July
2006.
|
|
Name (Year of Birth),
Positions Held with the Trust (Since)
|
Principal Occupations During Past 5 Years
|
|
Nektarios E. Manolakakis
(1972), Assistant Treasurer
(2020)
|
Managing Director, J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. since
2025, formerly Executive Director, J.P. Morgan Investment
Management Inc. since February 2021, formerly Vice President, J.P.
Morgan Investment Management Inc. since 2014; Vice President,
J.P. Morgan Corporate & Investment Bank 2010-2014.
|
|
Joseph Parascondola (1963),
Assistant Treasurer (2023)**
|
Executive Director, J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. Mr.
Parascondola has been with J.P. Morgan Investment Management
Inc. since 2006.
|
|
Gillian I. Sands (1969), Assistant
Treasurer (2023)
|
Executive Director, J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. Ms.
Sands has been with J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. since
September 2012.
|
|
Tier One
|
Up to $15 billion
|
0.0030%
|
|
Tier Two
|
Next $85 billion
|
0.0025%
|
|
Tier Three
|
Over $100 billion
|
0.0015%
|
|
Other Fees:
|
||
|
Minimum
|
$20,000 per Fund per year
|
|
Tier One
|
Up to $15 billion
|
0.0030%
|
|
Tier Two
|
Next $85 billion
|
0.0025%
|
|
Tier Three
|
Next $300 billion
|
0.0015%
|
|
Tier Four
|
Over $400 billion
|
0.10%
|
|
Other Fees:
|
||
|
Minimum
|
$15,000 per Fund per year
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Receive annual report and accounts
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the financial statements give a true and fair view of the financial
position of the Company for the recent fiscal year, and of its
financial performance and its cash flows for the year then ended
in accordance with the law.
|
|
Accept financial statements/statutory report
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the financial statements give a true and fair view of the financial
position of the Company for the recent fiscal year, and of its
financial performance and its cash flows for the year then ended
in accordance with the law.
|
|
Accept accounting irregularity
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the financial statements give a true and fair view of the financial
position of the Company for the recent fiscal year, and of its
financial performance and its cash flows for the year then ended
in accordance with the law.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Ratify auditor appointment and
remuneration
|
We generally recommend FOR the auditor when the following
conditions are met: 1) non-audit fees do not make up a
substantial proportion of all fees the auditor is charging the
company; 2) auditor tenure ˂ 20 years; 3) total auditor fees
(universe percentile) ˂75th percentile; and 4) total auditor
sanctions, last 10 years ˂ 10. The purpose is to maintain some
independence for the auditor.
|
|
Remove auditor
|
We generally recommend a vote FOR the removal of the auditors
whenever the Company may deem it necessary to ensure auditor
independence and integrity.
|
|
Ratify auditor appointment
|
We generally recommend FOR the auditor when the following
conditions are met: 1) non-audit fees do not make up a
substantial proportion of all fees the auditor is charging the
company; 2) auditor tenure ˂ 20 years; 3) total auditor fees
(universe percentile) ˂75th percentile; and 4) total auditor
sanctions, last 10 years ˂ 10. The purpose is to maintain some
independence for the auditor.
|
|
Ratify auditor or director remuneration
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the proposed director and auditor emoluments are
commensurate with their efforts, services rendered, and
contribution to the Company.
|
|
Approve discharge of auditors
|
We generally recommend FOR because after reviewing the
auditor acts for the fiscal year that has ended, we find it
advisable to grant discharge from liability to the auditors.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Approve share repurchase plan
|
We generally recommend FOR when the total compensation is
reasonable considering the company's performance as measured
by change in adjusted stock price, and considering the following
governance requirements: 1) the company did not have an
unjustified performance metric change without shareholder
approval, 2) the company does not have a 'pay-for-failure'
severance provisions and 3) the company has a no-trigger or
single-trigger change-in-control provision.
|
|
Stock exchange listing
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
approval of the stock exchange listing would create investment
opportunities for the Company and provide greater liquidity
while diversifying the risks associated with it.
|
|
Increase authorized shares
|
We generally recommend FOR except when one of the following
conditions is met: 1) The new proposed stock is ˃50% of total
authorized shares of common stock; 2) The increase is NOT tied
to a specific transaction or financing proposal; and 3) The Share
pool was NOT used up due to equity plans.
|
|
Exchange debt for equity
|
We generally recommend FOR if the transaction is the best
available option for current equity holders.
|
|
Re-price options
|
We generally recommend FOR when the company's current
share price is below the original strike price and when the new
option strike price divided by the current option strike price is
less than 1.2.
|
|
Approve dividends
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the proposed dividend payout will not put the companýs liquidity
at risk.
|
|
Allot securities
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the allotment of shares or securities will enable the Company to
capitalize on future business opportunities. This flexibility
provides the Company with the ability to act promptly and
strategically to business decisions, ensuring it remains
competitive and well-positioned for long-term success.
|
|
Issue bonds
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
approval of this proposal will give the Company greater flexibility
in considering and planning for future corporate needs, including,
but not limited to, stock dividends, grants under equity
compensation plans, stock splits, financings, potential strategic
transactions, including mergers, acquisitions, and business
combinations, as well as other general corporate transactions.
|
|
Change share par value
|
We generally recommend FOR when the new par value is less
than or equal to old par value.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Split stock / reverse split
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the proposed reverse stock split would make the Company's
common stock a more attractive and cost-effective investment
for many investors, thereby enhancing the liquidity of current
stockholders and potentially broadening the investor base.
|
|
Reclassify shares
|
We generally recommend FOR unless the new shares will have
superior voting rights to outstanding shares.
|
|
Issue shares upon exercise of warrants
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the proposed issuance of shares will provide the Company with a
source of capital to fund its corporate endeavors and activities.
|
|
Repurchase bonds
|
We generally recommend FOR when the total compensation is
reasonable considering the company's performance as measured
by change in adjusted stock price, and considering the following
governance requirements: 1) the company did not have an
unjustified performance metric change without shareholder
approval, 2) the company does not have a 'pay-for-failure'
severance provisions and 3) the company has a no-trigger or
single-trigger change-in-control provision.
|
|
Decrease authorized shares
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the proposed decrease in authorized shares will provide the
Company with greater strategic flexibility in managing dilution
and its capital structure.
|
|
Issue shares below NAV
|
We generally recommend FOR if the shares to be issued below
NAV are 25% or less of the outstanding shares.
|
|
Approve stock terms revision
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the
guidelines committee.
|
|
Issue shares
|
We generally recommend FOR except when one of the following
conditions is met: 1) The new proposed stock is ˃50% of total
authorized shares of common stock; 2) The increase is NOT tied
to a specific transaction or financing proposal; and 3) The Share
pool was NOT used up due to equity plans.
|
|
Convert shares
|
We generally recommend FOR if the conversion would provide
equal rights to shareholders.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Approve sustainability auditor
|
We generally recommend FOR the auditor when the following
conditions are met: 1) non-audit fees do not make up a
substantial proportion of all fees the auditor is charging the
company; 2) auditor tenure ˂ 20 years; 3) total auditor fees
(universe percentile) ˂75th percentile; and 4) total auditor
sanctions, last 10 years ˂ 10. The purpose is to maintain some
independence for the auditor.
|
|
Approve sustainability report
|
We generally recommend a vote FOR because according to our
policy, the proposed report demonstrates the Company's
commitment to sustainability and provides valuable information
about its ongoing initiatives. This transparency enables
shareholders to better understand the Company's sustainability
efforts and progress, aligning with best practices in corporate
responsibility and long-term value creation.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Approve employment/management/
severance/partnership agreement
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the
guidelines committee.
|
|
Distribute profit/dividend/etc according to
plan
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the proposed distribution plan will not put the companýs
liquidity at risk.
|
|
Approve executive/director/related party
transactions
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the related party transaction is advisable, substantively and
procedurally fair to, and in the best interests of the Company and
its shareholders.
|
|
Approve employee stock purchase plan
|
We generally recommend FOR if the following conditions are
met: 1) option exercise price / current fair market value of the
stock is reasonable and 2) the plan qualifies under section 423(c).
|
|
Approve incentive stock option plan (non-
SPAC)
|
We generally recommend FOR when the plan results in dilution
of less than 10%.
|
|
Approve retirement plan / allowance
|
We generally recommend FOR when the total compensation is
reasonable considering the company's performance as measured
by change in adjusted stock price, and considering the following
governance requirements: 1) the company did not have an
unjustified performance metric change without shareholder
approval, 2) the company does not have a 'pay-for-failure'
severance provisions and 3) the company has a no-trigger or
single-trigger change-in-control provision.
|
|
Approve incentive stock option plan (SPAC)
|
We generally recommend FOR if the plan is for the newly formed
entity arising from the business combination with a special
purpose acquisition company (SPAC) and the authorized share
pool doesn't exceed 3% of the new entity's authorized share
capital.
|
|
Approve other compensation
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the
guidelines committee.
|
|
Approve bonuses
|
We generally recommend FOR when the total compensation is
reasonable considering the company's performance as measured
by change in adjusted stock price, and considering the following
governance requirements: 1) the company did not have an
unjustified performance metric change without shareholder
approval, 2) the company does not have a 'pay-for-failure'
severance provisions and 3) the company has a no-trigger or
single-trigger change-in-control provision.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Authorize board to fill vacancies
|
We generally recommend FOR if the appointees will face a
shareholder vote at the next annual meeting.
|
|
Approve director liability insurance
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
approval of director liability insurance would enable the
Company to provide a greater scope of protection to directors in
cases of litigations. Further, such a provision would also help the
Company to attract, retain and motivate its directors whose
efforts are essential to the Company's success.
|
|
Approve spill resolution
|
We generally recommend FOR when the total compensation is
reasonable considering the company's performance as measured
by change in adjusted stock price, and considering the following
governance requirements: 1) the company did not have an
unjustified performance metric change without shareholder
approval, 2) the company does not have a 'pay-for-failure'
severance provisions and 3) the company has a no-trigger or
single-trigger change-in-control provision.
|
|
Remove director without cause
|
We generally recommend a vote FOR because according to our
policy, allowing shareholders to remove a director without cause
enhances accountability and strengthens shareholder rights. This
provision empowers shareholders to take action if they believe a
director is not acting in the best interests of the company,
ensuring greater transparency and governance.
|
|
Remove director only with cause
|
We generally recommend AGAINST the proposal because
according to our policy, directors should be removed with or
without cause. This level of flexibility allows the Company to
make necessary changes to its leadership when deemed
appropriate. Allowing for the removal of directors with or
without cause ensures that the Board can effectively address
issues such as performance concerns and maintain the best
interests of the Company and its shareholders.
|
|
Adopt/amend board nomination procedure
|
We generally recommend FOR if the following conditions are
met: the candidate nominations can be submitted within 90 days
of the annual meeting and the director information disclosure is
required.
|
|
Approve director indemnification
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
approval of director indemnification would enable the Company
to provide a greater scope of protection to directors in cases of
litigations. Further, such a provision would also help the
Company to attract, retain and motivate its directors whose
efforts are essential to the Company's success.
|
|
Change number of directors
|
We generally recommend FOR if the board size is between 5 and
15.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Authorize exculpation of officers (DGCL)
|
We generally recommend a vote FOR because according to our
policy, implementation of the exculpation provision pursuant to
Delaware Law will enable the Company to attract, retain and
motivate its officers whose efforts are essential to the Company's
success. Additionally, Delaware's exculpation law strikes a
balanced approach, offering protection to directors while
ensuring accountability for significant breaches of their fiduciary
duties.
|
|
Decrease required director experience /
expertise / diversity
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the
guidelines committee.
|
|
Eliminate retirement age requirement
|
We generally recommend FOR this proposal because, in
accordance with our policy, the Company and its shareholders
are in the best position to determine the approach to corporate
governance, particularly board composition. Imposing inflexible
rules, such as age limits for outside directors, does not
necessarily correlate with returns or benefits for shareholders.
