Iran: Relearning the Importance of Waging a War, Not Just Fighting One

Commentary by James Michael Dubik

Published March 19, 2026

Our operations in Iran are again teaching that war involves more than fighting. Wars must be fought and waged. Fighting is a necessary part of war, and the U.S. military is very good at it. Our military won every tactical engagement in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. American citizens have every reason to ask, therefore, if we fight so successfully, why did we lose in Vietnam and Afghanistan and why was success in Iraq so limited? And will the same thing happen in Iran?

These are questions are about America's war-waging capacity. Fighting succeeds when military forces integrate and synchronize, among themselves and with allies, seven important battlefield functions-intelligence, maneuver, fires (air and ground), protection (from enemy ground, air, cyber, and space threats), mobility/counter-mobility, sustainment, and command and control. Successful fighting requires that all seven stay in synch, as much as possible, from start to finish. This requires constant adaptation because fighting is unpredictable. Change, fear, fog, friction, and surprise are the only constants in fighting. Perfection is never the standard; being better than your enemy is. Even allowing for inevitable mistakes, the U.S. military, fighting as a joint force and usually with coalition partners, are expert professionals at fighting well.

Waging war is another case. As Vietnam and Afghanistan should have taught senior American political and military leaders, winning every battle and losing the war is entirely possible. After over 20 years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, American citizens wonder, why is our war-waging capacity so weak? The short, simple answer is that in the United States, we equate war with fighting-too often leaving war-waging requirements as afterthoughts.

Waging war-especially in the United States and other democracies-requires senior military and political leaders working together to execute three critical skills. The products of these skills provide the context within which fighting takes place. Executing them well enough increases the probability of success in war. Poor execution, even if the fighting goes well, decreases the probability of wartime success.

The first skill is to achieve and sustain coherency. Senior political and military leaders must, together, set clear and achievable war aims and align military and non-military means as well as strategies, policies, and campaign decisions to increase the probability of achieving those aims. The second skill is to generate and sustain organizational decisionmaking capacity. Political and military organizations, again together, must translate initial decisions into orchestrated action, adapt as the war unfolds, bring the war to an end by achieving the aims set, and establish durable political conditions necessary for "a better peace." The final skill is to maintain legitimacy. Once again, senior political and military leaders are co-responsible for going to war for the right reasons, conducting the war consistent with American values and international law, sustaining public support by articulating a coherent strategy and making progress on that strategy, and ensuring proper integration of military and civilian leadership. Ambiguity and uncertainty in any of these elements-especially if it goes on too long-will ultimately erode legitimacy in the minds of the American citizenry.

These skills matter, for they often are the difference between winning or losing a war. How well or poorly American leaders and institutions can execute these skills is on display right now.

Skill One: Is Our Strategy Coherent?

Judging from the outside, the short answer is "not sufficiently." The most glaring deficiency is agreement on what the war is meant to achieve. Reduction of Iran's military capacity? Destruction of their nuclear capacity? Elimination of their ability to govern? Ending their capability for internal security? Regime change? All of the above? Some of the above? The issue is not whether Iran is an enemy of the United States. It is. Nor is the issue whether Iran has been at war with the United States for a long time. It has. The point of strategic coherency is simply this: Without clarity of purpose, aligning ways and means and acting coherently is nearly impossible.

Iran isn't the first time that the United States employed its military forces even as it was ambiguous as to what force was intended to achieve. The Obama administration's 2011 action in Libya had as its stated objective to protect civilians from the trepidations of the Gaddafi regime-something it tried to do using air power alone. From the start, using air power to protect civilians was, to say it kindly, less than an achievable objective. But it was worse than that. The other objective-unstated but thinly veiled-was regime change, again using air power alone. The world saw the result. Gaddafi was killed, neither the United States nor NATO had a plan for what would follow, and Libya remains an unstable, weakly governed state to this day.

Iran isn't the same as, but it rhymes with, Libya. In Iran there seems to be coherency in the military campaign. The air campaign has phases, each phase has a set of associated targets, and the cumulative effect of destroying each target set leads to a reduction of some portion of Iranian military, nuclear, oil, and industrial capacity. All this seems well executed, but questions arise. The first is, toward what end is all this destruction aimed? What if we find that the aggregate result of months of bombing is an Iran still capable of internal security, a weakened-but-still-in place governing structure, but with only a remnant of an economy-what or who fills this vacuum? This begs a second question.

Where are the non-military campaigns that are a necessary component of waging war? A well-executed and successful military campaign will not, by itself, guarantee wartime success. Military campaigns are just one part of the set of campaigns necessary to win wars.

