Towards Syria’s People’s Assembly Elections: Striking a Trade-Off Between Aspirations and Constraints

• Commentary Middle East and North Africa
  by Silvia Carenzi
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IIn a historic moment for Syria, preparations are underway for the elections of the new People's Assembly (majlis al-sha'b), originally expected between 15-20 September and now scheduled for October 5, with a delay due to logistics reasons. The upcoming elections are a momentous event for the country's future, being the first to be held in the post-Assad era, and will take place according to an indirect system based on electoral colleges and supervised by the Higher Committee for People's Assembly Elections (al-lajna al-'ulya l-intikhabat majlis al-sha'b).

The last round of elections, held in July 2024, during the last months of the Assad regime, could hardly be characterized as free or fair - widely seen as a "bureaucratic ritual" weaponized by Assad to tighten and formally legalize its rule over. Despite the nominal introduction of a multi-party system in the 2012 Constitution, in practice the People's Assembly remained dominated by the Ba'th Party, its allies, and Assad's cronies as long as the former regime was in power.

The 5 October elections come at a delicate moment for Syria's post-revolutionary and post-war transition, as the government seeks to navigate multiple challenges and opportunities alike. Beyond reconstruction and economic recovery, challenges include last July's spiral of violence in Druze-majority Suwayda, and ongoing processes of Security Sector Reform, transitional justice, and societal healing. Trust-building between Syria's different components, including ethnic and religious communities, and their successful inclusion into a new social contract, remains a delicate yet vital challenge to mitigate risks of inter-communal conflict. Added to this are Israel's persistent incursions and strikes - amid reports of ongoing talks - and slow progress in negotiations with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)¹, which still control the northeastern region. On the other hand, opportunities are best exemplified by recent announcements of investment pledges and the gradual lifting of sanctions (despite the intricacies of the process). Another milestone has been Syria's comeback to the international stage after years of isolation, marked by President Al-Sharaa's recent trip to New York - and, notably, his speech at the UN General Assembly, the first by a Syrian leader in nearly six decades -, strengthening his credibility.

During field research conducted by the author over recent months, several interlocutors have pointed to three key notions underpinning the upcoming elections: balancing competing realities, needs, and aspirations; ensuring adequate competencies; and representing Syria's socio-political makeup and diverse professional segments. The article seeks to shed light on the context in which these elections are taking place and its constraints, the workings of the new electoral system, and the trade-offs the government is seeking to strike in this transitional phase.

A primer on the temporary electoral system

The key role and functions of the People's Assembly are outlined in the Constitutional Declaration signed by Syrian President Al-Sharaa last March. As stated in article 26, the People's Assembly assumes "legislative authority until a permanent constitution is adopted and new legislative elections are held in accordance to it," and it is elected for a renewable 30-month term (i.e., two years and a half). Its main tasks, specified in article 30, include proposing and approving laws; amending or repealing previous laws; ratifying international treaties; approving the state's general budget; approving a general amnesty; accepting or rejecting the resignation of one of its members, or lifting their immunity, in accordance with its internal regulations; holding hearings for ministers. Decisions are taken by majority vote. Hence, the soon-to.be-formed People's assembly will fill the vacuum left by the collapse of Assad-era institutions, serving as the engine of legislative activity during this transitional phase.

As noted by both state officials and observers of Syrian affairs, the upcoming elections will not be direct - that is, they will not involve the population at large - but rather will follow an indirect or hybrid system involving 'electoral colleges' or 'bodies' (al-hay'at al-nakhiba). This temporary electoral system is enshrined in Decree 143/2025, issued on 19 August. The decree sets[1] the People's Assembly at 210 members (up from 150 members that had been previously envisioned): two-thirds (140 members) are elected via the new electoral system, while one-third (70 members) are appointed by the President.