Similar to arbitrary term limits, age limits could force valuable
directors off the board solely based on their age, potentially
undermining the effectiveness of the board.
|
|
Declassify the board
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
staggered terms for directors increase the difficulty for
shareholders to make fundamental changes to the composition
and behavior of a board. We prefer that the entire board of a
company be elected annually to provide appropriate
responsiveness to shareholders.
|
|
Classify the board
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, staggered terms for directors increase the difficulty for
shareholders to make fundamental changes to the composition
and behavior of a board. We prefer that the entire board of a
company be elected annually to provide appropriate
responsiveness to shareholders.
|
|
Change size of board of directors
|
We generally recommend FOR if the board size is between 5 and
15.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Change domicile / jurisdiction of
incorporation
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
changing the Company's legal domicile is necessary to align the
legal structure of the Company in a manner that is more
consistent with their business objectives.
|
|
Approve joint venture agreement
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the
guidelines committee.
|
|
Approve recapitalization plan
|
We generally recommend FOR unless the new shares will have
superior voting rights to outstanding shares.
|
|
Approve restructuring
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the
guidelines committee.
|
|
Advise on merger related compensation
|
We generally recommend FOR if any of the following conditions
are met: 1) The payout to the executive is reasonable (less than
3x severance package), 2) the payout is triggered after the
transaction closes, 3) Payouts do not accelerate vesting of equity
awards or 4) payouts only occur given the executive's
termination.
|
|
Approve liquidation plan
|
We generally recommend FOR if the following conditions are
met: the transaction is the best strategic alternative for the
company and the appraisal value is fair.
|
|
Approve M&A agreement (sale or purchase)
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the
guidelines committee.
|
|
Adopt greenmail provision
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, the adoption of greenmail provision will pave the way for
a potential hostile takeover which could be detrimental to the
shareholders' interests.
|
|
Approve M&A share issuance
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the
guidelines committee.
|
|
Approve anti-takeover measures
|
We generally recommend FOR if the following conditions are
met: it is a family controlled entity, there is a change in
ownership, and if the meeting is not contested.
|
|
Proceed with bankruptcy
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
approval of the bankruptcy plan is the best available alternative
in order for the Company to provide a reasonable value for its
shareholders.
|
|
Approve opt-out plan
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the
guidelines committee.
|
|
Remove antitakeover provision
|
We generally recommend FOR if the following conditions are
met: it is a family controlled entity, there is a change in
ownership, and if the meeting is not contested.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Ratify poison pill
|
We generally recommend a vote FOR because according to our
policy, approval of the proposal will acknowledge both the
advantages and inherent risks of implementing a shareholder
rights plan, or poison pill. While these plans can deter hostile
takeovers, they also carry the risk of management entrenchment
in some cases. Ensuring that shareholders are given a voice on
the advisability of such a plan is crucial to safeguarding the
Company from these risks, promoting transparency, and
maintaining a balance between protecting shareholder interests
and preventing potential misuse of the plan.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Allow virtual-only shareholder meetings
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
virtual meetings will increase the likelihood of an improved
attendance rate in meetings, not to mention the benefits of
flexibility, reducing costs and improved accessibility.
|
|
Adopt notice and access provisions
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
approval of the notice and access provision would provide
shareholders with sufficient disclosure and ample time to make
informed decisions regarding the election of directors at
shareholder meetings. This provision ensures that shareholders
have the opportunity to review relevant information regarding
the nominees, the Company's performance, and other important
matters, therefore enabling the shareholders to participate
meaningfully in the governance process.
|
|
Expand right to act by written consent
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the right to act on written consent allows an increased
participation of shareholders in the voting process, thereby
democratizing voting and giving shareholders the right to act
independently from the management.
|
|
Approve previous meeting minutes
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
approval of this proposal is in the best interests of the Company
and its shareholders.
|
|
Elect chairman of the meeting
|
We generally recommend FOR because electing a presiding
person would allow the Company to facilitate the meeting in an
organized manner.
|
|
Adjourn meeting
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
approval of the adjournment will enable the Company to solicit
additional proxies if there are insufficient votes at the time of the
meeting to approve a certain proposal.
|
|
Change fiscal year end
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the proposal would enable the Company to optimize its financial
reporting, improve the timeliness of business operations and
strategic planning, and better align its fiscal year-end with that of
its peers. This alignment will enhance comparability, improve
operational efficiency, and support more effective decision-
making.
|
|
Restrict right to act by written consent
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, the right to act on written consent allows an increased
participation of shareholders in the voting process, thereby
democratizing voting and giving the shareholders the right to act
independently from the management.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Restrict right to call a special meeting
|
We generally recommend AGAINST the proposal because
according to our policy, the ability of shareholders to call special
meetings is widely regarded as an important aspect of good
corporate governance. We believe the Company's current
threshold appropriately balances the rights of shareholders to
call a special meeting with the broader interests of the Company
and its shareholders.
|
|
Create notice period of general meeting
|
We generally recommend voting FOR this proposal because, in
accordance with our policy, there may be situations where it is
crucial for the Company to call meetings on short notice. This
proposal would authorize the Company to convene general
meetings (other than the annual general meeting) with a
minimum of 14 clear days' notice, enabling timely action on
matters that are urgent or time-sensitive for the Company.
|
|
Appoint independent proxy
|
We generally recommend a vote FOR because according to our
policy, appointment of the independent proxy is necessary to
convene the shareholders meeting.
|
|
Change location / date / time
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the proposed change will increase the likelihood of increased
attendance rate in meetings, not to mention the benefits of
flexibility and improved accessibility to shareholders.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Approve sub-investment advisory agreement
|
We generally recommend FOR if the following conditions are
met: the investment fees are reasonable and the investment
strategy is cogent.
|
|
Adopt investment policy
|
We generally recommend FOR if the investment strategy is
cogent.
|
|
Convert to open-end fund
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the conversion to an open-end fund would provide for portfolio
diversification hence reducing the Company's risk exposure, and
at the same time providing greater liquidity to its shareholders.
|
|
Approve investment advisory agreement
|
We generally recommend FOR if the following conditions are
met: the investment fees are reasonable and the investment
strategy is cogent.
|
|
Approve non-fundamental investment
objective
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, a fundamental investment objective for funds will ensure
that any revision or matter related to the fund's activities will be
brought up for shareholder approval, thereby protecting their
interests as shareowners.
|
|
Approve management agreement
|
We generally recommend FOR if the following conditions are
met: the investment fees are reasonable and the investment
strategy is cogent.
|
|
Issue/approve 12b-1 plan (distribution of
funds through intermediaries)
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
approval of the 12b-1 plan would enable the Fund to facilitate its
distribution and sale through various intermediaries, which
would be beneficial in improving its asset position.
|
|
Change fundamental restriction to non-
fundamental
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, approval of the proposal would increase the Fund's
exposure to significant losses arising from investment in high-risk
assets. Moreover, contrary to a fundamental investment
restriction, non-fundamental investment restrictions are often
focused on short-term investing which is subject to market
volatility and fluctuations.
|
|
Approve company as investment trust
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the
guidelines committee.
|
|
Approve fundamental investment objective
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, a
fundamental investment objective for funds will ensure that any
revision or matter related to the fund's activities will be brought
up for shareholder approval, thereby protecting their interests as
shareowners. By involving shareholders in key decisions, the
Company reinforces transparency, accountability, and the
protection of shareholder value.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Appropriate profits/surplus
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the proposed allocation of profits or earnings is commensurate
with the Company's current financial position.
|
|
Advise on executive compensation (SAY-ON-
PAY)
|
We generally recommend FOR when the total compensation is
reasonable considering the company's performance as measured
by change in adjusted stock price, and considering the following
governance requirements: 1) the company did not have an
unjustified performance metric change without shareholder
approval, 2) the company does not have a 'pay-for-failure'
severance provisions and 3) the company has a no-trigger or
single-trigger change-in-control provision.
|
|
Decide frequency of executive compensation
|
We generally recommend an annual frequency for the say-on-
pay vote.
|
|
Approve directors' compensation
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the proposed director emoluments are commensurate with the
directors' efforts and contributions, and approval of the proposal
would enable the Company to attract, retain and motivate its
directors who are essential to the Company's success.
|
|
Approve named executive officers'
compensation
|
We generally recommend FOR when the total compensation is
reasonable considering the company's performance as measured
by change in adjusted stock price, and considering the following
governance requirements: 1) the company did not have an
unjustified performance metric change without shareholder
approval, 2) the company does not have a 'pay-for-failure'
severance provisions and 3) the company has a no-trigger or
single-trigger change-in-control provision.
|
|
Reduce of legal reserve
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the proposed reduction of legal reserves is commensurate with
the Company's current financial position and would strengthen
its cashflow.
|
|
Appropriate profits/surplus
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the proposed allocation of profits or earnings is commensurate
with the Company's current financial position.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Approve discharge of supervisory board
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
we find no breach of fiduciary duty that compromised the
Company and shareholders' interests for the fiscal year that has
ended.
|
|
Receive directors' report
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the financial statements give a true and fair view of the financial
position of the Company for the recent fiscal year, and of its
financial performance and its cash flows for the year that has
ended.
|
|
Approve discharge of management board
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
we find no breach of fiduciary duty that compromised the
Company and shareholders' interests for the fiscal year that has
ended.
|
|
Approve discharge of board and president
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
we find no breach of fiduciary duty that compromised the
Company and shareholders' interests for the fiscal year that has
ended.
|
|
Elect company clerk/secretary
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the nominee appears qualified.
|
|
Authorization to the board to execute legal
formalities
|
We generally recommend FOR because approval of the proposal
is necessary in order to carry out the legal formalities related to
the meeting.
|
|
Approve previous board's actions
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
we find no breach of fiduciary duty that compromised the
Company and shareholders' interests for the fiscal year that has
ended.
|
|
Approve directors' report
|
We generally recommend FOR because approval of the directors'
report is in the best interests of the Company and its
shareholders.
|
|
Approve financial statements and discharge
directors
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the financial statements give a true and fair view of the financial
position of the Company for the recent fiscal year, and of its
financial performance and its cash flows for the year then ended
in accordance with the law.
|
|
Fix number of directors
|
We generally recommend FOR if the board size is between 5 and
15.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Elect director to committee
|
We generally recommend FOR when the change in adj stock
price over the director's tenure is poor (given that the director
tenure is at least three years) and when the following
governance requirements are met: 1) the candidate attended at
least 75% of all board and committee meetings, 2) the candidate
is not affiliated and a member of the audit, compensation, or
nominating committees, 3) the candidate is not over-boarded,
and 4) the Company did not earn a poor cybersecurity risk score
while the candidate served as the chair of the board.
