Article 19

12/18/2025 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 12/18/2025 07:57

Bangladesh: Telecommunication Ordinance Amendment 2025 undermines human rights

In November 2025, ARTICLE 19 engaged in the public consultation on the draft Bangladesh Telecommunication (Amendment) Ordinance 2025. Based on our analysis, the amended legislation represents a significant overhaul of the country's telecommunications regulatory approach. While the government has maintained that the intention of updating the legislation is timely given the rapid adoption and integration of digital technologies, there are concerns that the draft extends the scope of its remit far beyond traditional telecommunications moving towards a centralised, state-centered governance framework. The amendments that were introduced expand regulatory powers, centralise authority under the executive, and allow for the expansion of state-led surveillance capabilities. In its current form, the Ordinance raises serious human rights concerns, particularly with respect to privacy and freedom of expression, and particularly in Bangladesh's current socio-political climate. ARTICLE 19 urges the government to act on the recommendations directly provided during the open public consultation phase, align the framework with international human rights law and standards, to engage in meaningful and inclusive public consultation, and ensure that Bangladesh's digital infrastructure serves the public interest.


Expansion of the scope and remit
At the core, the Ordinance significantly broadens the scope of what the telecommunications framework is meant to regulate. Under Section 2(2a), the legislation extends its remit beyond traditional telecommunications networks and services, to now, social media platforms, intermediary services, Over-the-top (OTT) services, audiovisual and streaming platforms, television and broadcasting entities, e-commerce and online payment systems, content-based services, cloud providers, data centres, and even AI services. This scope expansion collapses what has been traditionally distinct and specialised regulatory domains into a single, centralised structure. Historically, it has been concerned with network infrastructure, spectrum allocation, and the provision of essential services. In contrast, the Ordinance now seeks to regulate online platforms, data governance, content moderation, competition, and AI. These require tailored legal frameworks grounded in transparency, human rights safeguards, and accountability mechanisms. By broadening its scope in this manner, the Ordinance conflates fundamentally different regulatory functions and over expands state authority over our communication ecosystem.

However, these concerns are particularly acute in Bangladesh's current socio-political climate, where digital platforms have become critical spaces for public discourse, journalism, dissent, and civic participation while facing increasing state control, as reflected in a recent criminal case filed by Dhaka University Central Students' Union (DUCSU) Vice President Abu Shadik Kayem against 18 individuals, the satirical platform Earki, and at least 15 Facebook pages on allegations of so-called 'cyber harassment/defamation'. The case involves journalists, political activists, students, and individuals affiliated largely with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, with the complainant himself being a member of the student wing of the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami. Using the Digital Security Act (DSA) and its successor legislation, the Cyber Security Act (CSA) adopted in 2023, and subsequently, the Cyber Protection Ordinance 2025, as well as longstanding practices of content takedowns and platform restrictions, the government has already demonstrated its capacity to intervene in online spaces.

The Ordinance's broad and vague definitions of intermediaries mean that nearly any service transmitting or hosting digital content falls within the mandate of the Bangladesh Telecommunications Regulatory Commission (BTRC), and by extension, the executive's regulatory reach. This greatly expands the potential for targeted takedowns, overcompliance by platforms fearing penalties, and blocking or throttling of content that is critical of authorities. The introduction of extraterritorial provisions further extend this authority by allowing enforcement even when content is hosted abroad or uploaded by individuals outside Bangladesh, creating significant chilling effects on expression at home and abroad.

Compounding these issues is Section 5, which elevates the Ordinance above all other domestic legislation, including for example data protection laws and media regulation frameworks. This dominance severely undermines the coherence and integrity of Bangladesh's emerging digital governance ecosystem, particularly the current Draft Data Protection Ordinance, the Cyber Protection Ordinance, and the forthcoming National AI Policy. The absence of meaningful public consultation exacerbates these concerns, signalling a shift toward centralisation and a lack of transparent governance.