Locally, electoral districts (al-dawa'ir al-intikhabiyya) have been formed at the level of manatiq - that is, administrative 'districts,' below governorates.[2] Each electoral district comprises one or more administrative district(s) or manatiq, for a total of 60 electoral districts nationwide - each with its own electoral college. The two-thirds of seats to be elected are distributed across electoral districts based on administrative divisions and population, in accordance with Ministry of Local Administration's Resolution 1378 (2011)[3]. A Higher Committee member that spoke to the author explained that this was the last census before the 2011 revolution, based on which an atlas was developed - relied upon by local administrative bodies and international actors alike. The decision to form electoral districts at the scale of administrative districts or manatiq, instead ofgovernorates, was made to better capture population diversity[4] at a more fine-grained level. Each electoral district is allocated one or more People's Assembly seats, and the number of members of the electoral college in each district equals the number of seats allocated to that district multiplied by 50.[5]

A breakdown of seat distribution in the People's Assembly per each overall governorate is shown below.

At the top of the electoral system is the Higher Committee, appointed on 13 June per Decree 66/2025. It lays the ground for the elections by forming electoral subcommittees at the local level (see below), supervising the overall process, and setting the election date. It is composed of 11 members with different political backgrounds: Muhammad Taha al-Ahmad (its chairperson), Hassan al-Daghim, Imad Barq, Lara Ezzouqi, Nawar Najmeh, Muhammad Yasin, Muhammad Wali, Muhammad Kahala, Hanan al-Balkhi, Bader Jamous, and Anas al-Abdeh. While all were appointed by President Ahmad al-Sharaa, its composition reflects a broader representation on the political spectrum - and it would be misleading to deem it as a mere emanation of President al-Sharaa's his inner circle. Rather, it seems to reflect to an extent the government's process of "expanding the base" already seen in appointments announced earlier this year. For instance, only two members of the Higher Committee have a political background in the former military and administrative structures based in Idlib (until 2024 under the control of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and the Syrian Salvation Government). Rather, several figures previously served in political or military institutions linked to their once-competing opposition bodies, such as the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces (also known as 'Etilaf'), the former Azaz[6]-based Syrian Interim Government and the Syrian National Army, or the Syrian Negotiations Commission. A legal committee (al-lajna al-qanuniyya) consisting of 5 members, also based on input from Syria's Bar Association, contributes legal advice and support the Higher Committee's work. To increase transparency, the Bar Association is expected to appoint lawyers to each electoral district as legal observers. This integration of legal oversight is intended to strengthen the integrity, credibility, and fairness of the electoral process - and its perception as such.

As mentioned above, the Higher Committee was tasked with forming electoral subcommittees (al-lijan al-far'iyya) in each electoral district - in consultation with local official and community figures - and appointing their chairpersons. Subcommittee members were to meet a number of conditions, including not being a supporter of the former regime[7]. Subcommittees' main roles included forming local electoral colleges, supervising the electoral process locally, and liaising with communities to ensure broadest participation. The formation of electoral colleges is a crucial stage, as it is members of electoral colleges that will elect two-thirds of People's Assembly, and, conversely, they also constitute the pool of those eligible to run for election to the People's Assembly. The electoral system originally envisioned that subcommittees themselves, in consultation with local official and community figures, would select electoral colleges' candidates in their districts. However, in order to enhance popular participation, it was later decided to open candidacy for membership in the electoral colleges to all Syrian citizens. On the other hand, subcommittees reviewed those nominations and drew up preliminary lists of electoral colleges' members, comprising two categories: professionals and community notables, expected to respectively account for 70% and 30% of electoral colleges. The Higher Committee has been tasked with reviewing the preliminary lists and approving the final lists, which have been announced in the past days[8]. Appeals committee (lijan al-tu'un) have been operating at all levels to take into account potential objections about appointed or elected figures. According to the temporary electoral system, women were expected to constitute at least 20% of overall electoral colleges, with mandatory representation also for persons, families of those killed or injured in the revolution, the disabled, and survivors of detention, alongside representation of social diversity, population distribution, and diverse technical competencies. Similarly to subcommittee members, also electoral colleges members are required to meet specific criteria.[9] On 27-28 September, members of the electoral colleges who chose to seek a seat in the People's Assembly have put forward their nominations - an overall 1,578 candidates, with 14% women, according to the statistics shared by Dr Muhammad Taha al-Ahmad, chair of the Higher Committee. Finally, the official electoral campaign period opened on 29 September.