|
|
Elect directors and fix the number of directors
|
We generally recommend FOR when the change in adj stock
price over the director's tenure is poor (given that the director
tenure is at least three years) and when the following
governance requirements are met: 1) the candidate attended at
least 75% of all board and committee meetings, 2) the candidate
is not affiliated and a member of the audit, compensation, or
nominating committees, 3) the candidate is not over-boarded,
and 4) the Company did not earn a poor cybersecurity risk score
while the candidate served as the chair of the board.
|
|
Delegate authority to a committee
|
We generally recommend FOR because the delegation of
authority to the committee is in the best interests of the
Company and its shareholders.
|
|
Elect director to board
|
We generally recommend FOR when the change in adj stock
price over the director's tenure is poor (given that the director
tenure is at least three years) and when the following
governance requirements are met: 1) the candidate attended at
least 75% of all board and committee meetings, 2) the candidate
is not affiliated and a member of the audit, compensation, or
nominating committees, 3) the candidate is not over-boarded,
and 4) the Company did not earn a poor cybersecurity risk score
while the candidate served as the chair of the board.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Appoint censor
|
We generally recommend FOR because appointment of the
censor would ensure the integrity of the voting process at the
shareholders' meeting.
|
|
Appoint rating agency
|
We generally recommend FOR because the appointment of the
proposed rating agency is in the best interests of the Company
and its shareholders.
|
|
Corporate assembly
|
We generally recommend FOR because approval of the
convening of the corporate assembly or shareholders' meeting is
in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders.
|
|
Approve acts - ratify the decisions made in
the prior fiscal year (e.g., distribution of initial
dividend, discharge of liability)
|
We generally recommend a vote FOR the approval of acts carried
out as of the fiscal year that has ended because according to our
policy, we believe that the decisions made by the directors on
the Company's behalf is in the best interests of shareholders.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Adopt, renew, or amend shareholder rights
plan
|
We generally recommend FOR if the proposed plan expands
rights for shareholders.
|
|
Redeem shareholder rights plan
|
We generally recommend FOR when the additional shares for the
beneficiaries of the poison pill are more attractive than takeover
by a hostile party.
|
|
Approve preemptive rights
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
pre-emptive rights allow shareholders to maintain their
proportional ownership in the Company in the event of new
share issuance, protecting their interests and ensuring they are
not diluted by future equity offerings.
|
|
Eliminate preemptive rights
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the elimination of pre-emptive rights would provide the
Company with greater flexibility to finance business
opportunities and conduct a rights issue without being restricted
by the stringent requirements of statutory pre-emption
provisions.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Adopt advanced notice requirement
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
advance notice requirement would protect the Company and its
shareholders from ambush proxy solicitations thereby facilitating
the nomination of individuals for election in an orderly process.
|
|
Adopt confidential voting
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
approval of the proposal will preserve the confidentiality and
integrity of vote outcomes.
|
|
Adopt exclusive forum for disputes
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
having an exclusive forum will allow the Company to address
disputes and litigations in an exclusive jurisdiction, with
familiarity of the law, and reduce the administrative cost and
burden related to settlement.
|
|
Approve cumulative voting
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy cumulative voting could make it possible for an individual
shareholder or group of shareholders with special interests to
elect one or more directors to the Company's Board of directors
to represent their particular interests. Such a shareholder or
group of shareholders could have goals that are inconsistent, and
could conflict with, the interests and goals of the majority of the
Company's shareholders.
|
|
Eliminate unequal voting rights
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
companies should ensure that all shareholders are provided with
equal voting rights, promoting fairness, accountability, and
alignment between economic ownership and control. By
adopting a one-share, one-vote structure, the Company can
better uphold shareholder democracy and support long-term
value creation for all investors.
|
|
Eliminate cumulative voting
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy
cumulative voting could make it possible for an individual
shareholder or group of shareholders with special interests to
elect one or more directors to the Company's Board of directors
to represent their particular interests. Such a shareholder or
group of shareholders could have goals that are inconsistent, and
could conflict with, the interests and goals of the majority of the
Company's shareholders.
|
|
Adopt unequal voting rights
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, in order to provide equal voting rights to all shareholders,
companies should not utilize dual class capital structures.
|
|
Eliminate confidential voting
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because approval of the
proposal will compromise confidentiality and integrity of vote
outcomes.
|
|
Reimburse proxy contest expenses
|
We generally recommend FOR when Egan-Jones recommends in
favor of the dissidents.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Amend quorum/voting requirement
|
We generally recommend FOR when the proposed quorum is at
least 33% of shares entitled to vote.
|
|
Adopt majority vote for director elections
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, a
simple majority vote in director elections will strengthen the
Company's corporate governance practice. Contrary to plurality
voting, a simple majority standard will give the shareholders a
meaningful way of electing directors by limiting the power of
shareholders to elect poorly performing directors.
|
|
Approve/increase supermajority voting
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, a simple majority vote will strengthen the Company's
corporate governance practice. Contrary to supermajority voting,
a simple majority standard will give the shareholders equal and
fair representation in the Company by limiting the power of
shareholders who own a large stake in the entity, therefore,
paving the way for a more meaningful voting outcome.
|
|
Establish right to call a special meeting
|
We generally recommend FOR if at least 10% of voting shares are
required to call a special meeting.
|
|
Eliminate/reduce supermajority voting
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, a
simple majority vote will strengthen the Company's corporate
governance practice. Contrary to supermajority voting, a simple
majority standard will give the shareholders equal and fair
representation in the Company by limiting the power of
shareholders who own a large stake in the entity and paving the
way for a more meaningful voting outcome.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Amend other articles/bylaws/charter
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the
guidelines committee.
|
|
Approve continuance of company
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
approval of this proposal is in the best interests of the Company
and its shareholders.
|
|
Attend to other business
|
We generally recommend FOR when the company is domiciled in
the US or Canada.
|
|
Approve company name change
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the proposed name change supports strategic changes that
enhance the Company's business objectives. Furthermore, the
proposed name change will more effectively reflect the
Company's mission and vision, thereby strengthening its
marketing and branding efforts and improving its overall market
positioning.
|
|
Approve political & charitable contributions
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, it
is necessary to allow the Company to fund charitable and
political activities, which is in the best interests of shareholders.
Such contributions can enhance the Company's reputation,
strengthen stakeholder relationships, and support its broader
social and corporate responsibility goals, ultimately benefiting
long-term shareholder value.
|
|
Establish power to execute legal formalities
|
We generally recommend a vote FOR because according to our
policy, approval of the proposal will authorize the Board or
someone who is acting on the Company's behalf to legally and
formally execute decisions made during the meeting, without the
need for further shareholder approval or meetings.
|
|
Adopt MacBride Principles, Sullivan
Principles, or similar
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because adoption of this
proposal would be duplicative and would make the Company
unnecessarily accountable to different sets of overlapping fair
employment guidelines that are already covered in its policies.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Appoint auditor
|
We generally recommend a vote AGAINST because according to
our policy, the appointment of auditors is a responsibility
entrusted to the board of directors, specifically the Audit
Committee. In our view, the procedures governing the selection
of auditors adhere to standard corporate governance and
accounting practices. Unless there are significant concerns that
could jeopardize the integrity and independence of the auditors,
we believe that approving this proposal is neither necessary nor
justified at this time.
|
|
Limit auditor non-audit services
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
auditors should not provide non-audit services. This practice
ensures the independence and integrity of the audit process,
maintaining objectivity and minimizing any potential conflicts of
interest that could undermine the reliability of the Company's
financial reporting.
|
|
Rotate auditor
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, we have seen no evidence that the auditor's integrity,
professionalism, or independence is in question
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Report on proxy voting review
|
We generally recommend FOR this proposal when at least 40% of
13 specific board governance criteria are being met. These
criteria include items such as: say-on-pay is on the agenda, the
CEO and chairman positions are held by different people, and all
classes of stock have equal voting rights.
|
|
Report on board oversight
|
We generally recommend FOR this proposal when at least 40% of
13 specific board governance criteria are being met. These
criteria include items such as: say-on-pay is on the agenda, the
CEO and chairman positions are held by different people, and all
classes of stock have equal voting rights.
|
|
Report on board member information
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, the information being requested in the shareholder
proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional
benefit to the shareholders.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Require shareholder approval to reclassify
shares or conversion rights
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
companies should ensure that all shareholders are provided with
equal voting rights, promoting fairness, accountability, and
alignment between economic ownership and control. By
adopting a one-share, one-vote structure, the Company can
better uphold shareholder democracy and support long-term
value creation for all investors.
|
|
Repurchase shares
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, while share repurchases can be beneficial for companies
in many cases, the repurchase suggested in this proposal is
unnecessary and misaligned with the current needs of the
Company. At this time, the Company's resources are better
utilized elsewhere, and the proposed repurchase does not
support the long-term strategy or financial objectives that would
maximize value for shareholders.
|
|
Issue shares
|
We generally recommend a vote AGAINST this proposal because
according to our policy, the approval could cause potential
excessive dilution in the interests of the shareholders and could
potentially overvalue the Company's stock price with such an
excessive issuance that is disproportionate to its needs.
|
|
Issue dividend
|
We recommend a vote AGAINST this proposal because according
to our policy, the Company's dividend payout plan should be
governed by the board of directors after taking into account
relevant factors such as the Company's liquidity and financial
position.
|
|
Require shareholder approval to authorize
issuance of bonds/debentures
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the
guidelines committee.
|
|
Convert shares
|
We generally recommend FOR if the conversion would provide
equal rights to shareholders.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Report on costs and risks associated with
climate plan or similar
|
We generally recommend FOR unless one of the following is true:
1) the report is clearly and fully redundant with other reporting
required of the Company or 2) the disclosure is an audit.
|
|
Adopt climate action plan / emissions
reduction / resource restriction
|
We generally recommend AGAINST the proposal, because,
according to our policy, its approval would not provide additional
benefits or value to shareholders, given the Company's existing
robust policy and strategy on climate change.
|
|
Report on climate plan / emissions / resource
use
|
We generally recommend FOR unless one of the following is true:
1) the report is clearly and fully redundant with other reporting
required of the Company or 2) the disclosure is an audit.
|
|
Report on animal welfare
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, approval of this proposal would result in the Company
incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts
that are already underway and providing additional reports with
information that is already available to shareholders.
|
|
Adopt animal welfare standards
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, the matters raised in the proposal have already been
addressed by the Company. Moreover, the proposal advocates
for impractical and imprudent actions that could negatively
impact the business and its results.
|
|
Reduce fossil fuel financing
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, the Company is already committed to meeting its climate
action goals related to sustainable financing. As businesses move
to achieving their net zero goals, we believe that the Company's
current policies in financing will bridge the transition to a low
carbon economy.
|
|
Report on GMO
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, preparing a report regarding GMOs would provide no
incremental and meaningful information to the Company's
shareholders. Moreover, given the Company's current
compliance with SEC reporting requirements and other
government regulators of GMOs, we believe that approval of this
proposal will accrue unnecessary costs and administrative
burden to the Company.
