2 Senior Defense Officials Hold a DOD Background Briefing on UkraineContracts for Jan. 7, 2025Entities Identified as Chinese Military Companies Operating in the United States

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: Good morning, everyone. Thanks so much for joining us for today's background briefing for an update on the UDCG. As a reminder, today's call is on background attributed to senior defense officials.

Please note that we will call on reporters, so please use the raise hand feature and we'll try to get to as many of your questions as possible in the 30 minutes that we have available. Before we begin, please just remember to keep your phones on mute unless you're asking a question.

And with that, I'll turn it over to our first senior defense official, followed by our second, for any opening comments?

Senior Defense Official 1: Great. Thanks so much, Charlie. Happy New Year, everyone. So, we are having the opportunity today to speak with you just before Secretary Austin convenes the 25th Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting on Thursday, January 25th at Ramstein Air Base in Germany.

It's like we planned it. 25 is a nice round number. Ramstein, as you will remember, is where this all started in April of 2022 when Secretary Austin convened the first meeting of this group at Ramstein. So, this meeting sends a clear and we believe powerful signal of support for Ukraine by this coalition of some 50 countries.

As the war is continuing into its third year in a - in a third winter, this group has shown extraordinary devotion, focus, and commitment to ensuring that Ukraine prevails in the face of Russian aggression. And I think you will - those of you who will be traveling with the secretary certainly will see that at this meeting.

Just a couple of overall numbers. At this point, the United States, allies, and partners collectively have committed more than $126 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since Russia began this invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, 2022. For the United States, this includes two Patriot batteries and other air defense systems, along with hundreds of interceptors, dozens of HIMARS systems and thousands of associated ammunition, including GMLRS and ATACMS, hundreds of artillery systems and millions of artillery rounds, thousands of armored vehicles, over 100,000 anti-tank weapons and hundreds of millions of rounds of small arms ammunition, and a significant quantity of drones.

Allies and partners, just to sample a little bit, have provided additional air defense systems, including additional Patriot systems or components for those systems from many countries, some of whom prefer to remain anonymous, but I can call out and thank Germany, the Netherlands, and Romania in particular, and Italy for a SAMP/T system as well.

This - this group of allies and partners have established Ukraine's F-16 capability with Belgium and Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway committing to provide 79 jets, and with Canada, Denmark, France, Romania and the UK training Ukrainian pilots.

This coalition has surged critical munitions, including Soviet legacy ammunition that enabled the Ukrainians to use both legacy and donated artillery systems to defend their country, but also NATO standard modern artillery systems, including a Czech initiative which has coordinated the delivery of hundreds of thousands of rounds of 155 millimeter ammunition from a dozen countries with European financing.

And in addition, European countries have furnished hundreds of main battle tanks and thousands of armed vehicles, including Leopard tanks, which now constitute the core of Ukraine's future armored force, a NATO standard tank that is now the core of Ukraine's future armored force. And I expect, as with previous UDCG meetings, you will hear even more high-level security assistance announcements announced on Thursday.

The last point I want to make before I turn it over to the second defense official and then certainly your questions is to highlight that we will also hold - the secretary will convene a meeting of the Coalition Leadership Group, which is the group of co-leads for the eight capability coalitions to support Ukraine's defense capability and build a credible deterrent force not just for its immediate battlefield needs but over the coming years.

The leaders of these coalitions will meet to endorse roadmaps that articulate Ukraine's air force, armor, artillery, demining, drone, integrated air and missile defense, information technology and maritime security needs and objectives through 2027. So, these roadmaps are intended to enable donors to support - plan for and support Ukraine sustainably into the future.

So, with that, let me turn it over - back to Charlie and welcome your questions. Thank you.

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: All right. We will go over to our second defense official now.

Senior Defense Official 2: Thank you so much, Charlie. That was a perfect tee up. For everyone dialed in, I think what you just heard was a very good recap of where we've been and how far we've come since April of 2022 when Secretary Austin convened what was the first Ukraine Defense Contact Group. And as we head later this evening to Ramstein for the 25th meeting, what I wanted to briefly convey at the top is how the Ukraine Defense Contract Group is very much Secretary Austin's brainchild.

