Biannual address to the Storting on important EU and EEA matters

Speech/statement | Date: 12/05/2026 | Ministry of Foreign Affairs

By Minister of Foreign Affairs Espen Barth Eide

Held 12 May 2026 to the Norwegian Parliament.

Mr President,

In my foreign policy address to this chamber in March, my main message was that we must face the fact that we are living in a more dangerous, more unpredictable world.

The world as we know it is changing.

Democracy, the rule of law and human rights have come under pressure.

These form the foundation that enables each of us to live freely and well.

Europe is contending with more complex and more serious threats to democracy than at any time since the Cold War period.

At the same time, trade, tariffs and energy are being used as weapons - which means that these areas are now becoming a more integral part of security policy.

In times like these, standing alone makes us vulnerable.

Nor will we gain more control if we choose to turn inward.

On the contrary, that will mean giving away the control that we have.

UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer pointed to this in his speech at the Munich Security Conference in February. His message was that the promise of the Brexit campaign to 'take back control' was flawed.

Quite simply, retreating to your own corner is not the way to gain more influence.

Power can also be built through cooperation.

The UK is now seeking to increase cooperation with the EU.

Norway is doing the same. Today, I would like to discuss why and how we are pursuing this.

Norway is a small country with an open economy.

When the global situation is turbulent, Norway feels the effects directly.

We have seen an example of this in recent weeks with the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. A major geopolitical conflict in a region far away has had immediate impacts across the world. Norwegian shipping is one of the sectors that has been affected.

Here in this chamber, these events were followed by a discussion on the impacts of higher prices for fuel, fertiliser and other critical goods. For Norway, the solution has been to raise prices. Other countries have been affected much more severely and have been forced to introduce rationing and reduce public services.

We are becoming more vulnerable politically, economically and in terms of our security.

We need our allies and partners more than ever.

We must seek closer cooperation with those who share our values and with whom our political and economic ties are strongest.

For Norway, that primarily means our neighbours in Europe, our close European partners and allies.

In addition to our geographical proximity, we share values and interests and have a close association with European cooperation both politically and economically.

This association allows Norwegians to travel, study and work freely in all of Europe and provides Norwegian businesses with a predictable framework and opportunities to export their goods.

Approximately two-thirds of Norwegian exports go to the EU and EEA countries, and the majority of our imports come from Europe.

Over 400 000 Norwegian jobs are dependent on the EEA Agreement and the access it provides to the internal market on an equal footing with the EU member states.

It is therefore vitally important that we are able to maintain and further develop our strong, long-term relationship with the EU in the situation we now face.

The instability of the world also has impacts on the EU, which, like Norway, is confronting difficult challenges. This is affecting policy and legislative developments in the EU, which again influences the EU's cooperation with Norway and the other EEA countries.

In response to rising global tensions, developments in the EU, are taking place at a record pace across multiple sectors, both within and outside the scope of the EEA Agreement.

Let me be very clear, Mr President: to an increasingly greater extent this is taking place outside the scope of the EEA Agreement. In the area of the customs union and trade policy, Norway has actively chosen to remain outside.

More and more often, however, the EU is developing policies, legislation and instruments in a 'grey area' where all or part of a new programme or legislation falls outside the areas that Norway as an EEA member can participate in. In these cases it will often possible to join in - if the EU allows Norwegian participation. Norway and the EU must in other words agree that Norway can be included.

This poses a completely new kind of challenge.

It requires us to work harder, Mr President.

Developments in the EU could affect Norwegian jobs, Norwegian businesses and local communities across the country. Our smoothly functioning cooperation with Europe and the market access we have almost been able to take for granted up to now are essential to preserving these.

The EEA Agreement has provided us with economic growth and welfare for three decades.

But the context for EEA cooperation has changed dramatically over the past 30 years. When the EEA Agreement was negotiated, the parties comprised 12 EU countries and 7 EEA EFTA countries. After Switzerland withdrew, the Agreement was signed by 6 EEA EFTA countries.

The relative strength of the parties on both sides resulted in a balanced agreement with a two-pillar structure. It is important to recall that EFTA was the EU's largest trading partner at the time, larger, for example, than the US. One pillar represented the EU and the other the EEA EFTA countries. The two pillars cooperate through joint EEA bodies, which means that both sides must approve the incorporation of new legislation into the Agreement.

We all know how the story unfolded after the EEA Agreement was signed. Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995, one year after the EEA was established. Only three countries remained in the EEA EFTA pillar. The EU has subsequently been enlarged a number of times, and now encompasses 27 member states.

Mr President,

I will not be holding another address on EU and EEA matters before 29 August.