|
|
Adopt GMO policy
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, approval of the proposal would impose unnecessary
burdens on the Company's operations.
|
|
Approve annual advisory vote on climate
change
|
We generally recommend FOR unless one of the following is true:
1) the report is clearly and fully redundant with other reporting
required of the Company or 2) the disclosure is an audit.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Report on executive compensation
|
We generally recommend FOR when the total compensation is
reasonable considering the company's performance as measured
by change in adjusted stock price, and considering the following
governance requirements: 1) the company did not have an
unjustified performance metric change without shareholder
approval, 2) the company does not have a 'pay-for-failure'
severance provisions and 3) the company has a no-trigger or
single-trigger change-in-control provision.
|
|
Include performance metrics in compensation
|
We generally recommend FOR when the total compensation is
reasonable considering the company's performance as measured
by change in adjusted stock price, and considering the following
governance requirements: 1) the company did not have an
unjustified performance metric change without shareholder
approval, 2) the company does not have a 'pay-for-failure'
severance provisions and 3) the company has a no-trigger or
single-trigger change-in-control provision.
|
|
Use deferral period for compensation
|
We generally recommend FOR when the total compensation is
reasonable considering the company's performance as measured
by change in adjusted stock price, and considering the following
governance requirements: 1) the company did not have an
unjustified performance metric change without shareholder
approval, 2) the company does not have a 'pay-for-failure'
severance provisions and 3) the company has a no-trigger or
single-trigger change-in-control provision.
|
|
Implement double triggered vesting
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
vesting of equity awards over a period of time is intended to
promote long-term improvements in performance. The link
between pay and long-term performance can be severed if
awards pay out on an accelerated schedule. More importantly, a
double trigger vesting provision would provide protection to the
Company's employees in the event of transition or change of
control.
|
|
Adopt advisory vote on executive
compensation
|
We generally recommend FOR when the total compensation is
reasonable considering the company's performance as measured
by change in adjusted stock price, and considering the following
governance requirements: 1) the company did not have an
unjustified performance metric change without shareholder
approval, 2) the company does not have a 'pay-for-failure'
severance provisions and 3) the company has a no-trigger or
single-trigger change-in-control provision.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Discontinue stock option and bonus programs
|
We generally recommend FOR when the total compensation is
reasonable considering the company's performance as measured
by change in adjusted stock price, and considering the following
governance requirements: 1) the company did not have an
unjustified performance metric change without shareholder
approval, 2) the company does not have a 'pay-for-failure'
severance provisions and 3) the company has a no-trigger or
single-trigger change-in-control provision.
|
|
Use GAAP metrics for compensation
|
We generally recommend FOR when the total compensation is
reasonable considering the company's performance as measured
by change in adjusted stock price, and considering the following
governance requirements: 1) the company did not have an
unjustified performance metric change without shareholder
approval, 2) the company does not have a 'pay-for-failure'
severance provisions and 3) the company has a no-trigger or
single-trigger change-in-control provision.
|
|
Cap executive gross pay
|
We generally recommend AGAINST this proposal because
according to our policy, implementing a cap on executive
compensation gross pay, could negatively impact the hiring and
retention of the Company's key executives and employees. Such
a restriction would limit the Company's ability to fully capitalize
on the skills, expertise, and experience that individual leaders
bring to the organization.
|
|
Amend clawback provision
|
We generally recommend FOR when the total compensation is
reasonable considering the company's performance as measured
by change in adjusted stock price, and considering the following
governance requirements: 1) the company did not have an
unjustified performance metric change without shareholder
approval, 2) the company does not have a 'pay-for-failure'
severance provisions and 3) the company has a no-trigger or
single-trigger change-in-control provision.
|
|
Deduct stock buybacks from pay
|
We generally recommend FOR when the total compensation is
reasonable considering the company's performance as measured
by change in adjusted stock price, and considering the following
governance requirements: 1) the company did not have an
unjustified performance metric change without shareholder
approval, 2) the company does not have a 'pay-for-failure'
severance provisions and 3) the company has a no-trigger or
single-trigger change-in-control provision.
|
|
Exclude legal/compliance costs in
adjustments
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the
guidelines committee.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Discontinue professional services allowance
|
We generally recommend FOR the proposal because according to
our policy, approval of the proposal would limit the use of
corporate funds for the personal benefit of executives.
Moreover, we believe that the current compensation package for
the Named Executive Officers (NEOs) already adequately covers
such expenses through base salary, bonuses, and stock awards,
rendering the proposed use of additional corporate funds
unnecessary.
|
|
Expense stock options
|
We generally recommend FOR when the total compensation is
reasonable considering the company's performance as measured
by change in adjusted stock price, and considering the following
governance requirements: 1) the company did not have an
unjustified performance metric change without shareholder
approval, 2) the company does not have a 'pay-for-failure'
severance provisions and 3) the company has a no-trigger or
single-trigger change-in-control provision.
|
|
Require executives retain shares
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
requiring senior executives to hold a significant portion of stock
obtained through executive pay plans aligns the interests of
executives with the long-term success of the Company,
encouraging decisions that drive sustained value for shareholders
and promoting a focus on long-term growth.
|
|
Approve retirement plan
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the
guidelines committee.
|
|
Prohibit equity vesting for government
service
|
We generally recommend AGAINST the proposal, as, according to
our policy, its implementation could hinder the Company's ability
to attract key employees. Additionally, it could inadvertently
penalize individuals who may wish to enter or return to
governmental service.
|
|
Require shareholder vote to ratify executive
or director severance pay
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
excessive executive compensation packages has been an ongoing
cause of concern among shareholders and investors. While the
Company argues that its severance and termination payments
are reasonable, we believe that it is in the best interests of the
stockholders if they ratify executive compensation in such form.
We believe that approval of this proposal will enable the
stockholders to voice their views and opinions regarding the
Company's executive severance payments and will ensure
decisions are in their best interests.
|
|
Remove tax gross-ups
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
tax gross-ups payments can lead to unclear compensation
packages and do not align with performance-based incentives.
Additionally, tax gross-ups can represent a significant cost to
companies without providing meaningful benefits to recipients.
By eliminating such payments, the Company can promote more
transparent, performance-driven compensation structures.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Eliminate term limits
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
elimination of term limits will help the Company to attract, retain
and motivate directors who can contribute valuable insights and
long-term strategic guidance. This will also ensure continuity and
strengthen the Company's governance by retaining
knowledgeable and capable leadership of experienced directors.
|
|
Decrease required director experience /
expertise / diversity
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the
guidelines committee.
|
|
Require director experience / expertise /
diversity or other limits on the board
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, the director requirement has already been addressed with
current composition and qualifications of the board.
|
|
Introduce retirement age requirement
|
We generally recommend AGAINST this proposal because, in
accordance with our policy, the Company and its shareholders
are in the best position to determine the approach to corporate
governance, particularly board composition. Imposing inflexible
rules, such as age limits for outside directors, does not
necessarily correlate with returns or benefits for shareholders.
Similar to arbitrary term limits, age limits could force valuable
directors off the board solely based on their age, potentially
undermining the effectiveness of the board.
|
|
Require stock ownership for directors
|
We generally recommend FOR if the following conditions are
met: 1) The cash value of required ownership does not exceed
the one-year salary of the lowest-paid director and 2) the
director has at least 3 years from their start date to meet the
requirement.
|
|
Declassify the board
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
staggered terms for directors increase the difficulty for
shareholders to make fundamental changes to the composition
and behavior of a board. We prefer that the entire board of a
company be elected annually to provide appropriate
responsiveness to shareholders.
|
|
Create key committee
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the board of directors should establish key Board committees-
namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating committees-
composed solely of independent outside directors. This structure
ensures sound corporate governance practices, enhances
objectivity, and strengthens the oversight of critical areas within
the Company.
|
|
Separate Chairman and CEO positions
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy
we believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having
an inside director serve as the Chairman of the board.
Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of
the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to
further ensure board independence and accountability.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Change size of board of directors
|
We generally recommend FOR if the board size is between 5 and
15.
|
|
Eliminate retirement age requirement
|
We generally recommend FOR this proposal because, in
accordance with our policy, the Company and its shareholders
are in the best position to determine the approach to corporate
governance, particularly board composition. Imposing inflexible
rules, such as age limits for outside directors, does not
necessarily correlate with returns or benefits for shareholders.
Similar to arbitrary term limits, age limits could force valuable
directors off the board solely based on their age, potentially
undermining the effectiveness of the board.
|
|
Introduce term limits
|
We generally recommend against this proposal because, in
accordance with our policy, it would not serve a useful purpose.
Having experienced directors on the board is crucial for the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of
shareholder value.
|
|
Amend indemnification/liability provisions
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
approval of the indemnification and liability provisions will
enable the Company to attract, retain, and motivate its directors,
whose efforts are crucial to its long-term success. By providing
directors with appropriate protection against personal liability,
the Company ensures that directors can make decisions in the
best interests of the Company without undue concern about
personal financial risks.
|
|
Ensure compensation advisor independence
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
approval of the proposal would recognize the valuable role of a
compensation advisor in ensuring that the Company's
compensation decisions are made based on independent and
impartial advice. This helps to ensure fairness and objectivity in
setting executive compensation, aligning it with the Company's
long-term goals and best interests of its shareholders.
|
|
Designate independent chairman
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
there is an inherent potential conflict in having a non-
independent director serve as Chairman of the Board. To further
ensure independence and accountability in the board room, we
believe it is crucial for the Chairman to be independent. This
structure enhances effective governance and strengthens the
oversight of management, ultimately benefiting the Company
and its shareholders.
|
|
Plan CEO succession
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, a
CEO succession plan would safeguard a smooth transition and
alignment into a new leadership whenever the need arises,
thereby ensuring continuity and shareholder confidence in the
Company.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Allow for removal of directors without cause
|
We generally recommend FOR the proposal because according to
our policy, allowing to remove directors without cause provides
flexibility to the Company to make necessary changes to its
leadership when deemed appropriate. Allowing for the removal
of directors without cause ensures that the Board can effectively
address issues such as performance concerns and maintain the
best interests of the Company and its shareholders.
|
|
Classify the board
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, staggered terms for directors increase the difficulty for
shareholders to make fundamental changes to the composition
and behavior of a board. We prefer that the entire board of a
company be elected annually to provide appropriate
responsiveness to shareholders.
|
|
Create non-key committee
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the
guidelines committee.
|
|
Establish stakeholder position to board
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, the current selection process, composition and skillset of
the board of directors already captures stakeholder
representation in the board room. As such, approval of the
proposal would be redundant and duplicative.
|
|
Allow for removal of directors only with
cause
|
We generally recommend AGAINST the proposal because
according to our policy, directors should be able to be removed
with or without cause. This level of flexibility allows the Company
to make necessary changes to its leadership when deemed
appropriate. Allowing for the removal of directors with or
without cause ensures that the Board can effectively address
issues such as performance concerns and maintain the best
interests of the Company and its shareholders.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Reduce sales/marketing of tobacco/vape
products/services
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, approval of the proposal is unnecessary as the Company
already complies with the applicable federal laws and regulations
and given the Company's nature of business, we believe that
approval of the proposal would significantly impact its
operations.