There's been a lot of people and incredible patriots like Official One and their team who have helped make it real and other countries have helped make it real, but this is very much Secretary Austin's brainchild, born from his experience and contributions to the D-ISIS coalition and his deep belief that, when you bring allies and partners together, the sum will be much greater than the parts.

And I think the proof is in all the numbers, the statistics, the actual donations that have been made as a direct result, and our growth from 30 countries at the first meeting to 50 countries gathering for this - this 25th contact group.

I also want to point out that it may seem obvious to us all now, but what the UDCG has accomplished has helped us move from ad hoc goodwill and the donations countries were making on more bilateral - on a more bilateral basis to Ukraine into an organized way of meeting Ukraine's urgent battlefield needs and their longer term needs with the supply and the donations that countries could provide. So, it's really a marquee accomplishment and I think it will be a great gathering at Ramstein.

The next thing I wanted to quickly say at the outset, and I'm sure we can take more questions on this, is to start to dispel a misperception that I believe is out there that we, the United States, should have done more sooner to support Ukraine's defense. I think this overlooks the Herculean effort that has gone into meeting Ukraine's battlefield needs as they evolved. And what Ukraine needed in the first months of the war is not what it has needed along the way, and we have met that - that demand over time. We've also done it in a way where we're very cognizant of the requests from Ukraine and its ability to absorb and sustain and train and operate on the capabilities that we are providing.

The last point I will make on this is that I think you have heard Secretary Austin say, and you'll probably hear him say again, that we have moved heaven and earth to support Ukraine's defense of its sovereign territory. And in this, there are a lot of unsung heroes like United States Transportation Command, who have worked around the clock, along with European Command, EUCOM, and others to continually flow the security assistance into Ukraine. They are doing it 24/7. They are doing it over the holidays. They are doing it over these holidays. And I think that should speak to our deep commitment to Ukraine's defense.

And I'll pause there. Thanks, Charlie.

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: All right. Thank you. We will start with Patrick Tucker from Defense One.

Q: Hey, good morning. Thanks for doing this. I appreciate the comments. In December, a Ukrainian member of Parliament, Oleksandra Ustinova, was very keen to highlight all of the importance of the - of the foreign aid for Ukraine's defense, but she also said that less than half of the promised aid had so far arrived in the country, just in terms of things that have been approved and the lag time in sort of getting things there.

And this includes some of the things that they would need, especially now, to maintain any sort of territorial - you know, to maintain territory in the event of a ceasefire negotiation where new borders are primarily drawn up. And one of the things that she highlighted was the request for not even long range fires, though she did talk about that, but also Blackhawks.

Is there any sense of how to address or how would you characterize - the lag between the promised aid and delivered aid, how would you characterize it? And can you tell us anything about getting Ukraine some of the other things that have been approved and promised but not yet there that are often less talked about, like Black Hawk helicopters? Thanks.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: Great. Thank you. So, it's important to highlight something. You made the point - there's two separate questions in your question. One is deliveries of announced assistance and second is Ukrainian requests that are being considered and have not been approved or financed necessarily. And I think the Blackhawks is in the latter category. So, it's important to, first of all, distinguish those two things.

On the numbers that get thrown around on deliveries, we actually have a fact sheet on this, Charlie, I would urge you to circulate it, that we've developed, because this question has been circulating since July when there were announcements that - in the context of the NATO summit about assistance. For - I won't speak for other countries, but for the United States, what those numbers unfortunately seem to confuse are dollar amounts that were announced for both PDA, the presidential drawdown, which is the nearer term supplies, and USAI, the longer term - Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, the longer term funding which requires procurement and production.

So, for example, under USAI, the United States is providing Ukraine with NASAMS, the air defense missile system, which is delivering, you know, year. These were contracted for in 2022. So, a big chunk of the announcements that you've seen in the last couple of - well, throughout the conflict but certainly in the last six months, have been USAI announcements that will - that - you know, you can't deliver things that don't exist. They have to be built and produced and then provided to Ukraine.

