01/22/2025 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 01/22/2025 03:41
Speech/statement | Date: 22/01/2025 | Ministry of Defence
Distinguished Audience,
"We lived in a democracy. But then, we felt the walls closing in around us." These words were spoken by Gunnar Sønsteby to a school class in Rjukan in the film Nr. 24. "We felt the walls closing in around us."
In just over a month, Russia's brutal war of aggression against Ukraine will enter its fourth year. It is almost inconceivable how many lives Putin is willing to sacrifice in his imperialist attempt to conquer Ukraine and the scale of destruction and suffering he has inflicted on the Ukrainian people. This use of force cannot prevail. It is existential for Ukraine but also poses a serious threat to Norwegian and European security and the international rules-based order.
Others are also feeling the weight of Russian pressure and influence. I visited Moldova shortly before their elections last autumn. Massive attempts at interference, vote-buying, and worse have been observed there. The pro-Western forces barely prevailed. The outcome was not as positive in Georgia after its disputed presidential election.
We are now facing a more dangerous and unpredictable neighbour. Russia threatens the use of nuclear weapons, and last year, they revised their doctrine on the use of these weapons. Nuclear arms have become even more prominent as a tool of power in international politics. Their rhetoric grows harsher and more unyielding. Simultaneously, the strategic importance of the High North is increasing. The Arctic's strategic significance for Russia also enhances allied interest in the Barents Sea and Arctic regions. This is our neighbourhood-our most important strategic area. It is crucial that we ensure situational awareness and presence in the North alongside our allies. We seek predictability and stability through calibrated military activity to deter Russia while avoiding misunderstandings and unintended escalation.
Russia's war in Ukraine is bolstered by significant contributions from countries like North Korea and Iran, as well as direct and indirect support from China. Totalitarian regimes are increasingly aligning; China and Russia speak of a "borderless partnership." Alarmingly, North Korean soldiers are now participating in a war on European soil. This marks a grim turning point: the war in Ukraine has become global.
Last autumn, I visited three of NATO's partner countries in the Pacific: South Korea, Japan, and Australia. It had been 40 years since a Norwegian Defence Minister visited Japan and the first time ever for Australia. It was striking how similarly we view global security challenges and threats. They were at least as concerned as we are about the connections between the Asia-Pacific region and our part of the world. The clear message was the significance of the war in Ukraine for security on "the other side of the globe."
The authoritarian forces in the world show little to no willingness to change course. We and our allies face increased unpredictability, uncertainty, and instability. As far as we can see, we are entering a new world order, and this will not pass.
The geopolitical uncertainty of our time brings an elevated risk of military conflict. We see growing distrust and less communication between states, which increases the risk of misunderstandings. Acts of sabotage, arson, cable cuts, and other disruptions in Europe signal that we are moving further up the conflict spectrum. The intelligence threat against Norway is rising, and we are constantly targeted by cyberattacks. Western solidarity, values, and supply chains are under attack.
A few weeks ago, the government presented the white paper on total preparedness, titled Prepared for Crises and War. The aim is a civil society prepared for crises and war, that is resilient to hybrid threats, and able to support military efforts.
Measures include reinstating the obligation to build shelters, strengthening the Civil Defence, introducing new laws for controlling foreign investments in strategic sectors, and new regulations to ensure access to and prioritisation of civilian labour in security crises and wars. In late 2022, the Armed Forces resumed issuing letters to households warning of possible requisitioning of vehicles in emergencies. Alongside other public and civilian actors, we have taken significant steps to secure critical subsea infrastructure. These initiatives highlight the uncharted territory we are navigating. National security and public safety policies are undergoing significant changes to address the composite threats we face, making the distinction between peace, crisis, and war less clear.
As we gather here in the Oslo Military Society, Donald Trump is being sworn in as the 47th President of the United States. His inaugural address will be watched worldwide, as will his immediate executive orders. If I had to summarise the current situation in one word, it would be unpredictability. Great unpredictability, I might add. Few, if any, truly know what lies ahead. We must be prepared for a very different world starting tomorrow, layered upon the security challenges I have described. We need to anticipate significant changes in trade policy, America's international role, and potentially even its security policy. When a superpower like the United States shifts its policies, the consequences ripple worldwide. The coming period will likely challenge us and demand great wisdom and manoeuvrability from Norwegian authorities.