Elections and the trade-off between aspirations and constraints in Syria's delicate political transition

As the first elections of the transitional phase - and in light of their significance for Syria's future - these polls are unfolding under close scrutiny both domestically and internationally. There are observers who emphasize the need for functional institutions and resuming institutional work in a timely fashion; whereas critics question the indirect electoral system or presidential appointments. In conversations with the author, figures directly involved in the elections' workings have highlighted notable constraints arising from post-war circumstances - illuminating the manifold challenges the country is confronting and, above all, the inevitable trade-offs and political choices that the government and bodies involved in the elections are facing. Interlocutors elaborated on existing challenges, spanning the practical, logistics, social, and political realm[10].

To start with, practical conditions after years of war and massive displacement - inside Syria as well as abroad - make direct elections impossible. As one Higher Committee member explained to the author:[11]

"Direct elections are not possible - technically, logistically, politically, and realistically - because holding direct elections involving all the Syrian people would first require an electoral register, which does not exist due to the absence of a real census, especially after the demographic change following the Syrian revolution and the systematic displacement […]. In addition, there are Syrians living in countries of asylum, as well as in camps, and destroyed areas: for example, Deir ez-Zor, which originally had a population of 1.7 million inhabitants, but of which only 50,000 have returned to the city center, as it is 70% destroyed.

This means that it is impossible to hold direct elections at this stage. For a start, there are no addresses […], nor records of new births and deaths, and, on top of this, there is no official census. Preparing voters' data therefore requires a colossal effort.

Then, beyond the logistical side, the Syrian state is a state shattered in spirit and morale [after years of war and the previous regime, author's note], that needs a huge rebuilding effort in order to be ready for direct elections. Moreover, the nature of the transitional phase and its political system requires time to prepare the country for direct elections, so as to avoid the return to power of [former] […] regime elements in one way or another […], especially as the establishment of state institutions must coincide with the establishment of civil peace - which, in turn, also requires transitional justice, so that society is politically ready to build its new state."

In an interview with SyriaNow, Higher Committee chair al-Ahmad noted that taking care of a population census will require "years". While postponement of elections for the sake of institution-building is an option that (despite potential drawbacks) may be explored in post-war settings[12], interlocutors that spoke to the author stressed the need for a timely formation of a new People's Assemble to engage in effective and meaningful political work. For instance, another Higher Committee member mentioned the need to amend old laws or approve new laws so that "the wheel of Syria's state-building [may] move forward", noting that several ministers are waiting for this to happen "in order to carry out their duties to the fullest extent."[13] During a meeting with the author, al-Ahmad elaborated on the socio-political difficulties stemming from the long-lasting, deep intellectual legacy of the Assad regime - especially sectarianism, regionalism, and other forms of partisanship that foster inter-communal tensions and hamper state-building. "It is a sensitive stage," al-Ahmad concluded[14].

In short, while critics lament the fact that only a small segment of the population will be able to vote and be voted, and voice concerns about entrenchment of power, all the interlocutors that spoke to the author have conveyed the idea that upcoming elections embody a temporary, pragmatic solution based on the status quo and feasibility - far from abstract idealism. Following the same logic of finding suboptimal yet actionable solutions, they emphasized that the presidential appointment of one-third has been introduced as a way to balance gaps in representation - be it, e.g., lack of representation of specific skills or segments of the population.[15]

At the local level, too, electoral work confronts complex realities. A member of the subcommittee in Damascus affiliated with the Higher Committee, Inas al-Najjar, discussed with the author issues and opportunities ahead, including relating to the composition of Damascus's electoral district as well as women's participation in the political sphere. Unlike other governorates, that typically include several cities or towns and are divided into several administrative districts, Damascus - albeit vast - represents a single governorate and (administrative and electoral) district, with the challenges that this poses as its social fabric needs to be adequately represented. Al-Najjar also described the steps taken to "enhance women's participation" in the People's Assembly. While the minimum women's quota in the electoral college was set at 20%, her team was aiming to elect 40% women in Damascus' electoral college - to make up for those districts where fewer women might be elected to electoral colleges. Likewise, she highlighted that the one-third appointed by the President will serve as a tarmim, i.e., an adjustment or corrective measure to possible imbalances, including underrepresentation of women.[16]

Beyond that, debates on social media suggest that clearly conveying to those involved - as well as the broader public -the exact regulations and criteria underpinning decisions to include or exclude candidates from the electoral colleges' final lists also poses hurdles. In some cases, there have been complaints from candidates whose name have been excluded from the final lists. For example, according to Syrian outlet Zaman al-Wasl, discontent has been recently voiced in Quneitra, where several figures have withdrawn in protest over the perceived exclusion of formerly prominent revolutionary figures. However, in response, members of the Higher Committee have clarified that decisions to remove several names previously included in preliminary lists were not based on status, reputation, or appeals; rather, they stemmed from technical reasons, meaning related to "population distribution, cultural diversity, and (academic) specialization."

