03/05/2026 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 03/05/2026 13:22
Photo: U.S. Navy photo via DVIDS
Commentary by Mark F. Cancian and Chris H. Park
Published March 5, 2026
As Operation Epic Fury-the U.S. military campaign against Iran-entered its sixth day on March 5, both President Donald Trump and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth indicated that the conflict could continue for weeks. Members of Congress, the media, and the public are increasingly asking about the cost of this operation, with a wide range of estimates now being circulated. The first 100 hours (H+100) of the operation are estimated to cost $3.7 billion, or $891.4 million each day. Some of these costs are already budgeted, but most ($3.5 billion) are not. The shift of U.S. forces to less expensive munitions and the steep decline of Iranian drone and missile launches will drive costs down. However, future costs will depend mostly on the intensity of operations and the effectiveness of Iranian retaliation.
Table 1 summarizes the costs in three categories: operational costs (approximately $196 million total, with $178 million budgeted and the rest unbudgeted); munitions replacement (approximately $3.1 billion), none of which is currently budgeted; and replacing combat losses and repairing infrastructure damage (approximately $350 million), also unbudgeted. The unbudgeted costs will likely require additional Department of Defense (DOD) funding, either through a supplemental appropriation or another reconciliation bill.
The DOD has released few specifics on the ongoing operations, whereas in previous Middle East campaigns, it provided daily strike updates or regular statistical compendia. Daily DOD fact sheets list the assets involved in Operation Epic Fury and the approximate numbers of targets struck but provide limited detail. Periodic statements from Secretary Hegseth, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine, and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Admiral Brad Cooper provide some context and additional figures on U.S. and coalition operations.
These DOD releases inform three categories of cost estimates:
This analysis draws on the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates of the operations and support costs for each unit (i.e., a destroyer or an F-35 aircraft) and their support units, adjusting for inflation and unit size. The baseline costs from the CBO for active-duty units are already included in the FY 2026 budget.
The estimate adds 10 percent to this base amount to account for costs of a higher operational tempo, based on practice in the Office of Management and Budget during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. This addition captures the costs for higher aircraft sortie rates, more ship steaming hours, heightened alert levels, extended deployments, and additional personnel compensation, such as family separation allowances and hazard pay.
Each subsection below includes a brief note on the CSIS estimated order of battle.
Air Operations: $125 Million at H+100, Increasing by Approximately $30 Million Daily
Admiral Cooper's update on March 3 noted that over 200 fighter aircraft are conducting operations. This is consistent with CSIS estimates of around 50 stealth aircraft (F-35 and F-22), 110 non-stealth aircraft (F-15, F-16, and A-10), and 80 carrier-based fighters (F/A-18E/F and F-35C).
As laid out in Figure 1, air operations with land-based aircraft, in the first 100 hours, cost $125.2 million. Each additional day, the operation adds at least $30 million, of which $2.7 million is unbudgeted. Additional assets flowing into the region will increase this cost, though the force flow is largely complete, according to General Caine.
Naval Operations: $64 Million at H+100, Increasing by Approximately $15 Million Daily
Figure 2 shows how naval forces have surged during times of tension since the October 7 attack, but the current surge is the largest in two and a half years of the Middle East war. Today, two U.S. Navy carriers, 14 destroyers, and three littoral combat ships (LCSs) constitute the fleet in the Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf, and the eastern Mediterranean.
Strike and support aircraft operate from the two carriers for the bombing campaign (costs included under air assets). The destroyers and submarines launch Tomahawk missiles against ground targets and air defense munitions to protect the fleet against missile attacks. The Low-Cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System (LUCAS) drones, in their combat debut, took off from at least one LCS.
As Figure 3 demonstrates, operating the fleet for the first 100 hours of the campaign cost $64.5 million-$5.9 million of which is unbudgeted. Each day the fleet, in its current size, takes part in Operation Epic Fury, it will incur another $15.4 million.
