DPRK Aggression: Near Term Concerns, Longer Term Challenges

Commentary by Sydney Seiler

Published October 21, 2024

The Non-Surprising Surprise

October is here, the U.S. presidential election is just around the corner, and tensions on the Korean Peninsula appear moving in the direction of the "October surprise," about which many, including CSIS, prognosticated and warned. Unlike missile launches and nuclear tests, which are strategically worrisome for how they demonstrate the growth of North Korea (DPRK)'s weapon of mass destruction (WMD) program, kinetic and lethal provocations put lives at risk both in the initial action and any follow-up responses. Recent repeated launches of waste material into South Korea (ROK) by North Korea and DPRK's recent threats warning of military responses to alleged ROK drones sending pamphlets into Pyongyang have resulted in an exchange of threats between the two Koreas that has drawn international attention. Could this be the escalation on the eve of the U.S. presidential election that has been a concern? Or is this the harbinger of something much more serious, even if a few years down the road?

Distinguishing Among Provocations

To understand and respond to recent DPRK actions, it's important to distinguish between rhetorical, coercive, and revisionist actions. On October 11, 2024, the DPRK Foreign Ministry issued a "Crucial Statement," accusing South Korea of flying drones over Pyongyang to distribute leaflets. Notably, the statement was harsh in its accusation but restrained in saying North Korea's "response" would only occur "if" additional drone flights from South Korea took place. Amplification of the warning came in a statement warning of a "horrible disaster" if another drone is found in the sky over Pyongyang issued in the name of Kim Jong-un's sister, Kim Yo-jong. The subsequent DPRK destruction of mostly symbolic transportation routes connecting the two Koreas moved closer to coercive action rather than mere rhetorical, but it still did not involve any threat to human life.

Balloons and Drones: Actions With a History

The accusation of ROK drones penetrating North Korean air spaces comes amid a seemingly relentless stream of ballons launched southward by North Korea containing trash, animal and human feces, wastepaper, and, of course, the small explosive devices used to blow up the balloon at the appropriate coordinates and altitude. Repeated penetrations of South Korean airspace by North Korean drones going as far south as Seoul and the sensitive THAAD (Thermal High Altitude Area Defense) missile defense site in the southern half of the ROK have been reported. In other words, North Korea is not the innocent victim and is more likely angry that persuasive propaganda consumed by the North Korean population can so easily be distributed in the capital city.

Debates about causality or who moved first aside, there is no reason to believe either side desires a significant escalation. There have been threats and intimidation on Pyongyang's part, but as with similar spats over the past 70 years of armistice, this is most likely a de-escalatable event. At the same time, this does not seem to qualify as an "October surprise" deliberately designed to exploit or influence the upcoming November U.S. presidential election. De-escalation to an armistice status quo ante is easily within North Korea's reach if it desires.

Containable Coercion or Revisionist Escalation?

Even though these tensions between North and South Korea do not seem to directly target the U.S. presidential elections, the United States now faces a new provocation environment on the peninsula. What was once seen as dangerous but ultimately containable North Korean coercive diplomacy could evolve into something more dangerous and fundamentally threatening to the status quo. Although higher-end provocation options may have been seen by Kim Jong-un as unnecessarily risky in the past, backed by a growing nuclear arsenal and support of Russia, Kim may feel more comfortable in taking chances. Overconfidence in his nuclear deterrent may lead Kim Jong-un to coercive actions not seen in the recent past.

Pyongyang's growing nuclear-backed coercive options and the possibility for more offensive nuclear use to achieve limited (short of reunification) but important revisionist objectives were addressed in a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) published last year reflecting the U.S. Intelligence Community's view of North Korea's options for nuclear use through at least 2030. The key judgments and a helpful graphic provided below were declassified by the Director of National Intelligence and have proven useful over the past year in feeding discussions on the strategic threat posed by North Korea's WMD program.

Source: National Intelligence Estimate from the National Intelligence Council, North Korea: Scenarios for Leveraging Nuclear Weapons Through 2030, January 2023, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NIC-Declassified-NIE-North-Korea-Scenarios-For-Leveraging-Nuclear-Weapons-June2023.pdf.

Concerns about DPRK's revisionist nature and options were also recently reflected in the way U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken described North Korea in his recent submission to Foreign Affairs looking at major threats faced by the United States. He described North Korea as a revisionist power that, like Russia, China, and Iran, seeks to "entrench autocratic rule at home and assert spheres of influence abroad," which in North Korea's case is South Korea. These powers, Secretary Blinken added, "all wish to resolve territorial disputes by coercion or force."

