Sanae Takaichi: Japan’s Likely New Leader

Commentary by Nicholas Szechenyi

Published October 6, 2025

On October 4, Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) elected Sanae Takaichi as its new leader. Takaichi is the first female leader of the party and will likely become Japan's first female prime minister after a parliamentary vote in mid-October. She succeeds Shigeru Ishiba, who resigned after losing two national elections and the LDP-led ruling coalition's majority status in both houses of the Diet (Japan's parliament). Takaichi takes the helm during a tumultuous period in Japanese domestic politics, with vociferous opposition parties eager to shape the policy debate as Japan navigates a deteriorating regional security environment and dramatic shifts in U.S. foreign policy under the second Trump administration.

As a protégé of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Takaichi presumably will try to build on his blueprint for Japanese strategy based on economic revitalization, enhanced defense capabilities, and strong ties with the United States and other like-minded countries. This is a tall order given domestic political strife-divisions within the LDP, the lack of a majority in the Diet, and ascendant opposition parties-and a more unstable global environment compared to Abe's tenure. If she can establish her political footing, Takaichi is poised to build on Abe's vision for a strong Japan and ensure continuity in a strategic trajectory that supports U.S. interests.

Economic Policy, First and Foremost

Like Abe, Takaichi is considered a security hawk eager to further Japan's defense strategy. Abe was widely expected to prioritize defense spending and constitutional revision to expand Japan's leadership role as a security actor when he began his second term as prime minister in 2012, but he first unveiled the economic pillar of his strategic vision for Japan, which became the basis for much of his popular support. Similarly, Takaichi will be forced to start with economic policy, but in a defensive posture, as opposition parties have seized control of the economic policy debate in recent elections.

Takaichi has long supported Abe's vision for the economy-dubbed "Abenomics"-centered on fiscal stimulus, loose monetary policy, and structural reform, which manifested most visibly in Japan's ratification of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). But in contrast to that period, Japan is currently in an inflationary environment, prompting Takaichi to moderate her messaging on fiscal stimulus and monetary easing during the LDP leadership campaign and entertain a combination of tax cuts and other incentives to address public frustration with stagnant wages. Her policy platform indicates sustained support for trade liberalization, including expansion of CPTPP membership and economic partnerships with the European Union. Takaichi said she would uphold the trade and investment agreement her predecessor Ishiba negotiated with the Trump administration but hinted at the potential for further discussions if some terms prove incompatible with Japan's national interests, perhaps signaling a tougher stance on trade.

Takaichi also pledges a range of initiatives related to economic security (AI, semiconductors, food, energy, and infrastructure) as foundations for sustainable growth. Takaichi will need to coordinate with opposition parties on responses to inflation in the near term, as well as immigration policy reforms, which were propagated by opposition parties during the Upper House election campaign in July. But the primary concern is the economy, and the contours of Takaichi's economic vision are evident. She can potentially utilize a core theme in her platform-translated roughly as Japan's "latent strengths"-to detail her own plan for ensuring Japan's future economic power.

Furthering Defense Capabilities

Abe had a lasting impact on Japan's defense policy debate evidenced most vividly by his release of the nation's first national security strategy in 2013, a sustained commitment to increased defense spending, and defense policy reforms captured in legislation passed in 2015 based on a reinterpretation of the constitution to recognize Japan's right to exercise limited collective self-defense, which facilitated advances in U.S.-Japan defense cooperation. A growing consensus on the importance of defense strategy and signs of a deteriorating global security environment, such as Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, prompted the Kishida administration later that year to unveil a second national security strategy and an ambitious defense strategy and procurement plan to increase defense spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2027.

Takaichi supports increased defense spending, and her platform reveals a desire to further refine existing strategic documents and accelerate the timeline for implementing the defense strategy to bolster Japan's independent capabilities and pursue other priorities, including enhanced interoperability between the U.S. and Japanese militaries, trilateral defense cooperation with other partners, including South Korea, and promoting dual-use technologies and defense industrial cooperation. Recent recommendations from outside experts, such as increased investments in uncrewed systems and the use of AI in military operations, suggest an appetite for updating defense strategy priorities as Takaichi proposes. Progress will depend fundamentally on her ability to explain the importance of defense spending and deterrence to the public amid coercive pressure from China, North Korea, and Russia, possibly a prerequisite for securing additional resources for further investments in defense capabilities.

Robust Diplomacy

The diplomatic pillar of Tokyo's strategy under Abe and Kishida prioritized Japan's alliance with the United States, networking a strong U.S.-Japan alliance with like-minded partners via "minilateral" frameworks such as the Quad (comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), and shaping regional rules and norms under his Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP). Takaichi endorsed FOIP and the networking dimensions to Japan's diplomatic strategy, on which a broad consensus has developed since Abe's tenure.

Her immediate task will be to replicate the personal rapport Abe established with President Trump, who is expected to visit Japan during a swing through Asia at the end of October. Her connection with Abe and general alignment with his policies should help in that regard. She might nudge Trump to develop a comprehensive agenda for defense cooperation, which was hijacked by bilateral trade negotiations and has not developed beyond a short joint statement Ishiba issued with Trump back in February. Trump could stress increased burden sharing from Japan, including the budget for covering costs related to the U.S. military presence in Japan (host-nation support), and Takaichi's commitment to defense could be an asset to those discussions.

Takaichi's diplomatic bona fides will also be tested in a multilateral context should she attend the summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum to be held in Malaysia and South Korea, respectively, at the end of October-both arenas in which Japan has traditionally played a leadership role in fostering shared approaches to regional challenges. Takaichi has regularly visited the Yasukuni Shrine, where Japan's war dead, including Class A war criminals, are memorialized, which could prompt renewed friction with South Korea and China over historical sensitivities. She has not stated whether she would visit Yasukuni as prime minister, a decision that could hinge on the extent to which she perceives a need to solidify her position among conservatives. (Abe visited once during his two terms as prime minister.)

A Strong Japan

The prevailing narrative about Takaichi as a nationalist is remarkably similar to coverage of Abe on the eve of his second term back in 2012, each considered hawkish on security policy and primed to shift national politics to the right. Abe managed to largely redirect that narrative with pragmatic economic, defense, and foreign policies that put Japan back on the map geopolitically. It remains to be seen whether Takaichi can implement similar strategies. The circumstances in which she would assume power are remarkably different, given her relatively weak political base and an ongoing power struggle between the conservative and progressive camps in the LDP, as well as weak positioning in the Diet that could necessitate extensive horse trading with opposition parties.

Takaichi would become the fourth prime minister since Abe stepped down in 2020, arguably trapped in the middle of another period of political instability that could prove debilitating. But parliamentary elections need not take place until 2028, offering a long runway in which to shape the policy debate and project strength economically, militarily, and diplomatically. These are early days, too soon to rule out the potential for Takaichi to build on the pragmatic blueprint of her mentor that should further Japan's international leadership role and shape Japanese strategy for years to come.

Nicholas Szechenyi is vice president of the geopolitics and foreign policy department and senior fellow with the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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