Transnistria: A Conflict Unfrozen but Not Thawed

Critical Questions by Leah Kieff

Published February 18, 2026

For more than three decades, Transnistria has existed as one of Europe's frozen conflicts-a breakaway region of Moldova sustained by Russian economic subsidies and military presence. But over the last year, the conflict has unfrozen, and over the next three years, there is a chance accelerate the process to reintegrate Transnistria with Moldova.

January 2025 marked a significant shift when Russia's decision to weaponize energy backfired, exposing the fragility of Transnistria's economy and the unreliability of its Russian patronage. Moldova, having diversified its energy supplies and integrated into European structures, now holds unprecedented leverage. But this leverage alone is not enough.

The question is no longer whether Transnistrian reintegration is possible, but how to seize this current confluence of events to achieve it. A resolution would benefit people living in Transnistria, the country's EU trajectory, and the region's security.

Q1: What is the brief history of the frozen conflict around the Transnistrian region of Moldova?

A1: In 1992, pro-Moscow forces directly supported the Transnistrian militia against the rest of Moldova. Since the 1992 ceasefire, this sliver of territory on the eastern bank of the Dniester River has operated as a de facto Russian protectorate unrecognized by any UN member state, including Russia. This region, which is largely Russian-speaking, has long had a de facto government friendly toward Moscow. A part of this friendship was Russia's provision of "free" gas to this region.

As a part of the agreement that ended the 1992 war, Russia left "peacekeepers" to patrol the territory. Today it is estimated that there are approximately 2,000 Russian troops in Transnistria, some a part of the "peacekeepers" and others, whose presence Moldova never agreed to, tasked with protecting a massive Soviet-era weapons depot. This depot continues to pose a threat to all of Moldova, for a multitude of reasons ranging from the intentional hostile misuse of the weapons to the instability of the munitions and the risk of inadvertent explosion.

As early as 1994, Moscow had agreed to the removal of these troops, but Russia continues to assert that these forces serve as "peacekeepers." While it is highly unlikely that the current troops in Transnistria could mount an invasion of Moldova without significant supplies and reinforcements, there remains a risk that Moscow might attempt to inject more military assets into Transnistria. The presence of these assets and Russian control of Transnistria is a continual pressure lever on Chisinau, the capital city of Moldova, and a major obstacle to the resolution of the conflict.

Historically, OSCE played a mediating role in the resolution through the defunct "5+2 format," which included Russia, Ukraine, Chisinau, Tiraspol (the capital of the Transnistrian region), and OSCE as part of negotiations, with the United States and the European Union as observers. Since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, they are unable to continue to serve as a co-mediator, leaving this format defunct. Moldova has indicated it will pursue reintegration through direct negotiations, a "1+1 format" with Tiraspol. The conversation occurring between Chisinau and Tiraspol today is the most substantive progress on a resolution since the Kozak Memorandum, over 20 years ago.

Q2: What are some of the economic, governance, and security obstacles to reintegration?

A2: The region has operated separately for over 30 years, developing distinct institutions and a separate political culture. Of the approximately 300,000 people living in Transnistria, over 90 percent hold Moldovan citizenship, but the region's predominantly Russian-speaking population has been conditioned for decades to view Moldova as foreign. Many of these residents hold dual citizenship, with estimates suggesting around 50 percent or more have Russian citizenship.

More than 20,000 Transnistrians travel daily to the western bank of the Dniester River for work. And approximately 30 percent of the residents voted for the pro-Western political party in the most recent election, which may suggest increasing openness to an EU trajectory from the population there. Increasing initiatives to further develop people-to-people ties and improve media freedom within Transnistria can accelerate this trend. The goal should be to frame reintegration not as a conquest but as reuniting a family that has been artificially divided.

