How to Lose a Navy in 10 Days

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From Battle Damage to Naval Theory

The range of targets reveals a larger story. In naval theory, a guiding adage is "fire effectively first." The phrase comes from Wayne Hughes and his study of the attritional character of naval battles, which is only exacerbated by the missile age. Modern naval battles are a salvo exchange defined by a mix of intelligence, decisionmaking, and offensive and defensive munitions. Sinking ships requires blinding the adversary, disrupting their command and control, and firing pulses-missile salvos combined with electronic attacks and even cyber and space operations-that increase the probability the strike overwhelms the defense. This approach has evolved since the first modern naval battle of the missile age that took place during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. During the Battle of Latakia, Israel used electronic deception and antiship missiles to defeat a larger Syrian fleet, but the underlying logic remains the same-the objective is not simply to target a ship but to blind it by breaking its targeting complex. This approach is often referred to as "C-C5ISR-T" and plays a key role in how both the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command commander and chief of naval operations describe joint maritime campaigns.

At the campaign level, the goal is not just to blind ships to fire salvos. Instead, the objective is to also destroy the adversary's ability to generate combat power. Pulsed operations target munition storage facilities, piers, and key equipment like loading cranes and dry docks necessary for maintenance. This infrastructure enables force generation. The enemy, therefore, will have fewer options to launch naval counterattacks. Operational art in the naval campaign lies in sequencing these attacks in time and space to force the enemy to culminate. In attritional contests, the side that can generate more salvos over time tends to prevail, putting a premium on defense and logistics.

Based on this logic, U.S. planners appear to have executed a four-phase initial campaign. First, the naval services set conditions by building up combat power in theater to generate strike options. Over the course of 60 days, multiple ships deployed to the Middle East. These forces provided the president with immediate military options during negotiations with Iran while also setting conditions for a larger mobilization. During crises, naval assets often move early while diplomats negotiate access, basing, and overflight for air and ground forces. The advantage of the U.S. Navy is that it can operate from international waters while diplomacy and joint planning come online. Given the defensive capabilities of modern ships, their presence also reassures partners and allies, signaling that the United States is willing to protect them in the event of a preemptive strike.

During this phase of the campaign, the often unseen side of the naval services also likely came online. Logisticians began moving munitions and fuel to prepare for the possibilities of a sustained campaign. Marines and sailors in the Maritime Operation Center build a common operating picture to support distributed naval groups and formations as a synchronized whole (i.e., distributed maritime operations). Intelligence analysts refine targeting packets built over years using processes like target systems analysis and other targeting methodologies. Information warfare specialists coordinated with other agencies and other services to build a menu of novel attack options that support the convergence of kinetic and non-kinetic fires, a key aspect of C-C5ISR-T. These activities set conditions for generating tempo (i.e., salvos over time) in the campaign.

Joint doctrine describes target development as grounded in joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment, with products that provide baseline analysis and characterization that inform target systems analysis. This target development produces detailed target folders and electronic target folders that can be pulled into force assignment and mission planning.

That matters because it changes the tempo problem. If the hardest work is done precrisis, then the order to attack is not the start of planning. It is the start of execution. The joint force can translate the commander's intent into a joint integrated prioritized target list, tasking orders, and repeatable assessment. The targeting playbook also formalizes how to decide what gets hit, when, and for what effect, illustrating how targeting is increasingly a key component of modern operational art. Joint targeting doctrine explicitly treats electronic warfare and cyberspace operations as integrated parts of the targeting cycle, meant to coordinate lethal and nonlethal fires in strike operations. It also highlights the role of joint space support in giving commanders access to space capabilities beyond organic assets. In practice, that convergence can create strike corridors: suppress radars, degrade networks, confuse command nodes, and open seams for Tomahawks and carrier aviation.

Second, the naval forces not supporting the initial strikes on Iranian political and military leaders could pull on those targeting packets to shape the battlespace. This included suppressing enemy air defenses, destroying enemy aircraft, and hitting any Iranian naval assets at sea capable of immediately retaliating. This included attacking frigates in the Indian Ocean, as highlighted in the table above. It also included strikes on key assets like antiship cruise missile radars and batteries. By reducing Iran's immediate ability to retaliate and protect its navy, these actions allowed for follow-on strikes designed to significantly degrade Iran's ability.