But, amid uncertainty, let us not forget the strong foundation we have to build on. Norway and the United States have been close allies for over 75 years, developing a strong, trusting partnership in defence and security policy. This collaboration progressed during Trump's first term and continues to grow - to our mutual benefit. America's cooperation with Norway in the Arctic is not charity; it aligns with its strategic interests in ensuring situational awareness, calibrated deterrence, and presence in the region. Norway, in turn, meets U.S. expectations, as a trusted partner with deep knowledge and experience in monitoring Russia and operating in the Arctic.
Last year, we expanded the Supplementary Defence Cooperation Agreement (SDCA) with the U.S., adding eight new agreed areas. This expansion, initiated during Trump's previous term, facilitates investments, increased presence, and more joint training activities.
Space is one notable area of cooperation. In the summer of 2024, we launched two satellites securing broadband coverage in the Arctic in close collaboration with the United States. This historic moment marked the first time the US Space Force placed a military payload on another nation's satellite. Moreover, together, we are building a satellite station at Andøya to support space infrastructure that ensures situational awareness in the High North. In December 2023, Norway joined the Combined Space Operations Initiative (CSpO), a highly exclusive multilateral partnership involving the 10 most advanced Western space nations. This collaboration aims to preserve freedom of action and promote responsible behaviour in outer space.
Moreover, Norway's commitment to NATO burden-sharing is noticed in Washington. After Norway delayed reaching the 2% GDP defence spending goal from the 2014 for too long, this government has ensured compliance by the 2024 deadline. And our Long-Term Defence Plan sets us on a trajectory toward 3%.
While strengthening our ties with the U.S., we also prioritise NATO as a credible and effective guarantor of allied security. As a political and military alliance, NATO and its collective security guarantee form the cornerstone of Norwegian security. At the same time, we are enhancing dialogue and cooperation with close European allies as a necessary response to increasing uncertainty and a harsher security landscape.
Last spring, I co-signed a strategic partnership agreement with the EU alongside the Minister of Foreign Affairs, aiming to develop cooperation pragmatically in areas aligned with Norwegian interests. In December, Germany's Defence Minister Boris Pistorius made his second visit to Norway last year. Last week, the French Defence Minister was here, and in short time, the UK's Defence Minister will visit. During every visit, we have agreed on strengthening the cooperation between our countries.
Let me add: they are all, of course, focused on frigates. We plan to procure, operate, and maintain new frigates in strategic partnership with a close ally. The current security situation and the increasing focus on the High North make Norway an even more relevant partner for these countries, and they, in turn, become more important for us.
Nordic defence cooperation is simultaneously moving forward on a broad scale.
Finland and Sweden's entry into NATO, in the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, marks the most significant change in our security environment.
One example of the new Nordic defence cooperation is the initiative launched by prime ministers and presidents in Bodø last year, focusing on military transport corridors in the northern regions of the Nordics. Increased military mobility is an obvious area for collaboration now that all of the Nordics are strengthening its defence, and we can look at Nordic geography as a unified operational area.
Let me briefly mention one more country: Poland.
They are on their way to becoming a European defence superpower.
History has given Poland bitter experiences. They understand the threat from the east and act accordingly.
Norway should deepen its defence and security dialogue with Poland. I therefore plan to visit my Polish counterpart shortly. We already have strong connections.
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I have chosen to spend considerable time on the US and European allies because the security situation and unpredictability make it essential for Norway to work strategically to safeguard our interests.
Allies, friends, and partners are crucial in an unpredictable and unstable world, particularly for a small nation like Norway.
The government's objective is to secure our freedom of action by maintaining and developing the strong relationships we have with both the US and our European allies, while also contributing to strengthening NATO and improving Norway's national preparedness and military capabilities.
This is the focus of the rest of this address, beginning with Ukraine.
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Throughout the war, Norway's political leadership has remained united in its support for Ukraine.
Last autumn, the government proposed increasing the Nansen Programme framework from NOK 75 billion to NOK 135 billion and extending the programme until 2030.
During the budget process before Christmas, all parties in the Parliament agreed to raise the framework even further to NOK 155 billion-with at least NOK 35 billion allocated for this year alone.
Going forward, our military support for Ukraine will rely less on our own stockpiles.
Simply put, we have less left. We must safeguard our own fundamental defence needs and ensure our capacity to increase production for a rapidly growing defence.
