The fall of El-Fasher: Sudan's war outpaces truce plan

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After more than 500 days under siege, El-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur in western Sudan, has fallen to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), who pushed out the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The 18-month blockade had already brought famine and devastation to the city, marked by indiscriminate shelling and drone attacks by both sides. In Darfur, civilians have suffered starvation, targeted killings, sexual violence, and assaults on refugee camps. The RSF's capture of the city has now ushered in a new phase of terror: house-to-house searches, arbitrary detentions and summary executions, with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimating that at least 62 000 people fled the El-Fasher area between 26 and 29 October.

On 30 October 2025, the UN Security Council (UNSC) held an emergency session condemning the atrocities that followed the RSF's entry into the city - including the killing of nearly 500 people at the Saudi Maternity Hospital, the only partially functioning health facility that had survived repeated shelling.

The EU has a strong interest in reinforcing accountability mechanisms for crimes committed in Sudan.

The war in Sudan is not only a humanitarian disaster but also a high-stakes conflict where regional and international powers pursue competing interests. Linking the Red Sea to the Sahel and North to Central Africa, Sudan lies at a strategic crossroads rich in valuable resources, notably gold.

Given its commitment to stability and the scale of the humanitarian crisis, the EU has a strong interest in reinforcing accountability mechanisms for crimes committed in Sudan.

Sudan's war and elusive peace

Once allies, the two generals - Abdel Fattah al-Burhan of the SAF and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, of the RSF - have been sworn enemies since April 2023. The RSF originates from the Janjaweed militia, which, alongside state forces, allegedly committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Darfur during the early 2000s. These acts led to two International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrants for then-President Omar al-Bashir in 2009 and 2010. During the 2015 Yemen war, Sudan deployed RSF units to support Emirati military operations, entrenching the group's external networks.

Since 2023, all warring parties in the Sudan conflict appear to have committed serious violations, including large-scale attacks on civilians and vital infrastructure. The latest offensive on El-Fasher occurred just days after a meeting in Washington of the so-called 'Quad' for Sudan - the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) -to discuss how to pressure the conflict parties into a three-month truce.

Regional and international rivalries further complicate mediation efforts.

A previous Quad declaration in September had proposed a three-month truce leading to a ceasefire and a nine-month transition toward civilian rule. Although this plan briefly revived hopes for peace, the belligerents continued fighting. The RSF now controls Darfur and most of Kordofan. Already in July 2025 it announced a parallel coalition government theoretically with national competence. Meanwhile, the SAF maintains control over the east and recaptured Khartoum and most of the surrounding region in late March 2025.in late March 2025.

The Quad's efforts for Sudan effectively relaunched the earlier mediation process led by the US and Saudi Arabia, whose main outcome had been the 2023 Jeddah Declaration on the Protection of Civilians - an agreement that both sides accepted but consistently violated. While US diplomacy has sought to regain momentum as part of Washington's broader ambition as peace broker, the Sudan peace process remains complex and fragile.

Regional entanglements

Regional and international rivalries further complicate mediation efforts. Countries in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf - along with Türkiye, Russia and Iran - have interests in Sudan. Egypt and Saudi Arabia view stability along the Red Sea as a matter of national security because of its geographical position and generally lean towards supporting the SAF. The UAE has denied allegations of providing direct support to the RSF in exchange for access to gold resources. Colombian mercenaries also reportedly joined the fighting on the RSF side after being contracted by Emirati companies. Eritrea and Tigrayan fighters appear to back the SAF in an effort to counterbalance Ethiopia, with which they have long-standing disputes - a position likely shared by Djibouti. Chad, meanwhile, is reportedly supporting the RSF, although some Chadian Zaghawa fighters are said to have joined Sudanese Zaghawa groups opposing it out of ethnic solidarity.

Russia initially courted both sides before tilting towards the SAF, motivated partly by its ambition to establish a naval base in Port Sudan - a goal that Iran has also pursued, raising alarm in Riyadh and other Gulf capitals. In November 2024, Russian support to SAF had concretised into vetoing a draft UNSC resolution aimed at guaranteeing humanitarian access and enforcing the arms embargo throughout Sudan.

A humanitarian catastrophe demanding accountability

With over 30 million people, including 16 million children, in need of humanitarian assistance due to famine, floods, cholera outbreaks, and war, Sudan's conflict is one of the world's most acute humanitarian crises.

The European Union remains one of the largest donors to Sudan, allocating €270 million to addressing the humanitarian crisis in 2025. The EU also supports peacebuilding initiatives, the African Union's efforts to assume a more prominent role in resolving the crisis, and co-organised humanitarian conferences in April 2024 in Paris and in April 2025 in London.

Sudan's conflict is one of the world's most acute humanitarian crises.

The EU can make its most significant contribution by reinforcing calls to halt the flow of weapons into Sudan and by supporting international investigations into illicit financial networks that fuel this conflict - and others beyond Sudan's borders.

To make a difference, peace efforts should move beyond statements and focus on sustained diplomatic engagement backed by concrete accountability measures.

Sudan's war is not only a humanitarian catastrophe, with estimates of more than 150 000 people killed in the conflict since April 2023, and about 12 million displaced, but also a source of growing regional instability. Beyond the immediate human toll, the war and its geopolitical entanglements threaten to fuel further escalation, proxy wars and spillover into neighbouring countries, along the highly strategic shores of the Red Sea where the interests of many countries converge and collide.

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