For example, waging war requires a fiscal campaign-how will the war be paid for. During most of the 20-year Global War on Terror, regardless of administration, America's answer was basically, "put it on the credit card." Congress passed one supplemental after the other and raised the U.S. debt ceiling along the way. Is that the plan for the Iran war, too? So far, Congress has not passed any supplemental bill. Without supplemental funding, the Defense Department will have to use its current budget to pay for combat operations. But that budget is earmarked for "routine, non-wartime" accounts: pay, housing, acquisition, maintenance, education, and training, for example. These accounts will have to be "robbed" to pay for current operations. Eventually, the administration will have to ask Congress for more money. What's the fiscal campaign plan for this war? And if the answer is "this war will end quickly," no one should be satisfied.

Waging war also requires an industrial campaign. The most famous example is World War II, where the United States became the arsenal of democracy. Secretary Hegseth said, as reported by Stars and Stripes on March 4, "We can sustain this fight easily for as long as we need." The question is, however, what if this fight lasts longer or expands wider or in ways not forecasted? This is what happened to the United States in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. And it happened to Russia in its war against Ukraine. We seem to be seeing the beginnings of expansion in the Iran theater. The question is not just can America's defense industrial base replenish, in time, the equipment destroyed and the munitions expended during the current fight with Iran. The question also includes what will be needed in a larger fight if this one unfolds in unexpected ways; or if a fight breaks out in another, unanticipated theater; or the war against Iran morphs into a multitheater affair? America is involved in a global great power competition. It cannot just focus on one theater.

The erosion of the U.S. defense industrial sector started in earnest at least with the end of the Cold War. Believing, falsely, that major wars were no longer in our future, the military services relied on the vast stockpiles what were to sustain a potential World War III. Now, 30+ years later, those stockpiles are long gone. On January 17, 2026, Bloomberg reported that America's defense industry is in trouble. In 2025, the Heritage Foundation issued a report that warned of the deteriorating U.S. defense industrial capacity. A year earlier, the Center for Strategic and International Studies expressed concern about the substantial decline in competition within America's defense industrial base. Further, 20 years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Global War on Terrorism, and support to Ukraine has made the stockpile and replenishment situation worse. On March 6, President Trump met leaders of the U.S. defense industrial base on just this issue. Only time will tell as to whether American industrial output can meet both current expenditures and future requirements. An industrial campaign annex to Operation Epic Fury would have outlined, answered, and planned for this dimension of the war. That's why industrial campaigns are an essential part of waging war.

And what of the information campaign necessary to inform the American people about the necessity of this war, how it will end, and why the results may be worth the risks? Or the diplomatic campaign needed to keep allies together, provide overflight and basing assets, demonstrate a foundation for the war broader than American justification, and structure a durable political solution to the war? Or the post-fighting campaign that consolidates battlefield success and contributes to creating a durable political solution? Fighting a war is just one dimension necessary for wartime success, but alone it is insufficient. The non-military campaigns mentioned above-as well as others-are equally necessary, but as absent now as they were at the start of our post 9/11 wars.

The George W. Bush administration began the fighting in Afghanistan with almost none of these supporting, non-military war-waging campaign plans completed. In many cases they were barely in concept form. So, while American, NATO, and coalition partner military forces won every tactical engagement, those successes could not be translated into strategic victory, and the war dragged on. The United States ultimately negotiated a deal with the Taliban that excluded the Afghan government, thus setting the conditions for the Biden administration's withdrawal in 2021.

In this sense, our action in Iran rhymes with both Libya and Afghanistan. A coherent approach to fighting and waging war increases the probability of success. Such coherence, at least as of this writing, appears absent from our approach to the war with Iran.

Skill Two: Is There Organizational Decisionmaking Capacity to Adapt as the War Unfolds?

At this point, it's probably too early to tell. But given the variety of explanations for why we went to war presented by the various principals in the administration in the first hours, days, and weeks of the war, skepticism about initial and adaptive decisionmaking is understandable. Skepticism also seems justified when considering the apparent surprise over Iran's reactions. Further, without a clear set of war aims and a coherent set of military and non-military campaign plans, adaptation is more likely to be ad hoc than well-thought-out, well-coordinated, and intentional branches or sequels to a base plan.

The classic American case for weak organizational capacity is the Vietnam War. This war lasted over 25 years, depending on what you use as a start date. In those decades, the war unfolded in a variety of ways, sometimes predictably but most often not. Numerous books, reports, and other analyses document the Johnson administration's weak organizational decisionmaking processes and the negative effect these processes had on how the administration waged the Vietnam War.

Weak organizational decisionmaking capacity was also exhibited between 2003 and 2006 in Iraq. President George W. Bush writes in his memoir, Decision Points, "For two and a half years, I had supported the strategy of withdrawing our forces as the Iraqis stepped forward. But in the months after the Samarra bombing [February 2006], I had started to question whether our approach matched the reality on the ground." Finally, in the spring of 2006, President Bush concluded, "This is not working."

