The Dilemma of Shan State for Myanmar’s Revolution

Commentary by Michael Martin

Published October 7, 2025

Nowhere in Myanmar is the revolutionary struggle more complex and confounding than in Shan State. Several separate ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) are operating in Shan State, each with their differing views of the current armed struggle against the military junta. Some of these EAOs have overlapping territorial claims that occasionally lead to fighting between their respective armies. In addition, Shan State is home to several ethnic communities that claim their right to autonomously govern their homeland. If there is any hope that the current civil war will lead to the reestablishment of a unified Myanmar, creative solutions will have to be found to resolve the conflicting claims in Shan State.

A Plethora of Ethnic Armed Organizations

More EAOs are active in Shan State than in any other part of Myanmar. The larger EAOs operating in Shan State include the Arakan Army (AA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N), the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S), the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the United Wa State Army (UWSA). The smaller EAOs reportedly active in Shan State include the Danu People's Liberation Army, the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force, the Kayan New Land Army, the Lahu Democratic Union, the National Democratic Alliance Army, the Pa-O National Army (PNA), the Pa-O National Liberation Army, and the Wa National Army. As the list reveals, some of the ethnic communities have two or more EAOs, often with differing views of the revolution and political goals.

Some of the EAOs support the armed struggle to overthrow the military junta; others have chosen to remain neutral with regard to the revolution; still others are siding with the junta. For example, the AA, KIA, MNDAA, and the TNLA formed the Northern Alliance to establish a united front against the junta. The UWSA, however, has chosen to remain neutral, provided that the various combatants respect the autonomy of its territorial control of eastern Shan State. Similarly, the SSA-S has chosen to abide by its ceasefire with the junta. The NDAA appears to have allied itself with the junta in return for partial control over a portion of eastern Shan State.

Some the EAOs have obtained varying degrees of administrative control and autonomy or portions of Shan State. The UWSA has had nearly complete autonomy over a large part of eastern Shan State for decades under a bilateral agreement with Burma's military. The SSA-N and SSA-S administer separate portions of central Shan State jointly with the junta. Some of the smaller EAOs, such as NDAA and PNA, have similar joint governance arrangements with the junta. The KIA, TNLA, and MNDAA have seized control over different areas of northern Shan State from the junta. The result is a patchwork of neighboring areas governed by different, and sometimes hostile, military forces.

While one might reasonably expect conflict between EAOs on opposite sides of the revolution, the struggle over territorial control has sometimes led to fighting between supposed allies. For example, the KIA, MNDAA, and TNLA have occasionally fought over villages that they think should be under their control. These EAOs also have exchanged fire with the SSA-N and the SSA-S since the start of the revolution.

Differing Objectives

Differences have also emerged over their views of the post-revolutionary period. The UWSA seeks to retain its near complete autonomy, regardless of who emerges victorious. The KIA apparently seeks to establish a similar arrangement to the UWSA, if a federated republic is formed. The AA makes no claims to territory in Shan State, but does seek autonomy, if not independence, for an expanded Rakhine State. Most of the other EAOs seemingly want some form of limited governance over their perceived homeland in exchange for their support of a new federated republic.

To date, attempts to negotiate a basic framework for a future federated republic in Myanmar have been unsuccessful. The National Unity Government (NUG), an entity created by some of the National League for Democracy (NLD) members elected to serve in the aborted 2021 Union Parliament, has made several attempts to craft such a framework, but only a few of the EAOs have participated in the negotiations, and ever fewer have agreed to the outcome of the talks. Other efforts have met a similar fate-limited involvement and no clear consensus.

For now, it seems most of the EAOs, including those operating in Shan State, are primarily focused on the military challenge of defeating the military junta, and secondarily struggling to establish at least a temporary governance system for the "liberated" villages and towns under their control. Rather than forcing the issue of the possibility of future reunification, the most promising and logical course of action for the international community, including the Burmese diaspora, is to offer assistance with the current top priorities of the EAOs and defer discussions of a possible future federated republic. For most of Myanmar's ethnic minorities, the struggle provides them with their first opportunity to establish a government of their own choosing, rather than one imposed by the military. Creating a suitable local government is a higher priority than discussing the framework for a possible federal republic.

The risk in this approach is that the post-conflict picture of Myanmar will be a patchwork quilt of autonomous states that share little in common and, in some cases, have overlapping territorial claims. Shan State appears ripe for such an outcome. The key question then will be whether or not the various autonomous states will be willing to participate in talks to reunify Myanmar, and if such discussions can be successful.

Michael Martin is an adjunct fellow (non-resident) with the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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