Speech

Good morning, and it's great to follow this very interesting, very honest and very open discussion. And it gives me really a great pleasure to be for the first time within this building. I remember visiting Norway many years ago. I was still a student, if I remember correctly, and as part of a Norwegian support program towards Central and Eastern Europe, I was invited here as one of the young leaders from the then Social Democratic Youth of Macedonia to join you for a program at Utøya. And it was a transformative experience, because going through the many different elements of the Norwegian model, I have been confirmed in my views that politics can be a noble profession, that we can achieve more if we show more solidarity, if we search for the right answers to our joint problems.

And I always say that it is because of Norway that I actually became involved very actively and chose politics as my profession. So, in my both good and bad days in politics - and my friends here know that there are plenty of both - I do thank and blame Norway for it very often.

But let me say I was invited here to talk about one of the most important challenges and questions of today, and this is how do we see transatlantic relations in the future. And let me share, we have had the beginning of this discussion initially by the Prime Minister [of Norway] and the [EU] High Representative, but let me kick up the discussion with few observations from where I stand in NATO.

First: transatlantic relations were, are and will be, a result of hard work, but also shared interests and political will. And this has always been the case. Sometimes it's more visible, sometimes it's less visible, but you need all these elements to make these transatlantic relations work and be productive for all.

For over three quarters of a century, NATO has been able to provide its key goal, and this is to give security for 1 billion people across the Alliance. And what is more important, we do agree on what is needed in order to deliver this shared goal: more defence investments, more defence production at a speedier scale, and also more support to Ukraine. And thank you for also raising this issue. It is clear that in this moment, we do have the political will to make these three things happen. And I will tell you, last year, more or less this time of the year, I was in Sweden for their Security Conference. I was also in Vilnius for their Snow Conference. And if someone would have asked any of us, not just me, any of us there, would it be feasible for all 32 Allies to agree not on a 2.5, not on a 3, on 5% of GDP defence investment pledge, most of us would have said no. Because let us not forget, even in 2025 it was still a challenge to have all Allies at 2% on which we have agreed more than 10 years ago.

So, still, we did at The Hague Summit - we have managed to convince all and to have everyone on board to invest up to 5% of GDP until 2035 and this is our direction of travel. If you would have asked us, and even these people who are very active in defence production, will we be able to turn the tide when it comes to scaling up production, speeding up defence production, many people probably would have been also less optimistic, but it is clear that the demand signal that was sent by the political leaders in The Hague, the fact that we have started interacting with defence industry in a regular, predictable and very open discussion, did change the course. And what we have seen is that the defence industry across the Alliance is already picking up pace, producing more firepower. We see this especially when it comes to ammunition, which was a source of great disappointment, that the fact that we couldn't produce, not only as much as Russia, but actually four times less than Russia. This has changed dramatically in the course of one year, and we see this together with adopting latest technologies as a key element to change the developments, to change the curve.

So don't get me wrong. We are not naive, and we shouldn't be. We still have a lot to do. A commitment to spend and invest more is still commitment. Some of the countries are paving the way towards 5% at a much more ambitious timescale, but some are still taking their time. But it is clear that both leaders and defence industry know that we cannot stick to the old normal. We have to invest in our security, because our security is challenged. And within our deterrence, we need to incorporate the defence industry. Because if there is one very clear lesson from Ukraine is that your pace of production and your industry and your innovation are as important as your political will to fight, as your military might and your command and control.

We have also been clear about stepping up support to Ukraine - and I'm saying this here in Norway, and I want to stress that it is Allies like Norway that have made this possible by being active on all fronts, not just supporting Ukraine politically, but also supporting humanitarian needs, supporting issues such as energy security, which has become the big crisis now in Ukraine, but also being very clear in supporting them with military means. And I know that in the course of the last, now, fifth year, we have seen ups and downs, but Norway's commitment was really exemplary. And thank you for doing this, and thank you for pushing also other Allies into doing the same.