And in fact, you will probably - I think if the plan goes as planned, you will hear a very substantial announcement of another tranche of USAI that will be announced. So, we need to distinguish between the numbers that are PDA, presidential drawdown authority, which is near-term delivery - you know, is available for nearer term delivery, and USAI.

The second issue is things like ammunition that we're pulling off the stock out of - you know, off the shelf or, you know, in readily available stocks can deliver very quickly. And the numbers on delivery of that in that fact sheet are between 80 and 90 percent. Those things are delivered very quickly because they, you know, exist. They're in good shape and they can be sent.

A large number of the armored vehicles that we have committed to providing to Ukraine and were announced under PDA needed to be refurbished because they need to be brought up to be fully mission capable, and so that takes weeks, sometimes months. But the idea is to provide Ukraine with actual equipment that it can use, not with equipment that, you know, they don't know how to refurbish because, you know, this is Western equipment that they haven't yet been trained in. They may not have the spare parts.

So, the aggregate numbers are extremely misleading. I understand they're heartbreaking for Ukrainians who read a headline and then say where is all this stuff. But thank you for the opportunity to clarify that. And I do think we can follow up with the specific numbers for you as well.

Charlie, back over to you.

Q: Great. Thank you. Just real quick follow up on the Blackhawk, because you're right, they're requested, not necessarily promised or delivered. But is there going to be any announcement on them? They think it's very important for them to kind of police the territory that they would control under any - under any ceasefire agreement, and it's not been approved.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: I don't have any announcement to preview on Blackhawks. But what I will say is we hear the Ukrainians, and we have been working with them and with partners and allies to find the kind of helicopters that they need to be able to do those kinds of missions. We have done so since the very beginning of the conflict, and we continue to find those capabilities for them. But I don't have anything specific to preview for you at this time.

Q: Ok. Thank you.

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: All right. Over to Chris Gordon.

Q: Thanks, Charlie, and thank you to the officials for doing this. I have two related questions. One, what are Ukraine's military prospects for the next few months, and what factors will determine success or failure?

And my second question is what is the current thinking of giving security guarantees to Ukraine absent NATO membership, which is not in the cards anytime soon? Does the US support giving security guarantees to Ukraine? And if so, how would they be structured? Thanks.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: So, thank you. I am - I am truly not trying to dodge the second question. But the truth is, is that I speak for the Biden administration, and I think that that is a question for the incoming administration, not the Biden administration.

What we are focused on right now, especially at the Pentagon, is providing Ukraine with the defense capabilities that we can provide in the time we have, including putting things on contract that will be delivered throughout 2025 and into 2026 in order to build that capability so that Ukraine can be in the strongest possible position if it comes to a negotiation.

Our calculation is that Putin is not one to give up something that he doesn't have to give up. And Putin is going to be most impressed as he faces a negotiation and as he faces a war in which he has not yet achieved his objectives and which the costs are building up on him, he is going to be more inclined to be reasonable, to listen to Ukrainian requirements the stronger Ukraine is on the battlefield. So, that is very much our focus at this time.

In terms of that assessment, Ukraine continues to hold out against an extraordinary Russian set of assaults, air attacks on cities, critical infrastructure deep in Ukrainian territory, air attacks on the front lines trying to disrupt Ukrainian defenses, artillery barrages, you know, the Russian way of war now supplemented, of course, by the North Korean forces in Kursk.

And yet Ukraine continues to defend those lines. It has lost some ground, some limited ground at a tactical level, which of course is a matter for focus, in which the US is focusing on the kinds of capabilities Ukraine needs to thwart Russia's efforts, including some of the strikes on Russian C2 nodes, supply areas on some of those kind of enabling capabilities that Russia has to thwart those capabilities - to thwart those operations in order to help Ukraine shore up those defenses.

But it is an ongoing fight, and what is key from our point of view to be - enable Ukraine to continue to defend those lines is to keep the flow of security assistance moving. And that is the reason for this Ukraine Defense Contact Group, so the secretary can once again sit down with his colleagues and counterparts and track out what Ukraine needs to be able to continue that fight in 2025.

Thank you.

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: All right. We'll move on to Missy Ryan from Washington Post.

Q: Can you guys hear me?

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: Yep.