Economically, the challenges are equally significant. Transnistria's regional government long relied on revenues from the provision of "free" Russian gas, leaving it now unable to fund public services. Complicating matters is the Sheriff holding company, an enterprise headed by an oligarch, which owns everything from supermarkets to the region's football team. Its interests are embedded in the status quo, but reintegration that introduces EU standards and transparency could challenge the Sheriff. This challenge also creates an opportunity in that it could be used to incentivize the Sheriff's owner to be a powerful ally in the reintegration.

Transnistria's alleged massive gas debts, accumulated over decades of "free" Russian supply, remain a potential issue. Historically, Russia has attributed these debts to Moldova's central government in Chisinau. Moldova recognizing or assuming this debt without concessions would likely be politically untenable. One long-shot approach might involve the transfer of ownership of property and infrastructure from the Transnistrian regional authority to Chisinau, with Moldova then working to settle with Moscow. Perhaps this settlement could involve Moldova paying a negotiated settlement of the debts in exchange for Russia removing its troops from Transnistria, which is another piece of reintegration that will require negotiations with Moscow.

But the removal of these troops is not the only security challenge to reintegration. There would need to be a plan in place to secure and remove the weapons stockpile. All Transnistria military and security forces would need to be disbanded, vetted, and possibly integrated into Moldova's institutions. This is essential not only from a unified structural perspective but also critical given the historical Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) influence within the Transnistrian security apparatus. Moldova will need to extend its legal system, including courts, across the region, allowing residents and businesses time to comply with requirements before full enforcement.

Q3: What role does EU accession play in reintegration strategy?

A3: Moldova's EU accession process provides both opportunities and complications to reintegration. The prospect of EU membership could be a powerful incentive-access to European markets has already become indispensable for Transnistrian businesses, with 71 percent of their exports sold to the European Union under the Moldova-European Union Association Agreement. However, it is unclear whether the European Union considers Transnistrian reintegration a prerequisite for membership.

Before Moldova's 2025 parliamentary elections, EU representatives stated that EU membership was a higher priority than reintegration and that Moldova might follow the "Cyprus model" of joining the European Union with a divided territory. Following the pro-EU victory in those elections, it appears the European Union's position may have shifted. This reversal suggests the European Union will handle Moldova's accession as one entity, not deferring Transnistria's status for later. This would require and means that the European Union expects substantial progress on reintegration before accession can be completed.

Making EU membership contingent on territorial integrity may risk giving Russia a de facto veto. Moscow has shown that a part of the strategic purpose of frozen conflicts is to prevent Western integration. But conversely, this linkage creates a forcing function to ensure the reintegration occurs by the target date of 2030 for joining the European Union. It puts pressure on Chisinau to develop a concrete reintegration strategy rather than allowing the conflict to remain frozen indefinitely.

Q4: How has the energy crisis shifted the balance of power between Chisinau and Tiraspol?

A4: Until January 2025, Transnistria's economic model was built on the fiction of viability as an independent entity. The region's survival depended entirely on "free" Russian natural gas, valued at hundreds of millions of dollars annually. Gazprom consistently billed the Moldovan government in Chisinau for gas used by Transnistria while never demanding payment from Tiraspol. Transnistrian consumers paid about 6 cents per cubic meter of gas, while those in the rest of Moldova paid roughly $1 for the same amount. The revenue generated by the sale to the rest of Moldova accounted for approximately 60 percent of the Transnistrian regional authorities' budget.

When Ukraine stopped transiting Russian gas on January 1, 2025, Gazprom claimed it would suspend supplies due to Moldova's alleged debt for previous deliveries. But Russia might have continued supplying Transnistria via other, albeit more expensive and complex avenues. Industries across Transnistria shut down, heating was cut off, and the region's main power plant-which had previously supplied up to 80 percent of Moldova's electricity-switched from gas to coal, drastically reducing its output and increasing costs to consumers across Moldova. Eventually, Tiraspol accepted support from Chisinau and Brussels, resolving the immediate crisis in early 2025.

The abrupt cutoff exposed the fragility of Transnistria's economic system and marked a historic reversal in leverage. For decades, Transnistria threatened Moldova's energy security through control of the largest electrical power plant. Now, Transnistria faces economic collapse without external support.