On that day, the people of Iceland will go to the polls to determine whether Iceland should re-enter membership negotiations with the EU.

We do not know how the people of Iceland will vote. Nor should we make any assumptions.

The outcome of new membership negotiations following a Yes vote from Iceland in August would be subject to a second, separate referendum before any agreement could be ratified by the parties. It is too early to estimate with any certainty the time frame required for a potential ratification process and subsequent EU accession. But we are preparing for the possibility that Iceland could be an EU member by 2030.

An Icelandic 'Yes' to resuming membership negotiations would have immediate ramifications for existing activities in the ongoing EEA cooperation. This may be something we have to deal with in the interim before my next address on EU and EEA issues in the autumn.

It would therefore be irresponsible to put off starting the process of evaluating the consequences of this potential new situation for Norway.

If Iceland says Yes, we must assume that much of the country's focus will shift to negotiating the terms of its membership. Similarly, we must expect the European Commission to devote greater political attention to the resumption of negotiations with Iceland.

There is nothing to suggest that Iceland or the Commission would deprioritise their commitments under the EEA Agreement. But it is likely that the willingness to make extra accommodation for Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein within the EEA framework would gradually diminish.

At the same time, the need for such accommodation is rising, in order to be included in new policy development.

In these circumstances, we must have realistic expectations for any arrangements not directly affiliated with the EEA Agreement.

We have already seen how the flexibility for new supplementary agreements depends more on the EU's needs than on Norwegian interests. For the EU, an increasingly relevant factor in this context is Norway's level of compliance with the EEA Agreement. We should expect this to be an escalating trend.

The reason I am speaking so frankly, Mr President, is that I believe it is crucial for the Storting to have this backdrop in mind going forward.

Let us be clear: the EU faces enlargement negotiations far greater in scale and difficulty than those relating to Iceland. And we are watching them all very closely.

But I am focusing on Iceland today because we must recognise that an Icelandic membership process will pose special challenges for Norway as an EEA country.

Mr President,

At its core, Norway's foreign and European policy-making involves understanding the impacts of geopolitical changes on us as a country and developing policies that safeguard our national interests as effectively as possible.

The changes we are currently seeing at the international level are creating widespread uncertainty and increasing vulnerabilities, and the need for cooperation is greater than ever. We need a more active European policy in order to protect our own national interests.

To meet the challenges we are now facing, the majority of European countries, including our Nordic neighbours, are developing new policies through their cooperation in the EU.

An EU that is being changed in response to a changing world.

As a consequence of this, we are seeing that the gap between EU membership and membership of the EEA Agreement is becoming greater. And we are seeing that policy areas not covered by the EEA Agreement are becoming increasingly important for us.

Some of the developments we are seeing are in the area of EU trade policy, which we ourselves have chosen to remain outside.

But there are also many new policy initiatives that do not clearly fall within or outside the scope of the EEA Agreement. Or that lie outside the scope of the EEA Agreement, but where it would be possible to join in if the EU allows Norwegian participation. As I mentioned at the beginning of this address, they are in a kind of 'grey area', and it is largely up to the EU to decide the extent to which it will include EEA EFTA partners and other third countries in these evolving initiatives.

This leaves us in a vulnerable position.

Norway is actively involved in other central discussions taking place in the EU. Our participation in the Schengen cooperation in particular gives us an important voice in the development of policy relating to our common border-free zone. But at the same time, we are seeing that key issues increasingly cut across policy areas. This means that we are often only invited to participate in part of what is a much broader discussion.

In other words, the nature of EU policy development is changing, and this is presenting the EEA members with new challenges.

While it will often be in the EU's interests to include us, our ability to influence the EU's assessments in this context is limited. Considerations relating to Europe's strategic autonomy - to become more self-sufficient in an unpredictable world - could lead to further constraints on the opportunities for external partners to participate in joint EU initiatives.

We must acknowledge that when these assessments are made by the European Commission or the member states, the EU's relationship with Norway is not the primary concern. More often than not, the discussions will focus on the broader issue of what the EU needs to be able to do autonomously and the extent to which it should allow itself to be dependent on partners. And, as I have said, there is no getting away from the fact that this is creating a challenging situation for us.

Mr President,

The European policy landscape we have been used to navigating is changing rapidly. In turbulent times such as these, a pragmatic approach is needed to safeguard Norwegian interests.

We must greatly improve our ability to define our core interests, and we must be willing to give priority to what is most important.

I would like to focus on three of Norway's core interests, all of which are related to our security, and all of which are set out in the National Security Strategy and the Government's Plan for Norway.

Our physical security,

our economic security, and

the security of our democratic system of governance.