|
|
Reduce sales/marketing of alcohol products/
services
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, approval of the proposal is unnecessary as the Company
already complies with the applicable federal laws and regulations
and given the Company's nature of business, we believe that
approval of the proposal would significantly impact its
operations.
|
|
Reduce sales/marketing of pornography
products/services
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, approval of the proposal would significantly impact the
Company's business operations.
|
|
Report on data privacy
|
We generally recommend FOR unless one of the following is true:
1) the report is clearly and fully redundant with other reporting
required of the Company; or 2) The proposal relates to abortion
or reproductive rights.
|
|
Reduce sales/marketing of weapon products/
services
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, the Company has in place extensive procedures to ensure
that weapon sales are made in strict compliance with all
applicable United States laws and regulations.
|
|
Report on suppliers / partners / customers /
sales
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, approval of this proposal would result in the Company
incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts
that are already underway and providing additional reports with
information that is already available to shareholders.
|
|
Report on product pricing/distribution
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, approval of this proposal would result in the Company
incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts
that are already underway and providing additional reports with
information that is already available to shareholders.
|
|
Reduce sales/marketing of unhealthy foods/
beverages
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, the Company is already addressing the issues related to
the consumption of its products through its sustainability and
current marketing initiatives.
|
|
Report on product information / production
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, approval of this proposal would result in the Company
incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts
that are already underway and providing additional reports with
information that is already available to shareholders.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Reduce sales/marketing of drug products/
services
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, approval of the proposal is unnecessary as the Company
already complies with the applicable federal laws and regulations
and given the Company's nature of business, we believe that
approval of the proposal would significantly impact its
operations.
|
|
Reduce sales/marketing of gambling
products/services
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, approval of the proposal is unnecessary as the Company
already complies with the applicable federal laws and regulations
and given the Company's nature of business, we believe that
approval of the proposal would significantly impact its
operations.
|
|
Report on high-risk country operations
|
We generally recommend FOR unless one of the following is true:
1) the report is clearly and fully redundant with other reporting
required of the Company or 2) the disclosure is an audit.
|
|
Modify business operations with high-risk
country, entity, region, etc.
|
We generally recommend AGAINST if the country has a score of 4
from the U.S. Department of State travel advisories.
|
|
Report on public health risks
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, approval of this proposal would result in the Company
incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts
that are already underway and providing additional reports with
information that is already available to shareholders.
|
|
Report on cybersecurity
|
We generally recommend FOR unless the Company receives a
failing grade on their cybersecurity risk score.
|
|
Report on content management
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, approval of this proposal would result in the Company
incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts
that are already underway and providing additional reports with
information that is already available to shareholders.
|
|
Report on intellectual property transfers
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, approval of this proposal would result in the Company
incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts
that are already underway and providing additional reports with
information that is already available to shareholders.
|
|
Reduce sales/marketing of other products/
services
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, approval of the proposal is unnecessary as the Company
already complies with the applicable federal laws and regulations
and given the Company's nature of business, we believe that
approval of the proposal would significantly impact its
operations.
|
|
Report on artificial intelligence
|
We generally recommend a vote AGAINST because according to
our policy, the proposed report on artificial intelligence would be
duplicative of the Company's existing efforts in AI reporting. Also,
approval of the proposal would pose significant administrative
costs and financial burden to the Company.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Adopt paid sick leave policy
|
We generally recommend a vote AGAINST because according to
our policy, approving this proposal would lead to unnecessary
costs and expenses by duplicating efforts that are already in
progress. Additionally, this policy is not universally applicable, as
it would only affect the Company's non-unionized employees
who already receive similar benefits. In contrast, unionized
employees are typically governed by collective bargaining
agreements, which already address such matters.
|
|
Report on maternal health outcomes
|
We generally recommend a vote AGAINST because, according to
our policy, approval of this proposal would result in the Company
incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts
that are already underway.
|
|
Report on plant closure impacts on
communities
|
We generally recommend a vote AGAINST because, according to
our policy, approval of this proposal would result in the Company
incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts
that are already underway.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Report on collective bargaining/union
relations
|
We generally recommend AGAINST this proposal because, in line
with our policy and given the Company's compliance with
applicable laws regarding freedom of association, we believe its
approval would not provide additional benefits to employees or
create further value for shareholders.
|
|
Report on prison/slave/child labor
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, approval of this proposal would result in the Company
incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts
that are already underway and providing additional reports with
information that is already available to shareholders.
|
|
Adopt diversity-based hiring
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, this could put the Company in an uncompetitive position
in terms of hiring prospective talents due to the rigid
requirements of the proposal.
|
|
Report on sexual harassment complaints
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the
guidelines committee.
|
|
Report to promote DEI practices
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the
guidelines committee.
|
|
Report on fetal tissue use
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, approval of this proposal would result in the Company
incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts
that are already underway and providing additional reports with
information that is already available to shareholders.
|
|
Become public benefit corporation
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, the proposal is not necessary and is not in the best long-
term interest of the Company and its shareholders.
|
|
Adopt merit-based hiring
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, this could put the Company in an uncompetitive position
in terms of hiring prospective talents due to the rigid
requirements of the proposal.
|
|
Address labor disputes
|
We generally recommend AGAINST this proposal because, in
accordance with our policy, the Company has already addressed
the labor concerns raised in the proposal. As such, approval of
the requested report is unnecessary and would result in
significant administrative costs, diverting Company resources
from more relevant and meaningful priorities.
|
|
Report on human trafficking
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy and given the Company's current policies which effectively
articulate their long-standing support for, and continued
commitment to, human rights, the proposal would be duplicative
and unnecessary.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Address income inequality
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, the Company's existing compensation processes are
guided by the fundamental principle that decisions are made on
the basis of the individual's personal capabilities, qualifications
and contributions to the Company's needs and not on gender.
Moreover, given the Company's current efforts to equal
employment opportunity, we believe that approval of this
proposal will accrue unnecessary costs and administrative
burden to the Company.
|
|
Report to discourage DEI practices (costs/
risks)
|
We generally recommend AGAINST this proposal because, in
accordance with our policy, conducting a cost/benefit report or a
stand-alone DEI audit by the Company or a group acting on its
behalf could potentially uncover violations of regulations or laws,
which could pose both legal and reputational risks. Additionally,
we are concerned that such report could, in our highly litigious
society, serve as a roadmap for lawsuits against the Company,
potentially leading to significant costs for shareholders in the
long term.
|
|
Report on worker misclassification
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, the Company already provides the industry standard
approach in classifying its employees. As such, approval of the
proposal would not create additional benefits to the employees
or value for the shareholders.
|
|
Address fair lending
|
We generally recommend AGAINST the proposal because,
according to our policy, it would not meaningfully improve the
Company's existing robust policies and risk oversight structure,
nor enhance the current disclosures that already provide
shareholders with meaningful information on how the Company
addresses and oversees risks related to discrimination.
Additionally, we are concerned that such an evaluation could, in
today's highly litigious environment, inadvertently provide a
roadmap for lawsuits against the Company, potentially leading to
significant legal costs for shareholders in the long term.
|
|
Report on abortion policy
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, providing a report on a highly sensitive topic could cause
divisiveness among the Company, its employees, customers and
shareholders. The complexity of views drawn from reporting the
policies on abortion or something similar could pose significant
reputational and legal risks for the Company which could
subsequently affect its operations and performance.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Report on in vitro fertilization
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, providing a report on a highly sensitive topic could cause
divisiveness among the Company, its employees, customers and
shareholders. The complexity of views drawn from reporting the
policies on abortion or something similar could pose significant
reputational and legal risks for the Company which could
subsequently affect its operations and performance.
|
|
Address sexual harassment complaints
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the
guidelines committee.
|
|
Adopt anti-discrimination policy
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, this could put the Company in an uncompetitive position
in terms of hiring prospective talents due to the rigid
requirements of the proposal.
|
|
Rescind the racial equity audit
|
We generally recommend a vote AGAINST because, according to
our policy, the proposed rescinding of the racial audit
undermines efforts to assess the impacts of the Company's
diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) practices. Racial audits are
essential in identifying and addressing disparities, and reversing
this initiative would limit shareholders' ability to evaluate the
materiality and effectiveness of the Company's DEI efforts.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Report on patent process
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy the proposal would not meaningfully improve the
Company's disclosure and reporting policies in place but is rather
duplicative of its current efforts in addressing issues with product
access and pricing.
|
|
Report on concealment clauses
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy and given the Company's existing anti-discrimination and
anti-harassment policies, we do not believe that the requested
report would add meaningful value to the policies, processes,
practices, and resources that are already in place.
|
|
Report on whistleblowers
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, approval of this proposal would result in the Company
incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts
that are already underway and providing additional reports with
information that is already available to shareholders.
|
|
Relinquish intellectual property
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy the proposal would not meaningfully improve the
Company's disclosure and reporting policies in place but is rather
duplicative of its current efforts in addressing issues with product
access and pricing.
|
|
Report on arbitration claims
|
We generally recommend AGAINST this proposal because, in
accordance with our policy, it presents a one-size-fits-all
approach that could adversely impact the Company's ability to
effectively use arbitration.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Request M&A / restructure
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because given the current
circumstances of the Company, we believe that the requested
restructuring is unwarranted and unnecessary.
|
|
Make self-tender offer
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, the proposal is not necessary and is not in the best long-
term interest of the Company and its shareholders.
|
|
Remove antitakeover provision
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, removal of the Company's antitakeover provisions may
leave the Company vulnerable to a hostile takeover. Additionally,
the current antitakeover provisions provide more time for
management to consider offers and negotiate better terms.
|
|
Ratify poison pill
|
We generally recommend a vote FOR because according to our
policy, approval of the proposal will acknowledge both the
advantages and inherent risks of implementing a shareholder
rights plan, or poison pill. While these plans can deter hostile
takeovers, they also carry the risk of management entrenchment
in some cases. Ensuring that shareholders are given a voice on
the advisability of such a plan is crucial to safeguarding the
Company from these risks, promoting transparency, and
maintaining a balance between protecting shareholder interests
and preventing potential misuse of the plan.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Change location / date / time
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the proposed change will increase the likelihood of increased
attendance rate in meetings, not to mention the benefits of
flexibility and improved accessibility to shareholders.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Convert close-end fund to open-end fund
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the conversion to an open-end fund would provide for portfolio
diversification hence reducing the Company's risk exposure, and
at the same time providing greater liquidity to its shareholders.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Report on lobbying expenditures
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy and given the Company's policies and oversight
mechanisms related to its lobbying expenditures and activities,
we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will
not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather,
the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that
would negatively affect the business and results.
|
|
Support public policy endorsement
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, although regulations are already in place as required by
federal, state, and local campaign finance and lobbying
regulations, we believe that political endorsements, often in the
form of contributions, increases the possibility of misalignment
with corporate values which in turn could lead to reputational
risks.
|
|
Report on government financial support
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy and given the Company's policies and oversight
mechanisms related to its political contributions and activities,
we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will
not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather,
the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that
would negatively affect the business and results.
|
|
Revoke public policy endorsement
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, political endorsement and spending is an integral part of a
business, as Companies should have a voice on policies affecting
them. As such, approval of this proposal will strictly limit the
Company's flexibility in supporting the advocacies that are
congruent with its business.