Finally, a further, significant challenge lies in the fate of elections in areas outside of central government control: namely, the Druze-majority governorate of Suwayda' in the south, alongside most parts of Raqqa and Hasaka governorates that - except for some enclaves - are administered by the ANEES and under SDF control. When the author spoke to a member of the Higher Committee last July, there was uncertainty as to how work would proceed in those areas, and different scenarios were being examined.[17] Until last month, it seemed that elections in all those areas would be postponed. However, a subsequent decision was taken to form subcommittees for selected areas of Raqqa and Hasaka - in response to requests advanced by local inhabitants living in the areas under Damascus control (i.e., the enclave comprising Tal Abyad and Ras al-'Ayn/Serê Kaniyê at the border with Turkey; and southern Raqqa governorate). Yet, the situation is different in Suwayda': for the time being, it seems that there will be no elections, and the relevant seats will remain vacant.

Key takeaways: the elections as an expression of Syria's overall balancing act in state-making

Objections have been raised by different parties, such as commentators and civil society organizations that have voiced concerns; alongside political actors such as the AANES that, so far, have rejected the elections. Nonetheless, the upcoming elections - constrained as they may be - can be seen as a practicable, temporary compromise in light of Syria's current circumstances. If anchored in best practices - such as those put forward by the Syrian Network for Human Rights, including expanded representation and participatory mechanisms, transparency and civilian oversight, alongside continuous engagement with local communities - and equipped with a clear roadmap towards general elections, they could lay the foundations for the emergence of genuine political life. To achieve this, it will be crucial to strengthen cooperation and communication between stakeholders involved in the electoral mechanisms and civil society organizations embedded within local communities, particularly those with expertise in legal matters, electoral procedures, and good governance - taking stock of relevant recommendations and fine-tuning concrete practices accordingly.

Some parallels may exist with electoral mechanisms seen in other contexts, whether post-war or post-regime settings or not. A member of the Higher Committee who spoke to the author last July, argued that the electoral colleges system bears some partial resemblance to the electoral mechanisms developed in South Africa after the apartheid regime - whereas the difference lies in the involvement of parties in the South African case. While current elections in Syria are not happening via parties, that have been dissolved, they are envisioned to be formed at a later stage, the Higher Committee member explains[18] - insofar as the current transitional phase seeks to open space for full maturation of political life, including party life. Likewise, the new People's Assembly will have a constitutive function, too, as a committee will subsequently emerge tasked with drafting the new constitution and a new electoral law.[19]

In an interview to Enab Baladi last June, legal expert Anwar al-Bunni has noted that this hybrid electoral formula fits the current stage, especially given its emphasis on competences and involvement of community notables - which could contribute positively to civil peace, particularly at a time when Syria's post-war identity is being renegotiated. In his media interview, Higher Committee chair al-Ahmad zeroed on the value of skills in the forthcoming People's Assembly: "We must achieve a People's Assembly with top-tier technical standards that eliminate the stereotypical image that Syrians have of the previous Assembly - which was seen as the assembly of hand-clapping and raised hands. No; we want an Assembly truly capable of carrying the burdens entrusted to it in the next stage." The dual emphasis on the one hand on highly skills professionals, and on the other hand on community leaders that can leverage prestige and trust within local communities, suggest an effort to strike a balance between a semi-technocratic approach and social legitimacy grounded in local networks. The dynamics seen in the workings of the new electoral system, taken together with wider-ranging socio-political dynamics emerged before and after the fall of the Assad regime, can also illuminate the broader trajectory of Syria's state-making over the past nine months: a quest for a balance between different - and not rarely competing - political imperatives. In a deeply divided society such as the one inherited after decades of the Assads' rule - with easily triggered inter-communal cleavages - the country's new government seeks to tread a thin path between aspirations and constraints of different nature. Syria's leadership strives to broaden its base, while retaining trusted figures in key sensitive positions, to make sure it steers the country's delicate transition; it seeks to respond to grievances and expectations expressed by segments of the population, while avoiding alienating other constituencies; it has set to rebuild the state in record time, all the while resources are limited. Virtually every political choice entails trade-offs. For Syria, this moment represents a unique, once-in-a-lifetime chance; for its government, it is a new test - particularly as the country is under the spotlight. As local contacts in Syria note, Idlib could be seen as a potential "laboratory" where a governance project began to be incubated and developed over the past years; and now, with all of Syria to be governed and rebuilt, there is no room to miss this opportunity or risk past

