Economic Fury Disrupts Networks Supplying Weapons and UAV Components to Iran

WASHINGTON-Today, as part of Economic Fury, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) targeted 10 individuals and companies based in several jurisdictions across the Middle East, Asia, and Eastern Europe that are enabling efforts by Iran's military to secure weapons, as well as raw materials with applications in Iran's Shahed-series unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and ballistic missile program. OFAC continues to proactively disrupt these networks that seek to support Iran's acquisition of weapons and materiel. Concurrently, the U.S. Department of State is designating four entities in connection to the conventional arms activities of Iran.

"While the surviving IRGC leaders are trapped like rats in a sinking ship, the Treasury Department is unrelenting in our Economic Fury campaign," said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. "Under President Trump's decisive leadership, we will continue to act to Keep America Safe and target foreign individuals and companies providing Iran's military with weapons for use against U.S. forces."

ECONOMIC FURY Delivers MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON IRAN

The Treasury Department is maintaining maximum pressure on Iran and targeting the regime's ability to generate, move, and repatriate funds. Treasury is aggressively advancing Economic Fury and has disrupted billions in projected oil revenue, taken actions that have led to the freezing of nearly half a billion dollars in regime-linked cryptocurrency, and cracked down on Tehran's shadow banking networks.

Treasury remains ready to take economic action against Iran's defense industrial base so that Iran cannot reconstitute its production capacity and project power outside its borders. Treasury is also prepared to take action against any foreign company supporting illicit Iranian commerce, including airlines, and, as necessary, may impose secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions that facilitate Iran's activities-including those connected to the People's Republic of China's independent "teapot" oil refineries.

Any person or vessel facilitating the illicit trade of oil or other commodities, through covert trade or financial channels, risks exposure to U.S. sanctions. Treasury will vigorously target both traditional sanctions evasion schemes and the exploitation of digital assets while continuing to freeze funds stolen from the Iranian people.

Through the blockade, the Trump Administration is directly targeting the regime's primary revenue stream, and any person or vessel facilitating the illicit flow of oil or other products risks exposure to U.S. sanctions.

WEAPONS PROCUREMENT

China-based Yushita Shanghai International Trade Co Ltd (Yushita) is a facilitator for the Center for Progress and Development of Iran (CDPI)-the latest name of Iran's U.S.-designated Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation (CITC), which coordinates Iranian technology acquisition efforts. CITC has sought to purchase weapons, including man-portable air-defensive systems (MANPADS), from China. The U.S. Department of State designated CITC pursuant to E.O. 13382 in June 2012. Dubai-based Elite Energy FZCO (Elite Energy) transferred millions of dollars to Hong Kong-based AE International Trade Co Limited (AE International) in furtherance of these procurement efforts for CITC. Hong Kong-based HK Hesin Industry Co Limited (HK Hesin) and Belarus-based Armory Alliance LLC (Armory Alliance) acted as intermediaries in these procurements for CITC, in an effort to obfuscate the Iranian end-user. Belarus-based Iranian national Mohammadmahdi Maleki (Maleki), an employee of Armory Alliance, also contributed to these procurements for CITC. Belarussian national Mohammed Ali Tolibov (Tolibov) is the chief executive officer of Armory Alliance and a long-standing arms procurement facilitator for Iran in Belarus.

Yushita, AE International, HK Hesin, Armory Alliance, and Maleki are being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, CITC. Elite Energy is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, AE International. Tolibov is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Armory Alliance.

Hong Kong-based Mustad Limited, as an intermediary, has facilitated, or attempted to facilitate, financial transactions in furtherance of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC's) procurement of millions of dollars' worth of weapons. The U.S. Department of State designated the IRGC pursuant to E.O. 13382 in October 2007 in connection with Iran's ballistic missile program.

Mustad Limited is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the IRGC.

UAV AND BALLISTIC MISSILE COMPONENT PROCUREMENT

OFAC today is taking additional action against Iran-based Pishgam Electronic Safeh Company (PESC), building on OFAC's action from April 2026. PESC has procured thousands of servomotors with one-way attack UAV applications, which have been recovered in downed Shahed-136 UAVs, for Iran's IRGC Aerospace Force Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization (IRGCASF SSJO). On September 27, 2023, OFAC designated PESC pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the IRGC ASF SSJO. The U.S. Department of State designated the IRGC ASF SSJO, which is involved in Iranian ballistic missile research and flight test launches, pursuant to E.O. 13382 on July 18, 2017 for having engaged, or attempted to engage, in activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery.

China-based Hitex Insulation Ningbo Company Limited (Hitex) has supplied-or attempted to supply-millions of dollars' worth of carbon fiber, honeycomb fabric, and other raw aerospace-grade materials to PESC, ultimately for the IRGC ASF SSJO. Chinese national Li Genping is the legal representative of Hitex and manages the company's sales, purchasing, and financial operations.

Hitex is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, PESC. Li Genping is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Hitex.

INTENSIFYING PRESIDENT TRUMP'S MAXIMUM PRESSURE CAMPAIGN

This action builds on OFAC's implementation of National Security Presidential Memorandum 2, which directs the U.S. government to apply maximum pressure on Tehran by curtailing Iran's ballistic missile program, countering its development of asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities, preventing it from obtaining a nuclear weapon, and cutting off the IRGC's access to the assets and resources that sustain its destabilizing activities.

Today's action also represents Treasury's sixth round of nonproliferation designations in support of the September 27, 2025, reimposition of United Nations (UN) sanctions and other restrictions on Iran, which occurred as a direct result of its "significant non-performance" of its nuclear commitments.

OFAC is taking this action pursuant to E.O. 13382, which targets weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferators and their supporters.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today's action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC's regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.

Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC's enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities with designated or otherwise blocked persons.

Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC's ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC's guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List.

Click here for more information on the persons designated today.

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