Early 2026 Elections: Asia Goes Conservative

• Pivot to Asia Asia
  by Filippo Fasulo, Paola Morselli, Guido Alberto Casanova and Michele Danesi
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In the first few weeks of 2026, three Asian nations have already been called to the polls, as general elections have been held in Japan, Thailand and Bangladesh in early February. The results of the vote tell three different stories of three different countries, each at its own turning point, but with one common feature: the empowerment of right-wing parties across the board. Structural factors in the internal and international arena play an important role in this shift, but so do fortuitous contingencies which, at this time, have been redirecting the popular sentiment towards more nationalist or conservative political choices. How deep is this turn and what does it mean for the rest of Asia?

Why it matters

1. Takaichi rules Japan. The gamble called by the new prime minister has paid off handsomely for the ruling LDP, which obtained an unprecedented two-thirds majority on its own after the general election held on January, 8. Takaichi - first appointed as PM in late October - has ignited a wave of enthusiasm among voters which carried her party to a victory of unexpected magnitude, while weaknesses of the opposition-leading Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) also played a major role. As a result, the overwhelming electoral success puts Takaichi's government in a privileged position, whereby the government now has a sufficient majority in the lower house to pass legislations without the consent of the upper house - where it does not possess a majority - and to initiate a debate on constitutional revision. Also, quite meaningfully, the LDP will regain the chairmanship of the powerful Budget Committee of the lower house, where the early November interrogation of Takaichi by opposition lawmakers prompted her remarks on Taiwan that sparked the current diplomatic dispute with China. Now fully in control of the political process, the PM is unlikely to deviate from the path of strategic clarity set out in that first hearing. Indeed, her first speech after being re-appointed to her post was focused on countering Chinese coercion.

2. Thailand chooses the conservative party. The elections of the 8^th February produced a somewhat surprising outcome. The reformist People's Party - heir to the dissolved Move Forward, which had won the 2023 elections - secured only 116 seats, while the conservative Bhumjaithai Party of incumbent PM Anutin Charnvirakul triumphed with 194 seats. Bhumjaithai has long been considered one of the political forces that were closest to the monarchy and the military establishment, responsible for blocking the formation of a Move Forward government in 2023. Several factors explain this reversal: Anutin's skilful exploitation of the nationalist sentiment stirred by clashes on the Cambodian border, while the People's Party's own decision to support Anutin as prime minister last year has eroded its reformist credibility among younger voters. Alongside the elections, a constitutional referendum was held to rewrite the 2017 Constitution, drafted under military influence: 65% of voters approved of its revision, opening - at least in principle - the door to a future constitutional reform. Thus, Thailand has voted on the same day to strengthen the very political forces that have historically resisted constitutional change, while also expressing a clear desire to dismantle the institutional framework those same political forces helped build.

3. Bangladeshi Gen Z under stress test. The resounding victory of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), along with the appointment of Tarique Rahman (son of former party leader Khaleda Zia who died in December 2025) as the new PM, was driven by the party's well-established network in the country, its long-standing political tradition and its tilt towards secularization -a relevant distinction from the Jamaat-e-Islam, the Islamist-leaning alternative. However, this election underlined the tenuous political legacy of the Gen Z: the movement that fuelled part of the 2024 revolution lacked political organization and uniformity of ideas - except for the constitutional requests incorporated in the "July Charter", approved in a referendum contextual to the general elections. This resulted in electoral inconsistency and fragmentation, with the students-led National Citizen Party (NCP) joining the coalition of Jamaat despite the secular character of the revolt. The path ahead is still uncertain: the domestic priorities will revolve around the implementation of the Charter, thus moving towards the legislative, administration and judiciary reforms approved in the referendum; while on the international front, Rahman will likely try to appease Indian concerns and keep strengthening ties with the US, balancing the BNP's traditional closeness with China in order not to upset New Delhi and Washington right away.

OUR TAKE

Nationalist and conservative forces have swept the latest round of elections in Asia. That's the case for a variety of reasons, ranging from forms of conflict-infused patriotic fervour to the personal charisma of leaders. Yet, in all these cases, a recurring feature seems to be the weak organization or the discredited political proposals of left-wing progressive forces. Overshadowed by growing international tensions, these forces have failed to keep pace and offer responses voters could buy into. Yet, while the electoral results foretell more conservative policy-making, they do not necessarily mean an inherent right-wing turn for the three countries: Takaichi will need to convince non-conservative Japanese citizens beyond the frenzy her profile generated, Thai leaders will have to deal with the issue of constitutional revision, and, in Bangladesh, Rahman will still need to take into account the concerns of the young generation who led the 2024 revolution.