This phase relies on reducing the time it takes to execute kill chains. Naval forces need high-quality target tracks, low latency, and persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to both strike targets in rapid succession and support battle damage assessment. This part of the campaign is where targeting starts to shift from deliberate to dynamic as naval forces prosecute time-sensitive targets. Furthermore, fog and friction alongside enemy counteraction tend to create new targets and devalue older targets once the chaos of battle starts. That means the naval campaign is always balancing offense and defense since it must protect intelligence assets and communications networks critical to supporting dynamic targeting and battle damage assessment.

Third, with Iranian naval forces in disarray and counterattack options limited, follow-on strikes could target naval infrastructure like ports, piers, and munitions stores. In the current campaign, this appears to have been done in rapid succession, essentially catching large numbers of Iranian ships pier-side and even limiting the ability of Iran to sortie key assets like minelayers and attack subs. It also included maritime patrol aircraft like the P-3, highlighted in the table above. This highlights that modern navies fight from the seabed to space. Coordinated pulse operations have to target subs, subsea sensors, ships, ports, aircraft, radars, and ground stations for satellite communications. For example, consider Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. Had a second attack wave hit fuel stores, it would have significantly delayed the ability of the U.S. to counterattack across the Pacific.

Fourth, the naval campaign likely had to balance sustained strikes with consolidating gains. That is, the navy had to rotate ships and aircraft to repair and rearm while ensuring it had enough assets to strike new targets that emerged. As seen in the table above, this included maintaining intelligence coverage of Iran's minelaying ships so that the second they attempted to leave port, they were destroyed. It also likely includes monitoring suspected launch points for drones, ranging from one-way attack to unmanned surface and subsurface vehicles, to limit Iran's ability to target naval forces and ships in the Strait of Hormuz. The art of this phase is balancing the demand for current operations with the activities required to support future operations, thus limiting the ability to focus purely on sustained offensive strikes.

What Does This Campaign Highlight About the Future of Naval Battles

The campaign's early pattern suggests a deliberate-to-dynamic sequence: prepared target system analysis and target folders enabling rapid execution, cross-domain convergence to open corridors for strikes, a cordon to prevent escape and dispersal, then BDA-driven dynamic targeting. The open question is whether ship counts are a distraction from the real measure of effectiveness: whether Iran's mine, USV, and small-boat denial toolset was actually neutralized, or merely displaced. That uncertainty will drive sustained intelligence operations and generate rapid strike options similar to the use of MQ-9 drones to strike ballistic missile launchers. For the U.S. Navy, this means accelerating its introduction of collaborative combat aircraft and even buying long-dwell drones that can conduct armed reconnaissance, given the flight time limitations (and costs) associated with manned helicopters and fighter jets conducting the same mission.

For countries watching like Taiwan, it means ensuring that its navy is never concentrated in port and that it retains a dispersed network of unmanned counterattack options. Beijing is well-positioned to launch the kind of naval campaign the United States executed against Iran in Taiwan. In fact, it could likely strike even more targets on shorter notice, given the close proximity of the states. Therefore, the only way to preserve deterrence is to signal resilience. Taiwan will need to ensure it constantly rotates its naval forces while expanding the number of submarines and inventory of unmanned surface and subsurface attack options capable of attacking ships in its immediate surroundings. Like the Ukrainians in the Black Sea, these drones should include anti-air missiles and be integrated with electronic warfare and mobile coast defense cruise missiles. Beijing has to always wonder what other options Taiwan has left to strike its fleet after a strike against Taiwan's command and control, air defenses, and naval forces.

For China, the lesson is not "the United States can sink ships." It is that modern campaigns try to sink the fleet, blind the sensors, and break the ports at the same time. And if that is the benchmark, every navy has to ask whether it is built to fight effectively first, or to be found and finished fast. The strikes in Iran will likely rekindle concerns that even a limited war with the United States could quickly involve mainland strikes against ports and fuel depots alongside communications networks. It will also push Beijing to create more resilient battle networks that allow it to survive C-5ISR-T strikes.

Finally, for the United States, the success of the initial naval campaign suggests a need to expand investment in the force. The U.S. Navy needs more ships-particularly unmanned systems-as well as improved maintenance capacity and larger munitions stockpiles to execute future campaigns. The campaign also illustrates the reality that all war is inherently joint and all-domain. The U.S. Navy will need to perfect integrating ground-based fires from Multi-Domain Task Forces and Marine Littoral Regiments with U.S. Air Force bombers supporting offensive mining. It must also be prepared to fight globally and conduct operations on the scale of the Iran campaign in multiple geographic theaters simultaneously against more capable adversaries.

Benjamin Jensen is director of the Futures Lab and a senior fellow for the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.