Q: Ok, great. Well, looking forward to seeing everybody later, and I hope everyone's dressing warmly for the flight over tonight. Basically I just wanted to follow up on the earlier question about PDAs. And just to make sure to level set as we go into these meetings this week, can you guys just clarify, of the PDA amount that has been approved by Congress, how much is remaining?

And I know that, you know, some of it has to actually be - that you guys have drawn down, announced, has to be actually transferred to Ukraine. But how much will be left for the Trump administration to decide whether or not to use? I'm trying to get a sense of like what - how much they'll - in PDA authority they'll have in their hands when they come in on January - in late January.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: Great. Missy, we do have that number. I am - because it's a snow day, I am speaking to you from my home office, and I don't have those numbers in front of me. We do have them. It's a couple of - it might be - $3.8 billion sticks in my head. Can I - can I get you all that number?

I - yes, I am bringing a blanket and I told all my staff to make sure to pack a blanket for the wonderful trip over on the C-17. So, I will have that for you in the - in the DV lounge. We can share that we do have that number, I am sorry, I don't have it off the top of my head.

Q: Ok.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: And just - Official 2, do you have it off the top of your head?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 2: We will fact check it. Senior Defense Official 1, I had something about the same in my head, between about 400 - $4 and $5 billion in authority remaining. And we can - Missy, we'll get that for you, just as Senior Defense Official 1 said.

But I think the larger point is the steady cadence and deliberate work we've done to get capabilities into the - munitions and equipment into the PDAs and USAI packages we have pushed out the door, and then surging with TRANSCOM to get those into Ukraine so they have what they need and they have runway. And I would say that's what this administration is able to do, and then it is over to the next administration to make decisions and the trade offs they come to.

Q: And then just to clarify, though, would the Trump administration have any ability to reach back into PDA disbursements that you guys have already announced but that have not gotten there yet and kind of halt those? And if so, like how would we find out how much that would be - you know, how much equipment or how much dollar figure that would represent, you know, on January 20th, if they so decided?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: So, we - as the other official pointed out, we are - right now, we -easy for me to say, TRANSCOM is in a surge operation to get the announced capabilities to Ukraine in the coming days and weeks, so - because Ukraine needs them for the battlefield. There may be some of those vehicles that I referred to which need refurbishment which may not be delivered, but the vast majority of what has been announced will be delivered this month.

And again, I - we'll track down whether we have specific numbers we can share. But, you know, we feel it is our responsibility, having worked those packages, having understood the urgency and importance for Ukraine to have that material on the battlefield, it is our duty to get it there. We're certainly not going to leave that to anyone else. It's not their responsibility. It's ours.

So, we have really worked to surge the capacity even over the holidays to get those packages delivered, except things that still need to be repaired and refurbished. But a lot of that equipment is in Europe and is being refurbished and repaired and made battle ready in Europe, and we expect it to be delivered in - you know, in the near term. Over.

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: Ok. We'll go over to Tara from Associated Press.

Q: Hi. Thank you for doing this. I have one clean up question and two others. Regarding the announcement that's expected on Thursday, the senior defense official had mentioned that it was USAI. But it was my understanding from our last major announcement that all USAI funds had been committed to and spent. So, just clearing up, is that indeed USAI? And then I have two other questions.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: I'm so sorry if I misspoke. Yes, the announcement, if there is one this week, would be PDA. You're right. Thank you.

Q: Ok. Thank you. And then getting back to one of your earlier points about, you know, surging the vast amount of material that has gone to Ukraine, I think - I was wondering, in hindsight it's not so much the volume of what's gone on, but maybe the length of time it took to deliberate on sending some of the advanced systems.

It seems like in the first months of the war there was genuinely - and even in the first year, genuinely a concern that you send a certain type of advanced system, it would escalate Russia. And ultimately, in the end, all of these systems have gone through anyway. So, is there a sense looking back that some of those systems should have been sent earlier to give Ukraine a faster advantage?

