Chairman Wicker Leads SASC Hearing on Strategic Competition in a Post-New START Treaty Environment

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WASHINGTON - U.S. Senator Roger Wicker, R-Miss., Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, today led a hearing to receive testimony and examine the dynamics of strategic competition post-New START.

Admiral (ret.) Charles A. Richard, USN, the former Commander of United States Strategic Command, the honorable Rose E. Gottemoeller, Hoover Institution Research Fellow, Stanford University, and Mr. Timothy A. Morrison, Former Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs all appeared before the committee.

During his opening remarks, Chairman Wicker emphasized the changes in the current threat environment from China's unprecedented nuclear buildup and the reality of how Vladimir Putin exploited the New START Treaty to extend Russia's nuclear advantage.

Read Chairman Wicker's hearing opening statement as delivered.

The committee meets this morning to explore how the United States can prepare for and effectively compete in a multi-polar world unconstrained by any limitations on nuclear forces.

The New START Treaty was negotiated in a bygone era, 15 years ago. In 2010, the idea of abolishing nuclear weapons seemed an attainable goal to some. For a while, the treaty did provide a degree of transparency and predictability between the United States and Russia on the two countries' nuclear forces-that is, until Vladimir Putin decided that compliance with Russia's obligations were no longer in his interest. That should be instructive, I would add, regarding any promises that he might be trying to make during this year.

Now, 15 years after the treaty was signed, we face an assortment of threats far more complicated and dangerous than anyone foresaw in 2010.

Today, the Putin dictatorship commands the world's largest nuclear arsenal, and he is developing new weapons designed to exploit our most vulnerable points. Despite conventional losses in Ukraine, which are substantial, Russia's nuclear weapons production capacity is far greater than our own. his capacity to produce nuclear weapons is far greater than that of the United States. It will likely remain so for the foreseeable future.

China is poised to become an even greater threat. Over the past several years, Xi Jinping has nearly quadrupled the size of his nuclear arsenal. Meanwhile, he has expanded China's shipbuilding capacity to more than 230 times that of the U.S., and he has built thousands of long-range missiles, including fractional orbital bombardment weapons.

The full list of China's military advances is too extensive to cover here. But China's goal is clear: Xi is committed to displacing the U.S. and is rapidly building the capability to do so.

The emergence of two peer competitors alone represents an unprecedented challenge to the U.S. However, these concerns are compounded by an extensive set of new threats to our national security. These threats include North Korea's growing nuclear and missile capabilities, the weaponization of space, the accessibility of dangerous narcotics, the increased use of unmanned systems, and the emergence of artificial intelligence.

This complexity has profound implications for future U.S. defense policies and strategies-hence our distinguished panel today.

First, in this complicated environment, deterrence depends on tangible military capability. Some American defense planners express hope for a "decent peace" with our adversaries. But to endure, that peace must be founded first and foremost on a credible deterrent. At its core, this will always be based on our nuclear forces. But improved defenses, such as the Golden Dome initiative, play a vital supporting role.

Second, strategic competition can no longer be divided into discrete domains. Our adversaries view all types of military capabilities as tools to shape geopolitical outcomes. Our nuclear posture, missile defenses, conventional forces, cyber capabilities, and space assets must be fully integrated and responsive to threats against U.S. national security, regardless of where those threats arise.

Third, we cannot field the capabilities we need without a strong industrial base. Decades of so-called streamlining have left our domestic manufacturers with almost no capacity to surge munitions production. Our critical mineral supply chains have become brittle. Poorly designed workforce development plans have left us with critical labor shortages in manufacturing and skilled trades.

Finally, this moment tests American resolve and our commitment to the alliances that have helped preserve our security for decades. Our allies are waiting to see whether we will respond to this new era with seriousness, strength, and leadership - or with hesitation, weakness, and complacency. We must compete with the adversaries I mentioned, and we must do so responsibly.

Competing responsibly does not mean recklessly seeking conflict- nor does not mean retreating into isolationism. Instead, we recognize that peace is preserved through strength, preparedness, and a willingness to act when appropriate to achieve our national interest. We saw this on full display during Operation Midnight Hammer.

I thank our witnesses for their views on how U.S. defense policy and strategy must adapt. I look forward to their ideas on what Congress can do to ensure that American deterrence remains unquestioned in an increasingly dangerous world.

With that, I turn to my colleague, Ranking Member Reed.