The World Trade Organization’s Fourteenth Ministerial Conference

Commentary by William Alan Reinsch

Published March 24, 2026

I decided to go with a straightforward title because I could not think of anything funny related to the World Trade Organization (WTO). This week, however, marks its fourteenth ministerial conference, this time in Yaoundé, Cameroon. The conference comes at an important time as the rules-based trading system crumbles, and the organization is subject to increasing pressure to prevent that from happening. That is probably a case of its supporters' reach exceeding their grasp, but opportunities are lurking in Yaoundé, and if the ministers attending can find a way to seize on them, we will all be better off.

Angela Ellard, former deputy director-general of the WTO and a CSIS non-resident affiliate, and I have recently published "MC14: The 'Turning Point Ministerial' to Strengthen the WTO and Advance U.S. Interests," which goes into the issues at the conference and discusses the strategy at greater length. Readers interested in a more in-depth review should check that out. This column treads more lightly on the subject.

The WTO has been subject to considerable criticism over the past 10 years, largely because its two main functions-trade agreement negotiations and dispute settlement-are not working as intended. There have been two multilateral agreements since 2015-the Trade Facilitation Agreement and the Fisheries Subsidies Agreement-but efforts to complete the second one and move on to others have faltered. The demise of the Appellate Body, caused largely by the United States, though many other countries criticized it as well, has prevented disputes from being resolved, as countries can now appeal panel decisions "into the void" to an Appellate Body that no longer exists to deal with them.

Probably most important has been the steady erosion of respect for the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle, a WTO rule that requires a trade concession made to one party to be made to all parties. This rule was intended to promote trade liberalization and growth and to deter fragmentation of the trading system. While the rule still covers 72 percent of global trade, non-MFN agreements are increasing-the Trump administration's many "reciprocal" deals are a good example-and the requirement to notify the WTO of unilateral non-MFN actions is increasingly ignored.

This has led the United States to present a paper outlining its reservations about the MFN concept, which was followed by a later one submitted by the European Union, also expressing doubts. This issue is not formally on the table at the conference, but it lurks underneath as a founding principle of the WTO now under attack.

One place where this issue is clear is the debate over plurilateral agreements-those that do not involve all 166 WTO members. This is not a new concept-bilateral and regional trade agreements have existed for a long time. The United States has 14, with 20 countries (although it is ignoring many of them); many nations have more. Interest in them has been growing because of the difficulty of reaching consensus among all 166 members on much of anything. Instead, countries are turning to "coalitions of the willing" to advance their interests. The United States is negotiating reciprocal agreements to advance Trump's trade goals. Other countries are doing the same thing to reduce their dependence on the United States. Unfortunately, some countries, notably India, have refused to permit these agreements to be incorporated into the WTO rulebook, even though they are not party to them. Plurilaterals are Plan B, but Plan A-big multilateral agreements-seems out of reach. Achieving consensus on allowing these to move forward would be an important step.

Another important issue is "special and differential" treatment for developing countries, which either excuses them from obligations or gives them more time to implement them. Each member can self-define whether it is a developing country, which has led to some dubious claims, including China, although it recently said it will not take advantage of that status in negotiations. One solution would be an objectively determined definition, but many members oppose that, probably because they realize that when a line is drawn, some people inevitably end up on the wrong side, and it might be them. Self-definition avoids that risk, but it opens the door to members taking advantage of it.

Finally, members will have to deal with the question of extending the moratorium on e-commerce taxation. The United States, along with most others, supports an extension, which is particularly important to the many U.S. companies that provide internet services, but members are divided over whether the extension should be permanent (in order to avoid having to deal with it every two years) or time-limited. Some members-again, India-oppose any further extension. Settling this issue has caused a lot of drama over the years as reluctant members hold out until the last minute, hoping to obtain concessions on other matters.

Not being able to extend the moratorium would be a major failure for the WTO, and the United States in particular, which has made it a top priority. That is ironic, since the Trump administration has apparently discovered that, having pulled out of or criticized numerous multilateral organizations, here is one that it needs. Nations that have been the victims of his vitriol may be reluctant to do him a favor, but extending the moratorium is important to future economic growth, and it would also, ironically, demonstrate to the skeptics that the WTO still has relevance.

There is optimism about the outcome of the ministerial conference because the bar has been set so low. The biggest accomplishments would be agreement on a work plan for reform and continuing the e-commerce status quo. Nothing to be sneezed at, but also not cause for a Fifth Avenue parade. Rebuilding the WTO will take time, and it begins with baby steps, but those first steps are very important, even if small. The ministerial is the opportunity to start down that path, and we should all hope the ministers stand up and get their feet moving.

Author's Note: I am retiring from CSIS on March 29, 2026. I plan to continue writing this column and participating in the Trade Guys podcast, so please continue to read and listen. However, my CSIS email address will no longer be working, so if readers or podcast listeners want to contact me directly, they should do so at [email protected].

William A. Reinsch is senior adviser and Scholl Chair emeritus with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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