So, we have come in a situation in which we see what is happening in Ukraine as also lessons learned of what are the wars of tomorrow. And by having your defence industry supporting them, by having all of us supporting their military capabilities, but also their training, their intelligence, we are actually also supporting our own deterrence and defence, and I don't think that we can repeat this message enough.

This leads me to my second point, and this is that strong Atlantic relations demand that we sometimes have to work through our differences, and this is where the hard work comes. And I think your Prime Minister was very clear in saying that this is an approach that works. We are democracies. We have debates within our societies, we should not take them for granted. We also have dialogue with different Allies, and sometimes, like in history, we have different points of view. And the big advantage is that the DNA of this Alliance is about discussing and finding a way out, and coming up with a solution that matches our shared interests for security.

So we have, as part of this also discussion lately, we have come up with a U-turn when it comes to Arctic security, and several things were already mentioned, but I will just add that it was through the intelligence and the information from Allies such as Norway, we have seen that, across the Arctic, we do see more interest and more presence by Russia. They have created their Arctic command. They have reopened some old military sites. They are creating new ones, basically deep-water ports, but also airfields. They're testing their novel weapons in the Arctic. And this calls for our attention, and it became clear that it was not only Norway, and it was not just our Arctic Allies that have the interest to preserve security, stability and cooperation in the High North. It is in the interest of all NATO Allies, and this is why we have agreed that we will do more. Without focusing on just one part of the Arctic, but really looking at the Arctic as an area where we have to be strategically present and we have to protect our interests. And we have seen that Allies are procuring more capabilities that are appropriate for our presence in the High North. Our troops are exercising in Arctic condition, and this is where Norway comes as a leader. So last October, we opened a new centre in Bodø that focuses on these issues, and with the exercise this March, this will be a very clear signal not only of your contributions, of the importance of the Arctic, but as was mentioned, the importance of transatlantic unity.

So transatlantic relations may be tested, and they are always tested, but we always come up with the Alliance being stronger. Which brings me to my third and final observation, that the bond between Europe and North America remains the only really winning way in developing our security in a more dangerous and less predictable world. US security, US troops, US military might is indispensable for European security, but it goes both ways. It is also what Europeans, what we bring to the table remains relevant, from the Arctic to the Atlantic and towards US and Canada's security. So, in this way, this is the bond that has kept our two continents together, and this is a bond that has made all of us more secure.

For Europe and Canada to step up on defence investment is not a question of choice, it is a question of necessity. And this has been the case for quite some time. But it is true that the time when we could, some would say conveniently, give up on focusing on security and allow the US to deal with it is over, and this is a much more just and more stable arrangement in which not only US, but also Canada and European Allies contribute in a meaningful way to our Euro-Atlantic security. This is why, when we did our last polls, 81% of Allied citizens, on average, throughout the Alliance, consider the transatlantic bond as crucial for our shared security, and we have these expectations to take into account, but we also have some lessons, good and bad, from the more than 75 years of history, and this is why we do believe that, especially in challenging times, we will be able to deliver more. More security, but also more cooperation in a very, very hostile and unpredictable world. Thank you.

Kate Hansen Bundt, Moderator

Thank you so much for pointing out the importance of the transatlantic bond and how we can strengthen in these turbulent times. It is a result of hard work, shared interest and political will, as you said in your remarks. However, we have to reflect on the last week's remarks from Donald Trump and the tough diplomacy around Greenland, and his rather harsh rhetoric to European Allies and Canada of being weak. How much has this harmed the trust among the Allies? Could you tell a little bit from the Headquarters, and how can we heal it?

NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska

Well, I remember reading, your Prime Minister mentioned, you know, the days of university work and how I remember my university lessons that spoke about what is the basis and the strength of alliances in history and in the world. Is it a threat, or is it trust? And in my view, it has to be both.