Q5: How should Moldova balance short-term crisis management with long-term reintegration planning?

A5: Transnistria is facing a crisis with its energy supply remaining unstable and its economy on the verge of collapse, with inflation double that of the rest of Moldova, and industrial output decreased by 30 percent over the past year. Chisinau has a moral and practical obligation to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe among Transnistria's residents, many of whom hold Moldovan citizenship. However, simply subsidizing energy without demanding concessions would relieve pressure on Tiraspol and, at best, extend the status quo of separation. There is also the potential for a Kaliningrad-like scenario to consider where Russia maintains or attempts to augment its current military presence as a notional counterweight to the NATO basing in Romania.

Moldova should leverage this immediate need for energy and economic assistance to build bridges for reintegration. Transitioning to market-rate energy will require subsidies to prevent collapse. Residents who paid pennies for utilities face bills tens or hundreds of times higher. Any Moldovan government overseeing this transition will likely face Kremlin-fueled accusations of impoverishing Transnistrians.

The European Commission has approved significant aid for Moldova, including millions for easing the energy crisis in Transnistria. Moldova should work with the European Union to ensure this aid reaches vulnerable populations while creating dependencies on Chisinau and Brussels rather than Moscow.

In parallel, Moldova should also continue developing a comprehensive reintegration roadmap, with departments and agencies creating plans for their respective spaces to integrate Transnistrian government structures and residents. While Chisinau has indicated it is working with the United States and European Union on such a plan, details remain confidential. While keeping it close hold may be helpful on some points, Chisinau should share broad outlines publicly to build support. This will be essential to ensuring the plan's implementation within the next three years-in advance of not only the 2030 goal for EU accession but also before the next county-wide elections.

Q6: What is the role of the United States and other international partners in supporting reintegration?

A6: While Transnistrian reintegration should be led by Moldova, it cannot be achieved by Moldova alone. The country lacks the financial resources, diplomatic leverage, and security capacity to manage the process without external support. The United States, the European Union, and its member states have demonstrated their commitment to Moldova's security and bring unique strengths to resolving this situation.

Most crucially, international partners should assist Moldova in countering Russia's hybrid warfare. Moscow will use every tool-from vote buying to cyberattacks-to obstruct reintegration. Moldova needs sophisticated homeland security capabilities, including but not limited to counter-drone capabilities, to ensure the physical security of negotiations and integration processes. Economic pressures alone cannot ensure a secure environment. But homeland security is certainly an area where U.S. and European expertise can make a decisive difference.

Additionally, the United States is uniquely positioned to use diplomatic weight to support Moldova in negotiations with Russia over troop withdrawal. The European Union might consider establishing targeted funding specifically for Transnistrian reintegration, signaling a serious commitment through resourcing. Brussels might also extend benefits in advance of full reintegration. Transnistrian businesses already enjoy trade preferences under the Moldova-European Union Association Agreement. Expanding these to include infrastructure investments, educational exchanges, and civil society development-particularly for institutions owned by Moldovan passport holders-could continue to shift attitudes and build support for integration. This could and should be done in conjunction with the integration of the legal system, including courts and police across the region.

Finally, bilateral support from EU states that have successfully navigated post-Soviet transitions and hybrid threats is invaluable. Romania plays a particularly important role as Moldova's neighbor. The Iași-Chisinau gas pipeline and the upcoming Vulcanești-Chisinau power line are critical to Moldova's continued energy independence. Estonia has provided valuable technical assistance to Moldova, from help in drafting the 2023 cybersecurity law to other support to advance its cyber development.

For the first time in three decades, there is clear and significant momentum toward reintegration, but converting this moment into a permanent solution requires vision, substantial financial resources, and delicate diplomacy. A recent poll found that approximately 45 percent of Transnistrians support reintegration with Moldova, indicating that economic realities may be shifting attitudes. The next few years will determine whether this opportunity is seized or squandered.

Leah Kieff is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Project on Prosperity and Development at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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