The president's realization and subsequent, courageous decision changed the course in Iraq. Rather than withdraw, which many thought was the best course of action, he ordered the surge of 2007-08. In the two and a half years the president supported the initial strategy, however, there were a number of internal and external studies all of which concluded that the initial strategy for Iraq was not working. But the senior political and military leaders did not adapt to this information. According to Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor's The Endgame, Secretary Donald Rumsfeld wanted to do everything possible to tamp down the critics-even as there was a "healthy tension" between two of the senior headquarters in Iraq as to "the nature of the threat and what to do about it." Little or no adaptation for over two years in a war as dynamic as it was in Iraq is a sign of weak organizational capacity. Will the American people see similar weakness concerning the war in Iran? Again, it may be too early to tell, but with events surrounding the Straits of Hormuz and Iranian attacks within the region, the possibility-maybe even the probability-is present.

Is There a Vision, Concept, or Idea About How to Bring the War to an End and Establish Durable, Political Conditions Necessary for "a Better Peace?"

Again, judging from the first weeks of this war, the short answer is "not immediately apparent."

U.S. and Israeli air and naval forces have had and will have little difficulty destroying Iran's missile and drone capabilities as well as their capacity to regenerate them. That degradation is already evident. Nor will the combined forces have any problem destroying Iran's naval forces or the shipbuilding and repair facilities necessary to sustain them. Iranian command and control infrastructure, air defense systems, nuclear facilities, ground forces, and internal security forces will fare no better. All will be destroyed, as will their associated regeneration capacity. The same will likely happen to Iran's oil infrastructure, Iran's monetary golden goose. But toward what end? A devastated Iran with a destroyed security structure; a significantly damaged economy; and untested leadership-but more hardline and repressive-striving just to stay in power and willing to act asymmetrically within the region and globally-this will be the direct products of our extensive bombing campaign. Do we then walk away from an Iran laid to waste? Will a Syrian-style civil war emerge? Will we turn our heads to allow such a civil war to exhaust itself? These kinds of visions of the end of fighting are strategically and morally vacuous.

In Gaza, Israel's cabinet finally approved a plan to occupy Gaza City, but Prime Minister Netanyahu opposed any occupation for a long time. He was satisfied with his war's destruction and devastation as well as the humanitarian crisis both produced. But he was reluctant to assume the legal or moral responsibilities associated with occupation, even in the face of international law. The essential criteria for the law of belligerent occupation, according to the 2002 book, The Law of Armed Conflict: An Operational Approach, by Geoffrey S. Corn et al., is: "the ability of the invading forces to exercise authority over the occupied territory." The authors go on to say, that "in an occupation, the invader has rendered the invaded government incapable of publicly exercising its authority, and . . . substituted its own authority for that of the legitimate government in the territory invaded."

In both the Israel-Gaza case and the still-brewing Iran case, neither Israeli nor American leaders want to occupy, for that incurs significant legal and moral responsibilities that are often costly and lengthy. That's understandable. But the question for the American people is this: Does America bear no responsibility for the consequences of our actions? We chose to escalate this war; we chose the time and the method. Is "walking away" a serious strategic, legal, or moral option? Isn't it more like strategic, as well as legal and moral, malpractice?

However these questions are answered, and they will be answered sooner or later, the issue for waging war is this: Is the America citizenry satisfied with using its military forces without a vision of how the war ends? Is the American population satisfied with American senior political and military leaders who are willing to use, risk, change, or end the lives of its citizens who are in uniform for no purpose other than destruction and killing? Ending wars by establishing a durable political solution is not an American strength. This is why so many service members are bitter over the U.S. departure from Afghanistan (and, similarly, over Vietnam) and why the Obama administration's withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 did not set the conditions for continued progress in Iraq, but for ISIS's expansion in 2012 and its full invasion that threatened Baghdad and forced the return of American forces in 2013-14.

The war-waging pattern seems to be this: The United States demands sacrifices from those who fight and from their families, but is unwilling to demand rigorous thinking and consistent action from those who send them to fight. One hopes that a post-fighting vision for Iran emerges sooner rather than later and that the United States will help structure a durable peace worthy of the sacrifices of the American people and those citizens in uniform sent to fight on their behalf.

Skill Three: Is the War Legitimate in the Eyes of the American Citizenry?

At the outset, the answer seems to be "not yet," at least not with the majority.

Polls at the start of the war with Iran are suggesting that the American people are not yet behind this war. NBC, USA Today, and Reuters all have reported a disapproval rating of between 43 and 54 percent, with an approval rating at about 25 percent-the rest being undecided. The close votes in the House and Senate regarding a war powers bill reveals similar ambiguity among our representatives. Clearly, polls do not establish legitimacy. Rather, they are indicators of how the American people are viewing a particular use of US. military force and of the potential challenges senior political and military leaders face in the information space.