The common denominators here are that we cannot safeguard any of these three core interests on our own, and that the EU and European countries are our most important partners in achieving them.

Our physical security is the focus of our security policy.

Our preparedness and our ability both to defend ourselves and to contribute to the defence of our Allies.

NATO is the cornerstone of our defence capability and the most important arena for interoperability with our European Allies. Norway has also long attached importance to participation in the EU's defence and security policy cooperation. This reflects the broad political consensus here in Norway that this cooperation safeguards Norwegian interests, as well as complements and supports NATO, which remains the bedrock of Norwegian defence and security policy.

Over the years, Norwegian governments have worked step by step to bring Norway into the European Defence Agency, EU operations and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). In PESCO, the member countries have undertaken binding commitments to deepen their cooperation on, among other things, capability development, investments and operations.

This is in addition to the wide-ranging defence industrial cooperation we take part in under the EEA Agreement.

In the security situation Europe is now facing, the arguments in favour of this approach are stronger than ever. As the EU intensifies its security and defence-related activities, it is essential that we also strengthen our cooperation.

Our existing cooperation with the EU, under the EEA Agreement and the Security and Defence Partnership, provides us with a better basis than other non-EU member countries for expanding our cooperation.

But we must also acknowledge that the pace and scope of EU policy development in this area - and the fact that Norway is not an EU member - are making it more difficult to secure Norwegian participation.

One topic of particular importance for Norway this spring is the EU regulation on military mobility. The proposed regulation establishes a framework to facilitate quick and efficient movement of military forces, equipment and supplies across national borders during crises or conflicts, by simplifying border-crossing rules and procedures and giving clear priority to military transport.

The speed of military transport could be decisive in the response to a crisis or war situation, in our region as well. It is therefore essential that Norway aligns itself as closely as possible with the EU regulation on military mobility. There is no other viable alternative.

The EU is able to establish harmonised rules on military mobility because, unlike NATO, it has regulatory and financial instruments it can use to develop infrastructure and transport capacities.

We will work to ensure that Norway can participate in the EU's military mobility initiative on as equal a footing as possible with the EU member states. A well-functioning system for military mobility in which Norway is fully integrated is essential to effective crisis management in, and the defence of, the Nordic region.

The Government has also decided that Norway will participate in the EU's new defence industry programme, EDIP.

The programme encompasses a number of new instruments to promote closer European defence industrial cooperation. It provides financial support of various kinds, intended, among other things, to increase production capacity, promote joint procurement initiatives and enhance security of supply.

This is important both for the Norwegian defence industry and for Norway's defence capability. We will be presenting a bill and a proposition to the Storting requesting its consent to this legislation in due course.

The EU is also strengthening cooperation on civil preparedness. Initiatives are being brought together under the coordinated umbrella of the EU Preparedness Union Strategy from March 2025. The Government is working to enable Norway to align closely with the initiatives resulting from the strategy. This is in line with the national efforts Norway is carrying out to enhance resilience in connection with the activities of the Total Defence Year and the work to draw up the first long-term plan for civil preparedness.

A key component of the European preparedness effort is to strengthen the resilience of vital societal functions. Security and preparedness considerations will now be integrated and mainstreamed across all policy development and all new plans.

A revision of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) has been proposed. The UCPM is designed to strengthen joint crisis response, and to integrate health preparedness and funding support. Norway has been a full participating state since the UCPM was launched. It has not yet been decided whether all elements of the revised mechanism will be open for cooperation with third countries.

The EU will also be proposing a stockpiling strategy, measures to enhance population preparedness, the establishment of public-private cooperation and the establishment of comprehensive civil-military cooperation on preparedness, including in EU-NATO cooperation. These are all key areas for Norwegian preparedness efforts as well.

The Arctic is an area where there is especially great potential for cooperation with the EU.

The High North is Norway's most important strategic priority.

Safeguarding Norwegian interests in the High North will be a more demanding task for Norway in the years ahead. We must ensure that Norway continues to have the knowledge needed and ability to influence future developments, in an uncertain and unpredictable world.

The EU is currently updating its Arctic policy and this gives Norway a clear opportunity to draw attention to the Arctic as a strategic area of cooperation. It also provides an opportunity to highlight Norway's relevance as a partner - our technology, knowledge and experience, in particular in the maritime and space-based domains, as well as our unique situational awareness of the region.

The Government is working to incorporate issues relating to the Arctic into the development of European foreign and security policy.

We are helping to shape EU initiatives of relevance to the High North and are participating in cooperation to safeguard Norwegian interests. In particular, we are looking into how we can develop cross-border cooperation schemes adapted to a new era between Norway, Sweden and Finland, above all in the north.