EXPERTS' VIEWS

What are the main foreign policy implications of Takaichi's electoral success and what can we expect for Japan's international positioning?

The recent parliamentary election in Japan marks a turning point for the administration of Prime Minister Takaichi. Her ruling Liberal Democratic Party has moved from minority status in both chambers to a supermajority in the Lower House, capable of overriding the Upper House. This shift significantly expands the government's policy latitude and institutional agility, particularly in priority areas such as defense, economic security, and alliance management. Such flexibility is critical given Japan's complex geopolitical environment, with intensifying pressure from China as well as sustained security threats from Russia and North Korea. At the same time, relations with the United States - Tokyo's indispensable ally - have grown more challenging under the second Trump administration, marked by US demands for economic and security concessions, aggressive tariff measures, and open defiance to international law and multilateralism. While Takaichi is likely to use her upcoming summit with Trump to reaffirm alliance cohesion, Tokyo will also intensify engagement with other partners to broaden its diplomatic room for maneuver. For Europe, this creates a timely opportunity to institutionalize deeper strategic cooperation across multiple policy domains.

Alexandra Sakaki, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)

How will the new BNP leadership in Bangladesh position itself vis-à-vis the two regional giants, India and China?

Post the 13th Parliamentary elections in Bangladesh, its regional cooperation with China and India will improve. Apart from Bangladesh's core focus on political stability, India and China will be seen as the regional partner contributing to its economic growth. China and Bangladesh have developed a strong partnership that includes, apart from the close military ties, a wide range of cooperation domains, especially infrastructure development. The bilateral ties, including economic cooperation, will grow. While India and Bangladesh recently experienced a lull period, it appears Dhaka and Delhi are also committed to close engagement. In keeping with normalizing ties, Dhaka has already initiated opening up visa procedures. Bangladesh and India will hopefully resume bilateral trade and make once again full use of the cross-border trade facilities. While India will be keen to support Bangladesh's economic growth, Dhaka will have to find ways to reenergize its ties with Delhi. There is ample scope for developing incremental bilateral measures for stronger economic, political and social ties in the days ahead.

Sreeradha Datta, O.P Jindal Global University

SPOTLIGHT: The Spring Gala and the Future of Chinese Robotics

At this year's Spring Festival Gala - the most-watched television event in the world and a longtime showcase for China's national ambitions - humanoid robots took center stage, performing synchronized choreography and martial arts routines complete with flips and weapon handling. Beyond the spectacle, the performance reflects a broader industrial reality: China accounts for over 80% of the humanoid robot installations deployed globally in 2025. Indeed, the sector has been growing rapidly, also thanks to state control over much of the supply chain, from rare earths and high-performance magnets to batteries and mechanical components. The dexterity on display hints at the humanoid potential in precision manufacturing and logistics jobs, though robots still need to prove their reliability in more human-centric settings like healthcare or home assistance - challenges that will likely demand further advances in both AI and mechanical engineering. The foundations, however, are in place: in 2024, over 450.000 registered smart robotics companies were registered in China and robotics are embedded as a strategic national priority through the latest Five-Year Plan. The Gala was entertainment, but it was also a statement by the central government to the world.

WHAT AND WHERE

The idea of a Middle Power Axis? Canada-EU-Indo-Pacific commercial deals

Against the backdrop of Canadian PM Mark Carney's speech at Davos at the end of January, the EU and the countries of the Comprehensive and Progressive trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), in close coordination with Canada, are jointly exploring the possibility of strengthening their trade ties. Of particular interest are the discussions on intertwining supply chains - especially relevant given that the countries involved include major manufacturing hubs such as Japan, Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, Mexico, and Australia - as well as the possibility of an agreement on "rules of origin," which determine the economic nationality of a product. However, it is not a complete novelty: an EU-CPTPP Dialogue on Trade and Investments had been launched last November in a first attempt to bring together two of the major global economic blocs, which together account for 32% of global GDP and 37% of global trade. The effort aligns with the European de-risking strategy and is rooted in the EU and CPTPP countries' uncomfortable position in their commercial relations with the US and China, as well as the common necessity to strengthen self-reliance and reduce trade dependency on the two economic superpowers. Along the same de-risking line, the EU had just been able to score a major result at the end of January: it established a Free Trade Agreement with India after long years of negotiation, which is now waiting for the approval of the European Parliament.