|
|
Report on charitable contributions
|
We generally recommend AGAINST this proposal because, in
accordance with our policy, the Company already carefully
evaluates and reviews its charitable activities, and makes
information about its corporate giving publicly available. We do
not believe that implementing the proposal would justify the
administrative costs and efforts, nor would it provide a
meaningful benefit to the Company's shareholders.
|
|
Report on public policy advocacy
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy and given the Company's policies and oversight
mechanisms related to its political contributions and activities,
we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will
not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather,
the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that
would negatively affect the business and results.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Report on political contributions
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy and given the Company's policies and oversight
mechanisms related to its political contributions and activities,
we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will
not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather,
the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that
would negatively affect the business and results.
|
|
Report on partnerships with political (or
globalist) organizations
|
We generally recommend a vote AGAINST because, according to
our policy, approval of this proposal would result in the Company
incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts
that are already underway.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Elect director to board
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, allowing a shareholder to elect a director to a board is not
in the best interests of the Company. Instead, the board should
continue to nominate directors for shareholder approval, as they
possess the expertise and resources to find the most qualified
candidates.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Require shareholder approval for bylaws
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
approval of the proposal will ensure that shareholders have a
voice in revising or adopting the bylaws which could compromise
their interests.
|
|
Ensure transparent voting on executive pay
|
We generally recommend FOR the proposal because according to
our policy, increased pay transparency is material to
shareholders. Providing greater visibility into executive
compensation practices allows shareholders to make more
informed decisions when evaluating and voting on executive pay
and Say-on-Pay proxy proposals. This level of transparency is
crucial for aligning executive compensation with long-term
company performance, ensuring that pay structures are both fair
and tied to shareholder value.
|
|
Require non-cumulative voting
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy
cumulative voting could make it possible for an individual
shareholder or group of shareholders with special interests to
elect one or more directors to the Company's Board of directors
to represent their particular interests. Such a shareholder or
group of shareholders could have goals that are inconsistent, and
could conflict with, the interests and goals of the majority of the
Company's shareholders.
|
|
Promote equal voting rights
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, a
differential in voting power may have the effect of denying
shareholders the opportunity to vote on matters of critical
economic importance to them. In order to provide equal voting
right to all shareholders, we prefer that companies do not utilize
multiple class capital structures.
|
|
Eliminate/reduce supermajority voting
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, a
simple majority vote will strengthen the Company's corporate
governance practice. Contrary to supermajority voting, a simple
majority standard will give the shareholders equal and fair
representation in the Company by limiting the power of
shareholders who own a large stake in the entity and paving the
way for a more meaningful voting outcome.
|
|
Introduce right to act by written consent
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the right to act on written consent allows an increased
participation of shareholders in the voting process, thereby
democratizing voting and giving shareholders the right to act
independently from the management.
|
|
Oppose right to act by written consent
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, the right to act on written consent allows an increased
participation of shareholders in the voting process, thereby
democratizing voting and giving the shareholders the right to act
independently from the management.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Tabulate proxy voting
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
adoption of proxy tabulation simplifies the voting process
without compromising transparency or shareholder participation.
This streamlined approach ensures that shareholder votes are
accurately counted and reported, making it easier for investors
to engage in the decision-making process. At the same time, it
preserves the integrity and transparency of the voting process,
ensuring that all shareholders have an equal opportunity to
influence key decisions while promoting efficient governance
practices.
|
|
Ensure confidential voting on executive pay
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
approval of the proposal will preserve the confidentiality and
integrity of vote outcomes regarding executive pay, which will
ensure that the Company's executive compensation policies and
procedures are aligned with the best interests of the Company
and its shareholders.
|
|
Implement cumulative voting
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy cumulative voting could make it possible for an individual
shareholder or group of shareholders with special interests to
elect one or more directors to the Company's Board of directors
to represent their particular interests. Such a shareholder or
group of shareholders could have goals that are inconsistent, and
could conflict with, the interests and goals of the majority of the
Company's shareholders.
|
|
Adopt fair elections/advance notice bylaw
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
adopting a fair elections/advance notice bylaw will ensure that
shareholders have the opportunity to vote on any proposal that
could impose inequitable restrictions, protecting their rights and
promoting transparency in the governance process. By
implementing such a bylaw, the Company reinforces its
commitment to fair shareholder participation and accountability.
|
|
Establish right to call a special meeting
|
We generally recommend FOR if at least 10% of voting shares are
required to call a special meeting.
|
|
Approve/increase supermajority voting
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, a simple majority vote will strengthen the Company's
corporate governance practice. Contrary to supermajority voting,
a simple majority standard will give the shareholders equal and
fair representation in the Company by limiting the power of
shareholders who own a large stake in the entity, therefore,
paving the way for a more meaningful voting outcome.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Increase proxy access
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
increasing proxy access would allow shareholders to submit
proposals at shareholder meetings and nominate directors to the
Board, empowering them to have a more direct influence on the
Company's governance. By enabling greater shareholder
participation, proxy access enhances transparency and
accountability, ensuring that the Board is more responsive to
shareholder concerns.
|
|
Adopt exclusive forum bylaws
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
having an exclusive forum will allow the Company to address
disputes and litigations in an exclusive jurisdiction, with
familiarity of the law, and reduce the administrative cost and
burden related to settlement.
|
|
Restrict nomination of directors
|
We generally recommend a vote FOR because, according to our
policy, a simple majority requirement in director elections,
combined with a mandatory resignation policy and prohibition
on the renomination of directors, ensures that the election
results accurately reflect shareholder sentiment. Specifically, this
approach addresses situations where a director receives less than
a majority of votes, aligning the election outcome with
shareholder expectations and maintaining effective governance.
|
|
Adopt majority vote for director election
|
We generally recommend a vote FOR because according to our
policy, a majority vote requirement in boardroom elections
enhance director accountability to shareholders. This standard
ensures that shareholder dissatisfaction with director
performance has tangible consequences, transforming the
election process from a mere formality into one that truly
reflects shareholders' voices.
|
|
Adopt proxy access
|
We generally recommend a vote FOR because according to our
policy, shareholders should have the right to nominate their own
representatives to the board. Proxy access would enhance the
Company's governance by empowering shareholders with
greater influence over the direction of the company, fostering
more accountability and alignment with shareholder interests.
|
|
Proposal
|
Vote Recommendation
|
|
Report on key-person risk
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy,
the requested report would be beneficial to the Company in
mitigating risks associated with key persons whose services and
contributions are crucial to its success. Additionally, the proposal
would enable the Company to develop effective succession plans,
ensuring continuity and minimizing disruption in the event of the
departure of these key individuals.
|
|
Report on other
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the
guidelines committee.
|
|
Adopt MacBride Principles, Sullivan
Principles, or similar
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because adoption of this
proposal would be duplicative and would make the Company
unnecessarily accountable to different sets of overlapping fair
employment guidelines that are already covered in its policies.
|
|
Issue other policy
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the
guidelines committee.
|
|
Disassociate from industry associations
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our
policy, companies benefit from industry associations, especially
when it comes to influential policies that can directly affect
businesses. As such, disassociation from such groups could
potentially pose potential reputational and systemic risks that
could be detrimental to the Company's business in the long-run.
|
|
Prepare an independent third-party audit
|
We generally recommend AGAINST this proposal because, in
accordance with our policy, conducting a stand-alone audit by
the Company or a group acting on its behalf could potentially
reveal violations of regulations and laws, which could be legally
and reputationally problematic. Additionally, we are concerned
that such an audit could, in our highly litigious society, provide a
roadmap for lawsuits against the Company, which could result in
significant costs for shareholders over the long term.
|
|
A-1
|
A short-term obligation rated 'A-1' is rated in the highest category by S&P Global
Ratings. The obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation is
strong. Within this category, certain obligations are designated with a plus sign (+). This
indicates that the obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments on these
obligations is extremely strong.
|
|
A-2
|
A short-term obligation rated 'A-2' is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects
of changes in circumstances and economic conditions than obligations in higher rating
categories. However, the obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments on the
obligation is satisfactory.
|
|
A-3
|
A short-term obligation rated 'A-3' exhibits adequate protection parameters. However,
adverse economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to weaken an
obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation.
|
|
B
|
A short-term obligation rated 'B' is regarded as vulnerable and has significant
speculative characteristics. The obligor currently has the capacity to meet its financial
commitments; however, it faces major ongoing uncertainties that could lead to the
obligor's inadequate capacity to meet its financial commitments.
|
|
C
|
A short-term obligation rated 'C' is currently vulnerable to nonpayment and is
dependent upon favorable business, financial, and economic conditions for the obligor
to meet its financial commitments on the obligation.
|
|
D
|
A short-term obligation rated 'D' is in default or in breach of an imputed promise. For
non-hybrid capital instruments, the 'D' rating category is used when payments on an
obligation are not made on the date due, unless S&P Global Ratings believes that such
payments will be made within any stated grace period. However, any stated grace period
longer than five business days will be treated as five business days. The 'D' rating also
will be used upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition or the taking of a similar action and
where default on an obligation is a virtual certainty, for example due to automatic stay
provisions. A rating on an obligation is lowered to 'D' if it is subject to a distressed debt
restructuring.
|
|
F1
|
HIGHEST SHORT-TERM CREDIT QUALITY. Indicates the strongest intrinsic
capacity for timely payment of financial commitments; may have an added "+" to
denote any exceptionally strong credit feature.
|
|
F2
|
GOOD SHORT-TERM CREDIT QUALITY. Good intrinsic capacity for timely payment
of financial commitments.
|
|
F3
|
FAIR SHORT-TERM CREDIT QUALITY. The intrinsic capacity for timely payment of
financial commitments is adequate.
|
|
B
|
SPECULATIVE SHORT-TERM CREDIT QUALITY. Minimal capacity for timely
payment of financial commitments, plus heightened vulnerability to near term adverse
changes in financial and economic conditions.
|
|
C
|
HIGH SHORT-TERM DEFAULT RISK. Default is a real possibility.
|
|
RD
|
RESTRICTED DEFAULT. Indicates an entity that has defaulted on one or more of its
financial commitments, although it continues to meet other financial obligations.
Typically applicable to entity ratings only.
|
|
D
|
DEFAULT. Indicates a broad-based default event for an entity, or the default of a short-
term obligation.
|
|
P-1
|
Ratings of Prime-1 reflect a superior ability to repay short-term debt obligations.
|
|
P-2
|
Ratings of Prime-2 reflect a strong ability to repay short-term debt obligations.
|
|
P-3
|
Ratings of Prime-3 reflect an acceptable ability to repay short-term obligations.
|
|
NP
|
Issuers (or supporting institutions) rated Not Prime do not fall within any of the Prime
rating categories.
|
|
R-1 (high)
|
Highest credit quality. The capacity for the payment of short-term financial obligations
as they fall due is exceptionally high. Unlikely to be adversely affected by future events.
|
|
R-1 (middle)
|
Superior credit quality. The capacity for the payment of short-term financial obligations
as they fall due is very high. Differs from R-1 (high) by a relatively modest degree.