The similarity between the secretary of state's words and the NIE is noteworthy. The NIE defines a coercive North Korea as one that "employs threats-including nuclear threats-and possibly limited use of military force to achieve some political objectives while maintaining escalation control and trying to minimize the risk of regime-threatening retaliation." A revisionist North Korea, meanwhile, "seeks to fundamentally shift the balance of power on the peninsula through the use of force. Nuclear weapons serve as an offensive option through use or the threat of use to dominate the South, achieve a decisive advantage in determining the future of the Korean Peninsula, or compel other desired outcomes." The secretary's depiction of North Korea in this context reveals the attention the United States is paying to this possibility.

What Is Pyongyang Seeking This Time?

Looking back at the history of North Korea's armed provocations, no two are exactly alike in their nature or objectives. There can be immediate causes or longer-term shaping objectives. Messaging objectives-both external and-can be tailored for both near-term and strategic goals.

In his most recent actions, Kim Jong-un is likely driven by a number of factors in his provocation calculus:

1. Punish ROK president Yoon Suk Yeol politically while undermining his North Korea policy.
2. Foment a debate in South Korea over the value of a deterrence-centric hardline policy toward North Korea versus a détente-seeking, softer engagement policy.
3. Undermine confidence in ROK conservates by instilling fears of U.S. entanglement, given that Pyongyang has already stated it will hold the United States accountable for ROK actions.
4. Beyond near-term tensions in the U.S.-ROK relationship, build support for a softer approach toward North Korea by the next U.S. administration.
5. Reinforce Pyongyang's commitment to fighting external efforts to transmit information, focusing on ROK-produced leaflets both balloon and drone delivered.

What About the United States?

CSIS warned at the beginning of the year that given the U.S. election, it was likely the United States would see provocative North Korea actions sometime around October, the classic "October surprise" option. This is a particularly challenging year for North Korea's messaging strategy toward the United States: the peculiarities of the election itself, the conflict in Ukraine and the Middle East, and now the major natural disasters in the United States all provide obstacles for the DPRK. North Korea itself has turned more introspective, saving its bellicose threats for South Korea and President Yoon. It's possible that if North Korea had something significant planned to capture U.S. attention, influence the election in a way favorable to DPRK policy objectives, and weaken the U.S.-ROK alliance, it would have decided to wait until after the election and subsequent inauguration. Such an approach, similar to the transition from President Bush to President Obama, has a more "welcome to the reality of the DPRK issue" effect, custom-tailored to the new U.S. president, likely shaping and possibly expediting the policy review process in Washington.

What Would Kim Be Seeking Further Down the Line?

Recent DPRK actions may help answer the longer-term strategic question of how Kim Jong-un plans to use his nuclear capability going forward. It's not so much that the United States needs to be worried about an imminent war, but rather that Kim may see advances over the past few years in his nuclear and missile capabilities enabling a tougher and more aggressive stance toward South Korea. This would open up a new menu of escalatory options for Pyongyang that has not been observed yet.

For now, North Korea is emboldened but not yet fully postured for more dangerous revisionist actions. However, as North Korea grows its nuclear arsenal qualitatively and quantitatively well beyond mere minimal deterrence, aligns closely with Russia-a nuclear power justifying force for revisionist purposes-and watches whether China goes forward to use force to redefine the status quo with Taiwan and other hot spots in Asia, it would be negligent not to consider a similar threat posed by North Korea.

When North Korea sunk the ROK, Pohang-class Corvette Cheonan in 2010 and then subsequently shelled YeonpyeongIsland later that year, the author was the deputy mission manager for North Korea at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The challenges posed by both incidents to restoring peace on the peninsula in the aftermath of North Korean provocations were significant. When encountering such surprise attacks, thoughts immediately turn to "What's next, and how can the armistice be quickly restored?" There have been over 70 years of armistice during which there has been notable success in preventing dangerous escalation.

Today, North Korea is literally hundreds of missile launches, four nuclear tests, and deployment of large numbers of weapons beyond where it was in 2010. A 2025 island shelling, ship sinking, or other military attack on South Korea is a sufficiently possible scenario for which planning needs to take place today. A scenario in which a robust, even proportionate ROK response generates threats of nuclear use is not beyond the imagination. While such discussions and planning are already underway, this will clearly be a critical topic for discussion between U.S. and ROK policymakers and military planners, particularly once the election passes.

Sydney Seiler is a senior adviser (non-resident) with the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Views expressed in this paper are the author's own and do not imply endorsement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Intelligence Community, or any other U.S. government agency.

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