Weakening of the regulatory authority
What is equally troubling within the Ordinance is the weakening of the BTRC's independence, as despite its nominal status as an autonomous regulator, the government is granted sole authority to appoint the Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, and Commissioners, determine their conditions of service, place government officials in line within the Commission, and appoint the BTRC Secretary, thereby significantly expanding executive control over its functioning. Under Section 9, commissioners are appointed directly by the government without independence. Furthermore, Section 12 further allows the executive to suspend or remove commissioners at will, even while investigations are pending. This arrangement weakens regulatory decision-making, making it unlikely that commissioners will challenge government interests or on politically sensitive matters such as surveillance, shutdowns, market entry of politically aligned companies, or enforcement actions against state-affiliated actors.

The commission's internal authority is also concerning. It is authorised to delegate any of its powers to "any other person," opening the door for politically appointed individuals or private sector actors to exercise regulatory authority without any accountability mechanisms. The Commission is granted sweeping investigatory powers without clear, defined or proportional limits or safeguards, including access to any documents or records deemed 'necessary' for its functions. These provisions run counter to international human rights standards on necessity, proportionality, and protection against arbitrary interference.

Oversight mechanisms introduced in the Ordinance also offer little reassurance. The Transparency and Accountability Committee established under Section 32A is entirely dominated by high-level government officials, with no space for civil society, independent experts, or consumer rights advocates. This parallel oversight mechanism, controlled by the executive, further compromises regulatory autonomy and undermines public confidence.

Centralisation of executive oversight
The Ordinance also centralises authority over licensing and market entry in unprecedented ways. Under Sections 33 and 36, ministerial committees are given the authority to determine "nationally significant" licences, a category left undefined, however, likely to include all major telecom and digital infrastructure operators, from mobile networks and submarine cables to data centres, satellite operators, and large content delivery networks. In a context where decisions about major digital infrastructure, such as the recent 10-year licence granted to Starlink, have significant national implications, leaving such determinations to political discretion undermines transparency and opens the door to corruption and political capture. According to the Ordinance, licensing decisions can now be made based on vague criteria such as "public welfare" or "national security," enabling censorship of digital services and platforms. Meanwhile, operating without a licence is criminalised with severe penalties, including imprisonment of up to 10 years and substantial fines, without procedural safeguards, clear appeals mechanisms, or standards of evidence.

Expansion of surveillance capabilities
One of the most concerning parts of the Ordinance is its expansion of surveillance powers. The legislation authorises the collection of all internet traffic information, installation of monitoring equipment on networks, and interception of communications including voice calls, messages, metadata, and social media records. The definitions within the text are broad, which means that nearly all forms of digital communication become subject to state monitoring. Although Section 97A introduces limited safeguards, they are overshadowed by provisions that allow interception based on vague justifications such as "national unity" or "public safety," without judicial authorisation or independent oversight.

Additionally, the admissibility of data obtained through surveillance as legal evidence further undermines due process and risks legitimising blanket surveillance practices. These provisions stand in clear contradiction to Article 43 of the Bangladesh Constitution and Bangladesh's obligations under Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The UN Human Rights Council Resolution on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age stresses that 'States should ensure that any interference with the right to privacy is consistent with the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality'.

Finally, the Ordinance provides no meaningful human rights protections for users, lacking explicit rights to privacy, data protection, due process, non-discrimination, or access to remedies, in contrast with international standards outlined in UN General Assembly resolutions 68/167 (2013), 69/166 (2014), and 71/199 (2016) on the right to privacy in the digital age, 45/95 (1990) on guidelines for computerised personal data files, and Human Rights Council decision 25/117 (2014) and resolution 28/16 (2015) on the right to privacy in the digital age. Despite granting the state and operators extensive authority over communications networks and platforms, the Ordinance does not impose corresponding transparency, accountability, or oversight obligations. Without human rights impact assessments, independent oversight bodies, or requirements for public consultation, the Ordinance risks entrenching a governance model that prioritises state control over human rights.

Without clear human rights safeguards, transparent processes, and robust oversight, the Ordinance risks consolidating state authority at the expense of privacy, freedom of expression, and due process.

The government must align the Ordinance's framework with international human rights law and standards, engage in meaningful and inclusive public consultation, and ensure that Bangladesh's digital infrastructure serves the public interest.
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