GAO report analyzes nuclear fuel efforts in national security and commercial sectors

The Government Accountability Office has released a report to Congress titled "Nuclear Fuel: Actions Needed to Enhance Cost Reporting and Economic Analysis for Federal Uranium Supply Efforts." The report describes National Nuclear Security Administration estimates of enriched uranium supplies and demands, examines the NNSA's plans to meet enriched uranium needs, and describes potential challenges to meeting supply goals. It also examines Department of Energy efforts to support the front-end fuel cycle for the commercial nuclear industry.

After reviewing NNSA and DOE documents and interviewing government officials and nuclear industry representatives, the GAO developed five recommendations, including calls for the NNSA to report the long-term costs of national security enrichment efforts to Congress and for the DOE to perform an analysis to determine if agency actions are sufficient to support domestic enrichment needs.

Goals and challenges: The GAO report begins by noting that the NNSA's plans for meeting U.S. national security enriched uranium requirements foresee the current inventory lasting into the 2040s. For the longer term, the agency is pursuing three main enrichment efforts, which it estimates will cost about $140 billion through 2105. However, details of these cost estimates have not been provided to Congress.

The report also notes that the DOE has awarded millions of dollars in funding to a number of companies to support the commercial nuclear industry, including by expanding enrichment capacity for both low-enriched uranium and high-assay low-enriched uranium. However, the DOE has not documented any analysis to determine whether these actions will actually "induce expansion of commercial LEU and HALEU production in the U.S."

The GAO stresses that "a range of challenges may affect NNSA's and DOE's goals to increase domestic enriched uranium production," such as limitations in domestic fuel cycle infrastructure.

Enriched Uranium Management Plan: The report provides details from the NNSA's 2023 Enriched Uranium Management Plan. Following a review of that plan, the GAO concluded that there is "sufficient supply of unobligated LEU, or HEU [high-enriched uranium] allocated for downblending to LEU, to produce tritium through the early 2040s." (Uranium used for national security purposes cannot involve any obligations to foreign countries, and is therefore "unobligated.")

The GAO also concludes that there is "sufficient HEU to meet naval nuclear propulsion needs until the 2050s . . . [and] sufficient HEU allocated to meet needs for isotope production and research reactors until 2040."

The GAO warns that "there are factors that could affect national security demands for unobligated enriched uranium and consume existing and projected inventories at a marginally faster rate." Although some of those factors are classified, one unclassified factor is "a potential future demand stream for unobligated HALEU to be used as fuel for microreactors under development for use" by the Department of Defense.

The report points out that "HALEU demands for commercial reactors remain highly uncertain because the extent to which advanced reactors using HALEU-based fuels-including many first-of-a-kind designs-will be proven, licensed, ordered, and deployed is also highly uncertain." Although there are more than 15 advanced reactor designs in various stages of licensing application with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, some stakeholders have "expressed skepticism about lofty HALEU demand estimates and noted uncertainty about how many of these reactor designs would succeed and ultimately be deployed."

Defense Fuels program analysis: The NNSA's Defense Fuels program, previously known as the Domestic Uranium Enrichment program, was reviewed for its ability to ensure a reliable supply of unobligated enriched uranium for national security mission requirements. Those national security requirements include the need to generate about 1.7 million separative work units (SWU) of enriched uranium per year by the 2050s.

According to the GAO, the NNSA is downblending excess HEU to LEU to supply two Tennessee Valley Authority reactors that produce tritium. When that downblending effort is complete, which is expected by 2027, "there will be sufficient unobligated LEU inventory to supply TVA reactors until the early 2040s."

Enrichment plants: The report also discusses the DOE-owned, Centrus Energy-operated American Centrifuge Plant in Piketon, Ohio, where, to date, unobligated uranium cannot be produced for national security purposes because the centrifuges contain foreign-made parts. The NNSA intends to address this problem by contracting a commercial operator to deploy one or two cascades at the Piketon facility using all unobligated parts, which will partially meet unobligated LEU demands beyond the early 2040s.

To provide most of the SWU needed for national security, the NNSA is planning to support new production capacity that will generate enough additional unobligated LEU "to completely fulfill the national security enrichment needs. According to NNSA officials, this production capability could include both or either of the small or large centrifuge technologies as necessary. Large centrifuges to support this production capability would be deployed at DOE's existing facility in Piketon; small centrifuges would require a separate purpose-built facility."

That small centrifuge technology is being demonstrated in a pilot plant that BWX Technologies is constructing in Erwin, Tenn. The technology may initially produce limited quantities of unobligated LEU, but will later transition to producing HEU to support the naval nuclear propulsion mission, using LEU as its feedstock.

According to the GAO, a new LEU production plant, whether located in Piketon, a separate facility, or both, "will need to produce about 1.5 million SWU per year starting in the 2050s to meet national security needs for both tritium and naval propulsion based on the most recent estimates available."

Evolving HALEU strategies: In regard to fuel for the commercial nuclear sector, the GAO report describes how DOE efforts to promote commercial-scale HALEU production have evolved in recent years. Most recently, the agency's incentivization-focused strategy of 2024 was changed in 2025 to a strategy of awarding task orders directly to companies to build capacity, "because negotiations with prospective companies revealed this approach would maximize the amount of capacity built."

Under the new approach, enrichment companies can enter supply contracts with end users, such as utilities and reactor developers, for the end users to purchase LEU and HALEU. The DOE believes that this strategy "will lead to the establishment of a domestic HALEU market and will fill part of the LEU supply gap resulting from the Russia import ban."

The DOE is also now pursuing milestone-based task orders, which will "contain milestones for companies to meet, such as to demonstrate the ability to enrich at commercial scale, as well as other milestones for licensing, construction, and technical items." Companies with these task orders "will be asked to provide 1 [metric ton of uranium] to DOE, which DOE plans to use to support the HALEU Availability Program."

Economic analysis: "DOE has taken multiple steps to facilitate a supply of HALEU for advanced reactors and has taken action to facilitate LEU supply for commercial nuclear reactors," the GAO states. Despite these actions, however, "DOE's actions are not currently supported by an economic analysis to guide its efforts. Furthermore, DOE has not yet developed key program management documents to guide the implementation of its efforts such as a written strategic plan, cost estimates, or an integrated schedule."

As explained in the report, an economic analysis "could provide useful and quality information to help DOE determine whether its planned actions are sized appropriately to induce expansion of commercial U.S. HALEU and LEU production and supply chain capability, or whether any changes in the scope or duration of DOE's planned actions would be appropriate based on market signals. Given the magnitude of funding, including $2.7 billion in awards to three companies to produce HALEU and LEU in January 2026, it is important for DOE to document its goals and estimates for how this funding will affect the market."

DOE program management plan: In terms of program management, the GAO report says that the DOE has a policy "that establishes expectations for program management . . . that a program should have documented plans and strategies to formally express its concept, vision, mission, and expected benefits." However, while "DOE has awarded companies with contracts to provide LEU, HALEU, and deconversion services, it has not yet documented a program management plan or strategic plan that comprehensively details goals and deliverables pertaining to how the program office plans to implement these efforts."

The Energy Act of 2020 calls for the DOE to provide a report to Congress on its HALEU activities, including cost and schedule estimates. According to the GAO, "DOE has been drafting this plan since 2021, and as of July 2026 DOE had not finalized it . . . Having comprehensive documentation and plans that provide details on DOE's efforts to fund expansion of HALEU and LEU capacity would provide assurance to Congress, potential investors, and developers of nuclear facilities, about the direction of such efforts."