Unlikely to be significantly vulnerable to future events.
|
|
R-1 (low)
|
Good credit quality. The capacity for the payment of short-term financial obligations as
they fall due is substantial. Overall strength is not as favorable as higher rating
categories. May be vulnerable to future events, but qualifying negative factors are
considered manageable.
|
|
R-2 (high)
|
Upper end of adequate credit quality. The capacity for the payment of short-term
financial obligations as they fall due is acceptable. May be vulnerable to future events.
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R-2 (middle)
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Adequate credit quality. The capacity for the payment of short-term financial
obligations as they fall due is acceptable. May be vulnerable to future events or may be
exposed to other factors that could reduce credit quality.
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R-2 (low)
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Lower end of adequate credit quality. The capacity for the payment of short-term
financial obligations as they fall due is acceptable. May be vulnerable to future events.
A number of challenges are present that could affect the issuer's ability to meet such
obligations.
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R-3
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Lowest end of adequate credit quality. There is a capacity for the payment of short-term
financial obligations as they fall due. May be vulnerable to future events and the
certainty of meeting such obligations could be impacted by a variety of developments.
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R-4
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Speculative credit quality. The capacity for the payment of short-term financial
obligations as they fall due is uncertain.
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R-5
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Highly speculative credit quality. There is a high level of uncertainty as to the capacity
to meet short-term financial obligations as they fall due.
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D
|
When the issuer has filed under any applicable bankruptcy, insolvency or winding up
statute or there is a failure to satisfy an obligation after the exhaustion of grace periods,
a downgrade to D may occur. DBRS Morningstar may also use SD (Selective Default)
in cases where only some securities are impacted, such as the case of a "distressed
exchange."
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AAA
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An obligation rated 'AAA' has the highest rating assigned by S&P Global Ratings. The
obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation is extremely
strong.
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AA
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An obligation rated 'AA' differs from the highest-rated obligations only to a small
degree. The obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation is
very strong.
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A
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An obligation rated 'A' is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects of changes
in circumstances and economic conditions than obligations in higher-rated categories.
However, the obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation is
still strong.
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BBB
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An obligation rated 'BBB' exhibits adequate protection parameters. However, adverse
economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to weaken the obligor's
capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation.
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BB,B,CCC,CC
and C
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Obligations rated 'BB', 'B', 'CCC', 'CC', and 'C' are regarded as having significant
speculative characteristics. 'BB' indicates the least degree of speculation and 'C' the
highest. While such obligations will likely have some quality and protective
characteristics, these may be outweighed by large uncertainties or major exposure to
adverse conditions.
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BB
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An obligation rated 'BB' is less vulnerable to nonpayment than other speculative issues.
However, it faces major ongoing uncertainties or exposure to adverse business,
financial, or economic conditions that could lead to the obligor's inadequate capacity to
meet its financial commitments on the obligation.
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B
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An obligation rated 'B' is more vulnerable to nonpayment than obligations rated 'BB',
but the obligor currently has the capacity to meet its financial commitments on the
obligation. Adverse business, financial, or economic conditions will likely impair the
obligor's capacity or willingness to meet its financial commitments on the obligation.
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CCC
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An obligation rated 'CCC' is currently vulnerable to nonpayment, and is dependent
upon favorable business, financial, and economic conditions for the obligor to meet its
financial commitments on the obligation. In the event of adverse business, financial, or
economic conditions, the obligor is not likely to have the capacity to meet its financial
commitments on the obligation.
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CC
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An obligation rated 'CC' is currently highly vulnerable to nonpayment. The 'CC' rating
is used when a default has not yet occurred but S&P Global Ratings expects default to
be a virtual certainty, regardless of the anticipated time to default.
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C
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An obligation rated 'C' is currently highly vulnerable to nonpayment, and the obligation
is expected to have lower relative seniority or lower ultimate recovery compared with
obligations that are rated higher.
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D
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An obligation rated 'D' is in default or in breach of an imputed promise. For non-hybrid
capital instruments, the 'D' rating category is used when payments on an obligation are
not made on the date due, unless S&P Global Ratings believes that such payments will
be made within five business days in the absence of a stated grace period or within the
earlier of the stated grace period or 30 calendar days. The 'D' rating also will be used
upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition or the taking of similar action and where default
on an obligation is a virtual certainty, for example due to automatic stay provisions. A
rating on an obligation is lowered to 'D' if it is subject to a distressed debt restructuring.
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AAA
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HIGHEST CREDIT QUALITY. 'AAA' ratings denote the lowest expectation of default
risk. They are assigned only in cases of exceptionally strong capacity for payment of
financial commitments. This capacity is highly unlikely to be adversely affected by
foreseeable events.
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AA
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VERY HIGH CREDIT QUALITY. 'AA' ratings denote expectations of very low default
risk. They indicate very strong capacity for payment of financial commitments. This
capacity is not significantly vulnerable to foreseeable events.
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A
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HIGH CREDIT QUALITY. 'A' ratings denote expectations of low default risk. The
capacity for payment of financial commitments is considered strong. This capacity may,
nevertheless, be more vulnerable to adverse business or economic conditions than is the
case for higher ratings.
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BBB
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GOOD CREDIT QUALITY. 'BBB' ratings indicate that expectations of default risk are
currently low. The capacity for payment of financial commitments is considered
adequate, but adverse business or economic conditions are more likely to impair this
capacity.
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BB
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SPECULATIVE. 'BB' ratings indicate an elevated vulnerability to default risk,
particularly in the event of adverse changes in business or economic conditions over
time; however, business or financial flexibility exists that supports the servicing of
financial commitments.
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B
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HIGHLY SPECULATIVE. 'B' ratings indicate that material default risk is present, but a
limited margin of safety remains. Financial commitments are currently being met;
however, capacity for continued payment is vulnerable to deterioration in the business
and economic environment.
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CCC
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SUBSTANTIAL CREDIT RISK. Default is a real possibility.
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CC
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VERY HIGH LEVELS OF CREDIT RISK. Default of some kind appears probable.
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C
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NEAR DEFAULT. A default or default-like process has begun, or the issuer is in
standstill, or for a closed funding vehicle, payment capacity is irrevocably impaired.
Conditions that are indicative of a 'C' category rating for an issuer include:
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●the issuer has entered into a grace or cure period following non-payment of a
material financial obligation;
●the issuer has entered into a temporary negotiated waiver or standstill agreement
following a payment default on a material financial obligation;
●the formal announcement by the issuer or their agent of a distressed debt exchange;
●a closed financing vehicle where payment capacity is irrevocably impaired such that
it is not expected to pay interest and/or principal in full during the life of the
transaction, but where no payment default is imminent.
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RD
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RESTRICTED DEFAULT. 'RD' ratings indicate an issuer that in Fitch's opinion has
experienced:
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●an uncured payment default or distressed debt exchange on a bond, loan or other
material financial obligation, but
●has not entered into bankruptcy filings, administration, receivership, liquidation or
other formal winding-up procedure, and
●has not otherwise ceased operating. This would include:
●the selective payment default on a specific class or currency of debt;
●the uncured expiry of any applicable grace period, cure period or default forbearance
period following a payment default on a bank loan, capital markets security or other
material financial obligation;
●the extension of multiple waivers or forbearance periods upon a payment default on
one or more material financial obligations, either in series or in parallel; ordinary
execution of a distressed debt exchange on one or more material financial
obligations.
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D
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DEFAULT. 'D' ratings indicate an issuer that in Fitch Ratings' opinion has entered into
bankruptcy filings, administration, receivership, liquidation or other formal winding-up
procedure or that has otherwise ceased business.
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Aaa
|
Obligations rated Aaa are judged to be of the highest quality, with minimal risk.
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Aa
|
Obligations rated Aa are judged to be of high quality and are subject to very low credit
risk.
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A
|
Obligations rated A are judged to be upper-medium-grade and are subject to low credit
risk.
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Baa
|
Obligations rated Baa are subject to moderate credit risk. They are considered medium-
grade and as such may possess certain speculative characteristics.
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Ba
|
Obligations rated Ba are judged to have speculative elements and are subject to
substantial credit risk.
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B
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Obligations rated B are considered speculative and are subject to high credit risk.
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Caa
|
Obligations rated Caa are judged to be of poor standing and are subject to very high
credit risk.
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Ca
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Obligations rated Ca are highly speculative and are likely in, or very near, default, with
some prospect of recovery in principal and interest.
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C
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Obligations rated C are the lowest-rated class of bonds and are typically in default, with
little prospect for recovery of principal or interest.
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AAA
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Highest credit quality. The capacity for the payment of financial obligations is
exceptionally high and unlikely to be adversely affected by future events.
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AA
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Superior credit quality. The capacity for the payment of financial obligations is
considered high. Credit quality differs from AAA only to a small degree. Unlikely to be
significantly vulnerable to future events.
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A
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Good credit quality. The capacity for the payment of financial obligations is substantial,
but of lesser credit quality than AA. May be vulnerable to future events, but qualifying
negative factors are considered manageable.
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BBB
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Adequate credit quality. The capacity for the payment of financial obligations is
considered acceptable. May be vulnerable to future events.
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BB
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Speculative, non-investment grade credit quality. The capacity for the payment of
financial obligations is uncertain. Vulnerable to future events.
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B
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Highly speculative credit quality. There is a high level of uncertainty as to the capacity
to meet financial obligations.
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CCC/CC/C
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Very highly speculative credit quality. In danger of defaulting on financial obligations.
There is little difference between these three categories, although CC and C ratings are
normally applied to obligations that are seen as highly likely to default, or subordinated
to obligations rated in the CCC to B range. Obligations in respect of which default has
not technically taken place but is considered inevitable may be rated in the C category.
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D
|
When the issuer has filed under any applicable bankruptcy, insolvency or winding up
statute or there is a failure to satisfy an obligation after the exhaustion of grace periods,
a downgrade to D may occur. DBRS Morningstar may also use SD (Selective Default)
in cases where only some securities are impacted, such as the case of a "distressed
exchange."
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AAA
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An insurer rated 'AAA' has extremely strong financial security characteristics. 'AAA' is
the highest insurer financial strength rating assigned by S&P Global Ratings.
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AA
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An insurer rated 'AA' has very strong financial security characteristics, differing only
slightly from those rated higher.
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A
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An insurer rated 'A' has strong financial security characteristics, but is somewhat more
likely to be affected by adverse business conditions than are insurers with higher ratings.
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BBB
|
An insurer rated 'BBB' has good financial security characteristics, but is more likely to
be affected by adverse business conditions than are higher-rated insurers.
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BB, B, CCC,
and CC
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An insurer rated 'BB' or lower is regarded as having vulnerable characteristics that may
outweigh its strengths, 'BB' indicates the least degree of vulnerability within the range
and 'CC' the highest.
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BB
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An insurer rated 'BB' has marginal financial security characteristics. Positive attributes
exist, but adverse business conditions could lead to insufficient ability to meet financial
commitments.
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B
|
An insurer rated 'B' has weak financial security characteristics. Adverse business
conditions will likely impair its ability to meet financial commitments.
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CCC
|
An insurer rated 'CCC' has very weak financial security characteristics, and is
dependent on favorable business conditions to meet financial commitments.
