Mali: a breaking point - or not (yet)

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Simultaneous attacks in several Malian cities on 25 April signal a dangerous reconfiguration and previously unseen tactical capabilities. As jihadist and separatist groups converge - at least tactically - against the military authorities in Bamako, Russian support to these authorities appearswholly ineffective, as Africa Corps elements have beendefeated and escorted out of Kidal.

Coordinated attacks on Kati, Sévaré, Mopti, Gao, Kidal and the airport area in Bamako marked a sharp escalation. They also revealed the alignment between the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda-affiliated group that has imposed a fuel blockade on the capital since September 2025. As events still unfold, regional and international actors such as Algeria, Morocco, the African Union, the European Union, Gulf countries and Türkiye as well as Burkina Faso and Niger,have condemned the attacks but offered little support, underscoring the risks of becoming entangled in the conflict in Mali, the uncertainty as regards future developments, and the relative isolation of the Malian junta, partly resulting from its partnership with Russia.

Maximum pressure

In Kati - the stronghold of the ruling officers - the Minister of Defence, Sadio Camara, a strong advocate of the partnershipwith Russia, was killed in a suicide attack.

The FLA claimed control over Kidal where Malian and Russian militaries negotiated an escorted withdrawal from the city. In the meantime, JNIM announced the continuation of the Bamako fuel blockade while the Malian government and its Russian allies reaffirmed their continued engagementagainst terrorism.

Longstanding grievances in northern Mali, combined with more recent resentment over abuses attributed to Russian forces - particularly Wagner (now Africa Corps) elementsoperating alongside the Malian army - have created fertile ground for recruitment by armed groups.

In its 25 April communiqué, JNIM openly acknowledged its alignment with the FLA for the first time and offered Russia's Africa Corps the option to remain outside the conflict in view of potential future negotiations. JNIM has increasingly sought to position itself as a political actor, combining local outreach with a relatively restrained implementation of Sharia law.Over the past few years, JNIM had also expanded its operational reach into coastal West African states, notably Benin. However, the scale and coordination of the 25 April attacks may indicate a renewed focus on the central Sahel. Bycontrast, the FLA continues to pursue northern independence and has called for the withdrawal of Russian forces.

Despite their tactical convergence, the two actors do not share the same objectives. JNIM likely seeks greater legitimacy and influence within a reconfigured Malian political order, whereas the FLA remains focused on securing territorial independence in the north. Recent developments suggest an emerging territorial logic: JNIM is more embedded in central and southern Mali, while the FLA is consolidating its presence in the north. Meanwhile, Islamic State affiliates remain active, particularly around Ménaka, a city close to Niger that they attacked on 29 April, adding a further layer of intra-jihadistcompetition.

The AES, Russia - and others

The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) has expressed solidarity with Mali but has not deployed forces, reflecting both operational constraints and strained domestic contexts in Burkina Faso and Niger. Clashes between JNIM and Islamic State affiliates in Niger earlier in April further underscore the region's fragmented security landscape.

Russia's role is also under scrutiny. Forces deployed under the Africa Corps have suffered operational setbacks and reputational damage, raising broader questions about the effectiveness of Moscow's security partnership. Mali thus joins a wider pattern in which Russian support struggles to decisively stabilise allied regimes (e.g., Syria, Venezuela, Iran), and in addition risks aggravating local tensions.

By contrast, the Sadat paramilitary group tasked with protecting President Assimi Goïta appears to have been more effective in ensuring his security, potentially pointing to agrowing role for Türkiye.

A conflict reconfigured

These developments point to an intensification and fragmentation of conflict dynamics in Mali, underscoring the limits of a purely military response to deeply rooted political and societal grievances. The security-first approach pursued by Bamako and its Russian partners has instead exacerbated tensions, as competing visions of the state, territorial control and intercommunal relations continue to divide Malian society.

The alignment between jihadist and separatist actors increases pressure on the authorities but is unlikely to endure given their diverging objectives. At the same time, the limited capacity of regional partners and the uncertain effectiveness of external support highlight the fragility of the current order.

In this context, Mali appears to be entering an even more volatile phase, marked by shifting alliances, contested territorial control and growing uncertainty over externalbacking. While attention remains focused on power dynamics,but civilians are increasingly caught in a fragmented battlespace where multiple armed actors compete forterritorial control, influence and allegiance.

In line with its renewed approach to the Sahel, the EU should further strengthen its support for human security as Mali braces for potential new waves of displacement.

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