Macron visits India to strengthen military cooperation

French President Emmanuel Macron visited India between 17 and 19 February, participating in the Artificial Intelligence Impact Summit and meeting with Indian PM Narendra Modi in Mumbai, after jointly inaugurating the India-France Year of Innovation in Mumbai. The two leaders, who last held a bilateral summit in Paris in February 2025, formalized a "Special Global Strategic Partnership", an upgrade of bilateral relations to enhance cooperation and strategic coordination. The two also discussed expanding military cooperation: the previous week, the Indian government had approved a $40 billion purchase of Rafale fighter jets and maritime patrol aircrafts. Previous Indian purchases of French equipment were of significantly lower values: between 2015 and 2025 India bought 26 Rafale jets for a total worth of about $8.7 billion. The deal represents a major contract opportunity for French industry, and, possibly, a first attempt by Modi to diversify away from Russia regarding arms provisions. Finally, Macron extended to Modi an invitation to the G7 Leaders' Summit, which will be hosted by France in 2026.

From Beijing to Milano-Cortina: China's winter sports movement, four years later

When Beijing was selected to host the 2022 Winter Olympics, China established a target of 300 million people involved in winter sports, thus betting on the construction of new infrastructure and an increase in tourism, which would have led the growth of the sector thanks to the 2022 Olympics. Four years later, we can observe the targets met: latest available data from Chinese sources shows how, between the Beijing Olympics and the end of 2024, 313 million people had been involved in winter sports, with the number of skiers and snowboarders increasing almost threefold (from 13 to 36 million) in 2022-2023 compared to 2017-2018. Furthermore, the number of venues surpassed 2700, the amount of tourists attracted exceeded 520 million in 2023 and finally the whole sector reached a total value of ¥1,05 trillion (about $140 billion), even though the government has already set new targets at ¥1.2 trillion by 2027 and ¥1.5 trillion by 2030. However, challenges remain concerning the future growth of the ice and snow economy. Big events, such as the 2022 Winter Olympics or the 2025 Asian Winter Games, have contributed to the creation of a preliminary ice and snow industry, but better integration between firms working on different segments of the industry is still needed, for example to resolve the resource utilization problems and operational inefficiencies experienced in recent years. Along industrial integration, other problems are related to environmental sustainability and regional imbalances.

Where does Trump stand when it comes to Taiwanese defence? China might have a clue

As Donald Trump announced his visit to China by the end of March, the US commitment to Taiwan has been seen as increasingly uncertain when it comes to its security assurances. Over the last few months, arms sales have come to the foreground in the bilateral unofficial relationship. In December, Trump approved a weapons package worth $11 billion for the Taipei government, and the press has since reported that another one twice that size is in the workings. Yet, when asked about it in February, Trump revealed that he is talking with Chinese President Xi Jinping about future arms sales and that they will "make a determination pretty soon". Such statement is in contrast with the decades-old policy of the US not to consult with China on its weapons sales to Taiwan, even if the White House has denied that its position has changed. Trump is likely playing balancing game here: heeding Xi's appeal to handle the issue of arming Taiwan "with prudence", he aims to complete a successful trip to Beijing later next month. However, some observers have raised concerns that the remarks will not be without consequences. On one hand they effectively create a precedent, while on the other they tarnish the image of US reliability at a delicate moment, when the Taiwanese legislature is set to discuss a special defence spending measure worth almost $40 billion that has stirred partisan tension in Taipei. In fact, after months of political gridlock, the government and the opposition are seeking common ground to advance the issue of arms procurement.

TREND: The Commercialization of China's Space Sector

The bar chart shows the yearly rise of orbital launch attempts in China since 2014, when the government officially started to open the space sector to the proliferation of commercial enterprises (in a domain traditionally led by SOEs). Over 12 years, not only the overall space-launch capacity has increased, but there has also been a significant rise in the participation of non-state companies, which, in 2025, accounted for more than 25% of the country's total attempts. The launch segment of the Chinese space industry exemplifies the trajectory of the sector as a whole: in the last decade, gradual opening towards privatization "with Chinese characteristics" pushed the growth of the space economy, which, in turn, has proved to be a relevant sector in the country's race for strengthening self-reliance as well as industrial and scientific innovation. China is not alone its space commercialization trend. Driven by the early success of US private space companies - above all SpaceX -, other Asian countries are following a similar path: South Korea and Japan have long maintained a high-degree of privatization, India can now count on a number of space start-ups being born, and Southeast Asian countries are gearing up to become strategic manufacturing hubs.

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