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CC
|
An insurer rated 'CC' has extremely weak financial security characteristics and is likely
not to meet some of its financial commitments.
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SD and D
|
An insurer rated 'SD' (selective default) or 'D' is in default on one or more of its
insurance policy obligations.
The 'D' rating also will be used upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition or the taking of
similar action if payments on a policy obligation are at risk. A 'D' rating is assigned
when S&P Global Ratings believes that the default will be a general default and that the
obligor will fail to pay substantially all of its obligations in full in accordance with the
policy terms.
An 'SD' rating is assigned when S&P Global Ratings believes that the insurer has
selectively defaulted on a specific class of policies but it will continue to meet its
payment obligations on other classes of obligations. An 'SD' includes the completion of
a distressed debt restructuring. Claim denials due to lack of coverage or other legally
permitted defenses are not considered defaults.
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AAA
|
EXCEPTIONALLY STRONG. 'AAA' IFS Ratings denote the lowest expectation of
ceased or interrupted payments. They are assigned only in the case of exceptionally
strong capacity to meet policyholder and contract obligations. This capacity is highly
unlikely to be adversely affected by foreseeable events.
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AA
|
VERY STRONG. 'AA' IFS Ratings denote a very low expectation of ceased or
interrupted payments. They indicate very strong capacity to meet policyholder and
contract obligations. This capacity is not significantly vulnerable to foreseeable events.
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A
|
STRONG. 'A' IFS Ratings denote a low expectation of ceased or interrupted payments.
They indicate strong capacity to meet policyholder and contract obligations. This
capacity may, nonetheless, be more vulnerable to changes in circumstances or in
economic conditions than is the case for higher ratings.
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BBB
|
GOOD. 'BBB' IFS Ratings indicate that there is currently a low expectation of ceased
or interrupted payments. The capacity to meet policyholder and contract obligations on
a timely basis is considered adequate, but adverse changes in circumstances and
economic conditions are more likely to impact this capacity.
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BB
|
MODERATELY WEAK. 'BB' IFS Ratings indicate that there is an elevated
vulnerability to ceased or interrupted payments, particularly as the result of adverse
economic or market changes over time. However, business or financial alternatives may
be available to allow for policyholder and contract obligations to be met in a timely
manner.
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B
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WEAK. 'B' IFS Ratings indicate two possible conditions. If obligations are still being
met on a timely basis, there is significant risk that ceased or interrupted payments could
occur in the future, but a limited margin of safety remains. Capacity for continued
timely payments is contingent upon a sustained, favorable business and economic
environment, and favorable market conditions. Alternatively, a 'B' IFS Rating is
assigned to obligations that have experienced ceased or interrupted payments, but with
the potential for extremely high recoveries. Such obligations would possess a recovery
assessment of 'RR1' (Outstanding).
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CCC
|
VERY WEAK. 'CCC' IFS Ratings indicate two possible conditions. If obligations are
still being met on a timely basis, there is a real possibility that ceased or interrupted
payments could occur in the future. Capacity for continued timely payments is solely
reliant upon a sustained, favorable business and economic environment, and favorable
market conditions. Alternatively, a 'CCC' IFS Rating is assigned to obligations that have
experienced ceased or interrupted payments, and with the potential for average to
superior recoveries. Such obligations would possess a recovery assessment of 'RR2'
(Superior), 'RR3' (Good), and 'RR4' (Average).
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CC
|
EXTREMELY WEAK. 'CC' IFS Ratings indicate two possible conditions. If
obligations are still being met on a timely basis, it is probable that ceased or interrupted
payments will occur in the future. Alternatively, a 'CC' IFS Rating is assigned to
obligations that have experienced ceased or interrupted payments, with the potential for
average to below-average recoveries. Such obligations would possess a recovery
assessment of 'RR4' (Average) or 'RR5' (Below Average).
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C
|
DISTRESSED. 'C' IFS Ratings indicate two possible conditions. If obligations are still
being met on a timely basis, ceased or interrupted payments are imminent. Alternatively,
a 'C' IFS Rating is assigned to obligations that have experienced ceased or interrupted
payments, and with the potential for below average to poor recoveries. Such obligations
would possess a recovery assessment of 'RR5' (Below Average) or 'RR6' (Poor).
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F1
|
Insurers are viewed as having a strong capacity to meet their near-term obligations.
When an insurer rated in this rating category is designated with a (+) sign, it is viewed
as having a very strong capacity to meet near-term obligations.
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F2
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Insurers are viewed as having a good capacity to meet their near-term obligations.
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F3
|
Insurers are viewed as having an adequate capacity to meet their near-term obligations.
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B
|
Insurers are viewed as having a weak capacity to meet their near-term obligations.
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C
|
Insurers are viewed as having a very weak capacity to meet their near-term obligations.
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RR1
|
OUTSTANDING RECOVERY PROSPECTS GIVEN DEFAULT. 'RR1' rated securities
have characteristics consistent with securities historically recovering 91%-100% of
current principal and related interest.
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RR2
|
SUPERIOR RECOVERY PROSPECTS GIVEN DEFAULT. 'RR2' rated securities have
characteristics consistent with securities historically recovering 71%-90% of current
principal and related interest.
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RR3
|
GOOD RECOVERY PROSPECTS GIVEN DEFAULT. 'RR3' rated securities have
characteristics consistent with securities historically recovering 51%-70% of current
principal and related interest.
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RR4
|
AVERAGE RECOVERY PROSPECTS GIVEN DEFAULT. 'RR4' rated securities have
characteristics consistent with securities historically recovering 31%-50% of current
principal and related interest.
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RR5
|
BELOW AVERAGE RECOVERY PROSPECTS GIVEN DEFAULT. 'RR5' rated
securities have characteristics consistent with securities historically recovering 11%-
30% of current principal and related interest.
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RR6
|
POOR RECOVERY PROSPECTS GIVEN DEFAULT. 'RR6' rated securities have
characteristics consistent with securities historically recovering 0%-10% of current
principal and related interest.
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Aaa
|
Insurance companies rated Aaa are judged to be of the highest quality, subject to the
lowest level of credit risk.
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Aa
|
Insurance companies rated Aa are judged to be of high quality and are subject to very
low credit risk.
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A
|
Insurance companies rated A are judged to be upper-medium grade and are subject to
low credit risk.
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Baa
|
Insurance companies rated Baa are judged to be medium-grade and subject to moderate
credit risk and as such may possess certain speculative characteristics.
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Ba
|
Insurance companies rated Ba are judged to be speculative and are subject to substantial
credit risk.
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B
|
Insurance companies rated B are considered speculative and are subject to high credit
risk.
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Caa
|
Insurance companies rated Caa are judged to be speculative of poor standing and are
subject to very high credit risk.
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Ca
|
Insurance companies rated Ca are highly speculative and are likely in, or very near,
default, with some prospect of recovery of principal and interest.
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C
|
Insurance companies rated C are the lowest rated and are typically in default, with little
prospect for recovery of principal or interest.
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P-1
|
Ratings of Prime-1 reflect a superior ability to repay short-term debt obligations.
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P-2
|
Ratings of Prime-2 reflect a strong ability to repay short-term debt obligations.
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P-3
|
Ratings of Prime-3 reflect an acceptable ability to repay short-term obligations.
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P-4
|
Issuers (or supporting institutions) rated Not Prime do not fall within any of the Prime
rating categories.
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SP-1
|
Strong capacity to pay principal and interest. An issue determined to possess a very
strong capacity to pay debt service is given a plus (+) designation.
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SP-2
|
Satisfactory capacity to pay principal and interest, with some vulnerability to adverse
financial and economic changes over the term of the notes.
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SP-3
|
Speculative capacity to pay principal and interest.
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D
|
'D' is assigned upon failure to pay the note when due, completion of a distressed debt
restructuring, or the filing of a bankruptcy petition or the taking of similar action and
where default on an obligation is a virtual certainty, for example, due to automatic stay
provisions.
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MIG 1
|
This designation denotes superior credit quality. Excellent protection is afforded by
established cash flows, highly reliable liquidity support or demonstrated broad-based
access to the market for refinancing.
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MIG 2
|
This designation denotes strong credit quality. Margins of protection are ample,
although not as large as in the preceding group.
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MIG 3
|
This designation denotes acceptable credit quality. Liquidity and cash-flow protection
may be narrow, and market access for refinancing is likely to be less well-established.
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SG
|
This designation denotes speculative-grade credit quality. Debt instruments in this
category may lack sufficient margins of protection.
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VMIG 1
|
This designation denotes superior credit quality. Excellent protection is afforded by the
superior short-term credit strength of the liquidity provider and structural and legal
protections that ensure the timely payment of purchase price upon demand.
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VMIG 2
|
This designation denotes strong credit quality. Good protection is afforded by the strong
short-term credit strength of the liquidity provider and structural and legal protections
that ensure the timely payment of purchase price upon demand.
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VMIG 3
|
This designation denotes acceptable credit quality. Adequate protection is afforded by
the satisfactory short-term credit strength of the liquidity provider and structural and
legal protections that ensure the timely payment of purchase price upon demand.
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SG
|
This designation denotes speculative-grade credit quality. Demand features rated in this
category may be supported by a liquidity provider that does not have a sufficiently
strong short-term rating or may lack the structural or legal protections necessary to
ensure the timely payment of purchase price upon demand.
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Pfd-1
|
Preferred shares rated Pfd-1 are generally of superior credit quality, and are supported
by entities with strong earnings and balance sheet characteristics. Pfd-1 ratings
generally correspond with issuers with a AAA or AA category reference point1.
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Pfd-2
|
Preferred shares rated Pfd-2 are generally of good credit quality. Protection of dividends
and principal is still substantial, but earnings, the balance sheet and coverage ratios are
not as strong as Pfd-1 rated companies. Generally, Pfd-2 ratings correspond with issuers
with an A category or higher reference point.
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Pfd-3
|
Preferred shares rated Pfd-3 are generally of adequate credit quality. While protection of
dividends and principal is still considered acceptable, the issuing entity is more
susceptible to adverse changes in financial and economic conditions, and there may be
other adverse conditions present which detract from debt protection. Pfd-3 ratings
generally correspond with issuers with a BBB category or higher reference point.
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Pfd-4
|
Preferred shares rated Pfd-4 are generally speculative, where the degree of protection
afforded to dividends and principal is uncertain, particularly during periods of economic
adversity. Issuers with preferred shares rated Pfd-4 generally correspond with issuers
with a BB category or higher reference point.
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Pfd-5
|
Preferred shares rated Pfd-5 are generally highly speculative and the ability of the entity
to maintain timely dividend and principal payments in the future is highly uncertain.
Entities with a Pfd-5 rating generally correspond with issuers with a B category or
higher reference point. Preferred shares rated Pfd-5 often have characteristics that, if not
remedied, may lead to default.
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D
|
When the issuer has filed under any applicable bankruptcy, insolvency or winding up or
the issuer is in default per the legal documents, a downgrade to D may occur. Because
preferred share dividends are only payable when approved, the non-payment of a
preferred share dividend does not necessarily result in a D. DBRS Morningstar may also
use SD (Selective Default) in cases where only some securities are impacted, such as the
case of a "distressed exchange". See the Default Definition document posted on the
website for more information.
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