And then my second question is have any of the officials that are working on the Ukraine account had an opportunity to talk to any of the incoming members of Trump's national security team to show them where you're at on Ukraine and kind of make the case for continuing this level of support? Thank you.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: Great. Thanks. On the second question, there is a regular transition process, with briefing materials and briefings and - you know, so that process is underway. I won't speak to any specific briefings, but, you know, that process is underway, as it - as it should be, because that is our - you know, our responsibility, our duty to the American people, to make a professional and smooth transition to the incoming administration. So, let me leave it there.

Q: Is that - is that specific to Ukraine? Just - sorry. Or is that in general, but are you specifically briefing on Ukraine?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: I mean, again, I can't really speak to the specific briefings. That I think would go past what we can talk about in public but - or even on background. But, you know, we are - the transition covers all issues that the incoming team has asked about and all issues that we believe are important to brief. Let me leave it there.

On sort of the notion that - and the other official spoke to this, but let me be more specific because I've seen some of these claims. You know, first of all, what Ukraine needed in 2022 was first and foremost the capabilities to fight off the Russian assault on Kyiv, and that's what we and other countries surged. Things like Javelins, Stingers, ammunition stocks, not NATO standard ammunition, actually, because they didn't have those artillery pieces, but in fact Soviet legacy ammunition surges, for example. And that's what I spent my first few months doing, is going through the list of what Ukraine needed in those first months to fight off Russian - ammunition for T-72 tanks, because they didn't have, you know, modern tanks.

So, that was the focus, and that was driven by what the Ukrainians needed in 2022. And that included countries being willing to send Soviet legacy aircraft, because that's what Ukrainian pilots knew how to fly in 2022. They didn't know how to fly things like F-16s. And if you kind of - I am certainly not an expert - well, I've become more expert, but the training cycle for an F-16 pilot is normally anywhere from two to three years.

So, the notion that sending Ukraine, say, F-16s in 2022 would have been a better use of the PDA we had in 2022 than beginning to send 155 ammunition and artillery or HIMARS and GMLRS, which proved absolutely vital to the Ukrainians being able - in the summer of 2022 and in the fall of 2022 to drive the Russians back, it's a hard case to make.

I, you know, never - I've never been an officer myself, but I - you know, I advise you to go talk to some officers and think about whether having F-16 pilots in training for a long period of time and F-16s sitting on a tarmac somewhere in Europe was a better bet for the Ukrainians in the summer of 2022 than Soviet legacy ammunition capabilities and beginning to train them and help them use those NATO standard platforms, which proved extremely successful in the summer.

And then by the fall - by the fall and the winter, what - the Ukrainian greatest need was air defense, air defense Interceptors for Soviet legacy capabilities and - or systems that they did have and knew how to operate, and beginning to provide Western standard air defense capabilities, including NASAMS and SAMP/Ts and eventually Patriots.

So, the counterfactual is problematic because it assumes that we had $126 billion in March of 2022, and we didn't. We had a handful of billions of dollars, which was great, but we had to prioritize what the Ukrainians needed in the battle at the moment and not kind of look at systems that would take months if not years to train the Ukrainians how to use.

Now, we did do that as well, which is why, coming into 2023, the Ukrainians were trained and capable of using those more advanced systems. But I think that is - that is the part of that story that often gets missed, which is we have to go with whatever budget we had at the moment. We had to go with Ukrainian battlefield priorities at the moment. And then we had to think about what the lead times were for training and equipping on much more advanced and very different NATO standard equipment.

Let me leave it there for now.

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: All right. We'll move on to Carla from VOA.

Q: Thanks, Charlie. And thanks, both of you, for doing this. I have two questions. So, my first question is kind of a follow to - on the PDA. And we were tracking $4.3 according to my Ukrainian service, so getting that number would be super helpful.

But, you know, we did a backgrounder on Ukraine in December, and a senior defense official had told reporters that the Biden administration wouldn't be able to use all the remaining PDA left. That was when it was $5.6 billion. And then, like, the next day or two days later, Mike Carpenter over at the White House told VOA that the administration did have a plan to use all the funds to allocate for Ukraine.

So, when we see this PDA announcement on Thursday, is it going to be - like, should we expect it to be the lump sum of what's left of the PDA? Is it not going to be that much? Is it going to be, like, more than half? Can you give us some more details on that?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: So, on Mike's comment, I'll refer you to Mike. But we do not expect that we will have fully utilized all of the PDA authority available. And there will be a substantial package announced.