[1] Unless stated otherwise, the description of the electoral system in the paragraphs below is based on Decree 143/2025.

[2] Syria has 14 governorates (muhafazat, singular muhafaza): Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Deir Ezzor, Raqqa, Hasaka, Idlib, Latakia, Tartus, Dar'a, Quneitra, Suwayda', Rif Dimashq.

At the level below that of muhafazat, there are the manatiq (plural of mintaqa) or 'districts'; and below districts, there are nawahi (plural of nahiya) or 'subdistricts.'

[3] Document provided to the author.

[4] Meetings and exchange with the author, Damascus, July 2025.

[5] Article 5 of Decree 143/2025 also adds that if that number of eligible candidates is not available, in any case it will not be fewer than 30.

[6] Azaz is a town in the northern countryside of Aleppo, that used to host the headquarters of the Syrian Interim Government backed by Turkey until 2024.

[7] There are 17 conditions: 1. Being a Syrian citizen before 1/5/2011; 2. Being registered in the civil registry within his/her own electoral district, or having resided there for 5 consecutive years before 2011; 3. Legal capacity; 4. Being 25 years or older; 5. Good conduct and behavior; 6. Not convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; 7. Not having run for presidential elections after 2011; 8. Not having been a member of the Assembly, or a candidate for membership, after 2011 (unless he/she defected); 9. Not supporting the former regime or terror groups; 10. Not affiliated with the army or security services; 11. Not holding the position of minister or governor, nor that of their deputy or assistant; 12. Being committed to the Constitutional Declaration; 13. Holding a degree or equivalent; 14. Residence in Syria when the formation of subcommittees has been announced; 15. Extensive knowledge of professionals and notables of his/her own district; 16. Reputation of neutrality and integrity; 17. Not having apparent enmity with any component of his/her district.

[8] At the time of writing, with the exception of the electoral districts in Hasaka and Raqqa governorates. Preliminary lists for those districts were published on 28 September.

[9] Conditions 1-12. seen above are also requirements for electoral colleges' members, alongside some specific conditions: not being a member of the Higher Committee, subcommittees, or appeals committees; for professionals, holding a university degree or equivalent title; for notables, holding a secondary school diploma.

[10] Conversations and field research, Damascus, July-September 2025.

[11] Meetings and exchange with the author, Damascus, July 2025.

[12] A wide array of academic and non-academic literature has addressed elections during political transitions, including their timing, e.g.: Reilly, B. (2002). Elections in Post-Conflict Scenarios: Constraints and Dangers. International Peacekeeping, 9(2); Brancati, D., & Snyder, J. L. (2013). Time to Kill: The Impact of Election Timing on Postconflict Stability. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 57(5); Reilly, B. (2016). Timing and sequencing in post-conflict elections. Centre for Research on Peace and Development (CRPD), KU Leuven; Fath-Lihic, A. M., & Brancati, D. (2017). Elections and Peacebuilding. Electoral Integrity Initiative, Kofi Annan Foundation; Alihodžić, S. et al. (2019). Timing and sequencing of transitional elections. International IDEA Policy. Paper no. 18, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

[13] Ibid.: Meetings and exchange with the author, Damascus, July 2025.

[14] Meeting with the author. Damascus, August 2025.

[15] Conversations and field research, Damascus, July-September 2025.

[16] Meeting with the author, Damascus, September 2025.

[17] Meetings and exchange with the author, Damascus, July 2025.

[18] Meetings and exchange with the author, Damascus, July 2025.

[19] Meetings and exchange with the author, Damascus, July 2025.