Mr President,

In the current geopolitical situation, security comprises much more than traditional defence and security policy.

This brings me to the second of our core interests - economic security.

Economic openness and cooperation between countries have benefited the world economy greatly. However, an open economy may also result in risks and vulnerabilities that have to be addressed and reduced. This is having a growing impact on trade policy.

While Norway has relatively robust cooperation arrangements with other countries as regards traditional security policy, we are in a much more isolated position when it comes to trade policy.

We have chosen to remain outside the EU's Customs Union and Common Trade Policy. And last autumn, we saw how this can affect Norway, when the EU decided to introduce safeguard measures on ferroalloys. Norway was treated as a third country, outside the EU system. As you are aware, Norway and Iceland disagreed with the EU on how the relationship between the EEA Agreement and WTO rules is to be interpreted in this case. Nevertheless, this was the result.

The EU is continuing to carry out major policy and legislative developments to boost European competitiveness and economic security, focusing among other things on addressing Europe's vulnerabilities. Much of this work is in areas outside the scope of the EEA Agreement.

These developments will have very important ramifications for Norway.

They also clearly illustrate the limitations of the EEA Agreement in a changing world.

Mr President,

The EEA Agreement was adopted in 1994, at a time when the world was opening up and on a path towards more free trade. The global situation now looks very different. Our needs have changed. The limitations of the EEA Agreement are becoming more obvious, and it is more demanding to safeguard Norwegian interests as part of our European policy.

I will revert to just how the Government is dealing with this in a little while.

But first, as I mentioned at the beginning of my address, the EU has intensified its work in this area against a geoeconomic backdrop of stiffer competition and rising tensions.

This situation is being shaped by great power rivalries. As a result, we are seeing disruption of global trade, dependencies and vulnerabilities being used to put pressure on countries or achieve specific goals, and unreasonable or exploitative behaviour that is intended to influence critical supply chains or to distort competition.

The response cannot be to sit and wait while major powers do as they please and disregard established rules for global trade and economic relations.

In this landscape, Europe's strongest card is the EU internal market.

As new challenges arise, it is vital to ensure that the internal market maintains its strength and competitiveness and that it functions smoothly.

The EU and its member states are now focusing strongly on efforts to achieve this, and they are working at a fast pace.

The EU initiatives reflect the changed landscape in which we all have to navigate, where the dividing lines between trade, industrial, climate and security policy are becoming blurred.

These initiatives focus on increasing European competitiveness and reducing dependencies in critical value chains that may weaken Europe's strategic autonomy and adaptability.

In today's geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape, a policy to boost European competitiveness involves more than a framework and rules for countries that are already part of the European internal market.

It must also address the issue of third-country actors that compete under different conditions, which could include lower climate and environmental standards, subsidies, economic dominance or other competitive advantages.

Norway has a strong interest in how this develops. The evolution of the internal market, European competitiveness and European security are of crucial importance for value creation in Norway, and thus also for welfare in our country.

Norway's economy is primarily European, and dependent on the internal market. It is obviously to our benefit if the EU is able to enhance economic security and bring about the green and digital transition in a way that does not diminish Europe's growth potential.

This is vital to maintain European value creation and welfare, and therefore for value creation and welfare in Norway too.

We must consider the green and digital transition, efforts to boost competitiveness and steps to strengthen economic security as all part of the same picture.

It is necessary to accomplish three goals at once - we need to reverse the slowdown in productivity growth, promote the green transition and increase economic security by reducing vulnerabilities.

The EU and its member states are responding to this challenge by introducing initiatives and measures across a wide range of areas.

These are primarily intended to strengthen and further develop the internal market. They involve closer coordination between industrial, competition and trade policy, promoting increased public- and private-sector investment in innovation, scaling up and growth, and simplifying rules and removing unnecessary regulation.

At the same time, efforts to reduce dependencies and promote economic and technological security are being stepped up.

Underlying all of this is the EU's acknowledgment that it is no longer enough just to focus on building competitiveness in global markets.

To maintain Europe's autonomy and its capacity to act independently, it is essential to ensure security of supply and to protect critical industries and infrastructure.

The European Economic Security Strategy contains a number of instruments designed to strengthen the EU's economic security and ensure that competition with states and actors outside the internal market is as fair as possible, in areas including trade, economy, research and technology.

These instruments are intended to ensure a secure supply of everything from critical raw minerals to pharmaceuticals and energy. Ultimately, the aim is to reduce vulnerabilities and increase economic resilience to external shocks such as wars, pandemics and economic coercion.

And, Mr President, we must recognise that in order to bolster its economic security, Europe may have to relinquish some of the benefits that globalisation has provided.

