The Moldovan parliamentary election: A dodged bullet, but dangers to democracy remain

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On Sunday, Moldovans went to the polls to elect their new parliament. While voters' primary concerns were the struggling economy and poor governance, their choice also carried a clear geopolitical message: it reaffirmed the country's European aspirations despite Moscow's extensive interference efforts. The challenge now will be to safeguard Moldova's fragile democracy against mounting hybrid threats, without sliding into a national security state.

Maia Sandu's Partidul Acțiune și Solidaritate (PAS) secured 50.15% of the vote, enough to hold onto a slim majority in the new parliament (with 55 seats out of 101). The opposition will consist of Blocul Electoral Patriotic (BEP) (24.19%), Alternativa (7.97%), Partidul Nostru (6.2%), and Democratia Acasa (5.62%). The unexpected success of the latter is largely attributed to a Tiktok campaign supporting its leader, Vasile Costiuc, which echoed the social media mobilisation strategies recently employed by his ally, George Simion, in Romania.

A fractured landscape

Partidul Acțiune și Solidaritate (PAS), which has ruled Moldova since 2021, was founded as an 'antisystem' movement to challenge post-communist stagnation, entrenched corruption and the power of oligarchs. Chief among these was Vlad Plahotniuc, a former tycoon and political heavyweight who was extradited back to Moldova last week after years on the run. PAS has grappled with a 'permacrisis' over the last few years, as the fallout of Russia's war on Ukraine has led to economic contraction and soaring prices, including for energy. However, many Moldovans consider PAS responsible for failing to deliver sufficiently on what they view as key issues: jobs, wages, pensions and corruption.

The ruling PAS has increasingly relied on the diaspora as its key support constituency. In last year's presidential election, 83% of the 330 000 voters living abroad supported Sandu in the runoff against Alexandr Stoinoglo. This decisively shaped the outcome of the election. The diaspora also tilted the balance in favour of a constitutional amendment that anchored accession to the EU as Moldova's strategic ambition. In Sunday's parliamentary elections, 301 polling stations were opened abroad - 30% more than in the last presidential election.

PAS has also doubled down on the geopolitical narrative, portraying the election as a fateful choice between East and the West. This message strikes a chord, given that key opposition blocs maintain shadowy ties to Russia - most notably BEP, a coalition of post-communist forces led by former president Igor Dodon. Nominally it supports a 'balanced' foreign policy, but when Dodon met with the Russian ambassador Oleg Ozerov in Chisinau last month, a future strategic partnership between Russia and Moldova was discussed. Dodon also claimed, implausibly, that Sandu intends to open a 'second front' against Russia through Transnistria. Ahead of the election, BEP was weakened by internal conflicts as well as by a sudden decision of the Central Election Committee (CEC) on Friday that barred one of the constituent parties, Inima Moldovei - led by the former Gagauzian leader, Irina Vlah - from running, citing bribery and illegal party financing. The CEC had already, last month, disqualified the Victorie bloc, a coalition of parties supported by the fugitive businessman Ilan Șor (now residing in Moscow) and headed by a former Gagauzian leader, Evghenia Guțul, who was recently sentenced to prison - also for handling illegal funds.

Renato Usatii, the leader of another opposition movement, the Eurosceptic and populist Partidul Nostru, has in the past been linked to Russian Railways. Alternativa, once considered a dark horse in the election, and likewise the advocate of a 'balanced' foreign policy stance, saw its fortunes decline after its leader, Ion Ceban, the mayor of Chisinau, was denied entry to Romania in July on unspecified security grounds. Finally, Democratia Acasa's Vlad Costiuc also has a record of doing business in Russia and murky links to its security apparatus.

A laboratory for Russia's hybrid warfare tactics

No one should underestimate the scale of Russia's attempts at interference in Moldova's politics. The country has justifiably been described as a 'laboratory' for Russian hybrid campaigns. Moscow and its proxies (including Șor) are trying to manipulate the election to steer the country away from its European trajectory, while simultaneously creating instability, deepening political polarisation and undermining trust in state institutions. These hybrid tactics comprise vote buying - including through the use of cryptocurrency - as corruption continues to expose Moldova to manipulation by the Kremlin. The Kremlin's hybrid machinery also manufactures alternative realities through strategic disinformation campaigns deploying deepfakes, AI-enhanced chatbots, and 'media mimicries' - fake replicas of real media outlets, such as those created under the Matryoshka project. The hybrid toolbox further includes cyber attacks and fake bomb alerts, aimed at undermining the legitimacy of the electoral process. Claims of electoral fraud, some amplified by fabricated content, are already spreading. Moscow also continues to weaponise energy dependencies - some 70 % of Moldova's electricity comes from the Ciciurgan plant in Transnistria where it is generated by burning Russian gas. Meanwhile a shadowy network, with tentacles likely reaching into the GRU, has trained Moldovan citizens in Serbia in street violence tactics.

However, Moldova is seen as a laboratory of Russian hybrid operations not just because it is a small former Soviet republic in Eastern Europe where the Kremlin seeks to restore its empire, but also because it offers ideal 'laboratory conditions': ongoing economic stagnation, the lingering impact of the 2022 inflation shock, a third of the population living below the poverty line (the figure has risen since 2022), endemic corruption, weak social cohesion, and ineffective governance. It would be misguided to hold PAS solely responsible for the resulting public disillusionment (only 41% people believe the country is on the right track). Yet it cannot be entirely exonerated either. At the same time, Russian hybrid campaigns, inherently opportunistic, do exploit and often deliberately exacerbate these vulnerabilities, shaping both economic realities and media narratives, particularly in rural areas. However, not all opposition to 'pro-European' forces can be attributed to Moscow's subversive activities either.

What can the EU do?

The problem at hand is clear: how to defend Moldova's fragile democracy in the face of increasingly blatant, AI-enhanced hybrid campaigns without undermining its foundations and replacing it with a national security state which suspends rather than safeguards pluralism and liberties?

Moldova has avoided a 'Georgia scenario', but its democracy is under increasing peril. Even if the state withstands current attempts at destabilisation it may not be so lucky next time.

The recently adopted Reform and Growth Plan, however ambitious, is unlikely to mobilise capital and improve Moldova's economic prospects unless the government accelerates key reforms. Political support for the PAS through high-profile visits and summitry will have limited impact if domestic institutions fail to generate output legitimacy - acting to improve people's lives. This is all the more pressing as Moldova's accession talks are now hostage to unresolved disputes over Ukraine's membership path.

The EU's support for Moldova should focus on democratic resilience - understood not as ensuring electoral success for European-friendly parties, but by fostering independent and efficient institutions, as well as strong, pluralistic yet cohesive communities capable of determining their own future.

Tactical defences against Russian hybrid subversion must be firmly established. In this endeavour the EU and Moldova can share expertise and support each other as partners. However, a strategic victory in the hybrid war can only be secured by addressing the underlying 'laboratory conditions' that allow the Kremlin and its proxies to fuel domestic enmity, distrust, fragmentation and instability.

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