7 Nuclear Verification (d) Implementation of the Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic

Chair,

I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

We thank the Director General for his report and express our sincere appreciation to the Secretariat and the Agency's inspectors for their professionalism, technical rigour, persistence, and independence in carrying out the Agency's safeguards mandate. The findings before us demonstrate the value of a safeguards system capable of pursuing unresolved questions over many years to establish the facts.

CANZ welcomes the cooperation extended by the Syrian authorities. The facilitation of Agency access to Dair Alzour and other relevant locations, the declaration of previously undeclared facilities and material, the provision of Design Information Questionnaires and nuclear material accountancy reports, and the conclusion of the July 2026 Memorandum of Understanding have enabled significant progress in addressing longstanding safeguards issues. We commend the cooperation demonstrated by the Syrian Transitional Government, which stands in marked contrast to the prolonged lack of transparency that characterised the approach of the former regime.

Chair, the technical findings reported by the Director General are significant.

The Agency has confirmed that the cooling infrastructure uncovered at Dair Alzour is consistent with a nuclear reactor and has reaffirmed its long-standing assessment that the site hosted an undeclared gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor.

The Agency has also verified substantial quantities of previously undeclared natural uranium metal and confirmed the existence of an undeclared fuel fabrication plant that manufactured fuel for the reactor. Together, these findings establish that the former Syrian authorities failed to report nuclear material, facilities and activities as required under Syria's NPT Safeguards Agreement.

Particularly significant is the Agency's assessment that fuel for the Dair Alzour reactor was manufactured at an undeclared fuel fabrication facility and subsequently stored, together with undeclared nuclear material, at a separate location. Nuclear activities were concealed from the Agency and questions about these activities remained outstanding for more than a decade.

The conclusions set out in this report reinforce the Board's 2011 determination of Syrian non-compliance. For many years, the Agency maintained its conclusions despite incomplete access and limited cooperation. The Agency was right in 2011, and stands proven so today. The ability of the safeguards system ultimately to establish the facts, verify undeclared material and activities, and reach technically grounded conclusions strengthens confidence in the effectiveness, credibility, and resilience of the international safeguards regime.

These findings also carry broader non-proliferation implications. They serve as a reminder of the risks associated with clandestine nuclear cooperation and the transfer of sensitive technologies, materials, and expertise outside established safeguards frameworks. In this regard, CANZ remains deeply concerned by the proliferation risks posed by illicit nuclear cooperation networks, including those that have previously been associated with the Dair Alzour project, and as emphasised in the Agency's technical briefing last week.

Chair,

CANZ notes the Director General's assessment that the Agency has been able to clarify and resolve the outstanding safeguards questions previously reported to the Board, and we welcome this significant achievement. The Agency's findings have further substantiated the existence of undeclared nuclear material, facilities and activities that formed the basis of that finding. We note important verification and follow-up activities remain ongoing and encourage Syria to continue its cooperation with the Agency in line with its NPT safeguards obligations. We look forward to further updates from the Director General on the results of verification activities that remain pending, and any further relevant developments.

Chair,

The Agency's resolution of these longstanding questions should mark the beginning of a new phase of cooperation between Syria and the international community - one built upon sustained transparency and cooperation. Previously undeclared nuclear material has now been brought under Agency safeguards, and continued implementation of safeguards obligations will remain essential to maintaining international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Syria's nuclear programme.

As Syria seeks to rebuild international confidence in its safeguards implementation, CANZ would also welcome consideration of additional confidence-building measures, including the conclusion and entry into force of an Additional Protocol, as called for in GOV/2011/41. Such a step would provide enhanced assurance regarding the peaceful nature of Syria's nuclear activities and further demonstrate Syria's commitment to transparency and non-proliferation.

Chair,

This report represents an important milestone both for the Agency and for Syria. It confirms that safeguards matter, that persistence in resolving safeguards questions matters, and that meaningful cooperation with the Agency can yield concrete results.

The IAEA's verification mandate remains indispensable to maintaining international confidence in the peaceful use of nuclear technology, even after decades without questions being answered. CANZ looks forward to continued engagement between Syria and the Agency and reaffirms its full support for the Secretariat's ongoing safeguards work.

Thank you, Chair.

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