Ground Operations: $7 Million at H+100, Increasing by Approximately $1.6 Million Daily
The Defense Manpower Data Center reports that 582 U.S. soldiers are permanently stationed across the Middle East as of December 2025, alongside those on rotational deployments. Several artillery units are known to be operating in the region, including field artillery (HIMARS) and air defense (THAAD and Patriot). To estimate costs, these batteries are assumed to collectively constitute a single brigade-strength fires formation. Also included is the cost of a National Guard battalion being activated and sent to the region, likely for force protection.
The United States has expended over 2,000 munitions of various types in the first 100 hours of the campaign. CENTCOM has provided few specifics on munitions used. Using past U.S. air campaigns as a guide, this analysis estimates it will cost $3.1 billion to replenish the U.S. munitions inventory on a like-for-like basis, with the costs increasing by $758.1 million a day.
These estimates, detailed below, are based on two assumptions:
Offensive Strike Munitions: Approximately $1.5 Billion Expended at H+100
Admiral Cooper reported that U.S. forces "struck nearly 2,000 targets with more than 2,000 munitions" in less than 100 hours of the operation.
The number of munitions expended exceeds the number of targets struck because some munitions will miss or be ineffective. In the first month of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States used around 1.5 munitions for each target, with 68 percent being guided munitions. When NATO coalition forces bombed Libya entirely with precision munitions, the munitions expenditure rate declined slightly to 1.3 per target.
U.S. forces likely are exclusively using guided munitions in Operation Epic Fury. Applying the Operation Odyssey Dawn munition-to-target ratio of 1.3:1 and assuming U.S. forces striking 2,000 targets by H+100, total munitions expended would be approximately 2,600 in the first 100 hours of the war.
The campaign likely began with a wave of long-range standoff weapons. Admiral Cooper described, "multiple waves of cruise missiles obliterating Iranian command and control and air defense capabilities." More than160 Tomahawks may have been used in this opening phase. Air-launch standoff missiles, such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, could also have been used in this phase when, as General Caine noted, "more than 100 aircraft launched from land and sea: fighters, tankers, airborne early warning, electronic attack, bombers from the states and unmanned platforms forming a single synchronized wave."
Though expensive and scarce, the long-range missiles allow U.S. forces to strike from a distance. In the initial, surprise attack, they would have been used to destroy Iranian air defenses and other counter-air capabilities and create permissive conditions for follow-on attacks. Some likely targeted key leaders (though Israel seems to have struck the leadership targets in Tehran) and security forces. Electronic warfare aircraft like the F-18G likely fired anti-radiation missiles to suppress Iranian air defenses.
General Caine reported on March 4 that U.S. forces are at a "point of munitions transition" in day four of Operation Epic Fury, shifting away from "stand-off munitions at range outside of an enemy's range to shoot at us" to "stand-in precision strikes overhead Iran."
Munitions, such as Joint Standoff Weapons (JSOW) or gravity bombs equipped with Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) guidance kits, are far less costly and more plentiful in U.S. inventories but require fighters to operate closer to targets. That is now possible. Iranian air defenses have been substantially degraded, and the coalition maintains air superiority over growing parts of the theater, with even vulnerable MQ-9 Reaper drones conducting daylight operations.
To give a sense of the cost difference, a Tomahawk missile costs $3.6 million; an equivalent JDAM costs $80,000. One result of coalition air superiority is that non-stealthy B-1 and B-52 bombers have begun operations from the continental United States over Iran with more and larger bombs than possible with fighters.
Ground-based fires are supplementing naval and air strikes. Artillery units with HIMARS launchers reportedly conducted strikes using Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and, for the first time in combat, the longer-range Precision Strike Missiles (PrSMs). "Countless one-way attack drones" were used for the first time, launching from the LCSs inside the Persian Gulf.
The administration has hinted at a surge in the bombing campaign, but it is unclear what that might be. Historically, such campaigns have eased off after the first few days. In any case, munitions costs will go down substantially as the U.S. strike operations switch to less expensive munitions.
