Why Did Pakistan Announce “Open War” Against the Taliban

Critical Questions by Alexander Palmer and Alexander Margolis

Published February 27, 2026

Early in the morning of February 27, Pakistan's defense minister announced "open war" between Pakistan and the Taliban, a group that Islamabad frequently backed in its 30-year quest to rule Afghanistan. The conflict will probably remain contained to border skirmishes and occasional air strikes but could also escalate further as the region faces heightened tensions due to the U.S.-Iran crisis.

Q1: What is happening?

A1: The announcement of "open war" follows a week of escalating conflict. On February 22, 2026, Pakistan carried out multiple air strikes against several alleged camps used by militant groups, including the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Pakistan claimed it conducted these attacks in response to terrorist attacks within the country over the last few weeks, including a high-profile attack against a Shia mosque in Islamabad in early February. The Taliban promised retribution for these attacks, which it claimed hit civilian targets, including a religious school.

On the night of February 26, the Taliban announced an offensive against Pakistani positions along the Durand Line, as the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is widely known. The attacks apparently prompted the Pakistani defense minister's announcement on February 27, which was accompanied by strikes against the cities of Kabul and Kandahar as well as in Paktia, a province on the Durand Line. The choice to target Kabul and Kandahar is significant because the two cities are the major Afghan political centers. While Kabul is Afghanistan's formal capital and houses much of its administrative bureaucracy, the Taliban's emir lives in Kandahar and has steadily accumulated power in the city.

The strikes follow more than a year of tension and conflict between the two states. Although most of this fighting has consisted of TTP attacks followed by Pakistani reprisals, the recent escalation is not unprecedented: In October 2025, Pakistan and the Taliban fought a brief conflict that killed at least 17 civilians.

Q2: Why is Pakistan bombing Afghanistan?

A2: Pakistan justified its actions on Friday in part by citing the Taliban's sheltering of "terrorists." Despite the Taliban's repeated denials, international terrorist groups-most notably Al Qaeda and the TTP-receive at least safe haven from the Taliban. Violence in Pakistan has dramatically increased since the Taliban seized power in Kabul in August 2021.

The TTP is at the heart of the Pakistan-Taliban conflict. It has steadily escalated its war against the Pakistani government since 2022, increasing the tempo of its attacks and expanding what it considers to be legitimate targets. A TTP offshoot also conducted a major attack in Islamabad in November 2025, although TTP leadership denied involvement.

Although the Taliban has mediated between Pakistan and the TTP in the past, it has proven to be more closely aligned with the TTP than its former backers in Islamabad. The TTP has pledged allegiance to the Taliban, fought alongside the Taliban during the conflict with the United States, and shares ideological and familial ties with the Taliban. Clamping down on TTP activity would probably threaten the Taliban's internal cohesion, including via TTP defection to the terrorist group Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP).The Taliban have consistently prioritized internal cohesion above other interests and show no sign of stopping.

In addition, the Taliban have never recognized the Durand Line. The line was drawn in 1893 as part of Great Britain's efforts to shield the British Raj from the Russian empire. The British did not appear to give much thought to how the line divided the Pashtun communities that live in the region. The Taliban remain a Pashtun-dominated movement, and its nationalist tendencies would likely drive it toward conflict with Pakistan even if the TTP had never arisen as an organization.

Finally, Pakistan has accused the Taliban of being "a proxy for India." However, most analysis suggests that India's engagement has primarily consisted of diplomatic contacts and the provision of humanitarian aid, and India was primarily aligned with the Northern Alliance and later the United States against the Taliban before August 2021. Whether the Pakistani government genuinely believes that India is using the Taliban or TTP as a proxy or whether such statements are mere rhetoric is an open question.

Q3: What will happen next?

A3: The most likely outcome is that the conflict will soon de-escalate. Previous periods of escalation have been limited to stand-off strikes and border skirmishes. The 2025 conflict began with a Pakistani strike in Kabul but took place mostly along the border and ended with a ceasefire.

However, Pakistan's rhetoric of "open war" suggests that more significant military options are on the table.

One option would be a larger-scale bombing campaign against targets in Afghanistan. Such a campaign would represent a continuation of Friday's strikes aimed at coercing the Taliban into restraining the TTP or degrading the TTP's ability to conduct attacks in Pakistan. Border skirmishes would almost certainly continue as long as such a campaign continued.

The Pakistani military might also conduct large-scale ground operations against the TTP in Pakistan. Rumors of an impending operation in the Tirah Valley, a long-standing hotbed of TTP activity, have swirled for weeks due to large-scale displacements in the area. Such an offensive would be destabilizing and could unleash unpredictable effects: Similar operations helped drive the creation of IS-KP during the early 2010s.

Finally, Pakistan could attempt a major ground incursion into Afghanistan itself. Islamabad has historically sought to manage the threat from its border regions and Afghanistan through nonstate proxies. However, its main nonstate partner in these efforts has been the Taliban. With the group increasingly at odds with Islamabad and the Taliban's main rivals either militarily inconsequential or also violently opposed to Pakistan, its options for indirect involvement in the country have largely disappeared. Such an effort would be unprecedented for Pakistan, and success is therefore highly uncertain.

In addition, the Taliban or TTP could escalate attacks in Pakistani cities. The Taliban said that it would attack Pakistan's "key centers and important cities" in retaliation for any attacks against major Afghan cities.

Q4: How does the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict affect U.S. interests?

A4: The main U.S. interest in Afghanistan and western Pakistan is counterterrorism. The region is still home to a variety of terrorist groups hostile to the United States-most notably IS-KP and the Al Qaeda core. War between Pakistan and the Taliban would probably increase the threat both groups pose to the United States, although the effect on the threat from Al Qaeda is less certain.

War between Pakistan and the Taliban would almost certainly affect IS-KP and the Al Qaeda core in different ways. IS-KP is waging an insurgency against the Taliban and (to a lesser extent) Pakistan while plotting mass-casualty attacks abroad. Conflict between its two main regional enemies would probably reduce the counterterrorist pressure it faces and allow it to resurge.

The Al Qaeda core, in contrast, is sheltered by the Taliban government and appears concentrated primarily on rebuilding after 20 years of intense pressure from the United States and its allies. The effect of a potential war on the group is more uncertain. On the one hand, any weakening of the Taliban could also weaken the Al Qaeda core, decreasing the threat it poses and increasing the independence of its regional affiliates. On the other, Al Qaeda has acted as a force multiplier for Afghan insurgents before-providing training and money-which could increase its utility to the Taliban and lead them to weaken any restrictions the group has placed on Al Qaeda's international activities.

The United States is also on the verge of conflict with Iran, which borders both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Depending on the extent of the escalation, a Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict could affect U.S. planning and policy toward Iran.

Finally, China is interested in the state of Pakistan-Afghanistan escalation. China has significant counterterrorism interests in the region. Afghanistan borders China's Xinjiang Province, and Beijing has framed its activities in the region as counterterrorism. Chinese nationals have also been repeatedly targeted by terrorist attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Terrorist propaganda is increasingly focused on China as well. Meanwhile, its security relationship with Pakistan has deepened. Beijing will push for a ceasefire, and success could further increase its regional influence, although de-escalation is otherwise consistent with U.S. interests.

Alexander Palmer is a fellow in the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism (WITT) Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Alexander Margolis is an intern with the WITT Program at CSIS.

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