Legitimacy, according to political scientists Christopher Gelpi, Peater D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler is a complex product. Using data on the Iraq War, these authors, in a study published by Georgia State University in the Winter of 2006 entitled "Success Matters," demonstrated that the American people consider the human costs of war "worth it" and the use of military force legitimate if they (a) understand the use of force as righteous, (b) understand its aims to be achievable, and (c) progress is being made toward achieving those aims.

With respect to military targeting, the fighting in Iran is clearly progressing. And it will likely continue to progress. Views concerning the righteousness of the war, its aims, and its strategy, however, appear to be a different matter.

Here the polls are suggesting consensus is far from settled. Independent analysts; media pundits from a variety of news outlets and online forums; retired military, diplomatic, and intelligence professionals; think tank analysts; as well as senators and representatives are debating the wars righteousness, aims, and strategy. This debate is feeding an absorbing American public still forming its opinion on these issues. Hence, at least for now, the Iran war's legitimacy in the eyes of the American people is an open issue and, therefore, senior American leaders face important challenges.

Part of the public debate over righteousness and strategy includes a discussion about the difference between a preemptive and a preventative war. A preemptive war is both legally and morally justified. Preemptive war is allowed if there is evidence of a "sufficient threat"-that is, in the words of Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars, "a manifest intent to injure, a degree of active preparation that make that intent a positive danger, and a general situation in which waiting, or doing anything other than fighting , greatly magnifies the risk." Preemptive war allows a nation to attack an enemy that is seriously and evidently putting the nation's territorial integrity or political sovereignty at risk. It is an evidence-based threat analysis. Preventative war is not legally or morally justified because it is a fear-based threat analysis.

Preventative wars are fought to preserve or create a better balance of power between or among nations. The logic is basically, "attack now while they're weak, before they can build up to become a bigger threat." Given the huge ambiguity in power politics and in measuring actual capabilities and intent, using the preventative war logic would allow too many nations to fight too often. Hence, preventative war is not permitted by international law, is unjustified by the moral norms governing war, and not sanctioned by the UN Charter.

The standards separating preemptive and preventative war are vague. That's why, before starting a war of this type, a nation like the United States normally needs to employ its established processes. These institutional systems ensure, to the degree possible, that arguments within its executive branch, between senior military and political leaders, and between the legislative and executive branches of government are as exhaustive as possible-before American military personnel are placed in harm's way. Reality will always truncate the multiple conversations the variety of government, military, academic, and other experts would like to have ahead of time. But the more extensive prewar dialogue and consultation is, the less likely it becomes the one will act on bias, assumption, mis-information, or single-perspective logic. Further, prewar dialogue allows political and military leaders to identify potential second- third-, and even fourth-order consequences, so they can make a comprehensive risk analysis and develop necessary contingency plans. How much of this kind of preparatory analysis or argument occurred beforehand with respect to the Iran war is hard to say. But one factor complicating this kind of necessary, internal prewar dialogue is the stance that Secretary Hegseth and other senior administration officials have on international law: that it is a nicety but not a constraint on American decisions or actions.

All this seems to be part of the uncertainty over the Iran war now evident in the American citizenry, among U.S. congressional representatives, and within our national security elites. Such uncertainty erodes legitimacy, especially the longer it goes on. Polls seem to be capturing this phenomenon and suggesting that senior American political and military leaders have more work to do. An information campaign plan-as part of a set of non-military, war-waging campaigns-would have helped leaders prepare for the challenges they now face.

How all these war-waging issues will ultimately shake out remains uncertain. It's too early in the war to know. War unfolds to its own logic, its own timelines, and its own surprises. And ending fighting does not necessarily mean ending a war. The only thing certain in war is that it will not go as expected. Excellence in waging war means only that one is better than one's enemy in executing the three war-waging skills. Now that the lives of Americans are at risk and the reputation of America is at stake, all citizens want to "win." But right now, none of us knows what winning in this case entails; whether we have strategies, policies, and campaigns in place that will increase the probability of winning; or how to know if we are progressing in achieving not just our military objectives but also our strategic political aims. American warfighting prowess helps, but it is not enough. U.S. war-waging prowess remains decisive.

Some might say that nothing in this essay is new and that the essay's content is well known. In one sense, I agree. All this is well known among most national security experts. But if it's that well known, why do American senior leaders, appointed and elected administration after administration, keep making the same mistakes? It seems that U.S. senior leaders continue to equate war with fighting, leaving war-waging requirements as afterthoughts.

This is a guest essay from Lieutenant General James Michael Dubik (U.S. Army, ret).

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

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