EU Statement – 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT): Main Committee II

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EU Statement - 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT): Main Committee II

04.05.2026

4 May 2026, New York - European Union Statement for Main Committee II of the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (27 April - 22 May 2026)

Chair,

1. I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The Candidate Countries Montenegro, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, and Bosnia and Herzegovina*, and the EFTA country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Monaco and San Marino align themselves with this statement.

1. Let me congratulate you on your election as Main Committee II Chair and assure you of the full support and cooperation of the EU and its Member States.

1. The EU stresses the urgent need to address decisively the multiple existing nuclear proliferation challenges, in order to preserve and strengthen the NPT's positive record in this regard. The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is a fundamental component of the NPT, and the EU and its Member States attach great importance to the IAEA's mandate and its impartial, independent and objective role.

Chair,

1. Russia's unjustified and illegal full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular its illegal seizure and militarisation of Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), has severe implications for safeguards in Ukraine. We call on Russia to immediately and unconditionally withdraw its military and other forces, equipment and unauthorized personnel from Ukraine's ZNPP and return the plant to the full control of the competent Ukrainian authorities, to respect Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. We urge Russia to comply with all relevant UN General Assembly and IAEA resolutions.

2. Military activities continue to challenge the implementation of IAEA safeguards under Ukraine's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol. Under these exceptionally difficult circumstances, the EU welcomes that the IAEA has continued to implement safeguards and in-field verification activities in Ukraine, and stresses the importance that it continues to be able to do so. Its presence at all of Ukraine's nuclear sites is of utmost importance.

Chair,

1. Developments in Iran and the wider region threaten both regional and global security. The EU calls for de-escalation, maximum restraint, protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure, and full respect for international law by all parties, including the principles of the UN Charter, and international humanitarian law. We strongly condemn Iran's indiscriminate military strikes against countries in the region, express our solidarity with countries affected, and call for the implementation of UNSC resolution 2817 (2026).

1. Iran must never be allowed to seek, develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. The EU has always supported diplomatic efforts as the only way to bring about a durable solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, which remains a key threat to international security. We support the resumption of talks between the US and Iran to achieve a robust and lasting agreement addressing the international community's serious concerns over Iran's nuclear programme.

1. The reinstated UN Security Council Resolutions after the completion of the snapback process create obligations for all UN Member States and oblige Iran to suspend several proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. Iran's continuously escalating nuclear trajectory over the last six years and its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement constitute an urgent and profound nuclear proliferation crisis in the region. Iran is the only NPT non-nuclear-weapon State to have produced and accumulated highly enriched uranium (HEU), for which there is no credible civilian justification. The IAEA has been unable to verify the stockpile of this material for almost one year. It therefore has been unable to exclude the diversion of nuclear material and to ascertain the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. This is a matter of compliance with Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement, the implementation of which cannot be suspended under any circumstances.

1. We also condemn Iran's military support to Russia, including the delivery of ballistic missiles and drones, which is a major threat to European and international peace and security.

Chair,

1. The EU condemns the DPRK's unlawful and destabilising actions that undermine regional and international peace and security. We urge the DPRK to comply with its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions and abandon all its nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, its ballistic missile programmes and its existing nuclear programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. The DPRK will never be recognised as a nuclear-weapon State under NPT or have any other special status on that regard.

1. The DPRK must return to full compliance with the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State and with the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and bring into force an Additional Protocol. The DPRK must refrain from testing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and sign and ratify the CTBT without further delay or preconditions. The EU calls on the DPRK to engage in meaningful discussions with all relevant parties to build a basis for sustainable peace and security and to take steps aimed at pursuing the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. This includes the IAEA's return to the DPRK. The EU stands ready to support any such efforts.

1. We express our deep concern about Russia's disturbing shift of position since 2024 on the DPRK's denuclearisation, considering it a "closed issue". This undermines decades-long international nuclear non-proliferation efforts. It is particularly disappointing for a permanent member of the UN Security Council to treat this matter so irresponsibly and inconsistently with its NPT obligations. We stress that all UN sanctions established pursuant to relevant UN Security Council resolutions remain fully in place. We resolutely condemn Russia's continuing illegal military cooperation with the DPRK, in flagrant violation of UN Security Council resolutions, and call on both countries to cease immediately these activities.

1. We fully support the IAEA's engagement with Syria and the ongoing process to clarify outstanding safeguards issues. We recognise efforts so far and highlight the importance for the Syrian authorities to continue to reinforce their cooperation with the IAEA so that the Agency can provide the necessary assurances as to the exclusively peaceful nature of Syria's nuclear programme. We strongly encourage Syria to conclude and bring into force without delay an Additional Protocol.

Chair,

1. Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, together with the Additional Protocol, represent the current IAEA verification standard under Article III of the NPT. The EU and its Member States continue to call for their universalisation without delay.

2. We call on concerned States to amend or rescind their Small Quantities Protocols immediately, especially those countries in the process of building a nuclear power plant or research reactor.

Chair,

1. The IAEA's safeguards system receives considerable support through the Support Programmes of the European Commission and of EU Member States.

1. The EU recalls the importance of effective export controls, which are fundamental to comply with obligations under Article III of the NPT, and UN Security Council Resolutions 1540, 1887 and 2325. We invite all States to adhere to the guidelines of the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Export control regimes contribute to facilitating legitimate transfers of nuclear technology and scientific knowledge for peaceful uses, to maintaining a predictable, transparent framework and a well-defined level-playing field for international nuclear and corresponding trade.

1. The proliferation of WMD-capable ballistic missiles and missile technology is a destabilising factor and remains a matter of grave concern to the EU. The EU calls on all States that have not yet done so to subscribe to The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, the only multilateral instrument aimed at both preventing ballistic missile proliferation and increasing transparency about ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles of the Subscribing States.

Thank you, Chair.

1. ^Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.