Bipartisan Members of Congress Call on Commerce Department to Block Americans from Working For Russian and Chinese Intelligence Agencies

Bipartisan Members of Congress Call on Commerce Department to Block Americans from Working For Russian and Chinese Intelligence Agencies

Wyden, Cornyn, Welch, Harrigan, Jacobs and McCaul Urge Secretary Lutnick to Implement Rules Passed by Congress in 2022 to Stop American Companies and Citizens from Supporting Intelligence Agencies in Foreign Countries of Concern

Washington, D.C. -Bipartisan members of Congress today called on the Commerce Department to stop American companies and citizens from aiding Russian and Chinese civilian intelligence agencies, by implementing a 2022 bipartisan law that the executive branch has never fully enforced.

U.S. Senator Ron Wyden, D-Ore., Sen. John Cornyn, R-Texas, Sen. Peter Welch, Rep. Pat Harrigan, R-N.C., Rep. Sara Jacobs, D-Calif., and Rep. Michael McCaul, R-Texas, urged Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick to close loopholes in U.S. export control rules that currently allow Americans to work with civilian intelligence agencies in China, Russia and other countries of concern. Without new controls against helping adversary nations, U.S. national security could be at risk.

"As a result, foreign intelligence agencies in many countries can still legally hire consultants in the United States and buy advanced U.S. surveillance, cyber, and artificial intelligence technology, for use in their intelligence operations to target Americans, and operate against American national security and foreign policy interests," the members wrote.

The Trump Administration imposed export controls on U.S. persons doing business with military intelligence agencies in China, Russia, and other countries of concern in 2021. But the law at the time only allowed such restrictions to be applied to military intelligence agencies. In 2022, Congress closed the civilian intelligence loophole in a 2022 law, allowing the government to impose export controls on foreign civilian intelligence and security agencies too. While the Biden Administration proposed draft regulations imposing export controls in 2024, those regulations were never finalized.

"Implementing these crucial enhancements to fully close this loophole is vital to preventing foreign adversaries from leveraging American tools and expertise against the U.S. government, our citizens and strategic interests," the members wrote.

The members urged the administration to include recommendations by Wyden, national security and human rights experts, including:

• Extending export controls to cover all serial human rights abusers and espionage threats. The country lists proposed by the last administration omitted numerous repressive regimes and nations that conduct espionage against the United States. BIS should establish a "trusted countries list" composed of nations with strong track records of respecting human rights and that do not surveil the United States. A license should be required for U.S. persons to do business with intelligence and security agencies in all countries not on that list

• Close due diligence loopholes for private surveillance contractors. Private spyware and cyber-surveillance firms frequently mask their client lists to bypass regulations. BIS must close this loophole by explicitly applying export restrictions to all foreign surveillance technology companies unless they provide their U.S. suppliers with a sworn attestation confirming that their clients do not include any intelligence or security end-users outside the trusted countries list.

• Control the export of all biometric surveillance and classification technologies: Although the 2024 draft rule proposed adding facial recognition to the EAR's Commerce Control List (CCL), oppressive regimes rely on a wider array of digital tracking tools. The final regulations must expand this category to include broader biometric identification technologies-such as gait or cardiac signature recognition-as well as biometric classification technologies used to sort individuals by demographic traits such as race, sex, or ethnicity.

A copy of the full letter sent to the GAO is available here.

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