Since Norway participates fully in the European internal market through the EEA Agreement, anything that the EU and its member states agree on and any policy they develop in these areas also concerns Norway and Norwegian interests.

The proposal for a new Industrial Accelerator Act, which was adopted by the European Commission earlier this spring, is a good example of broad-based policy development in the EU that has major implications for Norway.

This is why we, together with the social partners and other stakeholders, played an active part during the public consultations that took place while the proposal for the new Industrial Accelerator Act was being developed.

The purpose of the new legislation is to strengthen European industrial competitiveness, ensure access to strategic technologies, speed up the pace of decarbonisation in manufacturing industries, and reduce dependencies on third countries. And to do all this at the same time.

This will be done by introducing new 'Made in EU' and low-carbon requirements for selected products in public procurement procedures, speeding up permitting procedures for new industrial projects, and introducing new conditions for foreign investments in certain sectors. Together, these provisions are intended to boost European manufacturing production, increase employment and reduce CO₂ emissions.

Through this legislation, the EU aims to increase manufacturing as a share of EU GDP from 14.3 % in 2024 to 20 % in 2035.

The proposed legislation shows that the European Commission is seeking changes in the functioning of the internal market, with a view to strengthening Europe's global position and competitiveness.

However, the legislation is controversial. Certain EU member states view some of the proposed measures as overly protectionist, and are arguing that they should not be introduced. Others would probably like to go even further than the European Commission has proposed.

Norway shares a number of the same challenges as the rest of Europe. We too are seeking to provide a framework that will enable manufacturing businesses to cut their emissions in cost-effective ways. Norway is integrated into European value chains and participates fully in the internal market. This means that we have a strong interest in the final text of the Industrial Accelerator Act and in how it is implemented.

The Government will therefore make full use of the opportunities available during this phase of the legislative process to provide input on the proposed text. I would like to reiterate that involvement at an early stage is the best and most effective way of ensuring that Norwegian interests are safeguarded during EU policy development. That is where we have real opportunities to make ourselves heard.

Providing the EU with input before final acts of legislation are adopted considerably increases the likelihood that Norway's views will be heard. The Norwegian social partners have previously achieved good results using this approach, and they play an active part in public consultations.

The Government will therefore maintain a close dialogue with the social partners and other relevant stakeholders to ensure that Norway's interests are safeguarded as well as possible during the rest of the legislative procedure leading up to adoption of the Industrial Accelerator Act.

Another policy area of interest in this connection is cooperation on space activities. This is an area of growing importance, in the context of security, for society as a whole, and for European competitiveness.

The Government is seeking an option for full, unrestricted Norwegian participation in the EU's next space programme through the EEA Agreement.

There has been some focus by the media on the question of whether Andøya Spaceport can be used as a launch site for EU satellites. The EU's Secure Connectivity Regulation specifies that satellites may only be launched from the territory of a third country in exceptional circumstances. We have been aware of this ever since the legislation was proposed, and have also made the position in the regulation very clear in our dialogue with the Norwegian space industry. It is important to note that Andøya is not a very suitable launch site for the satellites planned as part of the Secure Connectivity programme. On the other hand, it is a highly suitable launch site for satellites that are to be deployed into a polar orbit.

The European Commission's proposal for a European Competitiveness Fund, which will support areas including space activities, allows for a separate agreement on satellite launches from third countries. The Government is giving priority to efforts to put an agreement in place.

Because Norway cooperates so closely with the EU and is integrated into the internal market through the EEA Agreement, it is also natural to engage in dialogue and cooperation with the EU and EU countries on economic security. The Government emphasised the importance of this in Norway's 2025 National Security Strategy.

Maintaining access to the EU internal market and its level playing-field provisions through the EEA Agreement is vital for the Norwegian business sector and thus for value creation and welfare in Norway. Strengthening European economic security is in Norway's interests too.

What the EU and its member states do in these policy areas, and how well they succeed, will also have direct impacts on Norway - on Norwegian jobs, the Norwegian economy and Norwegian welfare.

We are therefore working actively to promote and safeguard Norwegian interests as these processes and initiatives move forward. We are also working hard to ensure that there are effective procedures for incorporating new legislation and to reduce the backlog that prevents the implementation of new legislation which builds on already existing rules.

We are also working to build an understanding within the European Commission that given our close integration as parties to the EEA Agreement, it would not be to anyone's benefit to erect economic barriers to trade between Norway and the EU. In this way, we are laying the groundwork for a more formal partnership with the EU that in the longer term also includes economic security.

Here, we are not only seeking to protect Norway's interests as effectively as possible. We also wish to highlight Norway's position as a substantial contributor and important partner in efforts to enhance European competitiveness, resilience and strategic autonomy.