There was a very substantial package announced with that USAI package, or in the same context - timeframe as that USAI package earlier referenced. There will be an additional one. It will provide critical capabilities. But our numbers show, and we will share those numbers and we'll have better numbers on - you know, Thursday for you given, you know, the announcement that we expect. We expect that there will be PDA authority remaining for future contributions to Ukraine. Over.

Q: Ok. Great. Just to follow up on that, are we talking, like, most of it will be left or, you know, less than half, if you can give us some more details on that.

And then my second question is on these - how we're - you know, the US is leading - is the co-lead on multiple of these eight combat capability groups. So, going into this final UDCG for Austin, you know, what is the plan for these that the United States is involved in? Are they making contingency plans to have these without the United States support?

And, I mean, is that deflating to Austin coming into this, something that, you know, he was the - this was his brainchild, and now the US may not have significant involvement in this. I mean, what is the contingency plan to keep this thing going should the Trump administration change course?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: Great. On the PDA, I can't give you a specific number, and we'll know that in a couple of days. I mean, I think I know what it is. But what I can say is there will be more than a couple of billion dollars remaining in PDA assistance for future use after January 20th.

On the capability coalitions, the United States is co-lead on two of the eight. The Air Force Capability Coalition we co-lead with Denmark and Netherlands. And on the Artillery Capability Coalition, we co-lead with France. So, that means six of the capability coalitions, including armor, air defense, maritime, IT, drones, and demining are led entirely by European countries, entirely and ably by European countries.

And the two coalitions which we're privileged to co-lead are - we have strong partners. France has extraordinary expertise and experience and artillery. And we have a very strong coalition beyond our co-lead of France of European countries, many of whom actually produce artillery systems and ammunition and are major donors in that area. And of course, Denmark and Netherlands took the lead in not just donating F-16s, but also in training Ukrainian pilots.

So, we are very confident that the multilateral nature, which was absolutely baked in from the start by Secretary Austin, both because, as Senior Defense Official 2 referenced - the other senior defense official referenced, his absolute commitment to multilateral work building more than the sum of its parts, but also his knowledge that the - and respect for the capabilities of those European countries in so many of those defense areas meant that we were able to do more together with those - and will be with those eight capability coalitions than we could have alone.

What the future is of those coalitions, that is one of the reasons why the coalition leadership group will meet at the ministerial level to lay a sound foundation for future work of those coalitions. And again, I can't speak to what the incoming administration will decide about its role, but I'm very confident of European commitment and ability and experience and extraordinary belief in the mission, and confident that those capability coalitions will continue one way or another.

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: All right. We're starting out - ok.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 2: That was - again, do you mind if I - that was - that was perfect, what the first defense official senior defense official said. Carla, if I could just add a few things, humbly speaking for Secretary Austin, his priority is an orderly, smooth transition from this administration, where he's secretary of defense, to the next administration. So, that is a high priority for him. And I think everything the department is doing shows that.

And part of that is putting Ukraine in the best position possible. That's why, in his very last days in the job, he'll take the time to go to Ramstein to do this 25th Ukraine Defense Contact Group, and he'll make a forceful case for why there's an enduring US national interest in Ukraine's - Ukraine as a sovereign and democratic country.

And I would - I would clarify, and one way to think about this, is that this is Secretary Austin's last Ukraine Defense Contact Group, but we're not sunsetting the group. The next administration is completely welcome and encouraged, even, to - to take the mantle of this 50 country strong group and continue to drive and lead through it. And because of the multilateral work, because of the capability coalitions and all that we have done, it will endure in some capacity, in some form going forward, I believe, regardless of exactly how the next team does or doesn't pursue it.

And that is very much up to them. But we are trying to put them in a position where, should they choose, they can - they can take up leadership of the UDCG. If not, maybe a European country would. Over.

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: All right. Quickly, we'll move on to John Ismay from New York Times.

