Markey, Garamendi, Beyer Raise Alarm on U.S. Plan to Transfer Plutonium to Private Industry

Transfer of plutonium would increase the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation, including to rogue states or terrorists

Letter Text (PDF)

Washington (September 10, 2025) - Senator Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), and Representatives John Garamendi (CA-08) and Don Beyer (VA-08), today wrote to President Donald Trump expressing concern over the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) plan to transfer at least 20 metric tons of weapons-usable plutonium-enough for approximately 2,000 nuclear bombs-to private industry for commercial energy use.

In the letter, the lawmakers write, "The transfer of weapons-usable plutonium to private industry would increase the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation, including to rogue states or terrorists. For five decades, the United States has avoided the commercial use of plutonium and opposed the spread of technology to separate ('reprocess') plutonium from used reactor fuel. We did so to prevent nations with nuclear power plants from being able to extract plutonium from that fuel, which they-or terrorists into whose hands it could fall-could use to make nuclear weapons. Indeed, in the mid-1970s, both Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter established nonproliferation policies to avoid the use of plutonium fuel domestically and to strongly discourage it abroad."

The lawmakers continue, "Your plan-which would provide U.S. companies with plutonium from U.S. military stocks and subsidize them both to reprocess plutonium domestically and export reprocessing technology-would reverse our successful nonproliferation policy. The United States cannot effectively discourage other countries from using plutonium for civil purposes if we use it ourselves."

The lawmakers request responses to the following questions by September 30, 2025:

1. How can the U.S. discourage countries from using weapons-usable plutonium in civilian fuel if we do so ourselves?
2. Given the proliferation risks of plutonium, why should the U.S. government facilitate the development and export of proliferation-prone reprocessing technologies?
3. Why should the U.S. government promote the historically failed reuse of reactor fuel into fresh plutonium fuel?
4. Why should the U.S. government process surplus weapons plutonium into civilian fuel, if that would increase costs by $37 billion and increase risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism?
5. If the U.S. government proceeds to process surplus weapons plutonium into civilian fuel, which vital national security programs will be cut to pay for the additional $37 billion expense?
6. In what forms will the surplus plutonium be transferred?
7. What safety and security measures are planned for the transport of weapons-grade plutonium to private actors?
8. How much, if any, of the plutonium to be given to private industry will come from intact pits?
9. How would the transfer of weapons plutonium to private industry affect the possible need to produce new plutonium for nuclear weapons in the future?

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