Nevertheless, our overall support for Ukraine will be larger than ever this year.
The extensive training mission for Ukrainian soldiers, conducted in Norway and across Europe, will continue at a high level. Together with Ukraine and our allies, we are continually assessing how the training can be carried out most effectively. Last year, no less than 1,200 Norwegian instructors contributed to our training efforts.
Looking ahead, we will place significantly more emphasis on supporting Ukraine's own capacity to produce defence equipment. They have substantial capacity and, in many cases, can produce faster and more cost-effectively than we can.
This war has spurred an intense technological race, driving the need for rapid innovation and fresh thinking. Ukrainians have been incredibly skilled at adapting and consistently finding new solutions. But we can help them achieve even more.
We will prioritise efforts to support technological development and innovation, connecting the Ukrainian and Norwegian defence industries. We will utilise ongoing insights from the war in collaboration with Norwegian world-leading technology environments to develop solutions that provide Ukraine with the best possible capability to defend itself and push back.
But this also has another dimension.
The experiences and technological advancements emerging from the war are of great importance for the development of Norway's own defence capabilities.
The Ministry of Defence (FD), the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), the Norwegian Defence Materiel Agency (FMA), and various expert groups in the Armed Forces work to follow up this aspect of our efforts to support Ukraine.
The instructors are gaining valuable experience for themselves and for the Armed Forces, and many are being recruited for prolonged service within the military as a result of this work. We are gathering a wealth of knowledge from what is happening in Ukraine, but the effort to capture, systematise, and utilise these insights must be further strengthened. Moreover, collaboration with experts in Ukraine is also vital for the development of our own industry and technological leadership across various fields.
The government is also prioritising the development of Norwegian defence industry and increasing production capacity. Last autumn, we presented a roadmap for increasing production capacity, with several measures now being followed up. This spring, we will present an updated defence industrial strategy targeting both well-established large companies and smaller enterprises.
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The Long-Term Defence Plan was adopted last summer. It's possible that it feels like old news to many, so I won't be going through it line by line today.
That said, we're only 20 days into a 12-year-long plan, so there's still plenty to discuss and clarify about the way forward. Let me start with the fact that we've actually presented and secured parliamentary approval for this substantial defence initiative. That in itself is historic.
Norway's defence budget is set to almost double in the years to come.
And this is not just empty promises. No, we're following through, here and now. With this year's approved budget, the government is implementing the most significant strengthening of the defence budget since the Korean War in the early 1950s. The real increase amounts to NOK 16.5 billion compared to last year's revised budget.
Still, some might ask: Will all of this actually come to fruition in the long run? After all, this is a plan with a longer horizon than usual, spanning three parliamentary terms. Plus, our budgets are annual, and, well, the global security situation could improve, couldn't it?
To that, I'd say: Let's hope so - though current outlooks suggest otherwise. And no, I can't give any guarantees.
But this is what the Centre Party/Labour government is committed to, and we are following through 100% in the first year. If the defence boost itself is formidable, I also want to highlight the unanimity in Parliament. That is perhaps the strongest guarantee we can offer. Every party in Parliament - from Rødt to the Progress Party, and everyone in-between - has agreed to every word of the 22-page recommendation.
Let me quote the opening: "The committee notes that broad political consensus has been achieved in Parliament regarding the Long-Term Plan for the Defence Sector for 2025-2036. The parties in agreement (…) stress the importance of this consensus and of the parties' commitment to following through and financing the plan."
With this decision, the defence sector has also been entrusted with a huge responsibility. It must be executed in a way that builds trust and ensures we achieve the defence capability outlined in the plan. I believe we have a solid foundation. In fact, I'd argue that this plan is more thorough, balanced, and comprehensive than its predecessors, and better anchored across the sector.
That doesn't mean I'm without concerns, especially regarding rising equipment costs and the challenge of finding enough people with the right skills.
Under the leadership of the Chief of Defence, extensive planning is already underway across the sector to determine how the plan will be practically implemented. Defence Materiel is scaling up to handle increased investment levels, and Defence Estates is proving it can put increased resources to good use.
The Long-Term Plan also outlines policies to improve implementation. Thanks to good work in recent years, we're seeing a higher proportion of so-called "off-the-shelf" equipment being procured, while planning times for equipment projects are decreasing. For the plan to remain realistic, we must integrate personnel, equipment, and infrastructure - areas that have faced significant challenges in the past.