We do share the common goal of providing security, and we have to also work on this with the appropriate level of trust. And I have to say that trust goes both ways. But it is true that for many years, actually decades, as Europeans we got used to US carrying most of the burden in an unacceptable way, maybe acceptable after the Second World War. But practically this has been the source of frustration for so many years and for so many administrations. We also have to be open about this fact. I remember the first time I joined a ministerial meeting. It was Ministers of Defence when my country, North Macedonia, was still not part of the Alliance, but we did support NATO in Afghanistan and in Iraq previously. So we were there around the table discussing Afghanistan, but at every meeting, the Secretary of Defence from the US would start by calling European Allies and Canada to invest more in their defence. And some European colleagues saying, 'yes, we agree, but we cannot do it now.'

And this has been going on for too long. I remember some people were quoting JFK in '63 talking more or less about the same frustration from the other side of the Atlantic, that countries which are moving forward in terms of economy, in terms of capacities, are not willing to in a way finance appropriately and invest in their security. So, we have approached this problem in The Hague in a very pragmatic way. How can we do better? How can we invest in the trust by saying that European Allies and Canada are doing more?

And there is a clear sense, and I would say even understanding and consensus among all Allies, that we will continue to develop. You called it previously European pillar of NATO, European defence within NATO and this balance sharing, actually balance shifting will strengthen the Alliance. It will not weaken it. And of course, allowing the US to be present in other theatres, but also saying that US nuclear deterrent remains also very important for the Alliance, apropos the discussions that that we have had previously.

Kate Hansen Bundt, Moderator

I think it was Donald Tusk who said it's not fair that 500 million Europeans are asking 300 million Americans to defend them against 140 million Russians. And I think it's time to step up.

NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska

And I think he added, also from an economy the size of Italy, both in terms of numbers, in terms of economy, might, innovation, power of industry, you know. We can do better, and we can deter by investing even more in our security.

Kate Hansen Bundt, Moderator

It's talking about in NATO now burden shifting instead of burden sharing. What's the difference between the two terms? Does burden shifting somehow indicate that some downsizing or withdrawal of American troops in Europe? Burden shifting has been on the table for many decades.

NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska

Well, this is it. When you don't deal with burden shifting, you know, then you have to be even more ambitious afterwards. It is clear that European Allies and Canada, and European Allies especially on the continent, are prepared to take the lead when it comes to conventional deterrence. And this means a more prominent role, bigger numbers, but also capabilities. And this is where our relationship with defence industry become crucial. I started this morning in Oslo with a conversation with representatives from the Norwegian defence industry. Really remarkable. Not just the primes, but really small and medium companies who bring something to the table. And they said that they have seen the demand signal growing stronger after The Hague, but they also need some additional predictability. Why is this, the defence industry, still with certain question marks? That's because they're afraid. Is our commitment real and will it stay?

Because we have had commitments in the past, and unfortunately, too many Allies - we were dragging our feet. So, I think what was very important in The Hague was to send this message. And then what is important is that now we focus on implementation. Because it's not as if the 5% is something that we have on the table. The 5% is goal. Some countries are more ambitious. Some countries have already shown, you know, that they can contribute 5% either this year, next year, or until 2030. And I have to also say Norway was a very strong Ally in terms of having the 2% even before many of the others. But we have to convince also defence industry and our adversaries that our commitment is not going to disappear, especially the moment after the war in Ukraine ends. Because it is a clear understanding by all our intelligence services, by all our experts that when the war stops in Ukraine, the threat of Russia will not disappear. On the contrary, they have shown that aggression will be, and will continue to be, their foreign policy towards practically all their neighbours. And we have seen this when we analyse Russian economy, when we see how they're turning up military equipment. So, this is why our commitment cannot be a one-time decision. It has to be a sustained effort that will strengthen us.

Kate Hansen Bundt, Moderator

Totally agree. You mentioned the need for NATO to step up in the Arctic. To a Norwegian, a Finn, the Arctic is part of a DNA, Prime Minister Støre and President Alexander Stubb wrote in Financial Times, I think it was last week. And in the last year, the NATO profile in the Arctic is already enhanced due to updated regional plans and command structure, as well as Finnish and Swedish NATO membership. So, what more could you do, or should NATO do without diverting critical resources from other key priorities as Ukraine?

NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska

Well, you're absolutely right that, for you, Arctic was never too high or too north. And we have always counted on Norway to be our eyes and ears when it comes to this region. But it is true that there was hesitation, you know, on behalf of even Arctic nations, on how should NATO be involved. It was predominantly seen more as a national exercise, national responsibility. This thinking has changed. And what we have seen because of Russian presence, because of Russian activities there is that we have to be more united and we have to have a more coordinated response there.

Seven out of eight Arctic nations in the world are NATO Allies. So, it is our front yard in a way. And what is necessary, of course, is for us to have not only more knowledge, more situational awareness, but also more presence and more capabilities. And the whole concept of The Hague commitment is not to move our capabilities around, but to increase and strengthen our capabilities. What was different was that even in our defence planning cycle, you know, we had to adjust to looking at Arctic and Arctic capabilities as part of our planning. And the fact that now these countries are part of Norfolk Joint Command responsibility will be extremely helpful. But the idea is not to weaken our defences elsewhere, but actually to bring more capabilities to the table. And it's definitely capabilities that you don't need elsewhere. I mean, these are all more specialised capabilities, more specialised military exercises. And this is why, actually, our Arctic Allies are a huge resource, living and fighting in this environment is a completely different ball game, I was told. And after walking in Oslo, which is probably a very, very mild version of this, I can understand.

Kate Hansen Bundt, Moderator

We have to end by talking a little bit about the agenda for the upcoming Ankara Summit of NATO this summer. The Allies will meet again, and will it be assessment, or how far you have, you know, we have reached the commitments from The Hague. What other topics will be on the agenda? Do you know?

NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska

The Secretary General when we were preparing for the Hague, he was very clear, not only in the discussions about the Summit, but even discussions referring to NATO internal reorganisations. His goal, and maybe this is his Prime Minister's experience speaking, is we have to focus on our core business. And it was an additional argument for him also to advocate stronger cooperation with the EU. Why? Because there are areas in which EU is actually better positioned with more know-how. And we shouldn't just repeat what they know better. So, it should really be a cooperation.

But NATO has to focus on what we know best, and probably we are the only ones with the DNA and the history and the experiences, good and bad, of actually command and control, defining military capability and conducting operations. So, he said even then, we will not pick our three priorities for The Hague and then think about different priorities next year. No, it's all about implementation and delivering on these commitments, because the 5% pledge is only as good as our budget decisions are every year. If we don't follow up, they will actually become a vulnerability.

On defence production, we will continue also the focus in Ankara, and we will have another industry day, focusing very much on how can we support industry and how can we be better with using additional funds, but hopefully without avoiding additional costs. Because there were several ministers, I remember in the preparation to the Summit, who said if we increase spending, we will just end up with more inflation. So, this is why our message to Allies was, let's do more joint procurements, let's try to cooperate more, and let's insist on more innovative solutions in looking for the right capability targets. So, this will also be high on the agenda.

And the third element, this is what we do every day. I mean, we push Allies to do even more on supporting Ukraine, and we just had two very important NAC sessions focusing on how can we support Ukraine so that they can really negotiate with more assurances and more strength on their side. And trust me, especially on issues such as air defences, the situation is and was dire. And this is something where I cannot avoid mentioning again: Norway. The fact that you were able to use, also your defence industry to support, but you were also, I think, leader in terms of supporting financial package for the so-called Prioritised Ukraine Requirement List, which basically delivered ammunition and air defences to Ukraine as we speak, so very quickly. This saved lives. It saved lives on the battlefield. It saved lives in Ukrainian cities, and we know that the focus now is on the peace process. But we also know that we have to continue with this support. Because, as you could see, even today, the fighting has not stopped, and the attacks, especially on civilian and energy infrastructure, have only picked up. So, these three things will be our focus as we head towards Ankara as well.