This is a joint task involving the public authorities, stakeholders in manufacturing, the business sector and the social partners.

For Norway, which is a small open economy, a smoothly functioning global trading system is becoming increasingly vital.

Together with the EU, Norway has taken a leading role in promoting the importance of maintaining and further developing rules for trade and economic relations under the World Trade Organization (WTO).

In March, I attended the WTO's 14th Ministerial Conference in Cameroon. During the conference, Norway and many other countries worked intensively to reach decisions that could strengthen the organisation and put it in an even better position to ensure that there is real respect for the rules of the multilateral trading system.

Unfortunately, it was not possible to reach agreement on all matters on the agenda, and work on several of the important outstanding issues from the Cameroon conference will need to continue under the WTO General Council in Geneva.

Maintaining and further developing a strong multilateral trading system is an important issue for Norway. We will continue to be deeply involved in driving the WTO's reform efforts forward. However, we must also recognise that the world has changed greatly in the 30 years since the WTO was established. Trust between key countries has been eroded, making it more difficult to reach agreement.

I am mentioning this here because both the EEA Agreement and all our free trade agreements with other countries rest on the foundation of the common trade principles established by the WTO. This means that if the WTO's position becomes weaker, there could also be negative impacts on key Norwegian interests - making it more important than ever to ensure that we have close and healthy relations with Europe and the EU.

Mr President,

The third core interest I would like to focus on, as I also mentioned at the start, is the need to protect our democratic system of governance in these unsettling times.

We are seeing that democratic institutions in Europe are coming under systematic pressure, both from inside and from external sources.

The weakening of these institutions makes democracy itself more vulnerable.

We must defend our democracy, first and foremost at home.

We can do this by safeguarding and ensuring respect for our democratic institutions. We must protect the principle of separation of powers, the division of the powers of government into legislative, executive and judicial branches to prevent abuses of power. This is crucial to maintain the public's trust in our democratic institutions.

Mr President,

Democratic institutions are essential but are not enough on their own. We must also defend our democratic culture. We must lay the foundation for pluralism in the public sphere so the diversity of voices can be heard. Genuine freedom of expression is fundamental to a well-functioning democracy. Democracy must be practised.

The threat situation in Europe is no longer limited to traditional military or economic domains.

Legal systems, free media, election commissions and independent oversight bodies have all become the object of hostile influence operations ranging from targeted disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks to covert attempts to undermine confidence in our democratic institutions.

The changes we see are neither theoretical nor far away. They are taking place here and now - in Norway, in our neighbouring countries, among our allies and across the European community of which we are a part.

What is new about this situation is that the attacks are hybrid in nature - combining actions from the digital, political and social domains. They are coming from state and non-state actors alike.

The aim is not necessarily to take control of territory but to weaken democratic resilience, create uncertainty, deepen polarisation and reduce the people's trust in society's fundamental institutions.

Disinformation is one of the most powerful tools in this context. The fact that so many people get their news and their world view from social media exacerbates the challenge. Using manipulated news, targeted algorithms, coordinated networks of fake accounts and the spreading of viral narratives, foreign actors seek to cast doubt on the truth, the facts and the credibility of public authorities.

We have seen influence operations of this kind in connection with elections and political processes in several European countries. The aim is often the same: to undermine democratic stability and diminish Europe's ability to stand united, especially in its support to Ukraine's battle to defend itself.

We have seen considerable activity by Russia and other states in this area for many years. More recent, however, is that the US, too, has stated the aim of undermining support within European countries for the EU and European cooperation, as indicated in the new US National Security Strategy and other sources.

Elections are the foundation of our democratic system. When foreign powers try to influence voters, mobilise extremist groups or manipulate information flows, it is not just an attack on a specific country's democracy. It is an attack on the common values that underpin European cooperation.

Mr President, various European countries, acting independently, have acquired considerable expertise in dealing with these challenges.

France has developed a special government agency to detect and counter digital influence operations. Sweden has strengthened its national defence capability by establishing an agency that focuses systematically on influence preparedness, information security and coordination between the public authorities and civil society organisations. Countries such as Romania and Moldova have been subjected to extensive hostile influence operations in connection with elections. They have gained valuable insights which they are keen to share with other European countries.

National initiatives are important. But the challenge is greater than any one country can cope with. The EU has launched a joint initiative to consolidate expertise and coordinate efforts across Europe.

The aim is to establish a European Democracy Shield - a cooperative effort that brings together national agencies, specialist communities and early-warning systems to address the problem in a united stakeholder platform.