Q: Yes. Hi. I was wondering if you could tell me sort of about the relationship between the UDCG and the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine organization, as in what if any functions of the contact group have transitioned over to NSATU, and, you know, what that - whether any future roles and responsibilities may transfer from the contact group to NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine. Thanks.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: Great. Thanks. At this point, none of the functions of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group nor of the capability coalitions, which meet under the auspices of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, have transitioned to NSATU. NSATU was - by agreement of allies, in July took on the roles and responsibilities of something called the IDCC, the International Donors Coordination Cell, which was very much in coordination with the UDCG, but it basically was a cell of primarily European but also some international - beyond Europe countries as they coordinated their planning and especially their delivery of capabilities to Ukraine.

There is very much a synergistic relationship between the UDCG structure and the IDCC, and they often briefed and coordinated with the UDCG. And so, that - you know, and also coordinated with the Security Assistance Group Ukraine, which is the US military command for - in effect military command unit for providing American training and assistance and delivery of capabilities to Ukraine, but it's primarily that multilateral cell that was transferred.

And as well, although not entirely separate but additive, the coordination of much of the training of the Europeans for Ukraine now comes under the rubric of NSATU. And then NSATU also took up a mission that was created anew by NATO, which was to assist Ukraine with its longer term defense planning, primarily with a focus on ensuring that Ukraine's future capabilities are kind of baked in as being NATO interoperable in support of Ukraine's aspiration to be a member of NATO someday.

So, rather than sort of just - since they - since NATO had the opportunity to help Ukraine shape its decisions so that, at the same time as it was planning for a future force it planned it in a way that made meeting the NATO interoperability standards, you know, part of the plan and therefore it wasn't something they would have to then later go back and do, those are the three main areas of what NSATU encompasses. And certainly that overlaps with what the UDCG has done - has done, what the US bilaterally has done.

And we in our capacity, of course, as NATO allies are contributing to NSATU. But I hope that - I know it's a - it's a little puzzling because it is such a large set of lines of effort in support of Ukraine that it's kind of hard to kind of distinguish them, and I hope that that helps a bit. Over.

Q: It does. Thanks. Yeah, I was wondering if there was going to be any plans to further move any roles or responsibilities from the contact group to NSATU or another, you know, NATO entity or another entity altogether that we haven't talked about yet.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: Oh, right, I didn't answer that question. No, there are no plans at this time. That - that is something that, you know, going forward, the members of the UDCG, including the United States of the - under the next administration, you know, certainly, you know, would be open to consider. But at this point, there are no plans for that.

Q: Thank you very much.

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: All right. We'll go over to Natalia from Bloomberg and then wrap it up with Noah Robertson. Natalia?

Q: Hi. Thanks so much for doing this. I just wanted to get your thoughts on, you know, whether you're seeing any evidence of a slowdown or a shift in the types of assistance that you're seeing from allies, especially given the likely shift in the strategy coming from the US when it comes to Ukraine going forward? I'm kind of wondering if they're pulling back in light of Trump's, you know, plans for a ceasefire.

And then just secondly, was hoping to get your thoughts on Putin's comments the other day about, you know, vowing retaliation for the use of ATACMS. You know, how seriously do you take that, given there's about to be, you know, a transition in the government that - you know, that might be more favorable to him?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: On a shift in allied and partner contributions, we've seen a shift in the last year, much as you've seen a shift in US contributions, that are first and foremost driven by changing battlefield requirements, the changing nature of this war, but also, like us, a shift towards longer term production - procurement, production, and then delivery of production for the same reasons, which is, you know, while early on it was possible to surge capabilities from stocks that, you know, had been stockpiled in the event of other contingencies but kind of reaching the limits of what could be provided without detrimental effects on readiness, European countries and other members of the UDCG also faced - you know, have faced that constraint.

And so, they have, for the last year, pivoted more towards either purchasing capabilities on international markets to provide to the Ukrainians or investing in production. The EU has several facilities for investing in production, and so there has been a shift to that.

So, I think any shift that you've seen at least, you know, up til now shouldn't be read into hedging against potential changes in US policy per se, although, again, you know, I don't see that. We don't see that. We see it as part of this other trend, and certainly you should, you know, inquire of European countries. But I would say we don't see that. We see a shift, but it's for the reasons I laid out.