Air Defense Interceptors: Estimated $1.7 Billion Expended at H+100
Admiral Cooper reported that Iran has launched 500 ballistic missiles and 2,000 drones as of March 4. Defending against these threats requires different systems. Ballistic missiles are relatively expensive and travel at high speeds (4,000-15,000 mph). Only specifically designed defensive systems like the U.S. Patriot and THAAD, and Israel's David's Sling and Arrow, can intercept them.
The drones, such as the Shahed-136, travel at 120 mph and do not maneuver. Many systems can stop them, from antiaircraft guns to counter-drone systems like Coyote and the laser-guided air-launched Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS). The drones' value to Iran is in numbers.
Coalition efforts contributed substantially to shooting down Iranian drones and missiles. As Figure 5 shows, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) collectively report intercepting 500 cruise and ballistic missiles and 1,300 drones as of March 3. While this likely overestimates the number of kills, it does show that these local allies and partners are carrying much of the air defense effort.
These allied roles have reduced the immediate burden on U.S. forces and preserved U.S. missile defense inventories. Table 2 provides an estimate of U.S. missile defense expenditure after factoring in allied support. Although public reports discuss dwindling missile defense stockpiles, no specific figures have been confirmed by the DOD. The total number remains uncertain, not to mention the exact mix of missiles expended. As a reference point, the U.S. Navy expended 200 SM-2 and SM-3 missiles against Houthi attacks in the Red Sea over 15 months in 2024 and 2025. In October 2024, a dozen SM-3 missiles were used to shoot down Iranian missiles. Given this high degree of uncertainty, air defense munitions costs in the first 100 hours could range from $1.2 billion to $3.7 billion. The analysis used a midpoint.
So far, these losses have been limited to approximately $359 million, but they will continue to occur.
The only acknowledged equipment losses are three F-15s lost in a friendly-fire incident over Kuwait. Replacement cost for the F-15EXs is $103 million each, for a total of $309 million. The production line remains open, so procurement is straightforward. However, it will still be three years before new aircraft arrive in the field because of manufacturing time.
Iranian missiles and drones also caused some infrastructure damage. The extent is unclear, but videos have shown damage in Kuwait to port facilities and the U.S. Navy's fleet support activity and to facilities in Qatar. This estimate includes $50 million for repairs.
These estimates extrapolate from the first few days of the war, which are typically the most intense period of an air campaign. Although administration officials have suggested a future surge, historically, air campaigns settle into a more sustainable pace as new targets need to be identified, battle damage assessments must be collected to ascertain whether follow-up strikes are needed, crews need rest, and aircraft undergo maintenance. In particular, the cost of munitions will decline as the United States switches to lower-cost munitions. Nevertheless, the unbudgeted costs here will be substantial. This is unlike operations in the Caribbean that led to the capture of Venezuela's Nicolás Maduro, where most costs were already in the budget.
That means that the DOD will need additional funds at some point because the level of budget cuts needed to fund this conflict internally would likely be politically and operationally difficult. The Trump administration might decide to ask for a supplemental appropriation to cover the war and any other unexpected expenses across the government. The Bush administration did that at the beginning of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Trump administration might ask for the funds in a FY 2027 reconciliation bill, although it is not clear whether there will be such a bill. Finally, the administration could ask Congress to divert some of the DOD's $150 billion from the first reconciliation bill to cover these expenses. The political challenge for the administration will be that any funding action will become a focal point for opposition to the war.
Mark F. Cancian (Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, ret.) is a senior adviser with the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Chris H. Park is a research associate for the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS.
The authors would like to thank Madison Bruno for her thoughtful edits and Julia Huh for expeditiously formatting the charts. The authors also benefited greatly from helpful conversations with colleagues across the Defense and Security Department.
If you are interested in learning more about this topic, explore CSIS's Executive Education courses Meeting China's Military Challenge and Inside DOD's FY 2027 Budget.
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