In parallel with the Long-Term Plan, we're introducing governance changes across the sector. There's been inadequate execution and too much diffusion of responsibility. A key goal of these changes is to give the Chief of Defence and military leaders greater ability to take holistic responsibility for the results we aim to achieve. We're streamlining the relationship between the ministry and the armed forces and reducing micromanagement and resource-draining internal transactions within the sector.
As we embark on this defence boost, certain priorities stand out at the outset. Critical weaknesses in today's structure must be addressed - that's a prerequisite for further growth.
Let me highlight a few key points briefly: Stock depletion will be halted, and supply preparedness will be significantly increased. Allocations for fuel, spare parts, ammunition, clothing, and equipment are being significantly boosted.
Funding for equipment operations and maintenance is also rising. We cannot invest tens of billions in new equipment without allocating resources to ensure we achieve the operational capabilities that equipment offers.
Then there's the defence infrastructure. This has been a grossly under-prioritised area for many years, with operational consequences over time.
This is probably the issue I hear most about during my visits across the armed forces. Our facilities for personnel and equipment have been poorly maintained and are inadequate in number. That's why maintenance and renewal of infrastructure are receiving a significant boost in this year's budget.
There's so much more I could delve into, but I'll keep it brief: The Home Guard is growing, and from this year, all Home Guard districts will train annually for the required number of days. The Intelligence Service is being significantly strengthened. We're also making substantial investments in research, innovation, and technology development. Finally, we're heavily investing in the people behind the uniforms.
This year, we'll see an increase of over 1,400 personnel, including employees, conscripts, and reservists. Recruiting, retaining, and training the skilled personnel our armed forces need is the biggest challenge we face in implementing this defence boost. Officer schools are increasing their intake, and military academies are being prepared for further growth. Substantial funds are being allocated to initiatives aimed at recruiting, retaining, and developing personnel.
Even though the Long-Term Plan has been approved, many decisions still lie ahead. For instance, we need to choose a supplier for the new frigates - the largest single defence investment in modern times. Last Friday, the four remaining countries submitted more information, and the government aims to decide on the supplier this year.
We also intend to clarify the procurement strategy for the Navy's new standardised vessel class as soon as possible. A national competition will be the starting point. In fact, work is progressing on a host of major procurement projects - air defence, decisive munitions, helicopter initiatives, frameworks for developing the Finnmark and Southern Brigades, long-range maritime drones, and more. Decisions on processes and, eventually, choices will be made as we go along.
Other clarifications are also pending, such as location-related questions and details about research and education initiatives in the north. There's much to come. While we have achieved a satisfactory outcome with the Long-Term Plan, we are now moving into a new phase. Most of the work is still ahead of us, and this year will be incredibly important in taking charge of the mission entrusted to us by the Parliament.
Additionally, we will strengthen emergency preparedness by facilitating more cross-sectoral and long-term planning and reinforcement of civil and military readiness. One measure involves the development of Norway's first National Security Strategy.
The security situation makes it essential to mobilise all available resources in the country to work together effectively.
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Ladies and gentlemen,
On 6 June last year, many of us attended the solemn commemoration of D-Day and the beginning of the liberation of Europe in Normandy.
It left a lasting impression, and this year, the 80th anniversary of the liberation will be celebrated across the entire country.
We are reminded of the unimaginable price that was paid to restore freedom and democracy in Norway and the rest of the continent.
This was supposed to be the war that would never happen again. From the ruins of two catastrophic world wars, an international order emerged-based on organisations, agreements, and international law-to handle conflicts between nations peacefully.
And when the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union dissolved, it was said to be the end of history.
But now we find ourselves in a different situation.
The international legal order is under severe pressure and attack. Autocracies and totalitarian regimes are aligning in their pursuit of alternatives to the open, liberal democracies we are determined to defend.
There is a willingness to use power and confrontation.
We are facing uncertainty, unpredictability, and various threats in ways we haven't seen for a long time.
The walls are closing in on us.
It is more important than ever for Norway to collaborate with our closest allies and to strengthen our defence and national resilience as we navigate these uncertain times.
Thank you.
NB: This translation is provided with reservations for potential inaccuracies. Please consult the original in Norwegian for exact wording.