You know, on Putin's threats, Putin says lots of things. We don't - we don't brush them off. It's responsible to pay attention to what adversaries say. And sometimes what Putin says is what Russia does, like invading Ukraine. So, a lot of people were skeptical when he was threatening to invade Ukraine or hinting that he was going to invade Ukraine, hinting that he found NATO membership for Ukraine unacceptable, you know, a lot of things he says actually come to fruition, but some things he threatens do not.

So, you have to weigh, you know, thinking about is he simply saying this in order to try to coerce the United States and Ukraine's allies and partners to cease assisting Ukraine, is he trying to kind of prep the negotiation battlefield, so to speak, so he can get an outcome on his terms. There are all kinds of explanations, and those need to be weighed.

But I would - I would not dismiss his threats. That would be irresponsible. But I also think you have to weigh them against looking very carefully at Russian behavior, which is something that the US government does every day and weighs the evidence against his words. Over.

Q: Thank you.

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: All right. And Noah, if you could finish it up, please?

Q: Yes. Thank you both for doing this. I have a question to return to the group itself and the structure of it. Last year there was a moment in which European countries were talking about whether, given the pause in US assistance to the supplemental, the transition of the group needed to take place from US leadership to NATO leadership. I'm not going to say buyer's remorse here, but are you hearing any sorts of regrets about how that went, given that it stayed under US leadership and the future of that is uncertain? Then I have a second question.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: No, we've heard no sense that that would have been a good decision. I will say that there were not a lot of countries, a lot of NATO countries, that were seriously considering that idea and that proposal. And the majority of NATO countries were very skeptical of the idea and it didn't gain traction, and it didn't gain traction for the - for the NATO summit.

It is always useful to look through options. There were arguments for how that could be constructive and useful, you know, regardless of, you know, thoughts about US leadership either in the spring of 2024 or longer term. But on balance, you know, there was a decision that that was not the right move, and I have not heard any regrets that it was made. In fact, we continue to hear strong support for the UDCG.

You're going to see on Thursday an announcement that makes very clear a strengthening of the capability coalitions and their commitment and capacity for longer term defense assistance to Ukraine and support for its defense and deterrence. And I think, you know, to answer your question, no, I think the course has been solid for the last year, and I think you're going to hear that on Thursday as well.

Senior Defense Official 2, I don't know if you, you know, have a - have anything to add. Or if you think I'm wrong, please tell me I'm wrong.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 2: Oh, I completely agree with you. And I don't think that was a real and viable path at the time for all the reasons you laid out. And the contact group as it currently is constituted has continued to produce and yield real results for Ukraine.

And I would just reiterate what I said before, which is that this is the 25th, not the last UDCG. There are decisions the next team will make, and lots we have done to institutionalize this work in partnership with the other countries. And at the same time, I don't think anyone has found a useful and fully adequate substitute for US leadership in some of these efforts. So, all of that coexists at once. Over.

Q: I wanted to follow up on that specifically. If the idea of US leadership for the group is indispensable, as you both laid out pretty much right there, is it even possible to potentially have a European country take leadership? And what will it mean to have, regardless of what the next administration does since you can't speak for that, somebody who is as committed as Lloyd Austin is in your telling to this group than transition away to somebody who, I think regardless of what we're going to characterize it as here, is going to be, let's say, taking less ownership because it's not his brainchild, as you put it?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: One of the characteristics of great leadership is to start and build something that others take on. And I - if that were to be the path forward for the UDCG, I am confident that the organization and the culture and the processes and the commitment that Secretary Austin has created in the UDCG is something that whoever decided to take that on, whether it would be the incoming administration or were it to be a European defense leader, that that creates the foundation for success.

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: All right. Well, that is the full amount of time that we have today. And thank you to our senior defense officials and everyone for participating. If you have any follow ups, feel free to email them to me, or we will see you later today. And -

Q: Is this embargoed?

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: No.

Q: Ok. Thank you.

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: And as a reminder, all attribution should be to senior defense official. Thanks again, and we look forward to seeing you on the trip to Ramstein. Out here.

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