This Democracy Shield will strengthen the EU's ability to detect foreign influence, protect critical democratic functions and counter the spread of disinformation in order to ensure that European elections and institutions have the strength to withstand the activities of external influence actors.

Such cooperation is both natural and necessary in a time when threats are impervious to national borders, and the vulnerability of a single country quickly opens us all to risk.

Norway shares fundamental values with its European allies. It is clearly in our interest to engage more closely in this cooperative effort.

We must never think that our democracy is immune, or that its tenets can never be altered. Our democratic security is inextricably tied to European democratic security.

Cultural rights, too, are crucial to a well-functioning democracy. The EU is intensifying efforts to safeguard fundamental rights and gender equality and prohibit discrimination due to gender, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, disability and age. This rights-based approach is now to be incorporated into all policy areas.

The EU's priorities in these areas are closely aligned with Norwegian priorities and national action plans on gender equality and non-discrimination. This can open the door to new opportunities for cooperation with the EU.

Norway has been active in the EU's Creative Europe programme and is helping to develop policies and frameworks through its leadership of EFTA's Working Group on Cultural Affairs.

We are also examining opportunities to participate in the AgoraEU Programme, which focuses on media diversity, media independence, combating the spread of disinformation and expanding the role of civil society organisations.

Resilience to digital influence must be formed early in life. The Digital Services Act (DSA), is an important tool for protecting children and young people online. The legislation prohibits, among other things, behavioural advertising directed at children and manipulative designs that can mislead users into giving consent.

The Government gives priority to adopting this regulatory framework as quickly as possible. At the same time, Norway is one of the first countries in Europe to propose implementation of an age limit for children on social media. Protecting children online is one of our most critical tasks, and we take digital security for children extremely seriously.

Mr President,

Norwegian funding provided under the EEA and Norway Grants helps to enhance the development of civil society organisations, independent media, the rule of law and democratic institutions in a number of European countries. In the years ahead, Norway will be the largest source of funding for strengthening civil society in 15 of the EU's member countries.

Let me emphasise: this is a significant investment that is in Norway's own interest. It is an investment in our shared basic values and collective democracy - at a time when this is needed more than ever before.

A considerable part of this funding is targeted at strengthening democratic resilience and combating disinformation. It is important to support democratic actors in the areas where they are under pressure and to contribute to Europe's collective efforts to limit the influence of foreign states.

With regard to democracy in Europe, we should take a moment to welcome the positive change that has occurred in Hungary. The parliamentary election on 12 April returned a large majority for Péter Magyar and his Tisza Party.

After Viktor Orbán's 16 years in power, voters rejected his illiberal policies and close cooperation with Moscow. It is clear that the Hungarian people are seeking change for their country, including a shift towards European cooperation.

Mr Magyar's statements to date show that he plans to introduce wide-ranging reforms and pursue a fundamentally new path for Hungary. He intends to restore the rule of law and pluralistic democracy. He will give priority to anti-corruption measures, recovery of public assets and the restoration of free media. These actions may in turn pave the way for the release of frozen EU funds.

The Hungarian election will have effects far beyond the country's borders. It renews hope for Europe's democratic future and for European cooperation.

Mr Magyar has stated clearly that Hungary's home is within Europe, and that Hungary will be an active, constructive and loyal member of the EU and NATO - including with regard to support to Ukraine.

I am hopeful that these changes will strengthen Europe's ability to deal with the many challenges ahead.

It is particularly encouraging that the change in power in Budapest was quickly followed by EU decisions to release EUR 90 billion in war-related loans to Ukraine as well as to adopt the 20th sanctions package against Russia.

This support is vital to enable Ukraine to continue its battle to defend itself. It demonstrates that Europe is capable of increasing its support when other providers cut back. Of the EUR 90 billion released, EUR 60 billion is to be used on military support, and here Norwegian suppliers will be able to participate on the same terms as the defence industry in EU countries.

The 20th sanctions package contains new measures targeting the shadow fleet, the Russian banking sector and imposing export and import restrictions on several important categories of goods. As in the past, Norway will align itself with these sanctions.

Prime Minister Støre has had an initial telephone call with Péter Magyar. I myself had a promising conversation with Anita Orbán, the incoming Foreign Minister.

An important task for Norway will be determining how to support the reforms in Hungary.

Cooperation through the EEA and Norway Grants scheme will provide a good framework for such support.

Anita Orbán and I have already begun discussing this.

Mr President,

Democracy in Europe is resilient, but not indestructible. It requires protection, investment and vigilance.

We must confront threats where they arise and build a cooperative structure that gives us the strength to resist and endure.

Norway seeks to be a part of this effort. Partly because we benefit from it and partly because we will always stand up for the values our European community defends: freedom, transparency, the rule of law and democratic participation.

