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11/14/2025 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 11/14/2025 04:46

Warm waters: The Caribbean between counter-narcotics operations and the prospects of regime change

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14 November 2025 Reading time: 5 minutes By: Giuseppe Spatafora

The Caribbean is currently experiencing its biggest military escalation in decades. Before August, the US naval presence in the region was limited to two or three warships and Coast Guard cutters; now, it amounts to eight warships, a nuclear-powered fast-attack submarine, and has just been reinforced by the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford, the US Navy's most powerful vessel, redeployed from the Mediterranean. The deployment also includes 10 000 troops, 6 000 sailors and marines, one-nuclear-powered submarine, F-35 fighter jets, B-52 and B-1 bombers, reconnaissance and military cargo planes.

Since 2 September, US forces have been targeting boats allegedly used by drug smugglers off Venezuela's coast and, more recently, in the Pacific coast off Mexico. The strikes have killed more than 70 people so far. But the scale of the build-up suggests that something more could be at play. Given the deteriorating relations between President Trump and Venezuela's strongman Nicolás Maduro - accused of backing international cartels like Tren de Aragua - there is speculation that these operations may presage a campaign for regime change. Trump has authorised covert action by the CIA, and has been presented with military options to bring about the collapse of Maduro's government.

This Caribbean deployment marks the most significant shift in US defence policy since Trump took office. The strikes form part of a broader foreign policy experiment under Trump 2.0, in which the Americas appear to be the 'laboratory' of the administration's most audacious ideas: that the US should expand its territory; or that it can interfere in the domestic politics of other countries - whether to support or undermine their governments. Earlier this year, Trump made threats of territorial expansion into Greenland, Panama and Canada, and controversially renamed the Gulf of Mexico 'Gulf of America'. He has pressured Brazil to end the trial of former president Bolsonaro and recently imposed sanctions on Colombia's president Gustavo Petro for allegedly obstructing the fight against organised crime.

The operation so far has proved popular with a number of constituents who support Trump. The US is repositioning its forces from Eurasia to the near abroad, in line with the preferences of 'restrainers'. The operation blurs the line between law enforcement and military action, enabling the administration to use military tools to pursue domestic goals such as curbing drug trafficking. This mirrors the deployment of the National Guard in US cities, which serves Trump's stated objective of reducing crime and deporting irregular migrants. And Secretary of State Marco Rubio has called for a renewed 'maximum pressure' approach towards Venezuela. However, this equilibrium may not last: if the strikes go ahead, they could lead to a protracted military involvement, upsetting those in MAGA world who want less US military involvement abroad. If no action is taken, pro-interventionist voices will be disappointed.

US partners' uneasy balancing act

Countries in the region and beyond have reacted in different ways to the US strikes and military build-up. Many Latin American and Caribbean governments are alarmed. US strikes have killed not only Venezuelan smugglers but also citizens of Colombia and Mexico. Regional actors fear that these actions could signal a return to cross-border operations without sovereign consent, but on a greater and more overt scale. While many countries see Venezuela as an adversary, they fear that toppling its leader could fuel regional instability - some are drawing parallels with the Iraq War.

However, some regional actors also welcome the Trump administration's approach. The Maduro regime has been a source of regional insecurity for decades. Guyana welcomes US pressure on Venezuela, distracting Maduro from his territorial claims over the Essequibo region. Trinidad and Tobago, just off Venezuela's coast, also supports the move and is hosting US naval assets for joint drills. Trump has other ideological allies in the region, from El Salvador's Nayib Bukele to Argentina's Javier Milei, who recently secured a USD 20 billion currency swap from the US Treasury to keep the peso afloat.

Europe's choices

The evolution of the military situation in the Caribbean matters for Europe too. EU Member States, like France and the Netherlands, hold territories in the region. Drug trafficking from South America increasingly reaches European shores. The EU has stated that it aims to enhance its role as a trusted partner in the region. At the same time, it also wants to avoid unwanted friction with the United States. And Maduro's government, in addition to not being democratically elected, is Russia's main ally in the Western hemisphere.

How should the EU proceed in this fraught context?

First, it should continue acting in accordance with international law. Countries like the UK has stopped sharing intelligence with the US about suspected drug-trafficking vessels. At the G7, France condemned the use of US force for extra-judicial killings that run against international law. The EU should make sure it is not seen as complicit in these actions - otherwise, accusations of 'double standards' would only grow.

Instead, Brussels could provide a different approach to the fight against transnational organised crime. The Trump administration's strategy focuses on repression, neglecting the root causes of the problem - such as poverty and lack of opportunity, which drive recruitment into gangs, or poor governance, which allows transnational crime to flourish. With major USAID cuts earlier this year, more people risk turning to crime.

The EU can complement US efforts by focusing on these issues. It can scale up initiatives like EL PACCTO 2.0, which fosters regional law-enforcement cooperation. The Global Gateway Investment Agenda can fund development and offset US aid reductions. EU and Latin American and Caribbean countries should also develop dual-use capabilities - from intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) to command and control (C2) and digital systems - which are necessary both to fight transnational cartels and to deter external threats, including those posed by Russia.

Metadata Bottom

  • The Americas
  • Latin America
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