04/24/2025 | News release | Distributed by Public on 04/24/2025 04:22
To provide for affordable housing, councils often impose housing affordability contributions as conditions of consent. These conditions require developers to make monetary contributions. For Council to have the authority to impose these contribution conditions, there must be an authorising provision in the local environmental plan.
The recent case of Hanave Pty Ltd v Waverley Council [2025] NSWLEC 19 examines when Council is authorised to impose housing affordability contributions (Contributions) conditions, and whether these conditions can be severed from consents if they are invalid. In this article, we break down the Court's findings and what they mean for you.
In Hanave v Waverley Council [2025] NSWLEC 19, the applicants were granted a development consent to make extensions to their property. In granting the consent, Council imposed a condition requiring contributions for affordable housing (Condition). But the Waverley Local Environmental Plan 2012 (NSW) (WLEP) did not contain a provision authorising Contributions to be imposed. So, the applicants commenced judicial review proceedings in the Land and Environment Court seeking a declaration that the Condition was invalid.
Ordinarily, for councils to have the power to impose a condition requiring Contributions, the LEP must include a provision authorising Contributions to be imposed.
Clause 15A of the Environmental Planning and Assessment (Savings, Transitional and Other Provisions) Regulation 2017 (NSW) provided that a state environmental planning policy (SEPP) could also authorise a Contributions condition. In this case, Council argued that it relied on this clause, rather than the WLEP, to justify imposing the Condition.
The Court found that clause 15A does not enable councils to require Contributions without an LEP provision authorising the imposition of a Contributions condition. Justice Pritchard reasoned that:
As the WLEP did not contain a provision authorising Council to impose housing affordability contribution conditions, Justice Pritchard held that the Condition was invalid.
Since the Condition was found to be invalid, the other question before the Court was whether the rest of the consent remained valid. For the consent to remain valid, the Condition must be "severable" (able to be removed) from the rest of the consent.
The parties used different tests to argue whether the Condition was severable. In finding that the Condition could be severed, Justice Pritchard clarified what the test is and reasoned:
Put simply, the removal of the Condition would not change how the consent would operate, so the Condition was able to be severed.
Please let us know if you would like to discuss the implications of this article for you.