My message today, Mr President, is that this is a time of heightened uncertainty for Europe, and there is increasing pressure on our security, our economy and our democratic institutions. Basic principles, values and global institutions are being challenged from both the east and the west. This is having an impact on our continent.

Norway is deeply integrated in European cooperation through the EEA Agreement, the Schengen Agreement and a wide array of partnerships. It is therefore imperative that we confront these developments in a clear and principled manner, but also with a realistic focus and the ability to give priority to our core interests.

We will strengthen our resilience, we will contribute actively to collective solutions, and we will stand shoulder to shoulder with our European allies when democracy is challenged directly or by means of disinformation, hybrid threats and foreign influence.

The situation in Iceland that I mentioned in the beginning of my address may have ramifications for cooperation within the EEA. That is why we are already assessing the consequences of potential Icelandic EU membership. It is in Norway's interest to maintain the EEA as an effective, well-functioning, solid foundation for our European cooperation.

If Iceland should become a member of the EU, the balance of power between the parties to the EEA Agreement - originally 12 countries to 7 - will become 28 to 2.

And to those in this chamber whom I have heard calling for a renegotiated EEA Agreement, I wish to say clearly and unequivocally:

It is simply an illusion to think we will obtain better terms by renegotiating the EEA Agreement.

A Norwegian initiative to renegotiate the EEA Agreement could trigger considerable instability for businesses, financial partnerships and the willingness to invest in our country. I would advise against it in the strongest terms. It would produce the opposite of what the Government is working to achieve: economic security, job security and stability for trade and industry.

Whatever path Iceland takes, we must work to strengthen our cooperation with the EU.

To succeed in this, we must keep in mind that there is someone sitting on the other side of the table. In order to gain something from the EU, we are also expected to fulfil our part of the agreement. We must keep our own house in order.

We live in a new, more challenging time. It requires us to clarify our priorities.

The Government's aim is to keep Norwegian jobs and Norwegian businesses secure.

This requires effective cooperation with the rest of Europe.

The priorities of our policy on Europe are therefore:

• to develop closer ties with the EU in areas where the EEA Agreement does not adequately safeguard our interests;
• to safeguard Norwegian economic security and job security and ensure stability for Norwegian trade and industry;
• to help strengthen European unity and our community of shared interests and values by cooperating more closely with the EU and other European countries, including on these issues.

This means we must:

• Clear away the obstacles to closer cooperation with the EU. We must fulfil our obligations under the EEA Agreement. We must be an effective and constructive partner.
• Promote greater understanding in the EU for the fact that it will not be beneficial to introduce or establish economic obstacles or barriers within the internal market.
• Help to defend democracy, the rule of law and civil society in Europe, through among other things the EEA and Norway Grants.

We are in need of open, fact-based discourse on the best ways of maintaining and strengthening this cooperation.

This does not mean, Mr President, that the Government will initiate a membership process. But as mentioned earlier, we must acknowledge that Europe is changing, and that this change also affects Norway.

Gro Harlem Brundtland once said that it is typically Norwegian to be good at things. And we are indeed world champions at cooperating with the EU without being a member. In this niche sport, we have no equal.

Nevertheless, Mr President, I must be honest and say that maintaining this balance is becoming more and more difficult. As we move into the future, the dilemmas and choices we face will be increasingly problematic.

Norway is more closely aligned with the politics, economics and values of Europe than with those practised anywhere else. Safeguarding Norwegian security, welfare and freedom of action in the years ahead will require close cooperation with the countries that share our values and interests.

In this context, we must also add that the EU, of course, is not perfect in every way. The EU also has a long list of internal problems.

The EU consists of 27 member countries whose interests do not always coincide. Within the EU, there are different views on trade policy, energy policy and how to address climate change, as well the proper balance between national considerations and collective European solutions. We recognise these topics from our own discussions in Norway.

Decision-making processes can be time-consuming and require compromise.

But as I said earlier, quoting Prime Minister Starmer of the UK:

We build strength through cooperation.

If we turn inward, we lose influence.

The UK has felt the bitter consequences of cutting ties with the EU. Now they are once again strengthening those ties in important areas. They understand they are dependent on European cooperation to safeguard the UK's own security.

We are in the same situation, and we must do what is necessary to safeguard our core interests.

Norway cannot safeguard its physical, economic or democratic security on its own.

But when we stand together with like-minded countries, we are strong.

And when we look to our closest allies - we find they are primarily in Europe.

That is why Norway will remain an active, constructive and reliable partner to its European friends - as we contend with this new landscape, and these new challenges.

Thank you, Mr President.